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Here is an idea that just might save the world. It is  
that science, properly understood, provides us with the 
methodological key to the salvation of humanity. 
 A version of this idea can be found in the works of Karl 
Popper. Famously, Popper argued that science cannot 
verify theories but can only refute them, and this is how 
science makes progress. Scientists are forced to think up 
something better, and it is this, according to Popper, that 
drives science forward.
But Nicholas Maxwell finds a flaw in this line of 
argument. Physicists only ever accept theories that are 
unified – theories that depict the same laws applying 
to the range of phenomena to which the theory applies 
– even though many other empirically more successful 
disunified theories are always available. This means 
that science makes a problematic assumption about the 
universe, namely that all disunified theories are false. 
Without some such presupposition as this, the whole 
empirical method of science breaks down.
By proposing a new conception of scientific 
methodology, which can be applied to all worthwhile 
human endeavours with problematic aims, Maxwell 
argues for a revolution in academic inquiry to help 
humanity make progress towards a better, more civilized 
and enlightened world. 
Nicholas Maxwell taught philosophy of science for 
30 years at UCL, where he is now Emeritus Reader. He 
has published 10 books, including How Universities Can 
Help Create a Wiser World (2014) and In Praise  
of Natural Philosophy (2017). 
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Prologue: An idea to help save the world
Here is an idea that just might save the world. It is that science, properly 
understood, provides us with the methodological key to the salvation of 
humanity.
A version of this idea can be found buried in the works of Karl 
Popper. Famously, Popper argued that science cannot verify theories, but 
can only refute them. This sounds very negative, but actually it is not, 
for science succeeds in making such astonishing progress by subjecting 
its theories to sustained, ferocious attempted falsification. Every time a 
scientific theory is refuted by experiment or observation, scientists are 
forced to try to think up something better, and it is this, according to 
Popper, which drives science forward.
 Popper went on to generalize this falsificationist conception of 
 scientific method to form a notion of rationality, critical rationalism, 
applicable to all aspects of human life. Falsification becomes the more 
general idea of criticism. Just as scientists make progress by subjecting 
their theories to sustained attempted empirical falsification, so too all 
of us, whatever we may be doing, can best hope to achieve progress by 
subjecting relevant ideas to sustained, severe criticism. By subjecting our 
attempts at solving our problems to criticism, we give ourselves the best 
hope of discovering (when relevant) that our attempted solutions are 
inadequate or fail, and we are thus compelled to try to think up some-
thing better. By means of judicious use of criticism, in personal, social 
and political life, we may be able to achieve, in life, progressive success 
somewhat like the progressive success achieved by science. We can, in 
this way, in short, learn from scientific progress how to make personal 
and social progress in life. Science, as I have said, provides the method-
ological key to our salvation.
I discovered Karl Popper’s work when I  was a graduate student 
doing philosophy at the University of Manchester, in the early 1960s. 
As an undergraduate, I was appalled at the triviality, the sterility, of so- 
called “Oxford philosophy”. This turned its back on all the immense and 
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agonizing problems of the real world  – the mysteries and grandeur of 
the universe, the wonder of our life on earth, the dreadful toll of human 
suffering – and instead busied itself with the trite activity of analysing 
the meaning of words. Then I discovered Popper, and breathed a sigh of 
relief. Here was a philosopher who, with exemplary intellectual integrity 
and passion, concerned himself with the profound problems of human 
existence, and had extraordinarily original and fruitful things to say 
about them. The problems that had tormented me had in essence, I felt, 
already been solved.
But then it dawned on me that Popper had failed to solve his 
 fundamental problem:  the problem of understanding how science 
makes progress. In one respect, Popper’s conception of science is 
highly unorthodox:  all scientific knowledge is conjectural; theories 
are falsified but cannot be verified. But in other respects, Popper’s 
conception of science is highly orthodox. For Popper, as for most scien-
tists and philosophers, the basic aim of science is knowledge of truth, 
the basic method being to assess theories with respect to evidence, 
nothing being accepted as a part of scientific knowledge independently 
of evidence. This orthodox view  – which I  came to call standard 
 empiricism – is, I  realized, false. Physicists only ever accept theories 
that are unified – theories that depict the same laws applying to the 
range of phenomena to which the theory applies. Endlessly many 
empirically more successful disunified rivals can always be concocted, 
but these are always ignored. This means, I realized, that science does 
make a big, permanent and highly problematic assumption about the 
nature of the universe independently of empirical considerations and 
even, in a sense, in violation of empirical considerations:  namely, 
that the universe is such that all grossly disunified theories are 
false. Without some such presupposition as this, the whole empirical 
method of science breaks down.
It occurred to me that Popper, along with most scientists and phi-
losophers, had misidentified the basic aim of science. This is not truth 
per se. It is rather truth presupposed to be unified, presupposed to be 
explanatory or comprehensible (unified theories being explanatory). 
Inherent in the aim of science there is the metaphysical – that is, untest-
able – assumption that there is some kind of underlying unity in nature, 
that the universe is, in some way, physically comprehensible.
But this assumption is profoundly problematic. We do not know 
that the universe is comprehensible. This is a conjecture. Even if it 
is comprehensible, almost certainly it is not comprehensible in the 
way science presupposes it is today. For good Popperian reasons, this 
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metaphysical assumption must be made explicit within science and sub-
jected to sustained criticism, as an integral part of science, in an attempt 
to improve it.
The outcome is a new conception of science, and a new kind of sci-
ence, which I  call aim- oriented empiricism. This subjects the aims, and 
associated methods, of science to sustained critical scrutiny, the aims and 
methods of science evolving with evolving knowledge. Philosophy of sci-
ence (the study of the aims and methods of science) becomes an integral, 
vital part of science itself. And science becomes much more like natural 
philosophy in the time of Newton, a synthesis of science, methodology, 
epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy.
 The aim of seeking explanatory truth is, however, a special case 
of a more general aim, that of seeking valuable truth. And this is sought 
in order that it be used by people to enrich their lives. In other words, 
in addition to metaphysical assumptions, inherent in the aims of science 
there are value assumptions, and political assumptions, assumptions 
about how science should be used in life. These are, if anything, even 
more problematic than metaphysical assumptions. Here, too, assump-
tions need to be made explicit and critically assessed, as an integral part 
of science, in an attempt to improve them.
Released from the crippling constraints of standard empiricism, 
science would burst out into a wonderful new life, realizing its full poten-
tial, responding fully both to our sense of wonder and to human suffer-
ing, becoming both more rigorous and of greater human value.
 And then, in a flash of inspiration, I had my great idea. I could tread 
a path parallel to Popper’s. Just as Popper had generalized falsification-
ism to form critical rationalism, so I  could generalize my aim- oriented 
empiricist conception of scientific method to form an aim- oriented con-
ception of rationality, potentially fruitfully applicable to all that we do, to 
all spheres of human life. But the great difference would be this. I would 
be starting out from a conception of science – of scientific method – that 
enormously improves on Popper’s notion. In generalizing this, to form 
a general idea of progress- achieving rationality, I would be creating an 
idea of immense power and fruitfulness.
I knew already that the line of argument developed by Popper, from 
falsificationism to critical rationalism, was of profound importance for 
our whole culture and social order, and had far- reaching implications and 
application for science, art and art criticism, literature, music, academic 
inquiry quite generally, politics, law, morality, economics, psychoanalytic 
theory, evolution, education, history – for almost all aspects of human 
life and culture. The analogous line of argument I was developing, from 
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aim- oriented empiricism to aim- oriented rationalism, would have even 
more fruitful implications and applications for all these fields, starting as 
it did from a much improved initial conception of the progress- achieving 
methods of science.
The key point is extremely simple. It is not just in science that aims 
are profoundly problematic; this is true in life as well. Above all, it is 
true of the aim of creating a good world – an aim inherently problematic 
for all sorts of more or less obvious reasons. It is not just in science that 
problematic aims are misconstrued or “repressed”; this happens all too 
often in life, too, both at the level of individuals, and at the institutional 
or social level. We urgently need to build into our scientific institutions 
and activities the aims- and- methods- improving methods of aim- oriented 
empiricism, so that scientific aims and methods improve as our scien-
tific knowledge and understanding improve. Likewise, and even more 
urgently, we need to build into all our other institutions, into the fabric of 
our personal and social lives, the aims- and- methods- improving methods 
of aim- oriented rationality, so that we may improve our personal, social 
and global aims and methods as we live.
One outcome of the twentieth century is a widespread and deep- 
seated cynicism concerning the capacity of humanity to make real 
progress towards a genuinely civilized, good world. Utopian ideals and 
programmes, whether of the far left or right, that have promised heaven 
on earth, have led to horrors. Stalin’s and Hitler’s grandiose plans led 
to the murder of millions. Even saner, more modest, more humane and 
rational political programmes, based on democratic socialism, liberalism 
or free markets and capitalism, seem to have failed us. Thanks largely 
to modern science and technology, many of us today enjoy far richer, 
healthier and longer lives than our grandparents or great grandpar-
ents, or those who came before. Nevertheless, the modern world is con-
fronted by grave global problems:  the lethal character of modern war; 
the spread and threat of armaments, conventional, chemical, biologi-
cal and nuclear; rapid population growth; severe poverty of millions in 
Africa, Asia and elsewhere; destruction of tropical rainforests and other 
natural habitats; rapid extinction of species; annihilation of languages 
and cultures. And over everything hangs the menace of climate change, 
threatening to intensify all the other problems (apart, perhaps, from pop-
ulation growth).
 All these grave global problems are the almost inevitable outcome 
of the successful exploitation of science and technology plus the failure 
to build aim- oriented rationality into the fabric of our personal, social 
and institutional lives. Modern science and technology make modern 
Prologue xiii
  
industry and agriculture possible, which in turn make possible popula-
tion growth, modern armaments and war, destruction of natural habitats 
and extinction of species, and global warming. Modern science and tech-
nology, in other words, make it possible for us to achieve the goals of more 
people, more industry and agriculture, more wealth, longer lives, more 
development, housing and roads, more travel, more cars and aeroplanes, 
more energy production and use, more and more lethal armaments (for 
defence only, of course!). These things seem inherently desirable and, 
in many ways, are highly desirable. But our successes in achieving these 
ends also bring about global warming, war, vast inequalities across the 
globe, destruction of habitats and extinction of species.
 All our current global problems are the almost inevitable out-
come of our long- term failure to put aim- oriented rationality into 
practice in life. Were we to do so, we would actively seek to discover 
problems associated with our long- term aims, actively explore ways in 
which problematic aims can be modified in less problematic directions, 
and at the same time develop the social, political, economic and indus-
trial muscle able to change what we do, how we live, so that our aims 
become less problematic, less destructive in both the short and long 
term. Were we to do all this, we would at least be taking active steps 
to anticipate, and to avert the development of, grave global problems 
of the kind we face today. As it is, we have failed even to appreciate 
the fundamental need to improve aims and methods as the decades 
go by. Conventional ideas about rationality are all about means, not 
about ends, and are not designed to help us improve our ends as we 
proceed. Our current global problems are the outcome. Implementing 
aim- oriented rationality is essential if we are merely to survive in the 
long term. To repeat, the idea spelled out in this book, if taken seri-
ously, just might save the world.
Einstein put his finger on what is wrong when he said, “Perfection 
of means and confusion of goals seems, to my opinion, to characterize 
our age.” This outcome is inevitable if we restrict rationality to means, 
and fail to demand that rationality – the authentic article – must quite 
essentially include the sustained critical scrutiny of ends.
Scientists, and academics more generally, bear a heavy burden 
of responsibility for allowing our present impending state of crisis to 
develop. Putting aim- oriented rationality into practice in life can be pain-
ful, difficult and counterintuitive. It involves calling into question some 
of our most cherished aspirations and ideals. We have to learn how to 
live in aim- oriented rationalistic ways. And here, academic inquiry ought 
to have taken a lead. The primary task of our schools and universities, 
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indeed, ought to have been, over the decades, to help us learn how to 
improve aims and methods as we live. Not only has academia failed 
 miserably to take up this task, or even see it as necessary or desirable, 
even worse, perhaps, academia has failed itself to put aim- oriented 
rationality into practice. Science has met with such astonishing success 
because it has put something like aim- oriented empiricism into scientific 
practice, but this has been obscured and obstructed by the conviction 
of scientists that science ought to proceed in accordance with standard 
empiricism – with its fixed aim and fixed methods. Science has achieved 
success despite, and not because of, general allegiance of scientists to 
standard empiricism.
The pursuit of scientific knowledge dissociated from a more funda-
mental concern to help humanity improve aims and methods in life is, as 
we have seen, a recipe for disaster. This is the crisis behind all the others. 
We are in deep trouble. We can no longer afford to blunder blindly on 
our way. We must strive to peer into the future and steer a course less 
doomed to disaster. Humanity must learn to take intelligent and humane 
responsibility for the unfolding of history.
1  
Introduction
Karl Popper is famous for having proposed that science advances by a 
process of conjecture and refutation. He is also famous for defending the 
open society against those he saw as its arch enemies – Plato and Marx.
Popper’s contributions to thought are of profound importance, 
but they are not the last word on the subject. They need to be improved. 
My concern in this book is to spell out what is of greatest importance in 
Popper’s work, what its failings are, how it needs to be improved to over-
come these failings, and what implications emerge as a result.
 The basic theme of the book has already been summarized in the 
Prologue. In what follows I  spell out this theme in greater detail. The 
book consists of a collection of essays that dramatically develop Karl 
Popper’s views about natural and social science, and how we should go 
about trying to solve social problems.
 Criticism of Popper’s falsificationist philosophy of natural science 
leads to a new philosophy of science, which I call aim- oriented empiri-
cism.1 This makes explicit metaphysical theses concerning the compre-
hensibility and knowability of the universe that are an implicit part of 
scientific knowledge – implicit in the way science excludes all theories 
that are not explanatory, even those that are more successful empirically 
than accepted theories. Aim- oriented empiricism has major implications, 
not just for the academic discipline of philosophy of science, but for sci-
ence itself.
 Popper generalized his philosophy of science of falsificationism to 
arrive at a new conception of rationality – critical rationalism – the key 
methodological idea of Popper’s profound critical exploration of politi-
cal and social issues in his The Open Society and Its Enemies (1966a) and 
The Poverty of Historicism (1961). This path of Popper, from scientific 
method to rationality and social and political issues, is followed here, 
but the starting point is aim- oriented empiricism rather than falsifica-
tionism. Aim- oriented empiricism is generalized to form a new concep-
tion of rationality  – aim- oriented rationalism  – which has far- reaching 
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implications for political and social issues, for the nature of social inquiry 
and the humanities, and indeed for academic inquiry as a whole. The 
strategies for tackling social problems that arise from aim- oriented ratio-
nalism improve on Popper’s recommended strategies of piecemeal social 
engineering and critical rationalism, associated with his conception of 
the open society. This book thus sets out to develop Popper’s philosophy 
in new and fruitful directions.
The theme of the book, in short, is to discover what can be learned 
from scientific progress about how to achieve social progress towards 
a better world. That there is indeed much to be learned from scientific 
progress about how to achieve social progress was the big idea of the 
eighteenth- century Enlightenment. This was immensely influential. But 
the philosophes of the Enlightenment made mistakes, and these mis-
takes, inherited from the Enlightenment, are built into the institutional 
and intellectual structure of academic inquiry today. In his two great 
works, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959) and The Open Society 
and Its Enemies (1966a), Popper corrected some of the mistakes of the 
Enlightenment  – mistakes about the nature of scientific method and 
rationality. But Popper left other mistakes undetected and uncorrected. 
The present book seeks to push the Popperian research programme fur-
ther, and correct what Popper left uncorrected.
The fundamental idea that emerges is that there is an urgent need 
to bring about a revolution in academic inquiry so that it takes up its 
proper task of promoting wisdom and not just acquiring knowledge  – 
wisdom being the capacity to realize what is of value in life for oneself 
and others, thus including knowledge and technological know- how, but 
much else besides. I  have devoted much of my working life to trying 
to get this idea across. The essays that follow provide a record of this 
life work.
Most philosophers of science see their work as contributing to a 
meta- discipline. The object of study is science, and the task is to describe, 
explain and understand this object. It is no more the proper task of the 
philosopher of science to criticize science, or to make suggestion as to 
how science can be improved, than it is the task of the astronomer to 
criticize the moon. But this standard meta- discipline way of conceiving 
the subject entirely misconstrues what ought to be the proper relation-
ship between science and the philosophy of science. A major implication 
of the view to be expounded and defended here, aim- oriented empir-
icism, is that the rationality of science requires that the philosophy of 
science – critical exploration of views concerning the aims and methods 
of science – is an integral, influential part of science itself, both being 
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influenced by, and influencing, science. In other words, in order to be 
rigorous, science must include some imaginative and critical explora-
tion of problematic aims and methods. The very act of setting up the 
philosophy of science as a meta- discipline, distinct from science itself, 
looking down on science from above, as it were, describing and seek-
ing to explain and understand what goes on, but in no way interfering 
with, contributing to or criticizing science, serves to undermine the 
very thing the discipline seeks to understand, namely the rationality 
of science. The orthodox meta- discipline approach not only makes 
the subject sterile (in that it can have nothing to contribute to science 
itself), it makes it quite impossible to solve the fundamental problem 
of the  discipline – the rationality of science. Indeed, the discipline, so 
conceived, actually becomes the source of a pervasive and damaging 
irrationality in science.2
 I make no apology, therefore, for criticizing science, for attempt-
ing to contribute to and improve science, in what follows. Philosophy of 
science pursued within the framework of aim- oriented empiricism might 
be compared to the work Weierstrass, Dedekind and others did in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century in bringing greater rigour to 
mathematics:  they made mathematics more rigorous, and contributed 
to mathematics itself, at one and the same time. Somewhat analogously, 
I seek to increase the rigour of science, and make a contribution to sci-
ence at the same time. I  might add that in criticizing science and sug-
gesting how it might be improved (made more rigorous and of greater 
human value) I am again developing a tendency to be found scattered 
among Popper’s works. Despite – or perhaps because of – his great admi-
ration for science at its best, Popper does not shrink from criticizing what 
he sees as deplorable aspects of science:  specialization, authoritarian-
ism, submission to mere intellectual fashion, failure to grapple with the 
fundamental problems of cosmology. Again, Popper depicts graphically 
some of the bad consequences, for science itself, of attempting to put bad 
inductivist methods into scientific practice. But all this is paradoxically 
at odds with a major tenet of Popper’s philosophy of science, namely his 
proposed solution to the problem of demarcation. Popper holds that an 
idea, in order to be scientific, must be empirically falsifiable. Philosophies 
of science, because they are not empirically falsifiable, are not a part of 
science. They are to be severely demarcated from science. Thus Popper, 
in actively criticizing aspects of science, violates the precepts of his own 
philosophy of science. All this changes dramatically once Popper’s phi-
losophy of science has been amended to become the doctrine espoused 
here, aim- oriented empiricism.3
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The points just made concerning the proper relationship between 
science on the one hand and the philosophy of science on the other, will 
turn out to have a major bearing on further developments of the argu-
ment concerning social inquiry. I argue that social inquiry needs to be 
construed, not primarily as social science, but rather as social philosophy 
or social methodology. Social inquiry is not to be related to the social 
world as astronomy is to the moon, or geology is to the earth. Social 
inquiry is not, fundamentally, engaged in seeking to acquire knowledge 
about social phenomena. Rather, social inquiry needs to take the rela-
tionship between science and the philosophy of science (as specified 
by aim- oriented empiricism) to be the model, the ideal, of how social 
inquiry ought to be related to society. What the philosophy of science is 
to science, so social inquiry is to society. The proper task of social inquiry 
is to help worthwhile social endeavours improve their problematic aims 
and methods as they proceed, just as the proper task of the philosophy 
of science is to help science improve its problematic aims and methods 
as it proceeds. On this view, indeed, the philosophy of natural science is 
just that small, but crucial, bit of social inquiry that deals with the worth-
while social endeavour of natural science.
Let me now indicate, in a little more detail, the contents of the chap-
ters of this book.
Chapter 1 gives an account of Karl Popper’s life and work. I make 
it quite clear that, in my view, Popper is the greatest philosopher of the 
twentieth century. I am nevertheless critical of aspects of his work – it 
would be a betrayal of his “critical philosophy” not to be. In a preliminary 
way, I indicate what are, in my view, unsolved problems inherent in his 
views, and outline what needs to be done to overcome these difficulties. 
Subsequent chapters seek to improve Popper’s philosophy in some key 
respects in order to overcome these defects.
In Chapter  2 I  argue that aim- oriented empiricism is a kind of 
synthesis of the views of Popper, Thomas Kuhn and Imre Lakatos, 
but also a dramatic improvement over all three views. Aim- oriented 
empiricism stands in sharp contrast to standard empiricism, versions 
of which are defended by Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, and are taken 
for granted by most scientists and philosophers of science. According 
to standard empiricism, the basic intellectual aim of science is truth,4 
and the basic method is to assess claims to knowledge of truth impar-
tially with respect to evidence. Considerations of simplicity, unity or 
explanatory character may legitimately influence preference for a the-
ory for a time, but not in such a way that the universe itself is perma-
nently presumed to be simple, unified or comprehensible. Choice of 
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theory may be biased in the direction of a paradigm or metaphysical 
view for a time, but in the end empirical considerations must decide 
what theories are accepted and rejected. The key tenet of all versions 
of standard empiricism is that no assumption about the universe can 
be accepted permanently as a part of scientific knowledge independent 
of evidence, let alone in conflict with evidence. But physics, in accept-
ing unified fundamental physical theories only, and persistently reject-
ing empirically more successful disunified rivals, does thereby make 
a persistent metaphysical assumption about the world:  some kind of 
unified pattern of physical law runs through all phenomena. Standard 
empiricism is thus untenable. Aim- oriented empiricism, by contrast, 
acknowledges that persistent scientific acceptance of unified theories 
means that science implicitly accepts that the universe itself possesses 
some kind of underlying unity. Rigour demands that this highly prob-
lematic, implicit metaphysical conjecture be made explicit, so that it 
can be critically assessed, and so that alternatives can be developed 
and assessed, in the hope of improving the specific assumption that 
physics makes at any time. Aim- oriented empiricism holds that we 
need to represent this highly problematic assumption in the form of 
a hierarchy of assumptions, these becoming less and less substantial, 
and so less and less problematic, and more nearly such that their truth 
is required for science to be possible at all, as one goes up the hierar-
chy. In this way, we form a framework of relatively stable and unprob-
lematic assumptions, high up in the hierarchy, within which much 
more substantial and problematic assumptions, low down in the hier-
archy, may be critically assessed, and improved, in the light of which 
best help promote empirical knowledge, and comply with assumptions 
higher up in the hierarchy. This is the view that provides a triumphant 
synthesis of, and improvement over, the views of Popper, Kuhn and 
Lakatos – more Popperian than Popper, more Kuhnian than Kuhn and 
more Lakatosian than Lakatos.
Chapter 3 argues that Einstein was the first scientist to put some-
thing like aim- oriented empiricism explicitly into scientific practice in 
discovering special and general relativity. The method of discovery of 
aim- oriented empiricism played a crucial role in Einstein’s discovery 
of these theories. And not only did Einstein implement aim- oriented 
empiricism in scientific practice:  after his discovery of general relativ-
ity, Einstein came to advocate a view that came closer and closer to aim- 
oriented empiricism as the years passed.
Chapter  4 solves the problem of what it means to say of a scien-
tific theory that it is simple, unified or explanatory. This problem was 
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recognized by Popper (1963, p. 241), but Popper did not know how to 
solve it. Einstein recognized the problem too, but did not know how to 
solve it, either. It is one of the great successes of aim- oriented empiricism 
that it provides the means for the problem to be solved.
Chapter 5 gives a careful and more detailed argument in support of 
aim- oriented empiricism, attention being given to some of the difficulties 
that arise in connection with the view, and the argument in support of 
the view.
Chapter  6 compares and contrasts views about simplicity, unity, 
explanatory power or “beauty” associated with aim- oriented empiricism on 
the one hand, and a view put forward by James McAllister on the other hand 
(see his influential Beauty and Revolution in Science [McAllister, 1996]).
Chapter 7 argues that aim- oriented empiricism succeeds in doing 
what Popper’s falsificationism fails to do, namely solve the problem of 
induction.
Chapter 8 takes up a theme close to Popper’s heart: the problems 
of interpreting quantum theory in a realist way – so that the theory can 
be understood to be about electrons, nuclei, atoms and other denizens 
of the quantum world, and is not doomed to be a mere instrument for 
the prediction of experimental results. I argue that probabilism is the key 
to solving the fundamental quantum mystery – the apparent capacity of 
quantum entities (electrons, atoms and so on) to behave both as parti-
cles and waves. Probabilism, here, is the doctrine that nature herself is 
probabilistic. What exists at one moment may only determine what exists 
next probabilistically, and not deterministically. This develops basic 
ideas of Popper about quantum theory, but in ways of which he strongly 
disapproved.
Chapter 9 criticizes specialism, the doctrine that academic inquiry 
quite properly consists of a great number of specialized disciplines, only 
specialized intellectual standards being worthwhile. This is opposed by 
the view that academic inquiry must engage in sustained exploration 
of fundamental problems that cut across disciplinary boundaries, this 
exploration being undertaken in a way that influences, and is influ-
enced by, specialized research. This is an improvement of anti- specialist 
remarks scattered throughout Popper’s works.
Chapter  10 argues that Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery 
and The Open Society and Its Enemies, taken together, constitute a major 
development of the Enlightenment programme of learning from scien-
tific progress how to achieve social progress towards a more enlightened 
world. But what Popper has to say is not the last word on the subject. 
Popper’s version of the Enlightenment programme needs further 
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improvement, partly because Popper’s conception of scientific method 
needs to be improved, but mainly because, in order to implement the pro-
gramme, we need to apply scientific method, not to social science, but to 
the social world itself. How and why Popper’s version of the Enlightenment 
programme needs to be improved is outlined in this chapter.
8  
1
Karl Raimund Popper
Karl Popper is the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century. No 
other philosopher of the period has produced a body of work that is as 
significant. What is best in Popper’s output is contained in his first four 
published books. These tackle fundamental problems with ferocious, 
exemplary integrity, clarity, simplicity and originality. They have wide-
spread, fruitful implications, for science, for philosophy, for the social 
sciences, for education, for art, for politics and political philosophy.
In his first published book The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959, 
first published in German in 1934), Popper argues that, although 
scientific theories cannot be verified, or even rendered probable, by 
evidence, they can be falsified. Science makes progress by putting for-
ward falsifiable conjectures – theories which say as much as possible 
about the world, and which thus expose themselves as much as pos-
sible to the risk of empirical refutation; they are then subjected to a 
ruthless onslaught of attempted observational and experimental ref-
utation. When finally a scientific theory is falsified empirically, the 
task then becomes to think up an even better theory, which says even 
more about the world. The new theory must predict all the success of 
the old theory, predict successfully the phenomena that falsified the 
old theory, and predict new phenomena as well. In his next book, The 
Open Society and Its Enemies (1966), written during the Second World 
War and first published in 1945, Popper tackles problems that arise in 
connection with creating an “open” society, one which tolerates diver-
sity of views and ways of life. Popper argues that some of the great-
est thinkers have been opposed to the “open” society, most notably 
Plato and Marx. In The Poverty of Historicism (1961), first published 
in 1957, Popper is concerned to demolish the view that social science 
should, or can, predict the way societies evolve. Popper spells out his 
view of how social science should be developed, closely modelled on 
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the account of natural science given in The Logic of Scientific Discovery. 
The next book, Conjectures and Refutations (1963), is a collection of 
essays which restate in a more accessible way Popper’s falsificationist 
view of science, and draw out implications for a range of philosoph-
ical problems. Further books include Objective Knowledge (1972), a 
collection of essays which draw on the analogy between Darwinian 
evolution and scientific progress, and which expound Popper’s view 
that there exists, in addition to the material world and the psychologi-
cal world, a third world of theories, problems and arguments; The Self 
and Its Brain (1977), written with the neurologist John Eccles, which 
applies Popper’s “third world” view to the mind- body problem; and the 
three- volume The Postscript (1982a, 1982b, 1983), which amounts to 
a massive restatement and development of Popper’s falsificationist 
conception of science. A volume of The Library of Living Philosophers 
(Schilpp, 1974)  is devoted to Popper’s work; this includes Popper’s 
intellectual autobiography, published subsequently as a separate book 
with the title Unended Quest (1976a). This gives a fascinating and 
gripping account of the development of Popper’s thought. The Two 
Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge was a precursor to 
The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Its two problems are the problem of 
induction (the problem of how theories can be verified by evidence), 
and the problem of demarcation (the problem of how science is to be 
demarcated from non- science). The book was not published until 1979 
in German, and in 2009 in English.
Fundamental to Popper’s philosophy is the idea that criticism lies 
at the heart of rationality. It would be a betrayal of Popper’s philosophy 
to give an entirely uncritical exposition of his work; some criticism of key 
tenets of his philosophy will therefore be included in what follows.
1.1 Life
Karl Raimund Popper was born in Vienna on 28 July 1902. His parents 
were Jewish but converted to Protestantism before their children were 
born. Popper’s father, Simon Carl Siegmund (1856– 1932), was a doctor 
of law of the University of Vienna. He had a successful legal practice in 
Vienna, at which he apparently worked hard, but his real interests lay 
in the direction of scholarship and literature. Popper’s mother, Jenny 
Schiff (1864– 1938), came from a musical family, and was herself musi-
cal. Popper tells us that she played the piano beautifully; music had an 
important place in Popper’s life.
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During Popper’s early childhood, his parents were prosperous. They 
lived in a large apartment in an eighteenth- century house in the centre 
of Vienna, where Popper’s father conducted his legal practice. Popper’s 
father had an enormous library, which included many works of philoso-
phy; books were everywhere, Popper tells us, except in the dining room, 
where stood a concert grand piano.
As a young boy, Popper was much concerned with the poverty he 
saw all around him in Vienna. In his autobiography, Popper recounts an 
early brush with philosophy. His father had suggested he read some vol-
umes of August Strindberg’s autobiography. Finding that Strindberg gave 
much too much importance to words and their meanings, Popper tried 
to point this out to his father, and was surprised to discover that he did 
not agree. Popper later saw this as his first brush with a lifelong battle 
to combat the influential view that philosophy must concern itself with 
analysis of meaning.
Popper left school at 16 because of the tedium of the classes, and 
enrolled at the University of Vienna, initially as a non- matriculated 
student. Four years later, at the second attempt, he passed the exam 
to become a matriculated student. Any student could take any lec-
ture course, and, initially, Popper sampled lectures in a wide range of 
 subjects  – history, literature, psychology, philosophy  – before concen-
trating on physics and mathematics. In these fields Popper had excellent, 
if remote and autocratic, teachers:  Hans Thirring, Wilhelm Wirtinger, 
Philipp Furtwängler and Hans Hahn. Later, Popper devoted himself to 
the study of the psychology of thinking, influenced by Karl Bühler and 
the writings of Otto Selz.
The First World War and its aftermath brought dramatic changes 
to conditions of life in Vienna. Popper’s father lost much of his savings. 
Popper left home and moved into part of a disused military hospital con-
verted by students into a primitive students’ home, and joined socialist 
groups seeking political change. For a time, Popper thought of himself 
as a communist. But then, on 15 June 1919, an event occurred which 
Popper was later to describe as one of the most important in his life; it 
caused him to become critical of communism and Marxism, and, years 
later, led to the writing of his The Open Society and Its Enemies. The com-
munists organized a demonstration with the intention of freeing commu-
nists held in a police station in Vienna. The police opened fire, and some 
of the demonstrators were killed. Popper was deeply shocked, and even 
felt some personal responsibility for the tragedy, in that he had endorsed 
a doctrine, Marxism, which required that there should be just such inci-
dents, so that the struggle to overcome capitalism might be intensified.
 
 
Karl raiMuNd PoPPer 11
  
Popper nevertheless continued to think of himself as a socialist, 
and to associate with socialist groups. In his autobiography, Popper cel-
ebrates these groups of working people for their dedication, their eager-
ness to become educated. Even though the times were troubled, the 
economic and political outlook bleak, Popper says that he and his friends 
were often exhilarated at the intellectual and political challenges that lay 
before them. For a time Popper worked as a labourer, but found the work 
too hard; he then tried his hand at cabinet making, but was distracted by 
the intellectual problems that he was working on. Popper also worked for 
the psychologist Adler, and as a social worker concerned with neglected 
children.
Shortly before submitting his dissertation for his PhD, the focus 
of Popper’s interest switched from the psychology, to the methodology, 
of thought and problem solving, and in particular to the methodol-
ogy of science. This came about partly as a result of long discussions 
with two friends, the philosophers Julius Kraft and Heinrich Gomperz. 
The dissertation was hastily written. Popper’s examiners were Bühler 
and Schlick; Popper thought he had failed, but in fact he passed with 
distinction.
At this time a Pedagogic Institute was created in Vienna to train 
teachers in new methods of education. Popper decided to become a 
teacher, joined the course, held informal seminars for fellow students, 
and duly became qualified to teach physics and mathematics in sec-
ondary schools. He met, and later married, a fellow student, Josephine 
Henninger (Hennie), who also became a teacher.
While employed full- time as a teacher, Popper continued to work 
hard at epistemological and methodological problems of science, 
writing down his thoughts as an aid to research, rather than with the 
idea that the work might eventually be published. During this time, 
Popper got to know a number of people associated with the Vienna 
Circle, famous for promoting logical positivism. The Vienna Circle was 
essentially a seminar which one attended when invited by its conve-
nor, Moritz Schlick. Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, Herbert Feigl, Kurt 
Gödel, Friedrich Waismann, Victor Kraft, Karl Menger, Hans Hahn, 
Philipp Frank, Richard von Mises, Hans Reichenbach and Carl Hempel 
were among the members; Ludwig Wittgenstein, much admired by 
Schlick, was the intellectual godfather (together, perhaps, with Ernst 
Mach and Bertrand Russell). Visitors from abroad included A. J. Ayer 
and Frank Ramsey from England, Ernest Nagel and W. V. Quine from 
the USA, Arne Næss from Norway, and Alfred Tarski from Poland. But 
Popper was never invited to join the Circle (possibly because Schlick 
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was aware of Popper’s low opinion of Wittgenstein).1 Nevertheless, 
Popper did attend, and give papers at, a number of fringe seminars, and 
his work was strongly influenced by, but also critical of, the doctrines 
of the Circle.
1.2 Early work
Two issues were of central concern to Popper. The first was the problem 
of how to distinguish science from pseudoscience. Popper was impressed 
by the difference between the theories of Marx, Freud and Adler on the 
one hand, and Einstein’s general theory of relativity, on the other. The 
former theories seemed able to explain phenomena whatever happened; 
nothing, it seemed, could tell against these theories. Einstein’s theory, 
by contrast, issued in a definite prediction: light travelling near the sun 
would pursue a curved path due to the gravitational field of the sun. If 
this did not happen, Einstein’s theory would be refuted. Popper decided, 
around 1921 (he tells us) that this constituted the key difference between 
pseudo and genuine scientific theories: whereas the former were unre-
futable, the latter were open to empirical refutation (see Popper, 1963, 
pp. 34– 9; 1976a, p. 38; see also Hacohen, 2000, pp. 91– 6).
The other problem that preoccupied Popper was that of the logic, 
or methodology, of scientific discovery: How does science acquire new 
knowledge? This was the problem that confronted Popper when his ear-
lier interest in the psychology of thinking transmuted into interest in the 
logic of thinking, the logic of discovery.
Suddenly, Popper tells us, he put two and two together (Popper, 
1976a, p.  79). His earlier solution to the first problem also solves the 
second problem. There is no such thing as the verification of theories in 
science; there is only refutation. Scientists put forward theories as empir-
ically falsifiable conjectures or guesses, and these are then subjected to 
sustained attempted empirical refutation. Science advances through a 
process of trial and error, of conjecture and refutation.
Encouraged by Feigl, Popper wrote the first volume of what was 
intended to be a two- volume work, entitled Die beiden Grundprobleme 
der Erkenntnistheorie (The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of 
Knowledge). The first volume was accepted for publication by Schlick and 
Frank, the editors of a series of publications written mostly by members 
of the Vienna Circle. The publisher, Springer, insisted the book must be 
shortened. But in the meantime Popper had finished the second volume. 
He offered a new work consisting of extracts from both volumes, but this 
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was still judged by Springer to be too long. Popper’s uncle, Walter Schiff, 
cut the manuscript by about a half, and this was finally published late in 
1934 as Logik der Forschung. Thus emerged into the public domain, in the 
shadow of Hitler and impending war, what is, perhaps, the most import-
ant book on scientific method to be published in the last century. The 
book was only published in English translation, as The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery (with many additional appendices and footnotes), in 1959. 
(Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie was not published until 
much later, in 1979.)
1.3 The Logic of Scientific Discovery
The Logic of Scientific Discovery (L.Sc.D.) begins by spelling out what are, 
for Popper, the two fundamental problems concerning the nature of sci-
entific inquiry. (1) The problem of induction: how can scientific theories 
be verified by evidence, in view of Hume’s arguments which seem to 
show that this is impossible? (2) The problem of demarcation: How is sci-
ence to be demarcated from non- science (pseudoscience and metaphys-
ics)? As we saw above, Popper’s solution to the second problem is that, 
in order to be scientific, a theory must be empirically falsifiable. This, 
for Popper, solves the first problem as well. Scientific laws and theories 
cannot be verified by evidence at all; they can only be falsified. However 
much evidence may be amassed in support of a theory, its probability 
remains zero. But despite this negative conclusion, science can still make 
progress. This comes about as a result of theories being proposed as con-
jectures, in response to problems; these conjectures are then subjected 
to a ruthless barrage of attempted empirical refutation. The purpose of 
observation and experimentation is not to verify, but to refute. When a 
theory is refuted empirically, this creates the problem of discovering a 
new conjecture, a new theory, which is even more successful than its pre-
decessor in that it meets with all the success of its predecessor, success-
fully predicts the phenomena that refuted its predecessor, and predicts 
new phenomena as well. When such a theory is formulated, the task then 
becomes to try to refute this new theory in turn. Thus science advances, 
from one falsifiable conjecture to another, each successfully predicting 
more than its predecessor, but none ever having probability greater than 
zero. All theoretical knowledge in science is irredeemably conjectural in 
character. But science makes progress precisely because, in science, it is 
possible to discover that theories are false, and thus need to be replaced 
by something better.
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Popper has been much criticized for not appreciating that even 
empirical refutations are not decisive: it is always a conjecture that a the-
ory has been falsified, since it is always a conjecture that a given observa-
tion or experiment has yielded a falsifying result. But Popper has at least 
two replies to such criticisms.
First, there is a decisive logical asymmetry between verification 
and falsification. Any theory has infinitely many empirical consequences, 
for infinitely many times and places. We, however, can only ever verify 
finitely many of these consequences, and thus must forever be infinitely 
far away from verifying the theory. But we only need to discover one false 
empirical consequence of a theory in order to show decisively that the 
theory is false.
Second, Popper emphasizes that a theory is only falsifiable with 
respect to the adoption of a methodology. Given that a theory is empir-
ically falsified, it is always possible to rescue the theory from falsifi-
cation by adopting what Popper calls “conventionalist stratagems”. 
These include explaining the experimental result away in some way, 
or modifying the theory, in an ad hoc way, so that it no longer clashes 
with the empirical result. Popper proposes that science should adopt 
methodological rules governing the way theories are to be accepted 
and rejected in science in the light of evidence: these rules need to be 
designed to expose theories to the maximum risk of empirical refuta-
tion. Conventionalist stratagems, in particular, are to be banned. Faced 
by a refutation, a theory may be modified so as to overcome the refu-
tation, but only if the modification increases the empirical content, the 
degree of falsifiability, of the theory – the modified theory predicting 
more, excluding more potentially falsifying observational statements, 
than before. Scientists should always strive to put forward theories that 
say as much as possible about the empirical world, that expose them-
selves to the greatest risk of refutation, that have the highest possible 
degree of falsifiability. The supreme methodological principle of sci-
ence, for Popper, “says that the other rules of scientific procedure must 
be designed in such a way that they do not protect any statement in 
science against falsification” (1959, p. 54).
Even though theories cannot be verified, they can be “corrobo-
rated”. For Popper, corroboration is a measure of how well a theory has 
stood up to attempts to refute it. If a highly falsifiable theory has survived 
an onslaught of severe testing, then it has proved its worth. It deserves 
to be taken more seriously than an untested theory, or an unfalsifiable 
speculation.
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According to Popper, then, science makes progress by means of 
wild imagining, bold guesswork, on the one hand, controlled by fero-
cious attempted empirical refutation on the other hand.
L.Sc.D. was influenced by the thought of the Vienna Circle, but 
also differs from, and is highly critical of, some of the main tenets of 
the Circle. Logical positivism sought to demarcate the meaningful from 
the meaningless, with only those propositions capable of being verified 
being meaningful, the hope being that all meaningful factual proposi-
tions would be scientific. Popper stressed that any such criterion would 
condemn scientific theories to being meaningless, since they could not 
be verified. Popper’s demarcation problem differed from that of the pos-
itivists. For Popper, as we have seen, the problem was to demarcate sci-
ence from non- science (pseudoscience and metaphysics); falsifiability, 
not verifiability, is the key requirement; but non- scientific, metaphysi-
cal theories, though neither verifiable nor falsifiable, may nevertheless 
be entirely meaningful, and may even have a fruitful role to play in the 
development of science. Metaphysical theses, such as atomism, may sug-
gest, and may (as a result of acquiring precision) be transformed into, 
falsifiable scientific theories.
1.4 Criticism
Does L.Sc.D. succeed in solving its two basic problems? Three great mer-
its of the book are its originality, its clarity and its tight structure: every-
thing devolves from the key idea of falsifiability. This makes the book 
especially open to criticism, and to improvement. In the end, the book 
fails to solve its basic problems, due to its treatment of simplicity.
Popper claims that the more falsifiable a theory is, so the greater its 
degree of simplicity. (There is a second method for assessing degrees of 
simplicity, in terms of number of observation statements required to fal-
sify the theories in question, but Popper stresses that if the two methods 
clash, it is the first that takes precedence.) It is easy to see that Popper’s 
proposal fails. Given a reasonably simple scientific theory, T, one can 
readily increase the falsifiability of T by adding on an independently test-
able hypotheses, h1, to form the new theory, T + h1. This new theory will 
be more falsifiable than T but, in general, will be drastically less simple. 
And one can make the situation even worse, by adding on as many inde-
pendently testable hypotheses as one pleases, h2, h3 and so on, to form 
new theories, T + h1 + h2 + h3 + …, as highly empirically falsifiable and 
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as drastically lacking in simplicity as one pleases. Thus simplicity cannot 
be equated with falsifiability.
And there is a further, even more devastating point. Popper’s 
methodological rules favour T + h1 + h2 + h3 over T, especially if h1, h2 
and h3 have been severely tested and corroborated. But in scientific prac-
tice, T + h1 + h2 + h3 would never even be considered, however highly 
corroborated it might be if considered, because of its extreme lack of 
simplicity or unity, its grossly ad hoc character. There is here a funda-
mental flaw in the central doctrine of L.Sc.D.
Later, in Conjectures and Refutations (1963), Popper put forward 
a new methodological principle which, when added to those of L.Sc.D., 
succeeds in excluding theories such as T + h1 + h2 + h3 from scientific 
consideration. According to Popper, a new theory, in order to be accept-
able, “should proceed from some simple, new, and powerful, unifying idea 
about some connection or relation (such as gravitational attraction) 
between hitherto unconnected things (such as planets and apples) or 
facts (such as inertial and gravitational mass) or new ‘theoretical entities’ 
(such as field and particles)” (p. 241). T + h1 + h2 + h3 does not “proceed 
from some simple, new and powerful, unifying idea” and is to be rejected 
on that account, even if more highly corroborated than T.
But the adoption of this “requirement of simplicity” (as Popper 
calls it) as a basic methodological principle of science, has the effect of 
permanently excluding from science all ad hoc theories (such as T + 
h1 + h2 + h3) that fail to satisfy the principle, however empirically suc-
cessful such theories might be if considered. This amounts to assuming 
permanently that the universe is such that no ad hoc theory, that fails to 
satisfy Popper’s principle of simplicity, is true. It amounts to accepting, as 
a permanent item of scientific knowledge, the substantial metaphysical 
thesis that the universe is non- ad hoc, in the sense that no theory that 
fails to satisfy Popper’s principle of simplicity is true. But this clashes with 
Popper’s criterion of demarcation:  that no unfalsifiable, metaphysical 
thesis is to be accepted as a part of scientific knowledge.
It is, in fact, important that Popper’s criterion of demarcation is 
rejected, and the metaphysical thesis of non- ad hocness is explicitly 
acknowledged to be a part of scientific knowledge. The thesis, in the form 
in which it is implicitly adopted at any given stage in the development 
of science, may well be false. Scientific progress may require that it be 
modified. The thesis needs to be made explicit, in other words, for good 
Popperian reasons, namely so that it can be critically assessed, and per-
haps improved. As long as Popper’s demarcation criterion is upheld, the 
metaphysical thesis must remain implicit, and hence immune to criticism.
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Popper’s falsificationism can be modified, however, so that substan-
tial metaphysical theses, implicit in methods that exclude ad hoc theo-
ries, are made explicit within science, and are thus rendered available to 
critical scrutiny and revision (as we shall see in subsequent chapters; see 
also Maxwell, 1974, 1998, 2017a, 2017b).
On publication, L.Sc.D. achieved a certain impact; it was quite 
widely reviewed and discussed, and led to Popper being invited to give 
lectures in England, Denmark and elsewhere. Popper himself later 
claimed that his criticisms of logical positivism led eventually to the 
downfall of that doctrine.
1.5 The Open Society
Having dealt with the methodology of the natural sciences, Popper 
turned his attention again to what had long been of concern to him: the 
intellectual defects of Marxism, and the philosophy of the social sciences. 
But before he could get very far with that work, Popper was offered a lec-
tureship at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand. He accepted, and 
Popper and his wife left Vienna for New Zealand early in 1937.
For some years Popper had been privately highly critical of poli-
cies of socialists in Germany and Austria for playing into the hands of 
the Fascists and Hitler. This was due, in Popper’s view, to the harm-
ful influence of Marxism. But he had kept these criticisms to himself, 
as he felt any public criticism could only weaken the forces opposing 
Hitler. Then, in March 1938, Hitler occupied Austria, and Popper 
felt all grounds for restraint had disappeared. He decided to put his 
criticisms of Marxism, and his views on the social sciences, into a 
publishable form.
He began work on what was to become The Poverty of Historicism. 
But then, unexpectedly, sections on essentialism, and on totalitarian ten-
dencies in Plato, grew and grew (driven by the desperation of the times), 
and Popper found he had a new work on his hands:  it became what is 
perhaps his best known, most influential and greatest work, The Open 
Society and Its Enemies (1966a, first published 1945). Without referring 
anywhere to Hitler or Stalin, the book is, nevertheless, an urgent and 
passionate investigation into the problem and threat of totalitarianism, 
whether of the right or left. It seeks to understand what the appeal of 
totalitarianism can be, and why it should have come to be such a threat to 
civilization. Popper regarded the writing of the book as his contribution 
to the war effort.
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In The Open Society and Its Enemies (O.S.E.), Popper argues that 
a fundamental problem confronting humanity is that of moving from a 
closed, tribal way of life to an open society. The closed society is a society 
that has just one view of the world, one set of values, one basic way of 
life. It is a world dominated by dogma, fixed taboos and magic, devoid of 
doubt and uncertainty. The open society, by contrast, tolerates diversity 
of views, values and ways of life. In the open society learning through 
criticism is possible just because diverse views and values are tolerated. 
For Popper, the open society is the civilized society, in which individual 
freedom and responsibility, justice, democracy, humane values, reason 
and science can flourish.
But moving from the closed to the open society imposes a great 
psychological burden on the individuals involved, “the strain of civiliza-
tion”. Instead of the security of the tribe, organic, dogmatic and devoid 
of doubt, there is all the uncertainty and insecurity of the open society, 
the painful necessity of taking personal responsibility for one’s life in a 
state of ignorance, the lack of intimacy associated with the “abstract soci-
ety”, in which individuals constantly rub shoulders with strangers. This 
transition from the closed to the open society is, for Popper, “one of the 
deepest revolutions through which mankind has passed” (1966a, vol. 1, 
p. 175). Many cannot bear the burden of freedom and doubt, and long 
for the false security and certainties of the closed society. In particular, 
some of the greatest thinkers of Western civilization have given into this 
temptation and have, in one way or another, urged upon long- suffering 
humanity a return to something like a closed society under the guise of 
Utopia. This is true of Plato and Aristotle; and it is true, in more recent 
times, of Hegel and Marx. The lure of totalitarianism is built deep in our 
history and traditions.
The revolutionary transition from closed to open society first 
occurred, according to Popper, with the “Great Generation” of ancient 
Athens in the fifth century BC. Those to be associated with the birth 
and affirmation of the open society include Pericles, Herodotus, 
Protagoras, Democritus, Alcidamas, Lycophron, Antisthenes and, above 
all, Socrates.
It is from Plato, especially, that we learn of Socrates’ passionate 
scepticism, his searching criticism of current beliefs and ideals, his con-
viction that first one must acknowledge one’s own ignorance before one 
could hope to acquire knowledge and wisdom. But Socrates, Popper 
argues, was ultimately betrayed by Plato. The greatest advocate of the 
open society became, in Plato’s Republic, the spokesman for a return to a 
closed society.
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Popper’s devastating account of Plato’s “propaganda” for the closed 
society, in bald outline, amounts to this. Deeply disturbed by the democ-
racy, and the beginnings of the open society, in contemporary Athens, 
Plato came to fear all social change as embodying decay and corruption. 
Synthesizing elements taken from Parmenides, from the Pythagoreans, 
and from Socrates, Plato turned these fears into an entire cosmology and 
social theory. Every kind of material object has its perfect copy, its ideal 
representation, as a Form in a kind of Platonic Heaven (Plato’s famous 
theory of Forms). These Forms initiated the material universe by printing 
themselves on space, thus producing initial material copies. But, as time 
passes, copies of copies gradually become more and more corrupt, fur-
ther and further removed from their ideal progenitors. And this is just as 
true in the social and moral sphere as the material. The primary task for 
the rulers of society is to arrest all social change, and try to keep society 
resembling, as far as possible, the ideal Forms of order, justice and the 
Good. Most people know only of imperfect material things; but a very 
few philosophers, as a result of studying mathematics (which enables 
us to acquire knowledge of abstract, perfect objects and not just their 
imperfect material copies), are able to come to see, intellectually, the 
Forms, and eventually the supreme Form of the Good (represented as 
the sun in Plato’s famous myth of the cave in The Republic). Enlightened 
philosophers alone have seen the Form of the Good; they alone know 
what ideal form society should take, and how it can be protected from 
the corrupting effects of change. Philosophers, then, must rule, aided by 
guardians, a class of soldiers or police, who ensure that the rest of the 
population obeys the strictures of the ruling philosophers. Plato’s repub-
lic is a nightmarish totalitarian, closed society, rigidly ordered, individual 
liberty, freedom of expression and discussion, art, democracy and justice 
ruthlessly suppressed. But Plato presents all this with great subtlety, with 
a kind of twisted logic, so that ostensibly he is arguing for a just, wise 
and harmonious society, one of legal and moral perfection. Popper even 
suggests that Plato wrote The Republic as a kind of manifesto, to aid his 
adoption as philosopher- ruler.
Popper’s two big enemies of the open society are Plato (volume 1 of 
O.S.E.), and Marx (volume 2). Both uphold versions of historicism – the 
doctrine that history unfolds according to some fixed pattern, to some 
rigid set of laws of historical evolution. Plato, as we have seen, was a pes-
simistic historicist:  historical change involves decay and degeneration, 
and all that enlightened philosopher- rulers can do is arrest change some-
what. Marx, by contrast, is an optimistic historicist: historical develop-
ment will eventually result in socialism and freedom.
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Popper traces a direct link from Plato to Marx, via Aristotle and 
Hegel. Prompted in part by his biological interests, Aristotle modified 
Plato’s doctrine of the Forms so that it could give an account of biologi-
cal growth and development. Aristotle inserts a Platonic Form into each 
individual object so that it becomes the essence of that object, an inher-
ent potentiality which the object, through movement, change or growth, 
strives to realize. Thus the oak tree is inherent as a potentiality in the 
acorn. Germination and growth are to be understood as the acorn striv-
ing to realize its potentiality, thus becoming an oak tree.
In short, Aristotle modifies Plato’s doctrine of the Forms so that the 
Form ceases to be the perfect copy of an object from which the object 
can only decay, and becomes instead an inherent potentiality which the 
object strives to realize. This modification potentially transforms Plato’s 
pessimistic historicism of inevitable decay into an optimistic historicism 
of social growth, development and progress. But not until Hegel, did any-
one fully exploit Aristotelianism in this way.
Popper depicts Hegel as a complete intellectual fraud. He agrees 
with Schopenhauer’s verdict: “Hegel, installed from above, by the pow-
ers that be, as the certified Great Philosopher, was a flat- headed, insipid, 
nauseating, illiterate charlatan, who reached the pinnacle of audacity 
in scribbling together and dishing up the craziest mystifying nonsense” 
(quoted in Popper, 1966a, vol. 2, pp.  32– 3). Hegel’s great idea was to 
depict history as the process of Spirit, the Aristotelian essence and poten-
tiality of the State and the Nation, striving to realize itself through war 
and world domination. Taking over and corrupting the antinomies of 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1961), Hegel depicted history as a kind of 
pseudo- rational or logical dialectical process, thesis giving way to antith-
esis, which then results in synthesis. What matters is not individual liberty 
or democracy, but rather the triumph of the strongest State on the stage 
of history, its inner essence interpreted and directed by the Great Leader 
by means of dictatorial power.
Despite (or because of) his intellectual fraudulence, Hegel  exercised – 
Popper argues  – a powerful influence over the development of subse-
quent nationalist, historicist and totalitarian thought, of both the extreme 
right and the extreme left. Both Hitler and Stalin stumble onto the world 
stage out of Hegel, Popper implies (although neither is mentioned by 
name in O.S.E., as indicted above). In particular, Hegel exercised a pow-
erful and corrupting influence on Karl Marx.
For Popper, Marx is in a quite different category from Hegel. 
Popper pays tribute to Marx’s sincerity, his humanitarianism, his intel-
lectual honesty, his hatred of moralizing verbiage and hypocrisy, his 
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sense of facts and his sincere quest for the truth, his important contribu-
tions to historical studies and social science, his burning desire to help 
the oppressed. Nevertheless, Marx is one of the most dangerous enemies 
of the open society, his thought disastrously corrupted by its Hegelian 
inheritance.
In a well- known passage in Capital, Marx declared that Hegel 
“stands dialectics on its head; one must turn it the right way up again” 
(quoted in Popper, 1966a., vol. 2, p.  102). And in another passage, 
Marx declared:  “It is not the consciousness of man that determines 
his existence  – rather, it is his social existence that determines his 
consciousness” (quoted ibid., p. 89). Whereas, for Hegel, an idealist, 
history is the dialectical development of ideas, for Marx history is deter-
mined by the dialectical development of material processes, in partic-
ular those associated with the means of production. Distinct historical 
phases – pre- feudal, feudal, capitalistic, post- revolutionary socialist – 
owe their existence to distinct phases in the means of production, and 
the social arrangements these phases generate. Each phase leads, as 
a result of inevitable dialectical processes, to its own destruction and 
the creation of the next phase. Thus capitalism concentrates wealth 
and ownership of the means of the production into fewer and fewer 
hands until, eventually, the workers unite, overthrow the capitalists 
and establish socialism. The historical processes of dialectical materi-
alism work themselves out through class struggle; classes and the con-
flicts between them being determined by the means of production. It 
is the laws determining the evolution of the economic base that decide 
the path of history; ideas, democratic and legal institutions form an 
ideological superstructure, which reflects the economic base and the 
interests of the dominant class, but is powerless to influence the path 
of history. Marx condemned as “Utopian” those socialists who sought 
to bring about the revolution by means of political policies and plans. 
He held that the proper “scientific” approach to bringing about social-
ism is, first, to discover the dialectical laws governing the evolution of 
the economic base of society, and then to help this evolution along, 
in so far as this is possible, thus speeding up the coming of the final, 
inevitable socialist revolution.
Popper argues that a number of elements of Marxist thought are 
of value, if not taken too far. There is the idea that the social cannot be 
reduced to the psychological, sociology not being reducible to psychol-
ogy. There is the thesis that much of history has been influenced by class 
struggle, and the idea that the means of production, economic circum-
stances, play an important role in influencing the development of other 
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aspects of social and cultural life, even something as apparently remote 
from economic conditions as mathematics. Above all, there is the recog-
nition and depiction of the appalling conditions of life of the poor in the 
unrestrained capitalist conditions of Marx’s time, and the recognition, 
too, of the hypocrisy of much of the morality, the legal system and the 
politics of those times. Having described Marx’s account of the working 
conditions of children as young as six years, Popper writes: “Such were 
the conditions of the working class even in 1863, when Marx was writing 
Capital; his burning protest against these crimes, which were then toler-
ated, and sometimes even defended, not only by professional economists 
but also by churchmen, will secure him forever a place among the libera-
tors of mankind” (1966a, vol. 2, p. 122).
But these good points are, for Popper, more than counterbalanced 
by the dreadful defects, most of which stem from Marx’s historicism, 
inherited from Hegel. For the central tenet of Marxism is the idea that 
the laws of dialectical materialism determine the evolution of the means 
of production, and this in turn determines the evolution of everything 
else, from class struggle to culture, religion, the law and politics. But this 
is manifestly false. For one thing, there is a two- way interaction between 
economic conditions and ideas; eliminate scientific and technological 
ideas, and the economy would collapse. For another, ideas can them-
selves influence the course of history, Marxism itself being an example. 
Historical predictions made by Marx, on the basis of his economic histor-
icism, have been falsified by subsequent historical events. The Russian 
Revolution is, for example, entirely at odds with Marx’s theory, as is the 
way in which the unrestricted capitalism of Marx’s time has subsequently 
become both more economically successful and more just and humane as 
a result of diverse political interventions. Marx’s economic historicism is 
not just false; it is pseudoscientific. Only for exceptionally simple systems, 
such as the solar system, is long- term prediction, based on scientific the-
ory, possible. In the case of social systems, incredibly complex and open 
to the influence of a multitude of unpredictable factors, the idea that sci-
ence should be able to deliver long- term predictions is hopelessly unwar-
ranted. Marx’s historicism leads him to turn good points into bad ones by 
exaggeration. “The history of all hitherto existing society is a history of 
class struggle” (quoted in Popper, 1966a, vol. 2, p. 111) is a good point if 
“all” is not taken too seriously, but as it stands is an oversimplification and 
exaggeration; it ignores, for example, power struggles within the ruling 
class. Again, Marx was surely right to see legal and political institutions 
of his time as being biased in the direction of the interests of the ruling 
classes; but he was wrong to condemn all legal and political institutions 
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as inevitably having this function, as his economic historicism compelled 
him to do.
For Popper, the most damaging feature of Marx’s historicism has 
to do, perhaps, with the severe limitations that it places on the power 
of politics, on the capacity of people to solve social problems. Marx is 
famous for his eleventh thesis on Feuerbach:  “The philosophers have 
only interpreted the world in various ways; the point however is to 
change it” (quoted in Popper, 1966a, vol. 2, p. 84). But Marx’s economic 
historicism leads immediately to a severely restricted view as to what 
political intervention can achieve. In Capital he declares: “When a soci-
ety has discovered the natural law that determines its own movement, … 
even then, it can neither overleap the natural phases of its evolution, nor 
shuffle them out of the world by a stroke of the pen. But this much it 
can do; it can shorten and lessen its birth- pangs” (quoted ibid., p. 86). 
Just those actions which were to improve the unrestrained capitalism of 
Marx’s time beyond all recognition, namely political intervention and the 
actions of trade unions, are discounted at the outset by Marx’s economic 
determinism as necessarily impotent. Political planning and policymak-
ing for socialism is condemned by Marx, in line with his central doctrine, 
as inherently inefficacious and Utopian. One disastrous consequence of 
this was that when Marxists gained power in Russia, they found their 
literature contained no guidelines as to how to proceed. Another disas-
trous consequence was that Marxism, blind to the potency of political 
power, failed to anticipate the dangers inherent in handing over power 
to political leaders after the revolution, dangers which, after the Russian 
Revolution, became all too manifest.
The full force of Popper’s criticism is devoted, however, to the 
central argument of Capital – an argument which seeks to establish the 
inevitable downfall of capitalism and the triumph of socialism. Popper 
presents Marx’s arguments as having three steps, only the first of which 
is elaborated in Capital. The first step argues that an inevitable increase 
in the productivity of work leads to the accumulation of more and more 
wealth in the ruling class, and the greater and greater poverty and misery 
of the working class. The second step then argues that all classes will dis-
appear except for a small, wealthy ruling class and a large impoverished 
working class, this situation inevitably leading to a revolution. The third 
step argues that the revolution will result in the victory of the working 
class, which in turn will result in the withering away of the state and the 
creation of socialism.
Popper demonstrates that none of these steps is inevitable by show-
ing that alternative developments are entirely possible and, in many 
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cases, have actually happened since Marx wrote Capital. Even if there 
is a tendency under capitalism for the means of production and wealth 
to be concentrated in fewer and fewer hands (as the first step assumes), 
the state can intervene to counteract this tendency by such means as tax-
ation and death duties. And as far as the increasing poverty of workers 
is concerned, this can be counteracted by the formation of trade unions, 
by collective bargaining backed up by strikes. The brutal, unrestricted 
capitalism of Marx’s time has since been transformed out of all recog-
nition by just such interventionist methods. And Popper makes analo-
gous, decisive points to demolish the second and third steps of Marx’s 
argument. Even if the ruling class did become increasingly wealthy and 
the working class increasingly poor (as the second step assumes), this 
does not mean that all classes but these two would necessarily disappear, 
since landowners, rural workers, and a new middle class may well exist, 
given Marx’s assumptions. And even if violence breaks out, this does not 
mean it would necessarily constitute the social revolution, as envisaged 
by Marx. And finally, even if it is granted that the workers unite and over-
throw the ruling class (as the third step assumes), this does not mean 
that a classless society and socialism would necessarily result. It is all too 
easy to suppose that the new political leaders would seize and hold on to 
power, justifying this by exploiting and twisting the revolutionary ide-
ology, and by invoking the threat of counter- revolutionary forces. And 
many other possible outcomes can be envisaged. It is in fact implausible 
to suppose that the victory of the working class would mean the creation 
of a classless society, and hence the withering away of the state. (This 
bald summary does not begin to do justice to the cumulative force of 
Popper’s argument.)
Marx, as we have seen, condemned planning for socialism as 
Utopian; and in a sense, Popper agrees. Popper distinguishes two kinds 
of social planning or intervention, which he calls Utopian and piecemeal 
social engineering. Utopian social engineering seeks to attain an ideal 
social order, such as socialism, by bringing about holistic changes in soci-
ety; such an approach is, Popper argues, doomed to failure. Piecemeal 
social engineering, by contrast, searches for and fights against “the great-
est and most urgent evils of society”:  this is the approach that Popper 
advocates (1966a, vol. 1, ch. 9). Subsequently, during the course of crit-
icizing Marx, Popper points out that piecemeal social engineering can 
take the form either of state intervention, or of the creation of legal, insti-
tutional checks on freedom of action. The latter is to be preferred, Popper 
argues, as the former carries with it the danger of increasing the power of 
the state (1966a, vol. 2, pp. 129– 33).
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There is very much more to Popper’s O.S.E. than the above indi-
cates. Central to the book is the idea that reason is a vital component 
of the open society; reason being understood as “critical rationalism”, 
arrived at by generalizing Popper’s falsificationist conception of scientific 
method. For Popper, both scientific method and rationality need to be 
understood in social terms. Popper criticizes Karl Mannheim’s sociology 
of knowledge for overlooking the “social aspect of scientific method” 
(Popper, 1966a, vol. 2, ch. 23). Popper criticizes moral historicism, orac-
ular philosophy and the revolt against reason, and the idea that history 
might have a meaning (ibid., chs. 22, 24 and 25, respectively). Both 
volumes have extensive footnotes containing fascinating discussion of a 
great variety of issues tangentially related to the main argument, such as 
the development of ancient Greek mathematics, the problem of putting 
an end to war, or the proper aims of a liberal education.
Popper’s fiercely polemical book has provoked much controversy. 
His critical onslaughts against Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and Marx have been 
angrily repudiated by many scholars in these fields, or, much worse, just 
blandly ignored.
1.6 The Poverty of Historicism
The general doctrine of historicism is expounded and criticized by Popper 
in his The Poverty of Historicism (P.H.), first published in three parts in 
Economica in 1944 and 1945 (somewhat before O.S.E.) and only pub-
lished in book form in 1957. Popper divides historicist views and argu-
ments into two classes: those that hold that the methods of the social 
and natural sciences are quite different (the “anti- naturalist doctrines”) 
and those that hold they are the same or similar (the “pro- naturalist 
doctrines”).
Anti- naturalist doctrines can be summarized like this. Generali-
zations, experiments, predictions and understanding have roles in 
social science that are radically different from those they have in phys-
ics. Social phenomena exhibit novelty, complexity and a holistic aspect 
that is lacking in physical phenomena. These differences ensure that 
historicist social science, predicting in more or less rough outline the 
evolution of society, must employ methods that differ from those of 
 natural science.
Pro- naturalist doctrines of historicism make much of the success of 
long- term predictions in astronomy. Just as states of the solar system can 
be predicted by natural science far into the future, so too historicist social 
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science ought to be able to predict states of society far into the future. 
Such predictions will, however, employ social laws of succession, laws 
which specify how one characteristic phase of social development gives 
way to a subsequent phase.
Popper effectively criticizes the anti- naturalist doctrines of 
historicism. It is, however, Popper’s criticism of the pro- naturalist 
 standpoint that is the really important nub of the book. Historicist 
laws of succession are not laws at all, as these are understood in phys-
ics. They are trends. And “trends are not laws” (Popper, 1961, p. 115). 
A law provides a causal explanation of an event when the law plus 
initial conditions imply that the event occurs. Whenever a succession 
of causally connected events occurs in our environment, such as the 
wind shaking a tree and causing an apple to fall to the ground, laws 
(usually a number of quite different laws) plus the specification of 
a sequence of initial conditions are required to predict the sequence 
of events. Trends can, then, be explained by means of laws, but it is 
always laws plus relevant initial conditions which provide such expla-
nations. And the crucial point is that, given some trend, in particular a 
social trend, initial conditions that must continue to exist if the trend 
is to continue are likely to be very many indeed, most of which will 
be easy to overlook. This ensures that trends, such as the growth of 
a population, which have persisted for centuries, may quite suddenly 
cease if some condition, necessary for the persistence of the trend, 
ceases to exist. “The poverty of historicism”, Popper declares “is a pov-
erty of imagination” (ibid., p. 130) – the poverty of being unable to 
imagine that conditions, necessary for the persistence of some trend, 
might suddenly themselves change. And this is highly relevant to the 
whole idea of piecemeal social engineering, for the piecemeal engi-
neer may seek to change just such conditions, required for the per-
sistence of some undesirable trend.
1.7 At the LSE
In 1945 Popper was appointed to a readership in logic and scientific 
method at the London School of Economics (LSE); he took up the 
appointment in 1946, and was promoted to a personal professorship 
in 1949. Initially the only philosopher at the LSE, Popper was subse-
quently joined by J. O. Wisdom in 1948, Joseph Agassi in 1957 (who 
left in 1960), John Watkins in 1958, W. W. Bartley III and Imre Lakatos 
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in 1960, and Alan Musgrave in 1964. The Department at the LSE was 
famous for Popper’s weekly seminar. Notoriously, visiting speakers 
rarely succeeded in concluding the announcement of the title of their 
talk before being interrupted by Popper. He subjected each speaker 
to a devastating critical attack, almost sentence by sentence; quite 
often, the subject of the seminar would be continued a week later. The 
seminars were always dramatic, sometimes farcical, but nevertheless 
created an overwhelming impression of Popper’s passionate determi-
nation to get at the truth, even if conventions of politeness and good 
manners had to be sacrificed.
1.8 Conjectures and Refutations
In 1963 Popper published Conjectures and Refutations (C.R.), a collec-
tion of essays restating, extending and applying his views on scientific 
method, philosophy and rationality. This is perhaps the best introduc-
tion to Popper’s work. Here is a quick survey of some of the items in 
the book.
In the Introduction Popper makes a number of important episte-
mological points. He notes the widespread tendency to believe in the 
false doctrine that truth is manifest – readily available and easy to come 
by. When truth turns out not to be so easy to obtain, epistemological 
optimists become pessimists, and deny that knowledge is possible at all, 
or resort to conspiracy theories to account for the inaccessibility of the 
truth. Both Descartes and Bacon are famous for their anti- authoritarian 
stance in epistemological matters; and yet, Popper points out, there is an 
unnoticed implicit authoritarianism in their views. For Bacon, and for 
the empiricists who followed him, the senses are authoritative sources 
of knowledge; for Descartes, and for the rationalists who followed him, 
reason is the authoritative source of knowledge. Popper, of course, 
argues against the idea that conjectural knowledge has any authorita-
tive source.
In chapter two, Popper argues that philosophical problems have 
their roots in science and mathematics; and he argues against the 
Wittgensteinian view that philosophical problems are pseudo- problems 
that arise when ordinary language is misused.
In chapter three Popper distinguishes three views concerning 
human knowledge: essentialism, which holds that science can grasp the 
ultimate essence of things; instrumentalism, which holds that scientific 
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theories are merely instruments for the prediction of observable phe-
nomena; and realism, which holds that science puts forward falsifiable 
conjectures about aspects of reality that often go beyond what is observ-
able. Popper criticizes the first two views, and defends the third view.
In chapter five Popper gives a magnificent account of the 
Presocratic philosophers – Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, 
Parmenides  – as proposing and critically assessing successive theories 
about the origins and ultimate constituents of the universe, and about the 
problem of how to understand change. The Presocratics, Popper argues, 
almost unintentionally created critical rationality, the tradition of propos-
ing bold conjectures which are then subjected to criticism  – a tradition 
that led eventually to modern science.
In chapter eight Popper tackles the problem of how philosophical 
or metaphysical doctrines can be rationally assessed given that they can-
not be empirically falsified, like scientific theories. His solution is that 
philosophical doctrines can be assessed from the standpoint of the prob-
lems that they are intended to solve; even though irrefutable, they can 
nevertheless be criticized from the standpoint of the problems they seek 
to solve.
In chapter ten Popper restates and, as we have seen above, devel-
ops somewhat his falsificationist conception of scientific method. In this 
chapter Popper formulates and tries to solve what has subsequently come 
to be known as the problem of verisimilitude: What can we mean by sci-
entific progress if science advances from one false theory to another? 
Popper’s solution is that, given two theories, T1 and T2, even though 
both are false, nevertheless T2, say, may be closer to the truth than T1. 
Suppose, for example, that T2 implies everything true that T1 implies and 
more besides, but T2 does not imply anything false that T1 does not imply. 
Granted this, there is a perfectly good sense in which T2 can be said to be 
“closer to the truth” than T1, and thus an advance over T1. Unfortunately 
it was subsequently shown by Tichy (1974) and Miller (1974) that this 
proposed solution to the problem does not work. If T2 has more true 
implications than T1 does, then T2, necessarily, has some false implica-
tions which T1 does not have. Popper’s requirements for T2 to be closer to 
the truth than T1, when both are false, cannot be satisfied.
Chapter fifteen provides an exposition and decisive criticism of dia-
lectic reasoning: it is thus an adjunct to the criticisms of Hegel and Marx 
to be found in O.S.E.
One of the themes running through C.R., and through much of 
Popper’s subsequent writings, is that the proper task of philosophy is to 
tackle, in an imaginative and critical way, real, fundamental problems 
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having their roots outside philosophy in science, politics, art, life. This 
Popperian conception of philosophy stands in sharp contrast both to the 
pomposities and obscurities of much so- called “continental” philoso-
phy, and to the poverty and aridity of philosophy in the so- called “ana-
lytic” tradition, which is restricted to ordinary language analysis, the 
analysis of meaning. Popper has fought against both rival conceptions 
of philosophy, and has sought to put into practice his own critical ratio-
nalist, problem- solving conception of philosophy. His first four books 
are exemplary in this respect, and have undoubtedly exercised an enor-
mous, healthy influence on much subsequent philosophy, even though 
this influence has often not been acknowledged. A basic impulse behind 
these works might almost be summed up in a stray remark tossed out in 
O.S.E.: “We have to learn the lesson that intellectual honesty is funda-
mental for everything we cherish” (Popper, 1966a, vol. 2, p. 59).
1.9 The basic argument running  
through Popper’s early work
It is important to appreciate the existence of a central backbone of argu-
ment running through these four books. In L.Sc.D., as we have seen, 
Popper argues that all scientific knowledge is irredeemably conjectural 
in character, it being impossible to verify theories empirically. Science 
makes progress by proposing bold conjectures in response to problems, 
which are then subjected to sustained attempted empirical refutation. 
This falsificationist conception of scientific method is then generalized 
to form Popper’s conception of (critical) rationality, a general meth-
odology for solving problems or making progress. As Popper puts it in 
L.Sc.D.: “inter- subjective testing is merely a very important aspect of the 
more general idea of inter- subjective criticism, or in other words, of the 
idea of mutual rational control by critical discussion” (1959, p. 44, note 
1*). But in order to make sense of the idea of severe testing in science, 
we need to see the experimentalist as having at least the germ of an 
idea for a rival theory up his sleeve (otherwise testing might degener-
ate into performing essentially the same experiment again and again). 
This means experiments are always crucial experiments, attempts at try-
ing to decide between two competing theories. Theoretical pluralism 
is necessary for science to be genuinely empirical. And, more gener-
ally, in order to criticize an idea, one needs to have a rival idea in mind. 
Rationality, as construed by Popper, requires plurality of ideas, values, 
ways of life. Thus, for Popper, the rational society is the open society. 
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Given pre- Popperian conceptions of reason, with their emphasis on 
proof rather than criticism (and associated plurality of ideas), the idea 
that the rational society is the open society is almost a contradiction in 
terms. There is thus a very close link between L.Sc.D., on the one hand, 
and O.S.E., P.H. and C.R. on the other. And the direction of argument 
does not go in just one direction, from L.Sc.D. to O.S.E.: it goes in the 
other direction as well. For in O.S.E. (1966a, vol. 1, ch. 10), Popper 
argues that rationality, and scientific rationality as well, need to be con-
ceived of in social and institutional terms (and the argument is echoed 
in P.H., in connection with a discussion about the conditions required 
for scientific progress to be possible). O.S.E., P.H. and C.R. illuminate 
and enrich the doctrines of L.Sc.D.
Above, in connection with the discussion of L.Sc.D., it was argued 
that Popper’s falsificationism ultimately fails, because of its failure to 
exclude highly falsifiable but grossly ad hoc theories from science. The 
scientific enterprise is obliged to conjecture that the universe is more 
or less comprehensible, having some kind of unified dynamic structure, 
only those theories being tentatively accepted which satisfy (a) empiri-
cal considerations, and (b) considerations having to do with simplicity, 
unity, comprehensibility. As science proceeds, we improve our (conjec-
tural) knowledge of the kind of comprehensible unity which may exist in 
nature; the aim of science improves, and with it the methods of science. 
There is, in other words, a kind of positive feedback between improving 
knowledge and improving aims and methods, improving knowledge 
about how to improve knowledge. Science adapts its nature to what it 
finds out about the nature of the universe (which helps to account for the 
almost explosive growth of scientific knowledge).
This “evolving- aims- and- methods” view of science modifies quite 
considerably Popper’s falsificationism. When generalized, it leads to an 
“evolving- aims- and- methods” view of rationality which in turn modifies 
quite considerably Popper’s critical rationalism. These modifications, if 
adopted, have far- reaching implications for central doctrines of Popper’s 
L.Sc.D., O.S.E., P.H. and C.R. (see Chapters  2– 7 and 10, and Maxwell, 
1984a, 1998, 2004a, 2017a, 2017b).
1.10 Popper’s later work
Work published by Popper after C.R., though containing much of great 
value, is not, perhaps, in quite the same league as that of his first four 
books. Much of this work restates, extends and further applies earlier 
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ideas. Where Popper’s subsequent work launches forth in new direc-
tions, these are not always well chosen. Battles against subjectivity, anti- 
realism and physical determinism lure Popper into defending opposing 
views that are exaggerated, sometimes, almost to the point of absurdity. 
A subtle shift of perspective, of allegiance, can be discerned as we move 
from Popper’s earlier to his later work. In his early work, Popper speaks 
up on behalf of humanity, on behalf of any concerned person of good 
will, and against those traditional “great thinkers” and “experts” who 
threaten to beguile us and lead us to disaster. In his later work, the alle-
giances have shifted; now Popper speaks up on behalf of great science 
and great scientists, and against fraudulent academics, mostly philoso-
phers and social scientists.
In 1970 there appeared Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, 
edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, the fourth volume of the 
proceedings of a conference on philosophy of science held in London in 
1968. This volume is devoted to a comparison of the views of Thomas 
Kuhn and Popper on the philosophy of science, and contains contribu-
tions from Kuhn, Popper, Watkins, Toulmin, Lakatos, Feyerabend and 
others. In his contribution Popper praises Kuhn for having discovered 
normal science, science which takes some “paradigm” for granted and 
devotes itself to puzzle solving. Popper points out that he had himself 
made the same discovery over thirty years earlier, as recorded in the 
preface to L.Sc.D. But the normal scientist “has been badly taught. He 
has been taught in a dogmatic spirit:  he is the victim of indoctrina-
tion”. Normal science is “a danger to science and, indeed, to our civili-
zation” (Popper, 1970, p. 53).
In 1972 Popper published a second collection of his essays entitled 
Objective Knowledge. One of the essays makes the good point that common 
sense tends to combine two incompatible theses: common sense realism, 
and the epistemological view that knowledge comes flooding into our 
minds via the senses, rather like water being poured into a bucket  – a 
view which Popper dubs “the bucket theory of the mind”. Popper argues 
that these two theses clash, and that philosophers, registering this clash, 
have all too often held on to the bucket theory and rejected realism. But 
this, Popper argues, is exactly the wrong thing to do; one should hold on 
to realism, and reject the bucket theory.
Much of the rest of the book is devoted to developing and defend-
ing Popper’s three- world view. There are, according to this view, three 
worlds: the physical world (world 1), the psychological or mental world 
(world 2), and the world of objective theories, propositions, arguments 
and problems (world 3). World 3 interacts with world 1 via world  2. 
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Popper argues that this interaction is demonstrated by the fact that 
scientific theories lead to new technology, world 1 phenomena, which 
would not exist were it not for the prior development of world 3 theo-
ries. Popper puts world 3 into a biological and evolutionary context: like 
the webs, nests and dams created by spiders, birds and beavers, so too 
world 3 is our creation but, once created, it acquires an objective exis-
tence independent of us.
This theme is continued in Popper’s contribution to The Self and Its 
Brain (S.B.) (1977) a book written with the neurologist John Eccles. In 
this work, Popper develops a sustained argument in support of interac-
tionism and his three- world view, and criticizes materialism, physical-
ism and the thesis that the physical world is (causally) closed. There is 
also an interesting chapter on the history of the mind- body problem, in 
which Popper argues for the questionable thesis that the problem was 
recognized independently of, and before the arrival of, anything like the 
modern scientific view of the world.
What is one to make of this three- world view? Popper is surely right 
to hold that the contents of theories need to be distinguished from their 
linguistic forms (and from the causal effects these linguistic forms can 
have on appropriately educated brains). Popper is also right, surely, to 
stress that in order to make human sense of human action, we need to 
attend to the contents of theories. But it is quite another matter to argue, 
as Popper does, that world 3 entities, such as contents of theories, exist 
as full- blooded, almost Platonic entities, poltergeistic intellectual objects 
capable of influencing material phenomena via their influence on con-
scious minds. Popper overlooks or ignores the possibility that the material 
world may be causally closed but not explanatorily closed. He overlooks, 
that is, the possibility that physical phenomena, such as those associated 
with human actions and human technology, can be explained and under-
stood in two distinct (but perhaps interdependent) ways: (1) physically 
and causally, in terms of physical theory, and (2) “personalistically”, in 
terms of the intentions, plans and ideas of people. Such a view would 
hold that personalistic explanation is compatible with, but not reducible 
to, physical explanation. This view would give to the contents of theories 
a vital role in the (personalistic) explanation of human actions and the 
development of technology, without in any way undermining the exis-
tence, in principle, of a purely physical, causal explanation of physical 
phenomena associated with human action and technology (see Maxwell, 
2001a, ch. 5; 2016a, pp. 195– 200).
Popper insists that his world 3 entities differ from Plato’s Forms in 
that they are man- made, they consist of theories, including false theories, 
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and problems, rather than reified concepts or essences, and there is no 
suggestion that world 3 objects can be known with certainty (Popper 
and Eccles, 1977, pp. 43– 4). But even if Popper’s world 3 entities do not 
have implausible epistemological Platonic features, they most certainly 
have highly implausible ontological and causal Platonic features, in that 
they have causal effects on the material world (via their influence on con-
scious minds). That the elderly Popper should espouse such an implau-
sible Platonic doctrine almost seems like Plato’s revenge for the youthful 
Popper’s onslaught against him.
Chapter three of Objective Knowledge is called “Epistemology 
Without a Knowing Subject”. Despite the title, Popper does not alto-
gether neglect the personal dimension of the search for knowledge. What 
he does argue is that subjective knowledge is irrelevant to the study of 
scientific knowledge, only knowledge construed in objective, imper-
sonal, world 3 terms being important. But this downplays the point that 
all of objective knowledge, stored in books and libraries, is of value only 
in so far as it is understood and used by people. Albert Einstein once 
remarked: “Knowledge exists in two forms – lifeless, stored in books, and 
alive in the consciousness of men. The second form of existence is after 
all the essential one; the first, indispensable as it may be, occupies only 
an inferior position” (Einstein, 1973, p.  80). Einstein’s priorities seem 
saner than later Popper’s. And altogether saner, more humane and down- 
to- earth than elderly Popper’s spooky world 3 objects, is the viewpoint 
of the more youthful Popper of O.S.E., which sees science and reason in 
personal, social and institutional terms, without any appeal being made 
to ghostly, quasi- Platonic Forms.
In 1974 Popper became the fourteenth subject of The Library of 
Living Philosophers, edited by P. A. Schilpp. This two- volume work opens 
with Popper’s “Intellectual Autobiography”  – subsequently published 
independently as Unended Quest (1976a)  – continues with descrip-
tive and critical papers on diverse aspects of Popper’s work, by Quine, 
Putnam, Lakatos, Medawar, Watkins, Ayer, Margenau, Grünbaum, Kuhn 
and others, and concludes with Popper’s replies. Unended Quest is a fasci-
nating book, and gives a gripping account of Popper’s lifelong, passionate 
engagement with his fundamental problems and concerns. It includes a 
marvellous discussion of the development of polyphonic music, and pro-
vides an account of Popper’s battles with subjectivism in physics in con-
nection with quantum theory, and with thermodynamics and the arrow 
of time. Popper also declares that it was he who killed logical positivism. 
This book, together with C.R., provides the best introduction to Popper’s 
philosophy.
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In 1982– 3 there appeared The Postscript to The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery, a three- volume work which extends and elaborates doctrines 
and arguments of L.Sc.D., and much of which was written in the years 
1951– 6. The work reached the stage of proofs in 1956– 7, but was aban-
doned because Popper suffered from detached retinas and had opera-
tions on both eyes, his sight for a time in question. It was only much later, 
under the editorship of W. W. Bartley III, and after some additions and 
rewriting, that the work finally appeared.
Volume one, entitled Realism and the Aim of Science (1983), restates 
and elaborates Popper’s earlier views and arguments concerning induc-
tion, falsification, corroboration, demarcation, realism, metaphysics and 
probability. At one point Popper illuminatingly contrasts how a scientific 
paper might be written in the style of inductivism, and in the critical, 
problem- solving approach of falsificationism and critical rationalism 
(see pp. 47– 51).
Volume two, entitled The Open Universe:  An Argument for 
Indeterminism (1982a), sets out to refute determinism. Popper distin-
guishes between “scientific” and metaphysical determinism. “Scientific” 
determinism asserts that future states of physical systems can be pre-
dicted with any degree of precision by means of theories and initial 
conditions specified with sufficient precision (see p.  36). Metaphysical 
determinism asserts merely that “all events in this world are fixed, or 
unalterable, or predetermined” (p.  8). Popper spells out an argument 
which, he claims, refutes scientific determinism. Even given a universe 
in which all events occur in accordance with a deterministic physical the-
ory, T, nevertheless a predictor, put within an isolated system, could not 
predict all future states of the system with unlimited precision. Even if 
such a predictor had unprecedented powers to acquire knowledge of ini-
tial conditions, and make predictions using T, nevertheless it could not 
acquire up- to- date information about its own state, because the attempt 
to do so would continually alter its state. This means it would not be pos-
sible for the predictor to predict future states of the system of which it 
forms a part. Popper goes on to argue against metaphysical determinism.
Although full of interesting points, there are two oddities about 
this discussion. First, as Popper admits, his refutation of “scientific” 
determinism does not refute a second version of “scientific” determin-
ism which asserts that past states of physical systems can be predicted, 
employing prior initial conditions and physical theory. Second, Popper 
ignores a rather different third version of “scientific” determinism, 
which asserts that the universe is such that there is a discoverable, 
true, physical “theory of everything”, T, which is deterministic. This 
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version of determinism deserves to be called “scientific”, because T is 
asserted by it to be scientifically discoverable; furthermore, once dis-
covered, T will be falsifiable, and hence, by Popper’s own standards, 
scientific. It is curious that Popper, who is elsewhere (as we have seen) 
opposed to instrumentalism and in favour of realism, should here 
discuss at length a version of “scientific” determinism which is thor-
oughly instrumentalistic in character, in that it makes assertions about 
predictability, and should ignore a version of “scientific” determinism 
which is much more in keeping with scientific realism, in that it makes 
an assertion about the nature of the universe. This oversight seriously 
weakens Popper’s argument for indeterminism.
1.11 Quantum Theory
Volume three of The Postscript is called Quantum Theory and the Schism 
in Physics (Q.T.S.P.) (1982b). It is concerned with quantum theory and 
probability, interconnected issues which preoccupied Popper, on and off, 
throughout his working life.
Thus in Logik der Forschung (1934), Popper tackled two problems 
concerning probability: How are probabilistic statements or theories to 
be interpreted? And how can probabilistic theories be falsifiable given 
that they are in principle “impervious to falsification”? In response to 
the first problem, Popper defended a version of von Mises’ objective, 
frequency interpretation of probability. In response to the second, he 
insisted that probabilistic statements become falsifiable as a result of a 
methodological decision to treat them as falsifiable.
Logik der Forschung also devoted a chapter to problems of quantum 
theory. The main task is to criticize Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s orthodox 
interpretation of quantum theory (which gives equal weight to the two 
“complementary” pictures of particle and wave), and to provide an alter-
native which interprets the theory as an objective, realistic statistical the-
ory about particles. Popper criticizes Heisenberg’s interpretation of his 
uncertainty relations, which interprets these relations as placing restric-
tions on (simultaneous) measurement. Popper argues that these rela-
tions need to be interpreted as “scatter relations”, restricting what can 
be predicted, and not what can be measured. Indeed, Popper argues, not 
only can we make measurements – for example, simultaneous measure-
ments of position and momentum – that are more precise than allowed 
by the uncertainty relations as interpreted by Heisenberg, we need to do 
this in order to test these relations.
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These issues are restated and further developed in The Postscript, 
taking into account relevant developments in quantum physics itself, 
such as John Bell’s proof that local hidden variable versions of quantum 
theory cannot reproduce all the predictions of orthodox quantum theory, 
and experiments, such as those of Aspect, which seem to have refuted 
these local hidden variable theories. The main change in Popper’s views 
is his development of his “propensity” interpretation of probability, and 
his application of this to quantum theory.
Popper’s propensity idea is perhaps best understood in terms of an 
example. Consider tossing a die on a table. There is a certain probability 
of obtaining a six, which may or may not equal 1/ 6. This is determined 
by such things as properties of the die (e.g. whether or not it is made of 
a homogeneous material), the procedure for tossing and the properties 
of the table. It is this combination of properties that is, for Popper, the 
propensity:  it is a property, determining a probability associated with 
some repeatable event (such as tossing the die), “of the whole repeatable 
experimental arrangement” (Popper, 1982b, p.  71). In particular, then, 
the probabilistic statements of quantum theory can be interpreted as 
attributing propensities, not to individual electrons or photons as such, 
but rather to electrons or photons in the context of some specific, repeat-
able measurement.
Popper’s views on quantum theory have been criticized by Paul 
Feyerabend (1968– 9), on the grounds that Popper fiercely criticizes 
Bohr but ends up defending a view very close to Bohr’s. Because propen-
sities are properties defined in terms of experimental arrangements, this 
means that Popper’s propensity interpretation of quantum theory, just 
like Bohr’s interpretation, brings in measurement in an essential way. 
Popper’s reply is that propensities relate to “physical situations” which 
may, but need not be, experimental arrangements (Popper, 1982b, 
p. 71). But this reply fails in two ways. First, the probabilistic predictions 
of standard quantum theory are restricted to measurements. If these pre-
dictions are to include “physical situations” that are not measurements, 
then they need to be specified, and need to have specified quantum 
observables associated with them, so that definite probabilistic predic-
tions may be forthcoming: Popper provides nothing of this. Second, even 
if Popper did extend the interpretation of quantum theory in the way just 
indicated, the result would be a version of quantum theory which would 
reproduce most of the serious defects of the theory given Bohr’s inter-
pretation. These defects include being vague, ambiguous, ad hoc and 
non- explanatory, all resulting from the fact that the theory is made up 
of two incoherent parts, a quantum mechanical part, and a classical part 
specifying measurement or specific “physical situations”.
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It may, however, be possible to overcome these defects by modi-
fying Popper’s propensity version of quantum theory, so that quantum 
propensities determine probabilistically how quantum entities, such as 
electrons and photons, interact with each other (rather than with clas-
sically described, macroscopic, measuring instruments or “physical sit-
uations”). But this leads to a fully micro- realistic propensity version of 
quantum theory, very different from Popper’s version (see Chapter 8, and 
Maxwell, 1982, 1988, 1994a, 2011a). Quantum theory emerges as a the-
ory that is about, not particles, but a new kind of probabilistic entity, the 
“propensiton” (as it may be called), which is neither a particle nor a wave, 
even though it has some features of both. Furthermore, according to such 
a version of quantum theory, probabilistic transitions involve something 
like “wave- packet collapse” as a real physical process:  for Popper, any 
such idea is just another part of “the great quantum muddle”. But what 
this indicates is that here, as elsewhere in his work, Popper’s ideas, even 
when wrong or inadequate, are nevertheless rich in fruitful suggestions 
and implications for further development.
1.12 Final years and reputation
After The Postscript, a number of collections of essays have appeared, 
restating and elaborating themes already indicated:  A World of 
Propensities (1990), In Search of a Better World (1992), The Myth of the 
Framework (1994), Knowledge and the Body- Mind Problem (1994), Lesson 
of this Century (1997), The World of Parmenides (1998), All Life is Problem 
Solving (1999), and After the Open Society (2008).
Popper was knighted in 1965, and became a Companion of Honour 
in 1982. He retired from his position at the LSE in 1969. He became a 
Fellow of the Royal Society in 1976. Popper’s wife, Hennie, died in 1985, 
after a long struggle with cancer. In his later years, Popper was show-
ered with academic honours of various kinds:  membership of many 
academic societies, honorary degrees, conferences dedicated to his 
philosophy, and honours, medals and prizes from various sources (see 
Miller, 1997, pp. 403– 6). Popper died a week after a serious operation, 
on 17 September 1994.
Popper’s reputation, after his death, has suffered a curious fate. 
Most philosophers and philosophers of science recognize the significance 
of Popper’s work for twentieth- century philosophy of science, but seem 
to hold that it has little to contribute to the field in the second decade 
of the twenty- first century. Popper has become somewhat passé. Many 
scientists, on the other hand, hold Popper in high esteem, and even call 
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upon his work during the course of debates about scientific matters – a 
point made recently by Godfrey- Smith (2016, p. 104).
As far as Popper’s reputation among philosophers is concerned, 
a part of the problem is that too few philosophers have responded to a 
central feature and claim of Popper’s work:  that the basic task of phi-
losophy is to tackle, and try to help solve, urgent, fundamental prob-
lems that have their roots outside the discipline, in science, politics, the 
arts, the environment, education – problems which, if solved, may well 
have widespread fruitful implications for such diverse fields. And as far 
as the philosophy of science is concerned, the discipline has developed 
in the twenty- first century in ways that would have horrified Popper. 
Philosophy of science has increasingly succumbed to what was, for him, 
the ultimate intellectual sin: specialization. It has fragmented into phi-
losophy of physics, biology, chemistry, psychology, neuroscience and so 
on – mirroring specialization in science, and doing nothing to counter-
act it. The fundamental problems about the nature of the cosmos, our 
place in the cosmos, and our knowledge and understanding of it, that so 
gripped Popper’s imagination, are increasingly ignored.
In the rest of this book, I set out to subject Popper’s ideas to fero-
cious criticism in an attempt to improve them. It will emerge that 
Popper’s ideas about science, reason, quantum theory, academic inquiry, 
how to make progress towards a more civilized world, all need radical 
revision. In order to do justice to what is best in Popper’s philosophy, 
some of its tenets must be rejected – including what is, perhaps, its most 
famous tenet, the principle of demarcation. My hope is that Popper’s 
whole approach to doing philosophy will come to be seen as highly rele-
vant to the tasks that face us today: to provoke the thought of humanity 
into tackling, imaginatively, critically, and fruitfully, the gigantic prob-
lems that confront the modern world. Freed of some deadwood, Popper’s 
work becomes highly relevant to today’s global problems, both practical 
and intellectual.
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2
Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and  
aim- oriented empiricism
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter I  argue that aim- oriented empiricism (AOE), a concep-
tion of natural science that I  have spelled out and defended at some 
length elsewhere,1 is a kind of synthesis of the views of Popper, Kuhn and 
Lakatos, but is also an improvement over the views of all three. Whereas 
Popper’s falsificationism protects metaphysical assumptions implicitly 
made by science from criticism, AOE exposes all such assumptions to sus-
tained criticism, and furthermore focuses criticism on those assumptions 
most likely to need revision if science is to make progress. Even though 
AOE is, in this way, more Popperian than Popper, it is also, in some 
respects, more like the views of Kuhn and Lakatos than falsificationism 
is. AOE is able, however, to solve problems which Popper’s, Kuhn’s and 
Lakatos’s views cannot solve.
AOE stems from the observation that theoretical physics per-
sistently accepts unified theories, even though endlessly many empiri-
cally more successful, but seriously disunified, ad hoc rivals can always 
be concocted. This persistent preference for and acceptance of unified 
theories, even against empirical considerations, means that physics 
makes a persistent untestable (metaphysical) assumption about the uni-
verse: the universe is such that no seriously disunified, ad hoc theory is 
true. Intellectual rigour demands that this substantial, influential, highly 
problematic and implicit assumption be made explicit, as a part of theo-
retical scientific knowledge, so that it can be critically assessed, so that 
alternative versions can be considered, in the hope that this will lead to 
an improved version of the assumption being developed and accepted. 
Physics is more rigorous when this implicit assumption is made explicit 
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even though there is no justification for holding the assumption to be 
true. Indeed, it is above all because there is no such justification, and 
the assumption is substantial, influential, highly problematic and all too 
likely to be false, that it becomes especially important to implement the 
above requirement for rigour, and make the implicit (and probably false) 
assumption explicit.
Once it is conceded that physics does persistently assume that the 
universe is such that all seriously disunified theories are false, two funda-
mental problems immediately arise. What precisely ought this assump-
tion to be interpreted to be asserting about the universe? Granted that 
the assumption is a pure conjecture, substantial and influential but bereft 
of any kind of justification, and thus all too likely in its current form to be 
false, how can rival versions of the assumption be rationally assessed, so 
that what is accepted by physics is improved?
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meta-knowabiligy
Current scientific knowledge
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Figure 2.1 Aim- oriented empiricism (Source: author)
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AOE is designed to solve, or help solve, these two problems. The 
basic idea is that we need to see physics (and science more generally) 
as making not one, but a hierarchy of assumptions concerning the unity, 
comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, the assumptions 
becoming less and less substantial as one goes up the hierarchy, and thus 
becoming more and more likely to be true (see Figure 2.1). The idea is 
that in this way we separate out what is most likely to be true, and not in 
need of revision, at and near the top of the hierarchy, from what is most 
likely to be false, and most in need of criticism and revision, near the 
bottom of the hierarchy. Evidence, at level 1, and assumptions high up in 
the hierarchy, are rather firmly accepted, as being most likely to be true 
(although still open to revision); this is then used to criticize, and to try 
to improve, theses at levels 2 and 3 (and perhaps 4), where falsity is most 
likely to be located.
At the top there is the relatively insubstantial assumption that the 
universe is such that we can acquire some knowledge of our local circum-
stances, sufficient to make life possible. If this assumption is false, we will 
not be able to acquire knowledge whatever we assume. We are justified 
in accepting this assumption permanently as a part of our knowledge, 
even though we have no grounds for holding it to be true. As we descend 
the hierarchy, the assumptions become increasingly substantial and thus 
increasingly likely to be false. At level 6 there is the assumption that the 
universe is such that we can discover how to improve methods for the 
improvement of knowledge. At level 5 there is the rather more substan-
tial assumption that the universe is comprehensible in some way or other, 
the universe being such that there is just one kind of explanation for all 
phenomena. At level 4 there is the more specific, and thus more substan-
tial assumption that the universe is physically comprehensible, it being 
such that there is some yet- to- be- discovered, true, unified “theory of 
everything”. At level 3 there is the even more specific, and thus even more 
substantial, assumption that the universe is physically comprehensible in 
a more or less specific way, suggested by current accepted fundamental 
physical theories. Examples of assumptions made at this level, taken from 
the history of physics, include the following. The universe is made up of 
rigid corpuscles that interact by contact; it is made up of point- atoms that 
interact at a distance by means of rigid, spherically symmetrical forces; 
it is made up of a unified field; it is made up of a unified quantum field; 
it is made up of quantum strings. Given the historical record of dramati-
cally changing ideas at this level, and given the relatively highly specific 
and substantial character of successive assumptions made at this level, 
we can be reasonably confident that the best assumption available at any 
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stage in the development of physics at this level will be false, and will 
need future revision. At level 2 there are the accepted fundamental the-
ories of physics, currently Einstein’s theory of general relativity and the 
standard model.2 Here, if anything, we can be even more confident that 
current theories are false, despite their immense empirical success. This 
confidence comes partly from the vast empirical content of these theo-
ries, and partly from the historical record. The greater the content of a 
proposition the more likely it is to be false; the fundamental theories of 
physics, general relativity and the standard model have such vast empiri-
cal content that this in itself almost guarantees falsity. And the historical 
record backs this up: Kepler’s laws of planetary motion and Galileo’s laws 
of terrestrial motion are corrected by Newtonian theory, which is in turn 
corrected by special and general relativity; classical physics is corrected 
by quantum theory, in turn corrected by relativistic quantum theory, 
quantum field theory and the standard model. Each new theory in phys-
ics reveals that predecessors are false. Indeed, if the level 4 assumption 
of AOE is correct, then all current physical theories are false, since this 
assumption asserts that the true physical theory of everything is unified, 
and the totality of current fundamental physical theory, general relativity 
plus the standard model, is notoriously disunified. Finally, at level 1 there 
are accepted empirical data, low- level, corroborated, empirical laws.
In order to be acceptable, an assumption at any level from 6 to 3 
must (as far as possible) be compatible with, and a special case of, the 
assumption above in the hierarchy; at the same time it must be (or 
promise to be) empirically fruitful in the sense that successive accepted 
physical theories increasingly successfully accord with (or exemplify) 
the assumption. At level 2, those physical theories are accepted which 
are sufficiently (a)  empirically successful and (b)  in accord with the 
best available assumption at level 3 (or level 4). Corresponding to each 
assumption, at any level from 7 to 3, there is a methodological principle, 
represented by sloping dotted lines in the figure, requiring that theses 
lower down in the hierarchy are compatible with the given assumption.
When theoretical physics has completed its central task, and the 
true theory of everything, T, has been discovered, then T will (in prin-
ciple) successfully predict all empirical phenomena at level 1, and will 
entail the assumption at level 3, which will in turn entail the assumption 
at level 4, and so on up the hierarchy. As it is, physics has not completed its 
task, T has not (yet) been discovered, and we are ignorant of the nature 
of the universe. This ignorance is reflected in clashes between theses at 
different levels of AOE. There are clashes between levels 1 and 2, 2 and 3, 
and 3 and 4. The attempt to resolve these clashes drives physics forward.
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In seeking to resolve these clashes between levels, influences can 
go in both directions. Thus, given a clash between levels 1 and 2, this 
may lead to the modification or replacement of the relevant theory at 
level 2; but, on the other hand, it may lead to the discovery that the rel-
evant experimental result is not correct for any of a number of possible 
reasons, and needs to be modified. In general, however, such a clash 
leads to the rejection of the level 2 theory rather than the level 1 exper-
imental result; the latter are held onto more firmly than the former, in 
part because experimental results have vastly less empirical content than 
theories, in part because of our confidence in the results of observation 
and direct experimental manipulation (especially after expert critical 
examination). Again, given a clash between levels 2 and 3, this may lead 
to the rejection of the relevant level 2 theory (because it is disunified, ad 
hoc, at odds with the current metaphysics of physics); but, on the other 
hand, it may lead to the rejection of the level 3 assumption and the adop-
tion, instead, of a new assumption (as has happened a number of times in 
the history of physics, as we have seen). The rejection of the current level 
3 assumption is likely to take place if the level 2 theory, which clashes 
with it, is highly successful empirically, and furthermore has the effect of 
increasing unity in the totality of fundamental physical theory overall, so 
that clashes between levels 2 and 4 are decreased. In general, however, 
clashes between levels 2 and 3 are resolved by the rejection or modifica-
tion of theories at level 2 rather than the assumption at level 3, in part 
because of the vastly greater empirical content of level 2 theories, in part 
because of the empirical fruitfulness of the level 3 assumption (in the 
sense indicated above).
It is conceivable that the clash between level 2 theories and the 
level 4 assumption might lead to the revision of the latter rather than the 
former. This happened when Galileo rejected the then current level  4 
assumption of Aristotelianism, and replaced it with the idea that “the 
book of nature is written in the language of mathematics” (an early 
 precursor of our current level 4 assumption). The whole idea of AOE is, 
however, that as we go up the hierarchy of assumptions we are increas-
ingly unlikely to encounter error, and the need for revision. The higher 
up we go, the more firmly assumptions are upheld, the more resistance 
there is to modification.
AOE is put forward as a framework which makes explicit meta-
physical assumptions implicit in the manner in which physical theories 
are accepted and rejected, and which, at the same time, facilitates the 
critical assessment and improvement of these assumptions with the 
improvement of knowledge, criticism being concentrated where it is 
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most needed, low down in the hierarchy. Within a framework of rela-
tively insubstantial, unproblematic and permanent assumptions and 
methods (high up in the hierarchy), much more substantial, problematic 
assumptions and associated methods (low down in the hierarchy) can 
be revised and improved with improving theoretical knowledge. There 
is something like positive feedback between improving knowledge and 
improving (low- level) assumptions and methods  – that is, knowledge- 
about- how- to- improve- knowledge. Science adapts its nature, its assump-
tions and methods, to what it discovers about the nature of the universe. 
This, I suggest, is the nub of scientific rationality, and the methodological 
key to the great success of modern science.
The above is intended to be an introductory account of AOE. Further 
clarifications and details will emerge below when I come to expound AOE 
again during the course of arguing that the position can be construed to 
be a kind of synthesis of, and improvement over, the views of Popper, 
Kuhn and Lakatos.
In what follows I begin with Karl Popper and argue that AOE can 
be seen to emerge as a result of modifying Popper’s falsificationism3 to 
remove defects inherent in that position. AOE does not, however, break 
with the spirit of Popper’s work; far from committing the Popperian sin 
of “justificationism”, AOE is even more Popperian than Popper, in that 
it is a conception of science which exposes more to effective criticism 
than falsificationism does. Falsificationism, in comparison, shields sub-
stantial, influential and problematic scientific assumptions from criticism 
within science. Whereas falsificationism fails to solve what may be called 
the “methodological” problem of induction, AOE successfully solves the 
problem. And, associated with that success, AOE also solves the problem 
of what it means to assert of a physical theory that it is “simple”, “explan-
atory” or “unified”, a problem which falsificationism fails to solve.
The conception of science expounded by Thomas Kuhn in his The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970a) shares important elements 
with Popper’s falsificationism. The big difference is that whereas Kuhn 
holds that “normal science” is an important, healthy and entirely ratio-
nal (indeed, the most rational) part of science, Popper regards normal 
science as “dogmatic”, the result of bad education and “indoctrination”, 
something that is “a danger to science and, indeed, to our civilization” 
(Popper, 1970, p. 53). It is the apparent persistent dogmatism of normal 
science  – the persistent retention of the current paradigm in the teeth 
of ostensible empirical refutations – that is so irrational, so unscientific, 
when viewed from a falsificationist perspective. AOE, however, though 
subjecting scientific assumptions to even greater critical scrutiny than 
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Popper’s falsificationism, turns out to have features which are, in some 
respects, closer to Kuhn than to Popper. For, according to AOE, substantial 
and influential metaphysical assumptions are persistently accepted as a 
part of scientific knowledge in a way which seems much closer to the way 
paradigms are accepted, according to Kuhn, during normal science, than 
to the way falsifiable theories are to be treated in science, according to 
Popper. AOE depicts science as, quite properly, proceeding in a way that 
is reminiscent, in important respects, of Kuhn’s normal science, some-
thing that is anathema to Popper’s falsificationism. At the same time, 
AOE is free of some of the serious defects inherent in Kuhn’s conception 
of science. Even though AOE science mimics some aspects of Kuhnian 
normal science, it nevertheless entirely lacks the harmful dogmatism of 
this kind of science, and avoids problems that arise from Kuhn’s insis-
tence that successive paradigms are “incommensurable”.
Imre Lakatos’s “methodology of scientific research programmes”4 
was invented, specifically, to do justice both to Popper’s insistence on the 
fundamental importance of subjecting scientific theories to persistent, 
ruthless attempted empirical refutation, and to Kuhn’s insistence on the 
importance of preserving accepted paradigms from refutation, scientists, 
not paradigms, being under test when ostensible refutations arise. It is, 
like AOE, a kind synthesis of the ideas of Popper and Kuhn. Just as AOE 
incorporates elements of Popper and Kuhn, so too it incorporates elements 
of Lakatos’s research programme methodology. At the same time, AOE is 
an improvement over Lakatos’s view; it solves problems which Lakatos’s 
view is unable to solve. Whereas Lakatos’s view provides no means for 
the assessment of “hard cores” (Lakatos’s “paradigms”) other than by 
means of the empirical success and failure of the research programmes to 
which they give rise, AOE specifies a way in which “hard cores” (or their 
equivalent) can be rationally, but fallibly assessed, independent of the 
kind of empirical considerations to which Lakatos is restricted. This 
has important implications for the question of whether or not there is a 
rational method of discovery. It also has important implications for the 
strength of scientific method. For Lakatos, notoriously, scientific method 
could only decide which of two competing research programmes was the 
better long after the event, when one had proved to be vastly superior, 
empirically, to the other. “Minerva’s owl flies at night,” as Lakatos put it, 
echoing Hegel. AOE provides a much more decisive methodology than 
Lakatos’s, one which is able to deliver verdicts when they are needed, 
and not long after the event.
It may be thought that yet another critique of Popper, Kuhn and 
Lakatos is unnecessary, given the flood of literature that has appeared 
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on the subject in the last 40 years or so.5 My reply to this objection comes 
in two parts.
First, nowhere in this large body of critical literature can one find 
the particular line of criticism developed in the present chapter.6 This line 
of criticism is, furthermore, especially fundamental and insightful in that 
it reveals, as other criticisms do not, what needs to be done radically to 
improve the views of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos. Second, the improved 
view, namely AOE, that emerges from the criticism to be expounded 
here, has been entirely overlooked by the body of literature discussing 
and criticizing Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos. This is the decisive point. It is 
not enough merely to show that the views of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos 
are defective. What really matters is to develop a view that overcomes 
these defects. That is what I set out to do here.
It is also true that, during the last 30 years, a substantial body of 
work has emerged on scientific method quite generally.7 In none of these 
works does one find the criticism of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, expressed 
below, or the synthesis, namely AOE, which emerges from this criticism.8 
Furthermore, the methodological views developed in the works just cited 
all fall to the line of criticism deployed against Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos 
in the present chapter. There is no space to develop this last point here: it 
is, however, spelled out in Maxwell (1998, ch. 2) as far as works up to 
that date are concerned. One implication, then, of the present chapter 
is that philosophy of science took a wrong turning around 1974 when it 
failed to take up the line of argument spelled out here, an early version of 
which is to be found in Maxwell (1974).
2.2 Karl Popper
As I mentioned in the last chapter, Popper held that science proceeds by 
putting forward empirically falsifiable conjectures which are then sub-
jected to severe attempts at falsification by means of observation and 
experiment. Scientific theories cannot be verified by experience, but they 
can be falsified. Once a theory is falsified, scientists have the task of devel-
oping a potentially better theory, even more falsifiable than its predeces-
sor, at least as ostensibly empirically successful as its predecessor, and 
such that it is corroborated where its predecessor was falsified. In order 
to be accepted (tentatively) as a part of conjectural scientific knowledge, 
a theory must (at least) be empirically falsifiable. Non- falsifiable, meta-
physical theses are meaningful, and may influence the direction of scien-
tific research. There can even be what Popper has called “metaphysical 
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research programmes”  – programmes of research “indispensable for 
science, although their character is that of metaphysical or speculative 
physics rather than of scientific physics … more in the nature of myths, 
or of dreams, than of science” (Popper, 1982a, p. 165). For Popper, meta-
physical (that is, unfalsifiable) theses cannot be a part of (conjectural) 
scientific knowledge; such theses cannot help determine what is accepted 
and rejected as (conjectural) scientific knowledge, but they can influence 
ideas, choice of research aims and problems, in the context of scientific 
discovery. (For further details see Popper 1959, 1963, 1983).
Popper defended two distinct versions of falsificationism which, 
echoing terminology of Maxwell (1998), I  shall call bare and dressed 
falsificationism. According to bare falsificationism, defended in Popper 
(1959), only empirical considerations, and such things as the falsi-
fiability of theories and degrees of falsifiability, decide what is to be 
accepted and rejected in science. According to dressed falsificationism, 
a new theory, in order to be acceptable, “should proceed from some 
simple, new, and powerful, unifying idea about some connection or rela-
tion (such as gravitational attraction) between hitherto unconnected 
things (such as planets and apples) or facts (such as inertial and gravi-
tational mass) or new ‘theoretical entities’ (such as field and particles)” 
(Popper, 1963, p.  241). This “requirement of simplicity” (as Popper 
calls it) is in addition to anything specified in The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery (L.Sc.D.). In L.Sc.D. Popper does, it is true, demand of a the-
ory that it should be as simple as possible, but Popper there identifies 
degree of simplicity of a theory with degree of falsifiability. (There is a 
second, related notion, but Popper makes clear that if the two clash it is 
the falsifiability notion, just indicated, which takes priority [see Popper, 
1959, p. 130]). Thus, in L.Sc.D., in requiring of an acceptable theory 
that it should be as simple as possible, Popper is demanding no more 
than that it should be as falsifiable as possible. But Popper’s “require-
ment of simplicity” of his Conjectures and Refutations (C.R.) (1963) is 
wholly in addition to falsifiability. A  theory of high falsifiability may 
not “proceed from some simple, new, and powerful unifying idea”, and 
vice versa. We thus have two versions of falsificationism before us: bare 
falsificationism of Popper’s L.Sc.D. (1959), and dressed falsificationism 
of C.R. (1963, ch. 10), with the new “requirement of simplicity” added 
on to the 1959 doctrine.
I now give my argument for holding that neither doctrine is ten-
able. (I here elaborate the criticism of Popper sketched in the previous 
chapter.) My argument is not that Popper fails to show how theories can 
be verified, or rendered probable; nor is my argument that Popper fails to 
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show how scientific theories can be falsified, in that falsification requires 
the verification of a low- level falsifying hypothesis (which, according 
to Popper, is not possible).9 There is nothing “justificationist”, in other 
words, about my criticism.10 It amounts simply to this. Bare falsification-
ism fails dramatically to do justice to the way theories are selected in sci-
ence (entirely independently of any question of verification, justification 
or falsification). Dressed falsificationism does better justice to scientific 
practice, but commits science to making substantial, influential and 
problematic assumptions that remain implicit, and cannot adequately 
be made explicit within science. Science pursued in accordance with 
dressed falsificationism is irrational, in other words, because it fails to 
implement the elementary, and quasi- Popperian, requirement for ratio-
nality that “assumptions that are substantial, influential, problematic and 
implicit need to be made explicit, so that they can be critically assessed 
and so that alternatives may be put forward and considered, in the hope 
that such assumptions can be improved” (Maxwell, 1998, p. 21). Dressed 
falsificationism fails, in other words, for good Popperian reasons: it fails 
to expose substantial, influential, problematic assumptions to criticism 
within science.
2.3 Refutation of bare falsificationism
Here, then, in a little more detail, is my refutation of bare falsification-
ism. Given any accepted physical theory, at any stage in the development 
of physics, however empirically successful (however highly corrobo-
rated)  – Newtonian theory, say, or classical electrodynamics, quantum 
theory, general relativity, quantum electrodynamics, chromodynamics 
or the standard model  – there will always be endlessly many rival fal-
sifiable theories that can easily be formulated which will fit the available 
data just as well as the accepted theory. Taking Newtonian theory (NT) 
as an example of an accepted theory, here are two examples of rival the-
ories. NT*: “Everything occurs as NT asserts, until the first second of the 
year 2100, when an inverse cube law of gravitation will abruptly hold.” 
NT**: “Everything occurs as NT asserts, except for systems consisting of 
gold spheres, each having a mass of 1,000 tons, interacting with each 
other gravitationally in outer space, in a vacuum, within a spherical 
region of 10 miles: for these systems, Newton’s law of gravitation is repul-
sive, not attractive.” (For further examples and discussion, see Maxwell, 
1998, pp.  47– 54). It is easy to see that there are infinitely many such 
rivals to NT, just as empirically successful (at the moment) as NT. The 
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predictions of NT may be represented as points in a multidimensional 
space, each point corresponding to some specific kind of system (there 
being infinitely many points). NT has only been verified (corroborated) 
for a minute region of this space. In order to concoct a (grossly ad hoc) 
rival to NT, which is just as empirically successful as NT, all we need do is 
identify some region in this space that includes no prediction of NT that 
has been verified, and then modify the laws of NT arbitrarily, for just that 
identified region.
The crucial question now is this: On what basis does bare falsifica-
tionism reject all these falsifiable but unfalsified rival theories? According 
to bare falsificationism, T2 is to be accepted in preference to T1 if T1 has 
been falsified, T2 has greater empirical content (is more falsifiable) than 
T1, T2 successfully predicts all that T1 successfully predicts, T2 success-
fully predicts the phenomena that falsified T1, and T2 successfully pre-
dicts new phenomena not predicted by T1 (see Popper, 1959, pp. 81– 4 
and elsewhere). Given NT, it is a simple matter to concoct rival theories, 
of the above type, that satisfy all the above bare falsificationist require-
ments for being more acceptable than NT. Most accepted physical the-
ories yield empirical predictions that clash with experiments, and thus 
are ostensibly falsified. We can always concoct new theories, in the way 
just indicated, doctored to yield the “correct” predictions. We can add on 
independently testable auxiliary postulates, thus ensuring that the new 
theory has greater empirical content than the old one. And no doubt this 
excess content will be corroborated. For details of how this can be done, 
see Maxwell (1998, pp. 52– 4). Such theories are, of course, grossly ad 
hoc, grossly “aberrant” as I have called them, but they satisfy Popper’s 
(1959) requirements for being better theories than accepted physical 
theories.
It is worth noting that such “better” theories need not be quite 
as wildly ad hoc as the ones indicated above; sometimes such theo-
ries are actually put forward in the scientific literature, and yet are not 
taken seriously, even by their authors, let alone by the rest of the sci-
entific community. An example is an ad hoc version of NT put forward 
by Maurice Levy in 1890, which combined in an ad hoc way two dis-
tinct modifications of Newton’s law of gravitation, one based on the 
way Weber had proposed Coulomb’s law should be modified, the other 
based on the way Riemann had proposed Coulomb’s law should be 
modified (for details see North, 1965). By 1890, NT had been refuted 
by observation of the precession of the perihelion of the orbit of 
Mercury; attempts to salvage NT by postulating an additional planet, 
Vulcan, had failed. Levy’s theory successfully predicted all the success 
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of NT, and in addition successfully predicted the observed orbit of 
Mercury, just that which refuted NT; in addition, of course, it made 
predictions different from NT for further Sun– Mercury type systems 
not yet observed. Despite this, Levy’s theory was not taken seriously 
for a moment, not even by Levy himself. How can bare falsificationism 
recommend rejection of such ad hoc versions of NT when they satisfy 
all the requirements of bare falsificationism for being more accept-
able theories? No adequate answer is forthcoming, and it is this which 
spells the downfall of bare falsificationism  – as Popper may himself 
have realized when he put forward dressed falsificationism in his C.R. 
(1963, ch. 10).
Note, again, that this criticism of Popper has nothing justificational 
about it whatsoever: it simply points to the drastic failure of bare falsifi-
cationism to do justice to what actually goes on in physics.
It may be objected that ad hoc rivals to NT of the kind just consid-
ered are so silly, so crackpot, that they do not deserve to be taken seriously 
within physics.11 This is of course correct. The crucial point, however, is 
that bare falsificationism ought to be able to deliver this verdict, and this 
it singularly fails to do. Bare falsificationism actually declares of appro-
priately concocted ad hoc rivals to NT that these are better, more accept-
able than NT.
But can a criticism of Popper that appeals to such silly, crack-
pot theories be taken seriously? I  have two replies to this question. 
First, not all the ad hoc or aberrant variants are entirely silly. Levy’s 
theory is perhaps an example. There are degrees of ad hocness, from 
the utterly crackpot and absurd, to a degree of ad hocness so slight, 
so questionable, in comparison, that the issue of whether the theory 
really is ad hoc or not may be hotly disputed by physicists themselves. 
(Such disputes arise especially during scientific revolutions.) This is 
an important point which will have a bearing on the argument of the 
next section. Second, it is, I submit, the very silliness of these crackpot 
theories that makes the above criticism of Popper so serious. If bare 
falsificationism favoured T1 over T2, while most scientists favoured T2 
over T1, even though admitting that T1 is nevertheless a good theory, 
almost as acceptable as T2, bare falsificationism would not be in such 
trouble. What is lethal for bare falsificationism is that it declares T1 to 
be better than T2 in circumstances where scientists themselves (and all 
of us) can see that T2 is vastly superior to T1, T1 being grossly ad hoc, 
aberrant, wholly crackpot and silly. Bare falsificationism favours theo-
ries that receive, and deserve, instant rejection: there could scarcely be 
a more decisive falsification of falsificationism than that.
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2.4 Refutation of dressed falsificationism
Having argued that Popper’s (1959) bare falsificationism is untenable, 
I  turn my attention now to Popper’s (1963,  chapter  10) doctrine of 
dressed falsificationism. As I have mentioned, this adds on to the (1959) 
doctrine Popper’s new “requirement of simplicity” (Popper, 1963, p. 241) 
(see section 2.2 above).
As long as there is no serious ambiguity as to what proceeding “from 
some simple, new, and powerful, unifying idea” means, it is at once clear 
that the new doctrine is able to exclude from science all the empirically 
successful but ad hoc, aberrant, crackpot, silly theories, of the kind dis-
cussed above. They do not proceed “from some simple … unifying idea”, 
and are to be rejected on that account, whatever their empirical success 
may be, even if this empirical success is greater than accepted scientific 
theories.
However, adopting Popper’s new “principle of simplicity” as a 
basic methodological principle of science has the effect of permanently 
excluding from science all ad hoc theories that fail to satisfy the prin-
ciple, however empirically successful such theories might be if consid-
ered. This amounts to assuming permanently that the universe is such 
that all ad hoc theories that fail to satisfy Popper’s principle of simplic-
ity are false – granted that a basic aim of science is truth. It amounts to 
accepting, as a permanent item of scientific knowledge, the substantial 
metaphysical thesis that the universe is non- ad hoc, in the sense that all 
theories that fail to satisfy Popper’s principle of simplicity are false, how-
ever empirically successful they might turn out to be if considered. But 
this, of course, clashes with Popper’s criterion of demarcation: that no 
unfalsifiable, metaphysical thesis is to be accepted as a part of scientific 
knowledge.
If the demarcation principle is upheld, then the metaphysical 
thesis just indicated, asserting that the universe is non- ad hoc, remains 
implicit in the permanent adoption of Popper’s principle of simplicity as 
a basic methodological principle of science. (And this is the way Popper 
himself seems to have conceived the matter:  he says of metaphysical 
research programmes that they are “often held unconsciously”, and “are 
implicit in the theories and in the attitudes and judgements of the scien-
tists” [Popper, 1982b, p.  161].) But in leaving the metaphysical thesis 
of non- ad hocness implicit in the methodological principle of simplicity, 
science violates an elementary requirement for rationality, already men-
tioned, according to which “assumptions that are substantial, influential, 
problematic and implicit need to be made explicit, so that they can be 
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critically assessed and so that alternatives may be put forward and con-
sidered, in the hope that such assumptions can be improved” (Maxwell, 
1998, p.  21). The non- ad hoc metaphysical assumption may, after all, 
be false. We may need to adopt a modified version of the assumption. It 
may be essential for the progress of science that this assumption is mod-
ified. Just this turns out to be the case, given certain formulations of the 
assumption, as we shall see below. In leaving the non- ad hoc metaphys-
ical assumption implicit in the adoption of the methodological principle 
of simplicity, dressed falsificationism protects this substantial, influential 
and highly problematic assumption from criticism, from the active con-
sideration of alternatives.12
Dressed falsificationism fails, in other words, for good Popperian 
reasons:  it is inconsistent, in that the untestable, metaphysical thesis 
that the universe is non- ad hoc is accepted implicitly as a part of con-
jectural scientific knowledge, in conflict with the principle of demarca-
tion; and it lacks rigour, in that it protects this implicit, metaphysical 
assumption from explicit criticism within the intellectual domain of 
science.
Here again, it should be noted, there is nothing justificationist 
about this criticism of Popper’s dressed falsificationism. On the contrary, 
what the argument shows is that dressed falsificationism protects a sub-
stantial, influential, problematic but implicit assumption from criticism 
within science: Popper’s doctrine fails for the good Popperian reason of 
restricting criticism.
It may be objected that adopting Popper’s methodological princi-
ple of simplicity does not commit science to making a substantial meta-
physical assumption about the universe – namely that it is such that no 
falsifiable theory, however empirically successful, which fails to satisfy 
the principle, is true. But I do not see how such an objection can be valid. 
Suppose, instead of adopting Popper’s principle, science adopted the 
principle that in order to be acceptable, a new physical theory must pos-
tulate that the universe is made up of atoms. This methodological princi-
ple is upheld in such a way that even though theories are available which 
postulate fields rather than atoms, and which are much more empirically 
successful than any atomic theory, nevertheless these rival field theories 
are all excluded from science. Would it not be clear that science, in adopt-
ing and implementing the methodological principle of atomicity in this 
way, is making the assumption that the universe is made up of atoms, 
whether this is acknowledged or not? How can this be denied? Just the 
same holds if science adopts and implements Popper’s methodological 
principle of simplicity.
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Popper might have tried to wriggle out of accepting this conclusion 
by pointing to the fact that he only declared that a new theory, in order 
to be acceptable, “should” proceed from some simple, unifying idea. It 
is desirable, but not essential, that new theories should satisfy this prin-
ciple. The principle is relevant to the context of discovery, perhaps, but 
not to the context of acceptance and rejection. (It is a heuristic principle, 
not a methodological one.) But if Popper’s doctrine is interpreted in this 
way, it immediately fails to overcome the objections spelled out in section 
2.3 above. Either falsificationism adopts Popper’s principle of simplicity 
as a methodological principle, or it does not. If it does, it encounters the 
objections just indicated; if it does not, it encounters the objections of 
section 2.3.
2.5 From falsificationism to aim- oriented empiricism
The conclusion to be drawn from the argument of the last two sections 
is that science is more rational, more intellectually rigorous, if it makes 
explicit, as a criticizable tenet of (conjectural) scientific knowledge, that 
substantial, influential and problematic metaphysical thesis which is 
implicit in the way physics persistently rejects ad hoc theories, however 
empirically successful they may be.13 At once two important new prob-
lems leap to our attention. What, precisely, does this metaphysical thesis 
assert? And on what grounds is it to be (conjecturally) accepted as a part 
of scientific knowledge?
As far as the first of the above two problems is concerned, a wide 
range of metaphysical theses are available. As I  indicated in section 
2.3 above, ad hoc theories range from the utterly crackpot and silly, 
to theories that are only somewhat lacking in simplicity or unity. At 
one extreme, we might adopt a metaphysical thesis that excludes only 
utterly silly theories; at the other extreme, we might adopt the the-
sis that the universe is physically comprehensible in the sense that it 
has a unified dynamic structure, some yet- to- be- discovered unified 
physical “theory of everything” being true  – a thesis that I  shall call 
“physicalism”. We might even adopt some specific version of physical-
ism, which asserts that the underlying physical unity is of a specific 
type:  it is made up of a unified field perhaps, or a quantum field, or 
empty topologically complex curved space- time, or a quantum string 
field. Other things being equal, the more specific the thesis (and thus 
the more it excludes) so the more likely it is to be false, whereas the 
more unspecific it is so the more likely it is to be true. It is not, it seems, 
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at all clear what metaphysical thesis we should take science to be 
presupposing.
As far as the second of the above two problems is concerned, it 
could be argued that grounds for accepting the metaphysical conjecture 
of physics (whatever precisely it may be) come from the fact that physics 
inevitably accepts this conjecture in persistently accepting unified theo-
ries in preference to empirically more successful disunified rivals, and it 
is more rigorous to acknowledge the conjecture than to disavow it. No 
more is required to render acceptance of the conjecture rational. But this 
is hardly satisfactory. It would always be possible to formulate an aber-
rant version of the metaphysical conjecture – a version which asserts that 
the universe exhibits lawful unity until the year 2090, let us say, when 
quite different physical laws will begin to operate. If this conjecture is 
accepted, physical theories would be accepted which would be quite dif-
ferent from the ones we do accept, but nevertheless just as empirically 
successful (until 2090 at least). There does need to be some reason for 
accepting the unified metaphysical conjecture we do implicitly accept, in 
preference to aberrant versions of this conjecture – a reason more sub-
stantial than “this conjecture is implicit in what theoretical physicists 
actually do”.
We cannot hope to provide an argument that establishes that the 
unified metaphysical conjecture of physics is true, or probably true. Any 
such argument that ignores experience and is entirely a priori is surely 
entirely impossible. What could the premises of such an argument be? On 
the other hand, any such argument that appeals to experience, to empir-
ical science, also seems impossible. Any attempt to establish the truth of 
the metaphysical conjecture of lawful unity by an appeal to the success 
of science can always be rebutted by the counter- claim that the aberrant 
version of the metaphysical conjecture (which postulates radical change 
in 2090) would receive just as much support from an empirically equally 
successful aberrant science.
There does not seem to be much hope either for a Kantian argu-
ment along the lines that experience cannot refute order in the universe 
because experience, in order to be conscious, must exhibit some order. 
We can easily imagine a universe that is sufficiently orderly for conscious 
experience, and life, to be possible, but in which only disunified, aberrant 
laws, of one kind or another, hold. Arguments along Kantian lines do not 
provide grounds for accepting a metaphysical conjecture sufficiently con-
tentful to exclude empirically successful aberrant physical theories.
One possibility is to argue that it is rational to accept a metaphysical 
conjecture which is such that the truth of the conjecture is required for 
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the pursuit of knowledge to be possible at all. Even though there would 
be no argument for the truth of the thesis, there would be an argument 
for accepting the thesis as a part of knowledge since, if the thesis is false, 
we cannot acquire knowledge whatever we assume. Accepting the thesis 
as a part of scientific knowledge cannot imperil or adversely affect sci-
ence whatever the universe is like.
The problem with this argument is that it does not provide grounds 
for accepting a metaphysical conjecture that has sufficient content to 
exclude empirically successful aberrant physical theories of the kind that 
physics does, in practice, exclude (or just ignore). We can easily imagine 
a universe which is such that there is no underlying unity of physical law, 
and yet human life is possible, and new knowledge can be acquired.
A rather more Popperian argument would be that we should accept 
that metaphysical conjecture which holds out the greatest promise of sci-
entific progress. But any such argument faces the difficulty that there will 
always be equally valid arguments for aberrant metaphysical conjectures 
that promise success for aberrant science (science with a succession of 
empirically successful aberrant theories).
In attempting to justify acceptance of a metaphysical conjecture 
of science, there are four considerations that we may appeal to, three 
of which are wholly Popperian in spirit if not in the letter of Popperian 
doctrine:
(1) If some metaphysical thesis, M, is implicit in some scientific meth-
odological practice, then science is more rigorous if M is made 
explicit, since this facilitates criticism of it, the consideration of 
alternatives.
(2) A metaphysical thesis may be such that its truth is a necessary 
condition for it to be possible for us to acquire knowledge: if so, 
accepting the thesis can only help, and cannot undermine, the 
pursuit of knowledge of truth.
(3) Given two rival metaphysical theses, M1 and M2, it may be the 
case that M1 supports an empirical scientific research programme 
that has apparently met with far greater empirical success than 
any rival empirical research programme based on M2: in this case 
we may favour M1 over M2, at least until M2, or some third thesis, 
M3, shows signs of supporting an even more empirically progres-
sive research programme.14
(4) M1 may be preferred to M2 on the grounds that it gives greater 
promise of supporting an empirically progressive research 
programme.
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The above discussion has revealed that these four considerations 
fail to provide a justification for accepting the metaphysical thesis of 
physics.
To sum up. Intellectual rigour requires that physics acknowledges 
that there is a substantial metaphysical thesis implicit in its persistent 
acceptance of unified theories even though endlessly many empirically 
more successful disunified rivals are always potentially available. Two 
problems arise, however, once this metaphysical thesis of physics is 
acknowledged. What should we take this metaphysical thesis to assert? 
And what grounds are there for accepting it as a part of scientific knowl-
edge? So far, no satisfactory solution to these two problems has been 
forthcoming.
These two problems can be solved, however, if physics is construed 
as adopting, not just one metaphysical conjecture, but a hierarchy of 
such conjectures concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of 
the universe, these conjectures becoming more and more insubstan-
tial as one ascends the hierarchy, more and more likely to be true (see 
Figure 2.1). We need, in short, to adopt the hierarchical view sketched 
in section 2.1. This hierarchical view of aim- oriented empiricism (AOE) 
is a radical improvement over Popper’s falsificationism. In this section 
I expound AOE (in a little more detail than the introductory exposition 
of section  2.1) and indicate how it solves the two problems just men-
tioned; I  indicate further how it solves the methodological problem of 
induction and the related problem of simplicity, and then consider pos-
sible objections.
At level 7 there is the thesis that the universe is such that we can 
continue to acquire knowledge of our local circumstances, sufficient to 
make life possible. At level 6 there is the more substantial thesis that 
there is some rationally discoverable thesis about the nature of the 
universe which, if accepted, makes it possible progressively to improve 
methods for the improvement of knowledge. “Rationally discoverable”, 
here, means at least that the thesis is not an arbitrary choice from 
infinitely many analogous theses. At level 5 we have the even more sub-
stantial thesis that the universe is comprehensible in some way or other, 
whether physically or in some other way. This thesis asserts that the uni-
verse is such that there is something (God, a tribe of gods, a cosmic goal, 
a physical entity, a cosmic programme or whatever), which exists every-
where in an unchanging form and which, in some sense, determines or is 
responsible for everything that changes (all change and diversity in the 
world in principle being explicable and understandable in terms of the 
underlying unchanging something). A universe of this type deserves to be 
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called “comprehensible” because it is such that everything that occurs, 
all change and diversity, can in principle be explained and understood 
as being the outcome of the operations of the one underlying something, 
present throughout all phenomena. At level 4 we have the still more 
substantial thesis that the universe is physically comprehensible in some 
way or other (a thesis I shall call physicalism15). This asserts that the uni-
verse is made up of one unified self- interacting physical entity (or one 
kind of entity), all change and diversity being in principle explicable in 
terms of this entity. What this amounts to is that the universe is such that 
some yet- to- be- discovered unified physical theory of everything is true. 
At level 3 we have an even more substantial thesis, the best currently 
available specific idea as to how the universe is physically comprehensi-
ble. This asserts that everything is made of some specific kind of physical 
entity:  corpuscle, point- particle, classical field, quantum field, convo-
luted space- time, string or whatever. Because the thesis at this level is so 
specific, it is almost bound to be false (even if the universe is physically 
comprehensible in some way or other). Here, ideas evolve with evolving 
knowledge. At level 2 we have our best fundamental physical theories, 
currently general relativity and the so- called standard model, and at level 
1 we have empirical data (low- level experimental laws).
The thesis at the top of the hierarchy, at level 7, is such that, if it 
is false, knowledge cannot be acquired whatever is assumed. This thesis 
is, quite properly, accepted as a permanent part of scientific knowledge, 
even though we have no reason to suppose that it is true, since accepting 
it can only help, and cannot hinder, the acquisition of knowledge what-
ever the universe is like.
I have two arguments for the acceptance of the thesis of meta- 
knowability, at level 6:
(i) Granted that there is some kind of general feature of the universe 
which makes it possible to acquire knowledge of our local envi-
ronment (as guaranteed by the thesis at level 7), it is reasonable 
to suppose that we do not know all that there is to be known about 
the nature of this general feature. It is reasonable to suppose, in 
other words, that we can improve our knowledge about the nature 
of this general feature, thus improving methods for the improve-
ment of knowledge. Not to suppose this is to assume, arrogantly, 
that we already know all that there is to be known about how to 
acquire new knowledge. Granted that learning is possible (as 
guaranteed by the level 7 thesis), it is reasonable to suppose 
that, as we learn more about the world, we will learn more about 
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how to learn. Granted the level 7 thesis, in other words, meta- 
knowability is a reasonable conjecture.
(ii) Meta- knowability is too good a possibility, from the standpoint 
of the growth of knowledge, not to be accepted initially, the idea 
only being reluctantly abandoned if all attempts at improving 
methods for the improvement of knowledge fail.
These two arguments for accepting meta- knowability are, admittedly, 
weak. It is crucial, however, that these two arguments make no appeal 
to the success of science, for a reason that will become apparent in a 
moment.
The thesis that the universe is comprehensible, at level 5 is accepted 
because no rival thesis, at that level, has been so fruitful in leading to 
empirically progressive research programmes. It is hardly an exaggera-
tion to say that all empirically successful research programmes into nat-
ural phenomena have been organized around the search for explanatory 
theories, of one kind or another. Aberrant rivals to the thesis of compre-
hensibility, which might be construed as supporting aberrant empirically 
successful research programmes, are rejected because of incompatibility 
with the thesis of meta- knowability at level 6. Such rival ideas are not 
“rationally discoverable” in that each constitutes an arbitrary choice from 
infinitely many equivalent rivals.
Physicalism at level 4 is accepted because it is by far the most empir-
ically fruitful thesis at that level that is compatible with the thesis of com-
prehensibility, at level 5.
Since the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, all 
new fundamental physical theories have enhanced the overall unity 
of  theoretical physics. Thus Newtonian theory (NT) unifies Galileo’s 
laws of terrestrial motion and Kepler’s laws of planetary motion (and 
much  else besides). Maxwellian classical electrodynamics (CEM) 
 unifies electricity, magnetism and light (plus radio, infrared, ultravi-
olet, X- rays and gamma rays). Special relativity (SR) brings greater 
unity to CEM (in revealing that the way one divides up the electro-
magnetic field into the electric and magnetic fields depends on one’s 
reference frame). SR is also a step towards unifying NT and CEM in 
that it transforms space and time so as to make CEM satisfy a basic 
principle fundamental to NT, namely the (restricted) principle of rel-
ativity. SR also brings about a unification of matter and energy, via 
the most famous equation of modern physics, E = mc2, and partially 
unifies space and time into Minkowskian space- time. General relativ-
ity (GR) unifies space- time and gravitation, in that, according to GR, 
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gravitation is no more than an effect of the curvature of space- time. 
Quantum theory (QM) and atomic theory unify a mass of phenomena 
having to do with the structure and properties of matter, and the way 
matter interacts with light. Quantum electrodynamics unifies QM, 
CEM and SR. Quantum electroweak theory unifies (partially) elec-
tromagnetism and the weak force. Quantum chromodynamics brings 
unity to hadron physics (via quarks) and brings unity to the eight kinds 
of gluon of the strong force. The standard model unifies to a consider-
able extent all known phenomena associated with fundamental parti-
cles and the forces between them (apart from gravitation). The theory 
 unifies to some extent its two component quantum field theories, in 
that both are locally gauge invariant – the symmetry group being 
U(1) × SU(2) × SU(3). String theory, or M- theory, holds out the hope 
of unifying all phenomena. All these theories have been accepted 
because they progressively (a) increase the overall unity of theoreti-
cal physics and (b) increase the predictive power of physical theory, 
(a) being as important as (b). Physicalism is the key, persisting thesis 
of the entire research programme of theoretical physics since Galileo, 
and no obvious rival thesis, at that level of generality, can be substi-
tuted for physicalism in this research programme.
It may be asked how this succession of theories can reinforce phys-
icalism when the totality of physical theory has always, up until now, 
clashed with physicalism. The answer:  if physicalism is true, then all 
physical theories that only unify a restricted range of phenomena, must 
be false. Granted the truth of physicalism, and granted that theoretical 
physics advances by putting forward theories of limited but ever increas-
ing empirical scope, then it follows that physics will advance from one 
false theory to another (as it has done: see point 7 of section 2.6 below), 
all theories being false until a unified theory of everything is achieved 
(which just might be true). The successful pursuit of physicalism requires 
progressive increase in both empirical scope and unity of the totality of 
fundamental physical theory. It is just this which the history of physics, 
from Galileo to today, exemplifies – thus demonstrating the unique fruit-
fulness of physicalism.
At level 3 that metaphysical thesis is accepted which is the best spe-
cific version of physicalism available, that seems to do the best justice to 
the evolution of physical theory. Two considerations govern acceptance 
of testable fundamental dynamical physical theories. Such a theory must 
be such that (i) it, together with all other accepted fundamental physical 
theories, exemplifies, or is a special case of, the best available metaphys-
ical blueprint (at level 3), and physicalism (at level 4)  to a sufficiently 
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good extent, and (ii) it is sufficiently successful empirically (where 
empirical success is to be understood, roughly, in a Popperian sense).16
How does this hierarchical view of AOE overcome the problems 
and difficulties, indicated above, that confront any view which holds that 
science makes just one, possibly composite metaphysical assumption, at 
just one level? Given the one- thesis view, it must remain entirely uncer-
tain as to what the one thesis should be. If it is relatively contentful and 
precise, more or less equivalent to the current level 3 thesis of AOE, then 
it is all too likely that this is false, and will need to be replaced in the 
future. If it is relatively contentless and imprecise, equivalent to theses 
at levels 7 or 6, this will not be sufficiently precise to exclude empirically 
successful but grossly ad hoc, aberrant theories. Even the level 4 thesis 
of physicalism is both too contentful and precise, and not contentful and 
precise enough. Physicalism may be false, and may need to be revised. At 
the same time, physicalism lacks the potential heuristic power to suggest 
good new fundamental theories which the more precise and contentful 
theses at level 3 possess. All these difficulties are avoided by the hierar-
chical view of AOE, just because of the hierarchy of assumptions, graded 
from the relatively contentless, imprecise and permanent at the top, to 
the relatively contentful, precise and impermanent (but methodologi-
cally and heuristically fruitful) at the bottom.
Any one- thesis view faces the even more serious problem of how 
this one thesis is to be critically assessed, revised and improved. The 
hierarchical view of AOE overcomes this problem by providing severe 
constraints on what is to be revised, and how this revision is to proceed. 
In the first instance, and even then in quite exceptional circumstances, 
only the current level 3 thesis can be revised. This revision must proceed, 
however, within constraints provided by the level 4 thesis of physicalism, 
on the one hand, and accepted, empirically successful level 2 theories, 
on the other hand. In a really exceptional situation, scientific progress 
might require the revision of the level 4 thesis of physicalism, but this too 
would proceed within the constraints of the thesis at level 5, and empir-
ically successful theories at level 2, or empirically progressive research 
programmes at levels 2 and 3. The great merit of AOE is that it separates 
out what is most likely to be true from what is most likely to be false in the 
metaphysical assumptions of physics, and employs the former to assess 
critically, and to constrain, theses that fall into the latter category. It con-
centrates criticism and innovation where it is most likely to promote sci-
entific progress.
Finally, any one- thesis view cannot, as we have seen, simultane-
ously call upon principles (1) to (4) above to justify acceptance of the 
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single thesis, whatever it may be. The hierarchical view of AOE is able 
to do just that. It can appeal to different principles, (1) to (4) above, to 
justify (to provide a rationale for) acceptance of the different theses at the 
different levels of the hierarchy of AOE.17 Thus acceptance of the thesis at 
level 7 is justified by an appeal to (2); acceptance of theses at levels 3 to 5 
are accepted as a result of (a) an appeal to (3), and (b) compatibility with 
the thesis above in the hierarchy. The thesis at level 6 is accepted as a 
result of an appeal to (4). Aberrant rivals to theses accepted at levels 3 to 
5 (which might be construed to support aberrant, rival empirically pro-
gressive research programmes) are excluded on the grounds that these 
clash with the thesis at level 6.18
It may be objected that AOE suffers from vicious circularity, in 
that acceptance of physical theories is justified by (in part) an appeal to 
physicalism, the acceptance of which is justified, in turn, by the empiri-
cal success of physical theory. My reply to this objection is that the level 
6 thesis of meta- knowability asserts that the universe is such that this 
kind of circular methodology, there being positive feedback between 
metaphysics, methods and empirically successful theories, is just what 
we need to employ in order to improve our knowledge. The thesis of 
meta- knowability, if true, justifies implementation of AOE. This response 
is only valid, of course, if reasons for accepting the level 6 thesis of meta- 
knowability do not themselves appeal to the success of science (which 
would just reintroduce vicious circularity at a higher level). As I made 
clear above, the two arguments given for accepting meta- knowability 
make no appeal to the success of science whatsoever.19
A basic idea of AOE is to channel or direct criticism so that it is as 
fruitful as possible, from the standpoint of aiding progress in knowledge. 
The function of criticism within science is to promote scientific prog-
ress. When criticism demonstrably cannot help promote scientific prog-
ress, it becomes irrational (the idea behind (2) above). In an attempt to 
make criticism as fruitful as possible, we need to try to direct it at targets 
which are the most fruitful, the most productive, to criticize (from the 
standpoint of the growth of knowledge). This is the basic idea behind 
the hierarchy of AOE. Conjectures at all levels remain open to criticism. 
But, as we ascend the hierarchy, conjectures are less and less likely to 
be false; it is less and less likely that criticism, here, will help promote 
scientific knowledge. The best currently available level 3 conjecture is 
almost bound to be false: at this level, the history of physics reveals, as 
I have indicated above, that a number of different conjectures have been 
adopted and rejected in turn. Here, criticism, the activity of developing 
alternatives (compatible with physicalism), is likely to be immensely 
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fruitful for progress in theoretical physics. Indeed, elsewhere I  have 
argued that this provides physics with a rational, though fallible and non- 
mechanical method for the discovery of new fundamental physical theo-
ries,20 a method invented and exploited by Einstein in discovering special 
and general relativity (see the next chapter) something which Popper has 
argued is not possible (see Popper, 1959, pp. 31– 2). Criticizing physical-
ism, at level 4, may also be fruitful for physics,21 but (the conjecture of 
AOE is that) this is not as likely to be as fruitful as criticism at level 3. And, 
as we ascend the hierarchy (so AOE conjectures), criticism becomes pro-
gressively less and less likely to be fruitful. Against that, it must be admit-
ted that the higher in the hierarchy we need to modify our ideas, so the 
more dramatic would be the intellectual revolution that this would bring 
about. If physicalism is rejected altogether, and some quite different ver-
sion of the level 5 conjecture of comprehensibility is adopted instead, the 
whole character of natural science would change dramatically; physics, 
as we know it, might even cease to exist.
The biggest change, in moving from falsificationism to AOE, has 
to do with the role of metaphysics in science, and the scope of scientific 
knowledge. According to falsificationism, untestable metaphysical the-
ses may influence scientific research in the context of discovery, and may 
even lead to metaphysical research programmes; they cannot, however, 
be a part of scientific knowledge itself. But according to AOE, the meta-
physical theses at levels 3 to 7 are all part of current (conjectural) sci-
entific knowledge. This is the case, in particular, as far as physicalism is 
concerned. According to AOE, it is a part of current scientific knowledge 
that the universe is physically comprehensible  – certainly not the case 
granted falsificationism.
Another important change has to do with the relationship between 
science and the philosophy of science. Falsificationism places the study 
of scientific method, the philosophy of science, outside science itself, 
in accordance with Popper’s demarcation principle. AOE, by contrast, 
makes scientific method and the philosophy of science an integral part 
of science itself. The activity of tackling problems inherent in the aims of 
science, at a variety of levels, and of developing new possible aims and 
methods, new possible more specific or less specific philosophies of sci-
ence (views about what the aims and methods of science ought to be) is, 
according to AOE, a vital research activity of science itself. But this is also 
philosophy of science, being carried on within the framework of AOE.22
AOE differs in many other important ways from Popper’s falsifica-
tionism, whether bare or dressed (see Maxwell, 1998). Nevertheless the 
impulse, the intellectual aspirations and values, behind the hierarchical 
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view of AOE are, as I  have tried to indicate, thoroughly Popperian in 
character and spirit. The whole idea is to turn implicit assumptions into 
explicit conjectures in such a way that criticism may be directed at what 
most needs to be criticized from the standpoint of aiding progress in 
knowledge, so that conjectures may be developed and adopted that are 
the most fruitful in promoting scientific progress, at the same time no 
substantial conjecture, implicit or explicit, being held immune from crit-
ical scrutiny.
2.6 Aim- oriented empiricism:  
an improvement over falsificationism
AOE is also, in a number of ways, a considerable improvement over 
Popper’s falsificationism:
1. Consistency. Bare falsificationism fails dramatically to do justice to 
scientific practice, and is an inherently unworkable methodology, in any 
case. (In what follows I shall mostly ignore bare falsificationism as obvi-
ously untenable, and concentrate on comparing dressed falsificationism 
and AOE.) Dressed falsificationism does better justice to scientific prac-
tice, but at the cost of consistency; persistent rejection of empirically 
successful theories that do not “proceed from some simple … unifying 
idea” commits science to accepting a metaphysical thesis of simplicity 
as a part of scientific knowledge (though this is not recognized); this 
contradicts Popper’s demarcation principle. AOE is free of such lethal 
defects.
2. Criticism. Pursuing physics in accordance with dressed falsification-
ism protects the implicit metaphysical thesis of simplicity from criticism 
within science itself, just because this thesis is metaphysical (and there-
fore not a part of science) and implicit (and therefore not available for 
sustained, explicit critical scrutiny). AOE, by contrast, is specifically 
designed to provide a framework of metaphysical assumptions and corre-
sponding methodological rules within which level 3 metaphysical blue-
prints may be developed, and critically assessed, within science.
3. Rigour. Science pursued in accordance with AOE is more rigorous 
than science pursued in accordance with falsificationism. An elementary, 
but important requirement for rigour is that assumptions that are sub-
stantial, influential, problematic and implicit need to be made explicit 
so that they can be criticized, and so that alternatives can be considered. 
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If the attempt is made to do science in accordance with falsificationism, 
bare or dressed, one substantial, influential and problematic assumption 
must remain implicit (as we have just seen), namely the metaphysical 
assumption that nature behaves as if simple or unified, no ad hoc theory 
being true. This is implicit in the adoption of the methodological sim-
plicity principle of dressed falsificationism. AOE, by contrast, makes this 
implicit assumption explicit, and provides a framework within which 
rival versions can be proposed and critically assessed.
4. Simplicity. Falsificationism fails to say what the simplicity of a the-
ory is. Bare falsificationism provides an account of simplicity in terms 
of falsifiability, but we have already seen that this account is untenable. 
Popper’s (1963) “requirement of simplicity” appeals to a conception of 
simplicity or unity that is wholly in addition to falsifiability, but does not 
explain what the simplicity or unity of a theory is. It fails to explain how 
the simplicity of a theory can possibly be methodologically or epistemo-
logically significant when a simple theory can always be made complex 
by a suitable change of terminology, and vice versa. Popper himself rec-
ognized the inadequacy of his simplicity requirement when he called it 
“a bit vague”, said that “it seems difficult to formulate it very clearly” 
and acknowledged that it threatened to involve one in an infinite regress 
(Popper, 1963, p. 241). By contrast, AOE solves the problems of explain-
ing what the simplicity or unity of a theory is without difficulty, as we 
shall see in Chapter 4. Put very briefly, in order to be unified, a physical 
theory must be such that its content, what it asserts about the world, must 
be the same throughout all the phenomena to which the theory applies. 
If the content of a physical theory, T, splits into N distinct regions, so that 
the content of any one region is different from what it is in all the oth-
ers, then T is disunified to degree N. For perfect unity we require N = 1. 
Because what matters is content, not form, the way T is formulated is 
irrelevant to this way of assessing simplicity or unity. Falsificationism 
cannot avail itself of this way of assessing unity because to do so makes 
it abundantly clear that acceptance of unified theories only, in this sense 
of “unified”, when endlessly many empirically more successful disunified 
rivals are available, involves making a persistent metaphysical assump-
tion about the nature of the universe. Within AOE, there is a second 
way in which the unity of T may be assessed: in terms of the extent to 
which the content of T exemplifies the best available level 3 metaphysical 
blueprint. This second conception of simplicity or unity evolves with the 
evolution of level 3 ideas. As we improve our ideas about how the uni-
verse is unified, with the advance of knowledge in theoretical physics, so 
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non- empirical methods for selecting theories on the basis of simplicity 
or unity improve as well. Thus current symmetry principles of modern 
physics, such as Lorentz invariance and gauge invariance, which guide 
acceptance of theory, are an advance over simplicity criteria upheld by 
Newton.23 Ultimately, as we shall see in  Chapter 4, requirements of the-
oretical unity, as these apply in physics, need to be applied to the totality 
of fundamental physical theory in physics, and not to individual theories.
5. Scientific method. Dressed falsificationism acknowledges (correctly) 
that two considerations govern selection of theory in science, namely 
considerations that have to do with (a) evidence, and (b) simplicity. But 
because it cannot solve the problem of what simplicity is, dressed falsifi-
cationism cannot, with any precision, specify what methods are involved 
when theories are selected on the basis of simplicity. Nor can the view 
do justice to the way in which the methods of physics evolve with evolv-
ing knowledge, especially methods that assert that acceptable theories 
must satisfy this or that symmetry. In other words, falsificationism fails 
to solve what may be called the “methodological” problem of induc-
tion: the problem of specifying, merely, what the methods are that are 
employed by science in accepting and rejecting theories (leaving aside 
the further problem of justifying these methods given that the aim is to 
acquire knowledge). AOE, by contrast, solves the problem of simplicity, 
and thus can specify precisely what methods are involved when theories 
are selected on the basis of simplicity or unity. Furthermore, AOE can do 
justice to evolving criteria of simplicity (as we have just seen), and hence 
evolving methods. According to AOE, the totality of fundamental phys-
ical theory, T, can be assessed (i) by considering the extent to which its 
content is unified, and thus exemplifies the fixed level 4 thesis of phys-
icalism, or (ii) by considering the extent to which its content exempli-
fies the evolving, best available level 3 thesis. Whereas (i)  constitutes 
a fixed criterion of unity (as long as physicalism is not modified), (ii) 
constitutes an evolving criterion, a criterion of unity that improves with 
improving knowledge.
6. Evolving aims and methods. A  point, briefly alluded to in 4 and 5 
above, deserves further emphasis. As physics has evolved, from Newton’s 
time to today, non- empirical methods, determining what theories will 
be accepted and rejected, have evolved as well. Newton, in his Principia, 
formulated four rules of reasoning, three of which are concerned with 
simplicity (Newton, 1962, vol. 2, pp. 398– 400). Principles that have been 
proposed since include: invariance with respect to position, orientation, 
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time, uniform velocity, charge conjugation, parity and time- reversal; 
principles of conservation of mass, momentum, angular momentum, 
energy and charge; Lorentz invariance; Mach’s principle; the principle 
of equivalence; principles of gauge invariance, global and local; super-
symmetry; duality principles; the principle that different kinds of particle 
should be reduced to one kind, and different kinds of force should be 
reduced to one kind; and the principle that space- time on the one hand, 
and particles and forces on the other, should be unified. All of these prin-
ciples can be interpreted as methodological rules which specify require-
ments theories must meet in order to be accepted. They can also be 
interpreted as physical principles, making substantial assertions about 
such things as space, time, matter and force. Some, such as conservation 
of mass, parity and charge conjugation, have been shown to be false; oth-
ers, such as Mach’s principle, have never been generally accepted; still 
others, such as supersymmetry, remain speculative.
Principles such as these, which can be interpreted either as physi-
cal assertions or as methodological principles, which are made explicit, 
developed, revised and, on occasions, rejected or refuted, are hard to 
account for within the framework of falsificationism. It is especially dif-
ficult, within this framework, to account for principles which (a)  have 
a quasi a priori role in specifying requirements theories must satisfy in 
order to be accepted, but which at the same time (b) make substantial 
physical assertions about the nature of the universe. AOE, on the other 
hand, predicts the existence of such principles, with just the features 
that have been indicated. Accepted principles are components of the 
currently accepted level 3 blueprint. As the accepted blueprint evolves, 
these principles, interpreted either as physical or methodological princi-
ples, evolve as well. Indeed, according to AOE, these principles, and asso-
ciated blueprints, do not just evolve, they are improved with improving 
theoretical knowledge. AOE provides a more or less fixed framework of 
relatively unproblematic assumptions and associated methods (at level 4 
or above) within which highly problematic level 3 assumptions and asso-
ciated methods may be improved in the light of the empirical success and 
failure of rival research programmes (which adopt rival level 3 assump-
tions and associated methods).
This can be reformulated in terms of aims and methods of phys-
ics. A  basic aim of theoretical physics is to discover the true theory 
of everything. This aim can be characterized in a range of ways, 
depending on how broadly or narrowly “theory of everything” is con-
strued, what degree of unity such a theory must have in order to be a 
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theory at all, and thus how much metaphysics is built into, or is pre-
supposed by, the aim so characterized. The aim might be construed 
in such a way that no more than the truth of the thesis at level 7, 
or at level 6, is presupposed. Or, more specifically, the truth of the 
thesis at level 5 might be presupposed, or even more specifically, 
the truth of physicalism at level 4; or a range of increasingly specific 
blueprints at level 3 might be presupposed. Corresponding to these 
increasingly specific aims there are increasingly restrictive methods. 
As the aim becomes more specific, so it becomes more problematic, 
in that the presupposed metaphysics becomes increasingly likely to 
be false, which would make the corresponding aim unrealizable. AOE 
can thus be construed as providing a kind of nested framework of aims 
and methods, the aims becoming, as one goes down the hierarchy, 
increasingly problematic, and vulnerable to being unrealisable in 
principle, because the presupposed metaphysics is false. Within the 
framework of relatively unspecific, unproblematic, permanent aims 
and methods (high up in the hierarchy) much more specific, problem-
atic, fallible aims and methods (low down in the hierarchy) can be 
revised and improved in the light of improving knowledge. There is, as 
I have already in effect said, something like positive feedback between 
improving scientific knowledge and improving aims and methods. As 
knowledge improves, knowledge- about- how- to- improve- knowledge 
improves as well. This capacity of science to adapt itself – its aims and 
methods (its philosophy of science) – to what it finds out about the 
universe is, according to AOE, the methodological key to the astonish-
ing progressive success of science. Falsificationism, with its fixed aim 
and fixed methods, is quite unable to do justice to this positive feed-
back, meta- methodological feature of science, this capacity of science 
to learn about learning as it proceeds.
7. Verisimilitude. The so- called problem of verisimilitude arises because 
physics usually proceeds from one false theory to another, thus render-
ing obscure what it can mean to say that science makes progress. Popper 
(1963, ch. 10 and addenda) tried to solve this problem within the frame-
work of falsificationism but, as Miller (1974) and Tichy (1974) have 
shown, this attempted solution does not work. Not only does falsifica-
tionism fail to specify properly the methods that make progress in the-
oretical physics possible, it fails even to say what progress in theoretical 
physics means.
AOE solves the problem without difficulty. First, the fact that phys-
ics does proceed from one false theory to another, far from undermining 
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physicalism, and hence AOE as well, is just the way theoretical physics 
must proceed, granted physicalism (as I  have already indicated). For, 
granted physicalism, any theory, T*, which captures precisely how phe-
nomena evolve in some restricted domain, must be generalizable to cover 
all phenomena. If T* cannot be so generalized then, granted physicalism, 
it cannot be precisely true. In so far as physics proceeds by developing 
theories which apply to restricted, but successively increasing, domains 
of phenomena, it is bound (granted physicalism) to proceed by proposing 
one false theory after another.
Second, AOE solves the problem of what it can mean to say that 
theories, T0, … TN, get successively closer and closer to the true theory- 
of- everything, T, as follows. For this we require that TN can be “approxi-
mately derived” from T (but not vice versa), TN– 1 can be “approximately 
derived” from TN (but not vice versa), and so on down to T0 being “approx-
imately derivable” from T1 (but not vice versa).
The key notion of “approximate derivation” can be indicated by con-
sidering a particular example: the “approximate derivation” of Kepler’s 
law that planets move in ellipses around the sun (K) from Newtonian the-
ory (NT). The “derivation” is done in three steps. First, NT is restricted 
to N body systems interacting by gravitation alone within some definite 
volume, no two bodies being closer than some given distance, r. Second, 
keeping the mass of one object constant, we consider the paths followed 
by the other bodies as their masses tend to zero. According to NT, in 
the limit, these paths are precisely those specified by K for planets. In 
this way we recover the form of K from NT. Third, we reinterpret this 
“derived” version of K so that it is now taken to apply to systems like that 
of our solar system. (It is of course this third step of reinterpretation that 
introduces error:  mutual gravitational attraction between planets, and 
between planets and the sun, ensures that the paths of planets, with 
masses greater than zero, must diverge, however slightly, from precise 
Keplerian orbits.)
Quite generally, we can say that Tr– 1 is “approximately derivable” 
from Tr if and only if a theory empirically equivalent to Tr– 1 can be 
extracted from Tr by taking finitely many steps of the above type, involv-
ing (a) restricting the range of application of a theory, (b) allowing some 
combination of variables of a theory to tend to zero, and (c) reinterpret-
ing a theory so that it applies to a wider range of phenomena.24
This solution to the problem of what progress in theoretical phys-
ics means requires AOE to be presupposed; it does not work if falsifi-
cationism is presupposed. This is because the solution requires one to 
assume (a)  that the universe is such that a yet- to- be- discovered, true 
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theory of everything, T, exists, and (b)  current theoretical knowledge 
can be approximately derived from T.  Both assumptions, (a)  and (b), 
are justified granted AOE; neither assumption is justifiable granted 
falsificationism.25
8. Discovery of new fundamental theories. Given falsificationism, 
the discovery of new fundamental physical theories that turn out, 
subsequently, to meet with great empirical success, is inexplicable. 
(One thinks here of Newton’s discovery of his mechanical theory and 
theory of gravitation, Maxwell’s discovery of classical electromag-
netism, Einstein’s discovery of the special and general theories of rel-
ativity, Bohr’s discovery of “old” quantum theory, Heisenberg’s and 
Schrödinger’s discovery of “new” quantum theory, Dirac’s discovery 
of the relativistic quantum theory of the electron and, in more recent 
times, the discovery of quantum electrodynamics, the electroweak the-
ory, quantum chromodynamics and the standard model.) Granted that 
a new theory is required to explain a range of phenomena, there are, 
on the face of it, infinitely many possibilities. In the absence of ratio-
nal guidance towards good conjectures, it would seem to be infinitely 
improbable that anyone should, in a finite time, be able to come up 
with a theory that successfully predicts new phenomena. The only 
guidance that falsificationism can provide is to think up new theories 
that “proceed from some simple, new, and powerful, unifying idea”, in 
accordance with Popper’s (1963) requirement of simplicity, but this 
is so vague and ambiguous as to be almost useless. Famously, Popper 
explicitly denied that a rational method of discovery is possible at all 
(see Popper, 1959, p. 31). But if discovery is not rational, it becomes 
miraculous that good new theories are ever discovered. Scientific 
progress becomes all but inexplicable.
AOE, by contrast, provides physics with a rational, if fallible and 
non- mechanical, method for the discovery of new fundamental physical 
theories. This method involves modifying the current best level 3 blue-
print so that:
(a) the new blueprint exemplifies physicalism better than its 
predecessor;
(b) the new blueprint promises, when made sufficiently precise to 
become a testable theory, to unify clashes between predecessor 
theories;
(c) the new theory promises to exemplify the new blueprint bet-
ter than the predecessor theories exemplify the predecessor 
blueprint.
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(a), (b) and (c) provide means for assessing how good an idea for a new 
theory is which do not involve empirical testing (which is brought in once 
the new theory has been formulated). The level 4 thesis of physicalism 
provides continuity between the state of knowledge before the discov-
ery of the new theory, and the state of knowledge after this discovery. 
Modifying the current level 3 blueprint ensures that the new theory 
will be incompatible with its predecessors; it will postulate new kinds 
of entities, forces, space- time structure, and will exhibit new symme-
tries. In other words, because of the hierarchical structure of AOE, there 
is (across revolutions) both continuity (at level 4) and discontinuity (at 
levels 2 and 3), something that is not possible given falsificationism. AOE 
provides physics with specific non- empirical tasks to perform, specific 
non- empirical problems to be solved, and non- empirical methods for the 
assessment of ideas for new theories, all of which adds up to a rational, 
if fallible, method of discovery. It all stems from recognizing that phys-
icalism is a part of current scientific knowledge. The discovery of new 
fundamental physical theories then ceases to be inexplicable. None of 
this is possible granted falsificationism.26
The fact that AOE is able to provide a rational method of discov-
ery, while falsificationism is not, is due to the greater rigour of AOE 
(a point mentioned in 3 above). AOE has greater rigour because AOE 
acknowledges, while falsificationism denies, metaphysical assumptions 
implicit in persistent scientific preference for simple, explanatory the-
ories. It is precisely the explicit acknowledgement of these metaphysi-
cal assumptions which makes the rational method of discovery of AOE 
possible.
9. Diversity of scientific method. One striking feature of natural science, 
often commented on, is that different branches of the natural sciences 
have somewhat different methods. Experimental and observational 
methods, and methods or principles employed in constructing and 
assessing theories, vary as one moves from theoretical to phenome-
nological physics, from physics to chemistry, from astronomy to biol-
ogy, from geology to ethology. Falsificationism can hardly do justice to 
this striking diversity of method within the natural sciences. Popper, 
indeed, tends to argue that there is unity of method, not only in natu-
ral science, but across the whole of science, including social science as 
well (see Popper, 1961). AOE, by contrast, predicts diversity of method 
throughout natural science, overlaid by unity of method at a meta- 
methodological level. AOE can do justice to the diversity of methods to 
be found in diverse sciences, without underlying unity and rationality 
being sacrificed.
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It is important to appreciate, first, that different branches of the nat-
ural sciences are not isolated from one another: they form an intercon-
nected whole, from theoretical physics to molecular biology, neurology 
and the study of animal behaviour. Different branches of natural science, 
even different branches of a single science such as physics, chemistry 
or biology, have, at some level of specificity, different aims, and hence 
different methods. But at some level of generality all these branches of 
natural science have a common aim, and therefore common methods: to 
improve knowledge and understanding of the natural world. All (more 
or less explicitly) put AOE into practice, but because different scientific 
specialities have different specific aims,27 at the lower end of the hierar-
chy of methods different specialities have somewhat different methods, 
even though some more general methods are common to all the sciences. 
Furthermore, all natural sciences apart from theoretical physics presup-
pose and use results from other scientific specialities, as when chemistry 
presupposes atomic theory and quantum theory, and biology presup-
poses chemistry. The results of one science become a part of the presup-
positions of another, implicit in the aims of the other science (equivalent 
to the level 3 blueprint of physics, or the level 4 thesis of physicalism). 
This further enhances unity throughout diversity, and helps explain the 
need for diversity of method.
A key feature of AOE is that methods depend somewhat on aims, 
methods varying somewhat as aims vary. When the hierarchical struc-
ture of aims and methods of AOE, depicted in Figure 2.1, is applied to 
specific branches of natural science – geology, evolutionary biology, neu-
roscience, organic chemistry – the various spherical discs of Figure 2.1 
will need to be reinterpreted so that they come to represent the differ-
ent more or less specific aims of the various branches of natural science. 
What the various discs of the figure depict will vary as we move from 
geology to neuroscience and so on – even the number of levels required 
will vary. What remains constant throughout all these diverse applica-
tions of AOE, however, is the hierarchical structure of aims and methods, 
aims becoming increasingly insubstantial and unproblematic as one goes 
up the hierarchy in each case.
In short, in order to exhibit the rationality of the diversity 
of method in natural science  – apparent in the evolution of meth-
ods of a single science, and apparent as one moves, at a given time, 
from one scientific speciality to another  – it is essential to adopt the 
meta- methodological, hierarchical standpoint of AOE, which alone 
enables one to depict methodological unity (high up in the hierarchy) 
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throughout methodological diversity (low down in the hierarchy).28 
Figure 2.1, in depicting the aims and methods of theoretical physics, 
depicts what is common to all of natural science (physics being the 
fundamental to all of natural science). In addition, the hierarchical 
structure of Figure 2.1 forms a kind of template, a paradigm, for many 
similarly structured but diversely interpreted depictions of aims and 
methods of the many diverse specialized disciplines of natural science. 
It is in this way that the general AOE idea can do justice both to the 
diverse aims and methods of different sciences at any one moment, 
and to the evolving aims and methods of any one science over time. At 
the same time, it depicts what is common to all this diversity of aims 
and methods:  it is to be found at the metalevel, or the meta- meta- 
metalevel, and the common hierarchical structure. Furthermore, and 
crucially, AOE is able to provide a rationale for all this diversity of aims 
and methods: it does this at the metalevel, meta- methods having the 
role of assessing methods one step down in the hierarchy.
Falsificationism, lacking this hierarchical structure, cannot begin to 
do justice to this key feature of scientific method, diversity at one level, 
unity at another; nor can it begin to do justice to the rational need for this 
feature of scientific method.29
There is a further, important point. Any new conception of sci-
ence which improves our understanding of science ought to enable us 
to improve scientific practice. It would be very odd if our ability to do 
science well were wholly divorced from our understanding of what we 
are doing. A test for a new theory of scientific method ought to be, then, 
that it improves scientific practice, and does not merely accurately depict 
current practice. AOE passes this test. In providing a framework for the 
articulation and scrutiny of level 3 metaphysical blueprints, as an inte-
gral part of science itself, and thus providing a rational means for the 
development of new non- empirical methods, new symmetry principles 
and new theories, AOE advocates, in effect, that current practice in the-
oretical physics be modified. AOE makes explicit what is at present only 
implicit. And more generally, in depicting scientific method in a hierar-
chical, meta- methodological fashion, AOE has implications for method 
throughout the natural sciences, and not just for theoretical physics.
In case it should seem miraculous that science has made progress 
without AOE being generally understood and accepted, I should add that 
good science has always put something close to AOE into practice in an 
implicit, somewhat covert way, and it is this which has made progress 
possible.
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2.7 Thomas Kuhn
As I remarked in section 2.1 above, the main difference between Kuhn’s 
(1970a) picture of science and Popper’s is that, whereas Kuhn stresses 
that, within normal science, paradigms are dogmatically protected from 
refutation, from criticism, Popper holds that theories must always be sub-
jected to severe attempted refutation. AOE is even more Popperian than 
Popper’s falsificationism, in that AOE exposes to criticism assumptions 
that falsificationism denies, and thus shields from criticism. One might 
think, therefore, that AOE would differ even more from Kuhn’s picture of 
science than falsificationism does.
It is therefore rather surprising that exactly the opposite is the 
case: in some important respects, AOE is closer to Kuhn than to Popper.
The picture of science that emerges from Kuhn (1970a) may be 
summarized like this. There are three stages to consider. First, there is 
a pre- scientific stage: the discipline is split into a number of competing 
schools of thought which give different answers to fundamental ques-
tions. There is debate about fundamental questions between the schools, 
but no overall progress, and no science.
Second, the ideas of one such school begin to meet with empirical 
success; these ideas become a “paradigm”, and the pre- scientific school 
becomes normal science (competing schools withering away). Within 
normal science, no attempt is made to refute the paradigm (roughly, the 
basic theory of the science); indeed, the paradigm may be accepted even 
though there are well- known apparent refutations. When the paradigm 
fails to predict some phenomenon, it is not the paradigm, but the skill of 
the scientist, that is put to the test. The task of the normal scientist is to 
solve puzzles, rather than problems. The paradigm specifies what is to 
count as a solution, specifies what methods are to be employed in order 
to obtain the solution and guarantees that the solution exists: these are 
all characteristics of puzzles rather than open- ended problems. The task 
is gradually to extend the range of application of the paradigm to new 
phenomena, textbook successes being taken as models of how to pro-
ceed. Methods devolve from paradigms.
Third, the paradigm begins to accumulate serious failures of pre-
diction; these resist all attempts at resolution, and some scientists lose 
faith in the capacity of the paradigm to overcome these “anomalies”. 
A  new paradigm is proposed, which does resolve these recalcitrant 
anomalies, but which may not, initially, successfully predict all that 
the old paradigm predicted. Empirical considerations do not declare 
that the new paradigm is, unequivocally, better than the old. Normal 
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science gives way to a period of revolutionary science. Scientists again 
debate fundamentals, arguments for and against the rival paradigms, 
often presupposing what they seek to establish. Rationality breaks 
down. If the revolution is successful, the new paradigm wins out, and 
becomes the basis for a new phase of normal science. Many old sci-
entists do not accept the new paradigm; they die holding on to their 
convictions.
Kuhn argues that the dogmatic attitude inherent in normal sci-
ence is necessary if science is to make progress. Applying a paradigm 
to new phenomena, or to old phenomena with increasing accuracy, is 
often extremely difficult. If every failure was interpreted as a failure of 
the paradigm, rather than of the scientist, paradigms would be rejected 
before their full range of successful application had been discovered. By 
refusing to reject a paradigm until the limits of its successes have been 
reached, scientists put themselves into a much better position to develop 
and apply a new paradigm. For reasons such as these, normal science, 
despite being ostensibly designed to discover only the expected, is actu-
ally uniquely effective in disclosing novelty. Popper (1970), in criticiz-
ing Kuhn on normal science, ignored these arguments in support of the 
necessity of normal science for scientific progress.
AOE holds that much scientific work ought indeed to resemble 
Kuhn’s normal science, in part for reasons just indicated. But there are 
even more important considerations. According to AOE, and in sharp 
contrast with falsificationism, theoretical physics accepts a level 3 meta-
physical blueprint, which exercises a powerful constraint on what kind of 
new theories physicists can try to develop, consider or accept. The blue-
print has a role reminiscent, in some respects, of Kuhn’s paradigm, and 
theoretical physics, working within the constraints of the blueprint, its 
non- empirical methods set by the blueprint, has some features of Kuhn’s 
normal science.
Furthermore, according to AOE, other branches of natural science 
less fundamental than theoretical physics invariably presuppose relevant 
parts of more fundamental branches. Thus chemistry presupposes rele-
vant parts of atomic theory and quantum theory, biology relevant parts 
of chemistry, astronomy relevant parts of physics. Such presuppositions 
of a science have a role, for that science, that is analogous to the role that 
the current level 3 blueprint, or the level 4 thesis of physicalism, has for 
theoretical physics. The presuppositions act as a powerful constraint on 
theorizing within the science. They set non- empirical methods for that 
science. Such presuppositions have a role, in other words, which is sim-
ilar, in important respects, to Kuhn’s paradigms. Viewed from an AOE 
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perspective, one can readily see how and why much of science is Kuhnian 
puzzle solving rather than Popperian problem solving.
There are also, it must be emphasized, major differences between 
Kuhn and AOE. The chief difference is that, according to AOE, science 
has a paradigm for paradigms – to put it in Kuhnian terms.30 In order 
to be acceptable, level 3 blueprints must exemplify the level 4 the-
sis of physicalism (which in turn must exemplify the level 5 thesis of 
comprehensibility and so on, up to level 7). This means that, as long 
as physicalism continues to be accepted as the best available level 4 
thesis for science, metaphysical blueprints can be assessed in a quasi 
non- empirical way, in terms of how well they accord with physicalism. 
Natural science is, according to AOE, one sustained, gigantic chunk of 
normal science, with physicalism as its paradigm. In this respect, AOE 
is more Kuhnian than Kuhn (in addition to being more Popperian than 
Popper!).
Like falsificationism, Kuhn’s picture of science is hardly tenable. 
In the first place, it does not fit scientific practice very well. Normal sci-
ence undoubtedly exists, as even Popper recognized; it may well be that 
most scientific activity has the character of Kuhn’s normal science. But 
even when a discipline seems most like normal science, almost always 
there are a few scientists actively engaged in developing alternatives to 
the reigning paradigm. And on occasions, it is from the work of these 
few that a new paradigm, and a new phase of normal science, springs, 
often in a way that is quite different from Kuhn’s account. It is not obvi-
ous that accumulation of anomalies, resulting in a crisis in biology, led to 
Darwin’s theory of evolution. Quantum theory did not emerge, initially, 
from a crisis in classical physics. Planck’s work around 1900 on black- 
body radiation engendered the quantum revolution. It is true that clas-
sical physics, applied to a so- called black body emitting electromagnetic 
radiation, made a drastically incorrect prediction, but no one, not even 
Planck, thought that this posed a serious problem for classical physics. 
The fallacious prediction of classical physics was dubbed “the ultraviolet 
catastrophe”, but this phrase was coined by Ehrenfest, after the quan-
tum revolution was under way, around 1911, as propaganda for the new 
theory. It was Einstein who first recognized that Planck’s work spelled 
the downfall of classical physics; but general recognition of this only 
came later, probably with Bohr’s quantum theory of the atom, around 
1913. Again, Einstein’s general theory of relativity emerged, not because 
Newton’s theory had accumulated anomalies and was in a state of crisis, 
but because it contradicted special relativity. Einstein sought a theory of 
gravitation compatible with special relativity, and it was this that led him 
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to general relativity. These three revolutions, resulting in Darwinian the-
ory, quantum theory and general relativity, are among the biggest and 
most important in the history of science; and yet they do not fit Kuhn’s 
pattern.
Failure to fit scientific practice in detail does not, however, provide 
decisive grounds for rejecting a normative account of scientific method. 
One can always reply that the account specifies how science ought to 
proceed, not how it has in fact proceeded. Much more serious are the 
objections of principle to Kuhn’s account. Kuhn, like Popper, provides no 
account of the creation of new paradigms. And given Kuhn’s insistence 
that a new paradigm, after a successful revolution, is incommensurable 
with its pre- revolutionary predecessor, it would seem impossible to pro-
vide rational (if fallible) procedures for the creation of good new para-
digms while maintaining consistency with the rest of Kuhn’s views. Kuhn 
does allow that non- empirical criteria, or values, such as consistency and 
simplicity, are employed by science permanently (and therefore, presum-
ably, across revolutions) to assess theories or paradigms; but Kuhn also 
emphasizes that these criteria are flexible and open to different inter-
pretations (Kuhn, 1970a, p. 155; 1977, ch. 13). There is no account of 
what simplicity is, and no advance over Popper’s “requirement of simplic-
ity”. Furthermore, Kuhn’s appeal to simplicity faces the same difficulty 
we have seen arising in connection with Popper’s appeal to simplicity. 
If “simplicity” is interpreted in such a way that it has real content, and 
is capable of excluding “complex” or disunified and aberrant theories 
or paradigms from science, then its permanent employment by science 
commits science to a permanent metaphysical assumption that persists 
through revolutions, something Kuhn explicitly rejects (and could not, 
in any case, provide a rationale for). If “simplicity” is interpreted suffi-
ciently loosely and flexibly to ensure that no such metaphysical thesis 
is involved, invoking simplicity must fail to exclude complex, disunified, 
aberrant paradigms from science. Any Kuhnian requirement of simplic-
ity, in short, must either be incompatible with the rest of Kuhn’s views, 
or toothless and without content. Either way, Kuhn has no consistent 
method for excluding complex, aberrant paradigms from consideration. 
It should be noted that Kuhn is emphatic that no sense can be made of the 
idea that there is progress in knowledge across revolutions, the new para-
digm being better, closer to the truth, than the old one (see Kuhn 1970a, 
ch. 13). But this is a disaster for Kuhn’s whole view. Why engage in nor-
mal science if the end result is the rejection of all that has been achieved, 
all the progress in knowledge of that period of normal science being 
sacrificed when the science adopts a new paradigm? Kuhn’s arguments 
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for the progressive character of normal science, indicated above, are all 
defeated.
Perhaps the most serious objection to Kuhn’s picture of science 
is the obvious basic unintelligence of its prescriptions for scientific 
research. Suppose we have the task of crossing on foot difficult terrain, 
containing ravines, cliffs, rivers, swamps, thickets. Kuhn’s view, applied 
to this task, would be as follows. After debate about which route to fol-
low (pre- science), one particular route is chosen and then followed with 
head down, no further consideration being given to changing the route 
(normal science). Eventually, this leads to an impasse: one comes face 
to face with an unclimbable cliff, or finds oneself waist- deep in a swamp 
and in danger of drowning (crisis). Finding oneself in these dire circum-
stances, a new route is taken (new paradigm), and again, with head 
down, this new route is blindly followed (normal science) until, again, 
one finds oneself unable to proceed, about to drown in a river or tumble 
into a ravine.
This is clearly a stupid way to proceed. It would be rather more 
intelligent if, as one tackles immediate problems of wading through this 
stream, climbing down this scree (puzzle- solving of normal science), one 
looks ahead, whenever possible, and reconsiders, in the light of the ter-
rain that has been crossed, what adjustments one needs to make to the 
route one has opted to follow. Exactly the same point holds for science. 
There can be division of labour. Even if a majority of scientists tackle the 
multitude of puzzles that go to make up normal scientific research, taking 
the current theory, or paradigm, for granted, there ought also to be some 
scientists who are concerned to look ahead, consider more fundamental 
problems, explore alternatives to the current paradigm. In this way new 
paradigms may be developed before science plunges deep into crisis. And 
just this does go on in scientific practice, as I have already indicated in the 
brief discussion of the work of Darwin and Einstein (and somewhat less 
convincingly, Planck). Another example of a new, revolutionary theory or 
paradigm being proposed in the absence of crisis is Wegener’s advocacy 
of the movement of continents, anticipating the plate tectonic revolution 
by decades. Science is, in practice, more intelligent than Kuhn allows.
In sharp contrast to Kuhn, AOE does not merely stress the impor-
tance of “looking ahead”, of trying to develop new theories, new para-
digms, before science has plunged into crisis; even more important, AOE 
provides a framework for theoretical physics (and therefore, in a sense, 
for the whole of natural science) within which ideas for fundamental 
new theories may be developed and assessed.
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According to Kuhn, successful revolutions mark radical discontinu-
ities in the advancement of science, to the extent, indeed, that old and 
new paradigms are “incommensurable” (i.e. so different that they can-
not be compared). This Kuhnian view is most likely to be correct when 
applied to revolutions in fundamental theoretical physics, where radical 
discontinuity seems most marked. But it is precisely here that Kuhn’s 
claim turns out to be seriously inadequate. As I have already emphasized, 
all revolutions in theoretical physics, despite their diversity in other 
respects, reveal one common theme: they are all gigantic steps in unifica-
tion. From Newton, via Maxwell, Einstein, Bohr, Schrödinger and Dirac, 
to Salam, Weinberg and Gell- Mann, all new revolutionary theories in 
physics bring greater unity to physics. (And Darwinian theory, one might 
add, brings a kind of unity to the whole of biology.) The very phenome-
non that Kuhn holds to mark discontinuity, namely revolution, actually 
also reveals continuity – continuity of the search for, and the successful 
discovery of, underlying theoretical unity.31
This aspect of natural science, to which Kuhn fails entirely to do 
justice, is especially emphasized by AOE. According to AOE, revolutions 
in theoretical physics mark discontinuity at the level of theory, at level 2, 
and even discontinuity at level 3, but continuity at level 4. Physicalism, 
which asserts that underlying dynamic unity exists in nature, persists 
through revolutions – or, at least, has persisted through all revolutions in 
physics since Galileo. In order to make rational sense of natural science, 
we need to interpret the whole enterprise as seeking to turn physical-
ism, the assertion of underlying dynamic unity in nature,32 into a precise, 
unified, testable, physical “theory of everything”. That, in a sentence, is 
what AOE asserts. Physicalism, according to AOE, despite its metaphys-
ical (untestable) character, is the most secure item of theoretical knowl-
edge in science; it is the most fruitful idea that science has come up with, 
at that level in the hierarchy of assumptions.
Because of its recognition that, despite the discontinuity of revolu-
tions at levels 2 and 3, there is the continuity of the persistence of physi-
calism at level 4 (and of other theses at levels higher up in the hierarchy), 
AOE is able to resolve problems concerning the discovery and assessment 
of paradigms which Kuhn’s view is quite unable to solve. Both fundamen-
tal physical theories and level 3 blueprints can be partially ordered with 
respect to how well they exemplify physicalism, entirely independent of 
ordinary empirical assessment. Assessing progress through revolution 
poses no problem for AOE. As we have seen, AOE solves the problem of 
verisimilitude.
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I have already mentioned that AOE does not merely describe sci-
entific practice; it carries implications as to how scientific practice can 
be improved. One such implication concerns scientific revolutions. Kuhn 
(1970a) gives a brilliant description of the way, during a scientific rev-
olution, there is a breakdown of rationality, competing arguments for 
the rival paradigms being circular, and each presupposing what is being 
argued for. This is a feature of actual science. Scientists do not know how 
to assess competing theories objectively when empirical considerations 
are inconclusive. But all this can be seen to be a direct consequence of 
trying to do science without the explicit acknowledgement of persisting 
metaphysical assumptions concerning the comprehensibility of the uni-
verse, there thus being nothing available to constrain acceptance of the-
ories when empirical considerations are inconclusive. Consider Kuhn’s 
breakdown of rationality. A substantial revolution will involve, not just 
two rival paradigms or theories, T1 and T2, but two rival blueprints, B1 
lurking behind T1, and B2 lurking behind T2. Granted B1, T1 is far more 
acceptable than T2, but the reverse holds granted B2. But B1 and B2, being 
untestable, metaphysical theses, they are not explicitly discussable, and 
objectively assessable, within science; so they are more or less repressed, 
excluded from discussion. Nevertheless, scientists do think in terms of 
B1 and B2. Kuhn’s Gestalt switch, involved in switching allegiance from 
T1 to T2, can be pinpointed as the act of abandoning the old blueprint 
and adopting the new one. Non- empirical arguments in favour of T1 or 
T2 can only take the form of an appeal to B1 or B2, in however a muffled a 
way (due to the point that blueprints are not open to explicit discussion). 
Such arguments will be circular, and entirely unconvincing to the oppo-
sition, in just the way described by Kuhn. Accept B1, and T1 becomes the 
only possible choice; accept B2 and T2 is the only choice. Each side in the 
dispute is convinced that the other side is wrong, even incoherent. What 
needs to be done, and cannot be done, of course, is to discuss the relative 
merits of B1 and B2. Just this can be done, granted AOE. T1, B1, T2 and 
B2 can all be assessed from the standpoint of adequacy in exemplifying 
physicalism. When the scientific community adopts AOE, the Kuhnian 
irrationality of revolutions will disappear from science.
It may be asked how it is possible for AOE to be both more 
Popperian than Popper and more Kuhnian than Kuhn. The answer is 
that AOE is more Popperian that Popper in making explicit, and so 
criticizable, metaphysical theses which falsificationism denies, and 
thus leaves implicit and uncriticizable within science. But AOE is also 
more Popperian than Popper in insisting we need to exploit criticism 
critically, so that it furthers, and does not sabotage, the growth of 
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knowledge. Criticism needs to be marshalled and directed at that part 
of our conjectural knowledge which it is, we conjecture, the most fruit-
ful to criticize. This means directing critical fire at level 2 theories and 
level 3 blueprints, it being less likely, though still possible, that criti-
cism of the level 4 thesis of physicalism will aid the growth of empirical 
knowledge. Physicalism has played an extraordinarily fruitful role in 
the advancement of scientific knowledge; it should not be abandoned 
unless an even more apparently fruitful idea is forthcoming, or unless 
the empirical and explanatory success that physicalism appears to 
have engendered turns out to be illusory. It is this persistence of physi-
calism, for good Popperian reasons, which gives to theoretical physics, 
and indeed to the whole of natural science, something of the charac-
ter of Kuhn’s normal science, with physicalism as its quasi- permanent 
“paradigm”.
2.8 Imre Lakatos
Lakatos sought to reconcile the very different views of science held by 
Popper and Kuhn. According to Kuhn, far from seeking falsifications of 
the best available theory, as Popper held, scientists protect the accepted 
theory, or “paradigm”, from refutation for most of the time, the task being 
to fit recalcitrant phenomena into the framework of the paradigm. Only 
when refutations become overwhelming, does crisis set in; a new para-
digm is sought for and found, a revolution occurs, and scientists return 
to doing “normal science”, to the task of reconciling recalcitrant phe-
nomena with the new paradigm. Lakatos sought to reconcile Popper and 
Kuhn by arguing that science consists of competing fragments of Kuhnian 
normal science, or “research programmes”, to be assessed, eventually, in 
terms of their relative empirical success and failure. Instead of research 
programmes running in series, one after the other, as Kuhn thought, 
research programmes run in parallel, in competition, this doing justice 
to Popper’s demand that there should be competition between theories 
(a point emphasized especially by Feyerabend).33 Lakatos became so 
impressed with the Kuhnian point that theories always face refutations, 
the empirical successes of a theory being a far more important guide to 
scientific progress than refutation, that he finally came to the conclusion 
that Popper’s philosophy of science was untenable.
AOE has a number of features in common with Lakatos’s method-
ology of scientific research programmes. AOE makes extensive use of 
the notion of scientific research programme. Like Lakatos’s view, AOE 
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exploits the idea that such research programmes can, sometimes, be 
compared with respect to how empirically progressive they are. AOE, 
again like Lakatos’s view, sees the whole of science as a gigantic scientific 
research programme. And, like Lakatos’s view, AOE can be construed as 
synthesizing Popper’s and Kuhn’s views.
But there are also striking differences. There are differences in the 
way scientific research programmes are conceived, especially research 
programmes in fundamental physics. For Lakatos, the main compo-
nents of a research programme are the “hard core” (corresponding to 
Kuhn’s “paradigm”), and the “protective belt” of “auxiliary hypothe-
ses”, which facilitate the application of the hard core to empirical phe-
nomena. The main business of a research programme is to develop the 
protective belt, thus extending, and making more accurate, the empir-
ical predictions of the hard core. The hard core is a testable theory 
rendered metaphysical by the methodological decision not to allow it 
to be refuted, refutations being directed at the protective belt rather 
than the hard core.
According to AOE, by contrast, the metaphysical kernel of a research 
programme is not a testable theory but rather a thesis that is genuinely 
metaphysical (i.e. more or less unspecific, and usually untestable)  – a 
thesis such as the corpuscular hypothesis, Boscovich’s point- atom blue-
print, Einstein’s unified field blueprint and so on. The basic aim of the 
programme is to turn the relatively unspecific blueprint into a precise, 
testable (and true) physical theory. The research programme thus con-
sists of a succession of theories, T1, T2 … Tn, which can be compared, 
not only with respect to empirical success, but also with respect to how 
adequately each theory encapsulates, or exemplifies, the blueprint of the 
programme. (The latter is not possible within a Lakatosian programme.) 
Whereas a Lakatosian programme has a fixed basic theory (or hard core), 
and seeks to improve auxiliary hypotheses (the protective belt), an AOE 
programme strives to capture the blueprint more and more adequately 
by means of testable physical theories.
Both Lakatos’s view and AOE permit one to see natural science as 
one gigantic research programme, but how this programme is construed 
is very different. For Lakatos, “science as a whole can be regarded as a 
huge research programme with Popper’s supreme heuristic rule: ‘devise 
conjectures with more empirical content than their predecessors’ ” 
(1970, p.  132). The huge research programme of natural science has, 
for Lakatos, no hard core; to this extent, Lakatos’s view is a variant of 
Popper’s.34 According to AOE, however, if natural science is viewed as one 
gigantic research programme, then it does have something like a hard 
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core. First, there is physicalism at level 4, a metaphysical but nevertheless 
substantial thesis about the nature of the universe. And then there is the 
current blueprint at level 3, an even more substantial metaphysical the-
sis about the nature of the universe. These provide severe constraints on 
what theories are acceptable that are not straightforwardly empirical,35 
something that is not possible given the views of Popper or Lakatos (or 
even Kuhn).36
Lakatos and AOE have very different motivations for taking sci-
entific research programmes so seriously. For Lakatos, the motivation 
comes from appreciating that a scientific theory, T, cannot be decisively 
refuted at an instant, as it were, partly because auxiliary hypotheses can 
always be invented to salvage T from a refutation, partly because early 
applications of a new theory, such as Newton’s, may make simplifying 
assumptions which may well lead to false predictions (the fault lying 
with the simplifying, auxiliary hypotheses rather than the basic theory). 
Only by looking at a series of theories, a given T1 (the hard core) plus 
changing auxiliary hypotheses (the protective belt), and comparing this 
with a rival series based on a different hard core, T2, and comparing the 
extent to which the two series are empirically progressive or degenerat-
ing, can one assess the relative empirical merits of T1 and T2. For AOE, the 
situation is very different. A research programme in theoretical physics 
consists of a blueprint, B, and a succession of theories, T1, T2 … Tn (each 
equivalent to a Lakatosian hard core), which are successive attempts to 
capture B as a testable theory. If T1, T2 … Tn are increasingly empirically 
successful (in a roughly Popperian sense) and also increasingly success-
ful at capturing B, then this means that B is empirically fruitful. A rival 
blueprint, B*, might be such that the series T1, T2 … Tn moves further and 
further away from B*:  this would mean that B* is empirically sterile. 
A major part of the point of research programmes, for AOE, is to assess 
the relative empirical fruitfulness of rival metaphysical theses, at levels 3 
and 4 (and above, if necessary). Though mostly untestable, nevertheless 
metaphysical theses can be assessed in a quasi- empirical way, in terms of 
the empirical progressiveness or degeneracy of the research programmes 
with which they are associated (or can be regarded as being associ-
ated).37 This is, according to AOE, a key feature of scientific method, one 
which makes scientific progress possible. It makes it possible for improv-
ing theoretical knowledge to lead to a reassessment of what is the best 
available blueprint, which in turn leads to a reassessment of the best 
available non- empirical methodological rules, such as symmetry princi-
ples. In other words, it makes it possible for there to be positive feed-
back between improving knowledge and improving aims and methods 
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(improving knowledge- about- how- to- improve- knowledge), a vital fea-
ture of scientific rationality according to AOE.
The differences indicated enable AOE to overcome problems which 
Lakatos’s view cannot solve. Lakatos insists that there is no such thing as 
instant rationality: however apparently decisive the refutation of a the-
ory may be, it is always possible to salvage it from refutation in a content- 
increasing way by the invention of an appropriate auxiliary hypothesis. 
It is this consideration which leads Lakatos to argue that only series of 
theories, competing research programmes, can be assessed rationally, 
in terms of relative empirical progressiveness. But in practice in sci-
ence there do seem to be instant refutations. A  famous example is the 
refutation of parity. This is a symmetry which declares, roughly, that if 
a process can occur, then so can its mirror image. This was decisively 
refuted by Wu et al. (1957), by means of an experiment which showed 
that electrons were emitted in a preferential direction from cobalt nuclei 
undergoing radioactive decay in a magnetic field. Parity conservation 
implied that this would not occur. Strictly speaking, it was not parity con-
servation on its own that was refuted, but parity plus quantum theory 
plus the theory of weak interactions plus the theory of nuclear structure 
plus a highly theoretical description of the experiment. One would think 
there was plenty of scope, here, for auxiliary hypotheses to be invented 
to salvage parity from refutation. No such hypothesis was forthcoming; 
the refutation of parity conservation was accepted immediately by the 
physics community, despite strong resistance to accepting such a conclu-
sion (because of the implausibility of supposing that nature distinguishes 
between left- handedness and right- handedness at the level of fundamen-
tal physical theory). Allan Franklin, who has produced what is probably 
the best account of the downfall of parity conservation, has put the mat-
ter like this: “It is fair to say that as soon as any physicist saw the exper-
imental result they were convinced that parity was not conserved in the 
weak interactions” (Franklin, 1990, p.  66).38 Scientific practice seems 
almost to refute Lakatos’s view.
But it does not refute AOE. According to Lakatos, in the end only 
empirical considerations, plus considerations of empirical content, 
restrict choice of theory; few restrictions are placed on how a body of the-
ory may be modified to salvage it from refutation. AOE places much more 
severe restrictions on choice of theory. In addition to those that it has in 
common with Lakatos’s view, AOE demands of a fundamental physical 
theory that it, together with other such theories, exemplifies physicalism, 
to a sufficient degree. This makes it very much more difficult to modify a 
body of theory so as to salvage it from refutation. Instant refutation is not 
surprising, granted AOE.39
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Lakatos’s view requires that science consists of competing research 
programmes. Unquestionably, the history of science reveals that com-
peting research programmes have, on occasions existed. But it is not 
clear that all science has this character, as Lakatos’s view would seem 
to require. After Heisenberg and Schrödinger had developed quantum 
theory in the mid 1920s, there continued to be debate about how the new 
theory should be interpreted, and whether the new theory, interpreted 
along the orthodox lines advocated by Bohr, Heisenberg and others, was 
ultimately acceptable. But there was nothing like a competing research 
programme. Viewed from the perspective of AOE, all this makes perfect 
sense. There were indeed serious grounds for regarding the new theory 
as unsatisfactory (see Chapter 3; see also Maxwell, 1998, ch. 7). But the 
new theory had achieved such striking successes, it was rational to con-
jecture that progress lay in developing the new theory, applying it to new 
phenomena, reconciling it with special relativity  – in doing something 
like Kuhnian normal science, in other words  – rather than in trying to 
develop a rival theory, a rival research programme. (To say this is not to 
say that serious attention should not have been given to the theoretical 
defects of orthodox quantum theory.) Not only does the history of sci-
ence fail to reveal that there are always competing research programmes, 
whenever a new theory arrives on the scene that meets with extraordi-
nary empirical success and no refutation, no good rationale may exist for 
inventing a rival research programme. (As we have seen, unlike Popper’s 
falsificationism and Lakatos’s research programme view, AOE holds that 
something like Kuhn’s normal science may well be rational, as long as it is 
accompanied by some sustained tackling of problems associated with the 
currently accepted blueprint. This may, eventually, but not immediately, 
lead to the development of a new fundamental theory, a new research 
programme.)
There are other, much more decisive ways in which AOE is an 
improvement over Lakatos’s view. Lakatos’s methodology of research 
programmes inherits a number of unsolved problems from its two 
sources, Popper and Kuhn. Like Popper and Kuhn, Lakatos has no solu-
tion to the problem of what the simplicity, unity or explanatory charac-
ter of a theory, or hard core, is; AOE, as I have indicated briefly above, 
solves the problem without difficulty. In failing to say what simplicity is, 
Lakatos also fails to articulate with any precision that part of scientific 
method concerned with simplicity; AOE faces no difficulty here either. 
Like Popper and Kuhn, Lakatos can say nothing useful about how new 
theories, new hard cores, are created or discovered; AOE, as a result 
of including levels 3 and 4 within the domain of scientific knowledge, 
is able to specify a rational, if fallible and non- mechanical, method for 
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the creation of new theories, even new fundamental theories of physics. 
Finally, Lakatos’s view fails to solve the problem of verisimilitude, a prob-
lem which can be readily solved granted AOE.
Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, despite their differences, have one big 
failure in common (the source of almost all the others). All three take for 
granted that:
(A) In science no untestable but nevertheless substantial thesis 
about the world can be accepted as a part of scientific knowledge in such 
a firm way that theories which clash with it, even if highly successful 
empirically, are nevertheless rejected.
Popper accepts (A)  in that, for him, untestable theses are meta-
physical, and therefore not a part of scientific knowledge. Kuhn holds 
it, because, for Kuhn, nothing theoretical survives a revolution. Kuhn’s 
acceptance of (A)  is also apparent in his whole treatment of revolu-
tions: precisely because Kuhn accepts (A), Kuhn cannot invoke anything 
like the level 4 thesis of physicalism to assess rival paradigms during a 
revolution, when empirical considerations are inconclusive. The Kuhnian 
irrationality of revolutions is a consequence of scientists accepting (A); 
and in so far as Kuhn thinks this irrationality is inevitable, Kuhn accepts 
(A) as well.
A case could be made out for saying that Lakatos came near to 
rejecting (A)  in arguing for the need for science to adopt a conjectural 
metaphysical inductive principle which, if true, would more or less guar-
antee that Popperian, or rather Lakatosian, methods deliver authentic 
theoretical knowledge.
But Lakatos here missed the fundamental point, central to AOE, 
and highly Popperian in spirit, that our current methods are all too likely 
to be more or less the wrong methods to adopt, the metaphysics implicit 
in these methods being false. There is thus a vital need, for the sake of 
scientific progress, to make this false metaphysics explicit so that it can be 
criticized, so that alternatives can be developed and considered, leading 
to improved metaphysics and methods. In order to do this in the best pos-
sible way, we need to develop a hierarchy of metaphysical theses to form 
a framework of relatively unproblematic theses, at the top of the hierar-
chy, below which more specific and problematic theses may be developed 
and assessed, especially in the light of their potential and actual empiri-
cally progressive character.
Interestingly enough, Lakatos himself was aware of this defi-
ciency in his “plea to Popper for a whiff of ‘inductivism’ ” (1978, p. 159). 
Discussing his proposal that one should appeal to a metaphysical 
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inductive principle as a conjecture as a part of the solution to the prob-
lem of induction, Lakatos says:
Alas, a solution is interesting only if it is embedded in, or leads 
to, a major research programme; if it creates new problems – and 
solutions – in turn. But this would be the case only if such an induc-
tive principle could be sufficiently richly formulated so that one may, 
say criticize our scientific game from its point of view. My inductive 
principle tries to explain why we “play” the game of science. But 
it does so in an ad hoc, not in a “fact- correcting” (or, if you wish, 
“basic value judgment correcting”) way. (Lakatos, 1978, p. 164)
Lakatos highlights, here, the difference between his own position and 
that of AOE. The (revisable) AOE thesis of physicalism is indeed “suffi-
ciently richly formulated so that one may … criticize our scientific game 
from its point of view”. AOE not only offers a new research programme 
for the philosophy of science, it modifies the research programme of 
science, one modification being that the philosophy of science becomes 
an integral part of science itself. The passage above makes me wonder 
whether Lakatos might not have gone on to develop or endorse AOE if 
he had lived.
90
  
3
Einstein, aim- oriented empiricism, 
and the discovery of special  
and general relativity*
3.1 Einstein’s new method of discovery
According to Popper, Einstein is a falsificationist. Thus Popper 
declares:  “Einstein consciously seeks error elimination. He tries to kill 
his theories:  he is consciously critical of his theories” (Popper, 1972, 
p. 25). And elsewhere Popper declares: “what I have done is mainly to 
make explicit certain points which are implicit in the work of Einstein” 
(Whitrow, 1973, p.  23). Paul Feyerabend, on the other hand, holds 
Einstein to be a methodological “opportunist or cynic” or, in other words, 
a methodological anarchist (Feyerabend, 1978, p. 213n; see also p. 18 
and pp.  56– 7 and note). For Arthur Fine, Einstein adopts a view close 
to the natural ontological attitude (NOA). Fine writes: “In its antimeta-
physical aspect, NOA is at one with Einstein’s motivational realism” 
(Fine, 1986, p. 9). As far as I know, van Fraassen has not yet claimed that 
Einstein is a constructive empiricist but, amazingly, the claim has been 
made on his behalf by Fine, who writes:
Indeed it would not be too far off if we summarized Einstein’s views 
this way:  “Science aims to give us theories which are empirically 
adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it 
is empirically adequate” [a straight quote from Van Fraassen’s The 
Scientific Image (1980)] … My argument, then, is that if we under-
stand Einstein in the way that he asks us to, his own realist- sounding 
language maps out a position closer to constructive empiricism 
than to either “metaphysical realism” or “scientific realism”. (Fine, 
1986, p. 108)
* I am grateful to Harvey Brown for critical comments concerning the first draft of this chapter.
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The temptation to see one’s own view in Einstein’s thought is, it 
seems, all but irresistible. I too, it seems, am unable to resist this temp-
tation. For it is my claim that aim- oriented empiricism – the view which, 
I argued in the last chapter, emerges as a sort of synthesis of the views of 
Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos but which, at the same time, greatly improves 
on all these views – is close to Einstein’s mature view of science.
I must confess that I did not arrive at aim- oriented empiricism as 
a result of reading Einstein. I developed the view during the course of 
criticizing Popper, and as the key to the solution to the problem of induc-
tion.1 At first I was convinced that the orthodox view of science, which 
I propose to call standard empiricism, had such a dogmatic stranglehold 
on science that it would be quite impossible for any scientist to uphold 
aim- oriented empiricism. It did not occur to me that Einstein might be 
an exception.
By standard empiricism I mean the view that in science theories 
are accepted and rejected solely on the basis of empirical success and 
failure. If science gives preference to theories that are simple, unified or 
explanatory, this must not be done in such a way that the universe itself 
is permanently assumed to be simple, unified or comprehensible. The 
crucial tenet of standard empiricism is that science must not make any 
permanent assumption about the nature of the universe that is upheld 
independently of empirical considerations, and certainly not in viola-
tion of empirical considerations. Science may accept a paradigm or hard 
core for a time, in the sort of way depicted by Kuhn and Lakatos, but 
it must not accept any such assumption permanently, independently of 
evidence.
Aim- oriented empiricism (AOE) is in stark conflict with standard 
empiricism in that it holds that science does make permanent assump-
tions about the nature of the universe independent of empirical consid-
erations. Assumptions at levels 7 and 6 are, according to AOE, accepted 
permanently by science independently of evidence, and the even more 
substantial assumptions at levels 5 and 4 are accepted pretty permanently 
as well, and certainly not straightforwardly on the basis of empirical suc-
cess, as these are untestable metaphysical theses. AOE, as a result of being 
in such stark conflict with standard empiricism, would be, I thought, far 
too heretical a view to be acceptable to any scientist.
But then it began to occur to me that Einstein, in developing 
special and general relativity, had made essential use of aim- oriented 
empiricism  – his success owing much to his exploitation of the view 
in scientific practice.2 I  read everything I  could lay my hands on that 
Einstein had written about the nature of science, and I discovered, so 
it seemed to me, that Einstein had actually advocated key tenets of 
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aim- oriented empiricism in an increasingly explicit way as the years 
went by. He had, however, been ignored and misunderstood because of 
the powerfully prevailing influence of standard empiricism.3 Here are 
my reasons for holding this view.
Einstein invented aim- oriented empiricism in scientific practice in 
order to overcome a severe scientific crisis. The crisis was the demise of 
classical physics as a result of Planck’s 1900 quantum theory of black- 
body radiation. Initially, it was only Einstein who understood just how 
grave, how wholesale, the crisis was. In his “Autobiographical Notes” he 
puts the matter like this:
it [became] clear to me as long ago as shortly after 1900, i.e. shortly 
after Planck’s trailblazing work, that neither mechanics nor elec-
trodynamics could (except in limiting cases) claim exact validity. 
By and by I despaired of the possibility of discovering the true laws 
by means of constructive efforts based on known facts. The longer 
and the more despairingly I tried, the more I came to the conviction 
that only the discovery of a universal formal principle could lead 
us to assured results. The example I saw before me was thermody-
namics. The general principle was there given in the theorem: the 
laws of nature are such that it is impossible to construct a perpe-
tuum mobile (of the first and second kind). How, then, could such a 
universal principle be found? (Einstein, 1969, pp. 51– 3)
This, I claim, is the beginning of the explicit employment of aim- oriented 
empiricism in scientific practice. It is to this that Einstein owed his extraor-
dinary success in discovering special and general relativity. Soon after 
1900, Einstein found himself bereft of guidelines as to how to proceed, 
because Planck’s “trailblazing” result had cast into doubt the whole of 
classical physics. Ordinarily a theoretical physicist can proceed by apply-
ing, extending, modifying or reinterpreting existing established physical 
theory. This is how classical physics had developed so far, after Newton. 
Einstein, however, found himself in what seemed an unprecedented sit-
uation. Existing physical theory – especially Newtonian mechanics and 
Maxwell- Lorentzian electrodynamics – had to be fundamentally wrong, 
given Planck’s result. A fundamentally new kind of theory was needed to 
stand in their stead. But, in order to discover this new theory, it would be 
useless to try to extend or modify existing physical theories, in the ordi-
nary manner, since it was just these theories which were fundamentally 
wrong. In order to proceed, Einstein was obliged to invent a new method 
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of discovery for theoretical physics – a rational method capable of lead-
ing to the discovery of fundamentally new kinds of theories.
Within the framework of standard empiricism there can be no 
such rational method of discovery. If the only way in which theories 
can be rationally assessed in physics is by means of empirical success 
and failure, there can be no rational method for the invention of good, 
radically new physical theories which are incompatible with existing 
theories.
Popper (1959, 1963), Kuhn (1970a) and Lakatos (1970), all of 
whom defend versions of standard empiricism, not surprisingly all deny 
the possibility of there being a rational method of discovery of funda-
mentally new theories or paradigms  – theories whose invention and 
acceptance constitute a “scientific revolution”. Kuhn even denies that 
there can be rational assessment of a revolutionary new theory (with 
respect to its predecessor). The problem of how to proceed when con-
fronted by wholesale scientific crisis, the breakdown of all existing the-
oretical knowledge, which Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos failed to solve in 
principle in the 1930s, 1960s and 1970s, Einstein had already solved in 
successful scientific practice by the year 1905. He solved it by inventing 
special relativity.
What, then, is Einstein’s new rational method of discovery, which 
led to the discovery of special and general relativity? It can be put, 
quite simply, like this. Choose two of the most fundamental physical 
theories, T1 and T2, say, which are a part of “scientific knowledge” but 
which contradict each other. Discard everything about T1 and T2 that 
does not seem relevant to the contradiction until two mutually contra-
dictory principles, P1 and P2, are arrived at, P1 from T1 and P2 from T2, 
thus arriving, it is hoped, at the nub of the contradiction between T1 
and T2. Modify P1 or P2 (or both) or relevant background assumptions 
to resolve the contradiction into a new unified principle, P3 (a synthe-
sis of a transformed P1 and P2). Take P3 as the basis for a new theory, 
T3, which unifies T1 and T2.
In order for this method of discovery to be a rational one to adopt, 
one crucial assumption must be made:  the universe has some kind of 
discoverable unified structure, of which our present fundamental phys-
ical theories give us limited, approximate (and incompatible) glimpses. 
Given the truth of this assumption, we have rational grounds for holding 
that the method can lead to success. If the assumption is false, we have 
no such grounds. As we shall see, Einstein seems only to have fully under-
stood this point after the discovery of general relativity.
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3.2 The discovery of special relativity
As far as the discovery of special relativity is concerned, Einstein used 
the above method in the following way. The two fundamental physical 
theories that he takes as his starting point (T1 and T2) are Newtonian 
mechanics (NM) and Maxwellian electrodynamics (ME). These two the-
ories are incompatible, fundamentally because, given their most natural 
interpretation, NM is about forces- at- a- distance between point particles 
with mass, whereas ME is about one entity, the continuous electromag-
netic field. More specifically, however, there is the following contradic-
tion. NM asserts that forces affect accelerations, not velocities. Dynamic 
laws (laws concerning forces and their affects), formulated within the 
framework of NM, do not pick out any special velocity any more than 
they pick out some special place or time. ME does, however, pick out a 
special velocity: the velocity of light, the velocity at which, according to 
ME, vibrations in the field strengths of the electromagnetic field travel 
through space.
Both points are absolutely fundamental to the two theories. It 
is fundamental to the whole structure of NM that forces affect accel-
erations, not velocities (there thus being no role for absolute velocity 
within the theory). And it is fundamental to ME that influences should 
spread through the field at some fixed, finite velocity: for it is this which 
creates the need for a field theory in the first place. (Because gravita-
tional influences, in Newton’s theory of gravitation, spread at infinite 
velocity, instantaneous physical states can be specified in terms of point 
particles. When influences travel at some finite velocity, as in ME, this 
can no longer be done, as momentum and energy associated with vari-
ations in the force travelling at finite velocity through space will not be 
specified.)
One way in which the clash between NM and ME may be resolved 
is to interpret ME as a theory which presupposes the existence of the 
aether, states of the electromagnetic field being states of the aether. In 
this case, it is reasonable to hold that light has a constant velocity with 
respect to the aether, and the clash with NM disappears (the constancy 
of the velocity of light being as unproblematic as the constancy of the 
velocity of sound with respect to air). In his 1905 paper expounding 
special relativity, Einstein gave two reasons for rejecting this approach. 
First, it introduces an implausible asymmetry in the explanation of 
electromagnetic induction, implausible because of the symmetry in the 
phenomena to be explained. The theoretical explanation for the cur-
rent in a conductor moving near a magnet at rest is strikingly different 
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from the explanation of the current if the conductor is at rest and the 
magnet moves, even though all that matters is the relative motion as far 
as the effect is concerned. Second, it runs into empirical difficulties in 
that all attempts to detect the motion of the earth relative to the “light 
medium” – the aether – have failed. Einstein concluded that “the phe-
nomena of electrodynamics as well as of mechanics possess no properties 
corresponding to the idea of absolute rest” (Einstein, 1905; translated in 
Einstein et al., 1952, p. 37).
Einstein was of course well aware that the null result of the 
Michelson- Morley experiment does not decisively demolish the aether; 
he knew of Lorentz’s efforts to employ the FitzGerald contraction 
hypothesis to develop a version of electrodynamics which both presup-
poses the aether and is compatible with observation. In a paper pub-
lished in 1907, however, Einstein remarked of the FitzGerald- Lorentz 
approach (surely with some justice) that it is “ad hoc” and “artificial” 
(Holton, 1973, p. 334) – although, as Grünbaum and Zahar remind us, 
this approach is not as grossly ad hoc as some have supposed (Grünbaum, 
1963, pp. 386– 94; Zahar, 1973).
We know that during the decade before 1905, Einstein took the 
aether hypothesis sufficiently seriously to wonder how motion through 
the aether might be detected (Pais, 1982, pp.  130– 2). Nevertheless, 
it seems that, early on, Einstein was drawn to what may be called the 
“Faraday interpretation” of electromagnetism, according to which, 
instead of seeking to interpret electromagnetism in terms of some more 
fundamental kind of aetherial matter, one should, on the contrary, seek to 
understand matter in terms of electromagnetism, which is to be regarded 
as fundamental (the whole idea of the aether being a mistake). This is 
implicit in the “paradox” that Einstein discovered at the age of sixteen, 
and which he later saw as the germ from which special relativity grew. In 
his “Autobiographical Notes”, Einstein describes the paradox thus:
If I pursue a beam of light with the velocity c … I should observe 
such a beam of light as a spatially oscillatory electromagnetic field 
at rest. However, there seems to be no such thing, whether on the 
basis of experience or according to Maxwell’s equations. From the 
very beginning it appeared to me intuitively clear that, judged from 
the standpoint of such an observer, everything would have to hap-
pen according to the same laws as for an observer who, relative to 
the earth, was at rest. For how, otherwise, should the first observer 
know, i.e. be able to determine, that he is in a state of fast uniform 
motion? (Einstein, 1969, p. 53)
 
 
Karl PoPPer ,  Sc ieNce aNd eNlighteNMeNt96
  
This only makes intuitive sense as a paradox in so far as electromag-
netism is being conceived of in the absence of the aether.
As I have argued elsewhere,4 there are strong aim- oriented empir-
icist, quasi a priori grounds for favouring the Faraday interpretation of 
electrodynamics over the aether interpretation, the view that the aether 
is required to make electrodynamics intelligible being a sort of meta-
physical blunder. And there is an additional consideration. According to 
aim- oriented empiricism, the acceptability of the aether hypothesis is to 
be judged in terms of its heuristic and methodological power. But as ME 
was developed, up to 1905, especially in the hands of Lorentz, the role 
of the aether seemed to become increasingly tenuous. This, according to 
aim- oriented empiricism, counts against the aether approach. We may 
thus detect, in Einstein’s adoption of the Faraday interpretation of elec-
trodynamics, and his rejection of the aether interpretation, an instinctive 
allegiance to aim- oriented empiricism.
There is, however, another approach to resolving the clash between 
NM and ME. It is possible that the velocity of light is constant with respect 
to the source. Einstein tried this approach; he tells us that he abandoned 
it because of the complications to which it led (Shankland, 1963). 
Evidence against this hypothesis only began to come in later, in 1913, 
with observations of double stars.
Granted, then, that the above two approaches to resolving the clash 
between NM and ME are to be rejected, we are left with the following 
situation: ME appears to be committed to the existence of a fundamental, 
absolute velocity – the velocity of light – just that which NM rules out. 
We have here, then, two good candidates for P1 and P2, extracted from 
T1 (NM) and T2 (ME) in order to highlight the clash between the two 
theories, namely:
P1: The laws of nature have the same form with respect to all inertial 
(non- accelerating) reference frames.
P2: It is a law of nature that light travels with constant velocity c (in 
a vacuum).
P1 and P2 together form, it would seem, a horrible contradiction. In order 
for P1 and P2 to be compatible, it would be necessary for a beam of light 
to have the same velocity c with respect to all inertial reference frames, 
even though these are moving with all possible velocities with respect to 
each other.
Astonishingly, Einstein discovered how to make this apparently bla-
tant absurdity entirely consistent. What we need to do is to modify our 
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ideas about time and space, so that light does have the same velocity c in 
all reference frames. The basic postulates of special relativity are just P1
and P2: the many consequences of the theory arise from demanding that 
P1 and P2 be consistent.
More precisely, Einstein took P1 as one of his basic postulates, but 
modified P2 to become:
P2*:  It is a law of nature that the velocity of light is a constant c in 
some “resting” reference frame, and is independent of the velocity 
of the source.
P2 is then derived from P1 and P2*. It is entirely understandable that 
Einstein took P2* as his axiom rather than P2 interpreted to mean: it is law 
of nature that light has constant velocity c in all inertial reference frames. 
To adopt this latter postulate is to assume as comprehensible that which 
only becomes comprehensible with the development of the theory. P2* is 
not initially incomprehensible in this way; on the contrary, P2* is a basic 
tenet of the Lorentzian approach, of the aether approach widely held at 
the time.
How, then, is the contradiction between P1 and P2 to be resolved? 
Ordinarily we assume that the rate of clocks, and the length of rods, 
are unaected by uniform motion, temporal and spatial distances 
being frame-independent and absolute. Suppose we have two refer-
ence frames, R1 and R2, with parallel axes, and with origins that coin-
cide at t1 = t2 = 0, the origin of R2 travelling along the x-axis of R1 with 
velocity v in the +ve direction, and the coordinates of an event P being 
(xl, y1, z1, t1) and (x2, y2, z2, t2) in R1 and R2, respectively. In eect, we 
ordinarily assume that the coordinates are related by the “Galilean” 
transformations:
x x y y z z t tvt2 1 2 1 2 1 2 11= = = =− ; ; ; .
We assume, that is, that length and time are unaected by motion, 
and that if a pulse of light has velocity c along the x-axis in the +ve direc-
tion in R1, then its velocity in R2 is c – v.
What Einstein realized was that if rates of clocks and lengths of rods 
are aected by relative motion, so that x2 = x1 – vt1 and t2 = t1 are both 
false, then it is entirely possible that any given pulse of light has the same 
velocity c in both R1 and R2 – indeed, the same velocity c in all inertial 
reference frames.
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It turns out that the thesis that light does have the same velocity 
in all inertial reference frames – which is implied by P1 plus P2 – suces 
to fix uniquely just how the coordinates of R1 and R2 are related. All that 
we need, in addition, is that the relationship is symmetric (which may 
be said to be inherent in P1 in any case), linear and isotropic. With these 
assumptions it is not hard to show that the coordinates of R1 and R2
are related by the following equations, the “Lorentz” transformations:
x
x vt
y y z z t
t vx c
v cv c2
1 1
2 1 2 1 2
1 1
2
2 2 1 21 1
=
−
= = =
−
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According to these equations, all but uniquely determined by P1
plus P2, relative motion contracts rods and makes clocks go slow, but in 
such a way that the velocity of light is c in all inertial frames. The miracle 
of reconciling P1 and P2 has been achieved.
Special relativity has a number of startling implications. One 
is that mass, along with the speed of clocks and length of objects, is 
aected by uniform motion, so that m2 = m1/(l – v
2/c2)1/2, where m1 is 
the mass of an object in rest frame R1, with respect to which the object 
is at rest, and m2 is the mass of an object in R2. Another implication –
the most famous of all – is that mass is a form of energy, in accordance 
with E = mc2.
From the standpoint of aim-oriented empiricism, special rela-
tivity is doubly significant. First, the way in which Einstein discovered
special relativity exemplifies the method of discovery of aim-oriented 
empiricism, to the extent that Einstein used the method I have indicated 
above: namely, creating a new theory as the outcome of resolving a clash 
between two existing theories – thus creating greater conceptual and the-
oretical unification. Second, and quite strikingly, special relativity itself 
exemplifies aim-oriented empiricism, and in an important sense cannot 
be adequately understood within the framework of standard empiricism. 
For, as Einstein himself remarks in his “Autobiographical Notes”, two 
pages on from the quotation given above:
The universal principle of the special theory of relativity is con-
tained in the postulate:  The laws of physics are invariant with 
respect to the Lorentz-tranformations … This is a restricting prin-
ciple for natural laws, comparable to the restricting principle of the 
non-existence of the perpetuum mobile which underlies thermody-
namics. (Einstein, 1969, p. 57)
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Special relativity is thus a law of laws, a meta- law, a guiding prin-
ciple, a heuristic and methodological rule to be employed in discover-
ing and assessing physical theories – above all, for Einstein in 1905, to 
be employed as a heuristic tool for the discovery of the new theory to 
unify classical mechanics and electrodynamics. (When viewed from this 
perspective, what Einstein did in creating special relativity was to take 
a basic restricting principle of Newtonian mechanics, namely Galilean 
invariance  – the pre- relativistic way to interpret P1  – and modify this 
to make it compatible with P2, thus forming a new restrictive principle, 
P3, i.e. Lorentz invariance.) As a heuristic and methodological princi-
ple, special relativity has amply fulfilled Einstein’s hopes for it. It played 
a vital role in the discovery of de Broglie’s wave theory of matter, the 
so- called Klein- Gordon equation (first discovered by Schrödinger), the 
Dirac equation of the electron, quantum electrodynamics, quantum elec-
tro weak theory and quantum chromodynamics. In a modified form, it 
played a crucial role in the discovery of general relativity; and it contin-
ues to be relevant to superstring theory. Here, then, is a heuristic and 
methodological principle of enormous fruitfulness for all of theoretical 
physics, which can be formulated as the demand that acceptable theo-
ries must be Lorentz invariant. This demand – equivalent to the demand 
that space- time be Minkowskian (in the formulation of theories) – is not 
merely a methodological principle for, as we have seen, it has substantial 
physics in it. Special relativity is capable of being falsified and, from the 
standpoint of general relativity, it is false. All this is very hard to make 
sense of, or do justice to, within the confines of any version of standard 
empiricism, precisely because standard empiricism rejects the idea that 
methodological principles have physics, or metaphysics, built into them – 
there being, within standard empiricism, no (level 2) metamethodologi-
cal framework within which rival (level 1) methodological principles can 
be rationally assessed. From the standpoint of aim- oriented empiricism, 
there is no difference in principle between an ordinary methodological 
rule, such as position invariance (acceptable laws and theories must be 
invariant with respect to change of position in space), and full Lorentz 
invariance. To both there correspond substantial physical or metaphysi-
cal principles, namely “space selects out no special position” or “space- 
time selects out no special inertial reference frame”. Both may be false, 
and both therefore require critical scrutiny as science develops, in accor-
dance with aim- oriented empiricism, and not dogmatic acceptance or 
rejection, as required by standard empiricism, with its fixed set of meth-
odological principles (which no one yet has been able to formulate!). 
Standard empiricism differentiates sharply between the status of position 
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and Lorentz invariance – only the former qualifying as a methodological 
rule of physics, the latter belonging exclusively to the content of physics, 
as a physical theory. But this does violence to Einstein’s achievement; it 
does violence to the new way of doing physics inspired by Einstein, which 
precisely exploits the fruitful interplay between new theories and new 
heuristic and methodological principles (along the lines stipulated by 
aim- oriented empiricism).
3.3 Einstein’s discovery of general relativity
Aim- oriented empiricism is even more explicit in Einstein’s discovery 
of general relativity. Einstein exploits the same method of discovery. As 
before, there are two fundamental conflicting theories:  Newton’s the-
ory of gravitation (T1) and special relativity (T2). These conflict because 
whereas Newton’s theory implies that gravitational influences travel 
instantaneously, special relativity implies that such influences cannot 
travel faster than light. As before, Einstein searches for new principles 
that will guide him to a new unifying theory. His first step is to notice 
that there is a principle implicit in Newton’s theory of gravitation (P1) 
which, if generalized (P1*), makes it possible to generalize and improve 
the principle of relativity basic to special relativity (P2). This latter prin-
ciple seemed unsatisfactory to Einstein because of its restriction to some 
arbitrarily selected set of inertial reference frames all in uniform motion 
with respect to each other. Much more satisfactory would be a general 
principle of relativity (P2*) which asserts that the laws of nature have 
the same form in all reference frames, however they may be moving 
or accelerating with respect to each other. But this general principle of 
relativity seems impossible to implement. It is one thing to say, given 
a train moving uniformly through a station, that there are two equiv-
alent descriptions:  (1)  train moving, platform at rest; and (2)  train at 
rest, platform moving (in the opposite direction). It is quite another to 
say, given that the train crashes into the buffers at the end of the sta-
tion, that there are two equivalent descriptions: (1) train de- accelerates, 
platform remains unaccelerated; and (2)  train remains unaccelerated, 
platform de- accelerates. These are not equivalent descriptions:  in the 
first, it is people in the train that suffer from violent de- acceleration, 
whereas in the second it is people on the platform that suffer. But con-
sider now the following remarkable feature of Newton’s law of gravita-
tion (P1):  in a uniform gravitational field all objects accelerate equally, 
whatever their mass (essentially because inertial and gravitational mass 
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are equal). Generalize this to form the principle of equivalence (P1*): no 
local phenomenon distinguishes between (a) uniform acceleration, and 
(b) being at rest in a uniform gravitational field. Whatever effect a grav-
itational field has on some phenomenon, it is the same as the effect that 
the equivalent acceleration would have in the absence of gravitation. 
This immediately has two consequences. First, it allows us to hold that 
all frames, however accelerating, are equivalent, as long as, in moving 
from one frame to another accelerating with respect to the first, we can 
invoke an additional, compensating gravitational field. Thus, in the case 
of the crashing train we have: (1) train de- accelerates, platform remains 
stationary; (2) train remains stationary, platform de- accelerates, and a 
gravitational field exists momentarily to compensate precisely for this de- 
acceleration. In both cases, it is the people in the train who suffer: accord-
ing to the first description, because of de- acceleration; according to the 
second, because of the sudden gravitational field (and no compensat-
ing de- acceleration, as on the platform). The generalized principle of 
equivalence (P1*) makes it possible, in this way, to hold the generalized 
principle of relativity (P2*). The second consequence of the generalized 
principle of equivalence (P1*) is that, if correct, it enables us to discover 
the effects that uniform gravitational fields have on phenomena; all we 
need to do is to consider the effects of uniform acceleration and put these 
equal to the effects of the corresponding gravitational field in the absence 
of acceleration. The principle of equivalence (P1*) thus has great poten-
tial heuristic power for the discovery of the new theory of gravitation, to 
replace Newtonian theory.5
According to special relativity, acceleration affects geometry. 
Consider a flat, rapidly rotating disc. A  rigid rod, of length L at the 
centre of the disc will, according to special relativity, only have length 
L(l  — v2/ c2)1/ 2 at the circumference, given that it is aligned with the 
motion of rotation which, at the circumference, has the value v.  The 
geometry of the disc, as determined within a reference frame that is not 
rotating, will be non- Euclidean.6 Uniform circular motion is accelerated 
motion. But if acceleration affects geometry, so, too, by the principle 
of equivalence, must gravitation. We have the possibility that grav-
itation is the (non- Euclidean) curvature of space- time  – a possibility 
which, if true, would bring about a tremendous conceptual unification 
in the foundations of physics (namely the unification of gravitation and 
space- time geometry). Postulate therefore that gravitation is indeed 
the curvature of space- time. The presence of matter curves space- time; 
and matter moves along geodesics in this curved space- time. Curved 
space- time can always be reduced to flat Minkowskian space- time in 
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any infinitesimal region by an appropriate choice of coordinate system, 
in accordance with the principle of equivalence given its final local for-
mulation (P1**). What remains to be done is to formulate the precise 
way in which energy–momentum aects the Riemannian curvature of 
space-time.7 The field equations of general relativity are the simplest 
possible solution to this problem. Indeed, granted that the equations 
involve derivatives no higher than the second, the field equations are 
determined uniquely to be:
R GTg Rab abab− =1 2 8/ ?
Here Rab is the Ricci tensor of the metric gab (the Ricci tensor being deriv-
able from the Riemannian curvature tensor by contraction), R is the Ricci 
scalar (formed from Rab by contraction), Tab is the energy–momentum
tensor, and G is Newton’s constant of gravitation.8 We have arrived at T3,
which reduces to special relativity (T2) in the absence of gravitation, and 
which approaches Newtonian theory (T1) in the limit as gravitational 
fields become weak and velocities become low in comparison with the 
velocity of light.
3.4 Did Einstein really employ aim-oriented 
empiricism?
Does Einstein really put aim-oriented empiricism into practice in devel-
oping the special and general theories of relativity, in the way I  have 
just sketched? Is there, here, a genuine method of discovery, given that 
Einstein failed for over thirty years to develop a satisfactory unified field 
theory? A few comments are in order.
The full aim-oriented empiricist method of discovery involves the 
tackling of at least five kinds of problems: (1) conflicts between exper-
imental results and theory, (2) conflicts between two or more well-
established fundamental theories, (3) conflicts between such theories 
and the best available blueprint for physics at level 3 in Figure  2.1 
(see Chapter 2),9 (4) conflicts inherent in the best blueprint itself 
(or  between rival blueprints), and (5) conflicts between established 
physical theory and the level 4 thesis of physicalism. It could be argued 
that Einstein only exploits a small part of this method of discovery, in 
that he is primarily concerned with type (2) problems (and type (1) 
problems where relevant). But this is, I think, wrong for a number of 
reasons.
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First, the metaphysical thesis that the basic laws of nature have a 
unified structure is an implicit or explicit assumption in all of Einstein’s 
deliberations, which means type (4)  problems are, for Einstein, 
fundamental.
Second, in developing special and general relativity it is pre-
cisely the pre- existing metaphysical blueprints of classical physics that 
Einstein is led to transform:  basic assumptions about the nature of 
space, time, energy, mass, force. In developing new principles  – such 
as the principle of Lorentz invariance or the principle of equivalence – 
Einstein is, at one and the same time, modifying pre- existing blueprint 
ideas (Newtonian space- time being transformed into Minkowskian 
space- time, which is in turn transformed into the Riemannian space- 
time of general relativity).
Third, lurking behind the type (2) problems which concern Einstein 
(involving clashes between theories) there are type (4) blueprint prob-
lems. Consider the type (2) problem that led to special relativity – the 
clash between Newtonian mechanics and Maxwellian electrodynamics 
or, more specifically, the clash between Galilean invariance and the the-
sis that the constancy of the velocity of light is a law of nature. Around 
1900, as we have seen, there was an obvious solution to this problem: 
interpret electrodynamics in terms of the aether, regard the constancy of 
the velocity of light as being relative to the aether, and expect Galilean 
invariance to break down for high velocities with respect to the aether. 
This amounts, of course, to adopting a blueprint for physics – the aether 
blueprint. In formulating the problem in the way in which he did, Einstein 
is in effect rejecting this aether blueprint; he is adopting Faraday’s view 
that the field is fundamental, and does not require an underlying aether 
to make it comprehensible. As I have argued elsewhere (see note 4), 
there are good reasons for preferring what may be termed the Faraday 
blueprint to the aether blueprint. The important point, however, is that 
in formulating his type (2) problem in the way in which he did (crucial 
for the development of special relativity), Einstein is in effect interpret-
ing Newton’s and Maxwell’s theories to be two equally fundamental, 
rival theories, each with its rival blueprint, namely, the Newtonian (or 
Boscovichean) blueprint of point particles surrounded by spherically 
symmetrical, rigid fields, and the Faraday field blueprint with variations 
in the field being transmitted at some finite velocity. There is, in short, 
a type (4) blueprint problem inherent in the type (2) problem that led 
Einstein to special relativity. This type (4) problem may be formulated, 
not as a problem about how to reconcile, or choose between, two rival 
blueprints, but rather as the problem of how to resolve the clash that 
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results from attempting to unify the two blueprints in such a way as to 
accommodate charged point particles and a field.
Fourth, there are grounds for holding that Einstein’s fundamental 
problem soon after 1900 was the type (4) blueprint problem I have just 
indicated – the problem of understanding how charged point particles 
can interact with the field, or the problem of unifying point particle and 
field. It is a striking fact that Einstein’s three great papers of 1905 can all 
be interpreted as exploring aspects of this fundamental problem. We have 
just seen that this is true of the paper introducing special relativity. It is 
also true of the Brownian motion paper, concerned to establish the exis-
tence of atoms – the existence of the particle- like aspect of reality. And 
it is true above all of the paper which put forward the idea that light has 
a particle- like aspect in accordance with E = nhν (where E is the energy 
and ν the frequency of the light, h is Planck’s constant and n is some inte-
ger, the number of light quanta present), this “heuristic” hypothesis of 
light quanta then being used to explain the photoelectric effect. Here the 
classical particle/ field problem is intensified to an extraordinary extent 
in that the field itself is revealed to have a particle- like aspect.10
As it happens, Einstein himself makes clear in his “Autobio-
graphical Notes” (Einstein, 1969)  that he held the classical particle/ 
field problem to be of fundamental importance.11 Having explained 
that theories are to be critically assessed from the two distinct stand-
points of empirical success and “inner perfection” (unity or comprehen-
sibility) – which in itself commits Einstein to aim- oriented empiricism 
(see below) – he goes on to assess critically Newtonian mechanics and 
Maxwellian electrodynamics from the standpoint of inner perfection. 
We have here, incidentally, an adjunct to, and refinement of, Einstein’s 
method of discovery: one theory is here taken at a time, and is assessed 
from the standpoint of “inner perfection” – from the standpoint, that 
is, of the capacity of the theory to provide a “perfect” blueprint for all of 
physics as far as the form of the theory is concerned. (In indicating the 
“inner perfection” defects of a theory, one in effect indicates, at least in 
general terms, what would constitute a “perfect” theory: one indicates, 
that is, a blueprint.) Einstein discusses six “inner perfection” defects in 
Newtonian mechanics, namely: (1) arbitrariness in the determination 
of inertial reference frames from an infinity of alternatives, and inad-
equacy of introducing absolute space (with respect to which all bodies 
have absolute acceleration as a solution to this problem); (2) two dis-
tinct basic laws (and not one), namely: (a) the law of motion (F = ma), 
and (b) the expression for force or potential energy (F = Gm1m2/ d
2); 
(3) arbitrariness of (b) given (a), there being endlessly many equally 
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good possibilities for (b) given (a); (4) the possibility of the force law 
being determined by the structure of space (the form of the force law 
being suggestively simple when viewed in geometrical terms), and yet 
the failure to exploit this possibility; (5)  the ad hoc character of the 
equality of inertial and gravitational mass; and (6) unnaturalness of 
energy being split into two forms, kinetic and potential (see Einstein, 
1969, pp. 27– 31). As far as electrodynamics is concerned, Einstein dis-
cerns one basic defect associated with interpreting the field equations 
as applying to matter and, in the case of the vacuum, to the aether. 
Einstein argues (perhaps not altogether accurately) that this defect 
was overcome by Lorentz in reinterpreting the field equations to hold 
essentially only for the vacuum, with matter, in the form of charged 
particles, being the source of the field. Einstein then remarks: “If one 
views this phase of the development of theory critically, one is struck 
by the dualism which lies in the fact that the material point in Newton’s 
sense and the field as continuum are used as elementary concepts 
side by side” (Einstein, 1969, p. 37). Einstein explains why attempts 
to overcome this basic defect by eliminating the point particle do not 
succeed; and he concludes: “Accordingly, the revolution begun by the 
introduction of the field was by no means finished. Then it happened 
that, around the turn of the century … a second fundamental crisis set 
in” (ibid., italics mine) – namely the crisis engendered by the first step 
towards quantum theory, Planck’s quantum explanation of his empiri-
cal radiation law. If this is the second fundamental crisis, then the first 
is particle/ field dualism of classical physics. As it happens, the two cri-
ses are intimately interrelated, since Planck’s law and quantum theory 
deal with the interaction of field and matter.
There are good grounds, then, for holding that Einstein was con-
cerned with problems from type (2) to type (5), as defined above, and 
type (1) problems where relevant, a type (4) problem of special concern 
to Einstein being the problem of how to unify point particles and field.
But did Einstein really invent an authentic method of discovery in 
view of his failure, during the last thirty years of his life, to discover the 
unified field theory he so ardently sought?
One reply can be made immediately: the method of discovery, indi-
cated above, though rational, is also non- mechanical and fallible. The 
failure of the method to lead to a good fundamental new theory over a 
period of thirty years – even in the hands of Einstein – does not prove that 
the method is inauthentic.
But there is a much more important reply to be made. Einstein 
did not use his method of discovery in seeking to formulate his 
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unified field theory. Or rather Einstein misapplied this method, in a quite 
elementary way.
After around 1930, the two fundamental theories that stand in 
most glaring contradiction with each other are general relativity and 
quantum theory. In order to implement Einstein’s rational method of dis-
covery from about 1930, the first step to take is to extract basic principles, 
P1 and P2, from general relativity and quantum theory respectively, which 
contradict each other – this even perhaps being the nub of the contradic-
tion between the two theories. The task then is to modify P1 and P2 (or 
something else) to form P3, a new principle which guides us to a new 
unified theory, T3, unifying general relativity and quantum theory.
12
Einstein did none of this. Instead he took as his two theories gen-
eral relativity and classical electrodynamics and sought to unify these 
two theories, to form a theory which applied to all phenomena, including 
quantum phenomena. One may well have doubts as to whether these two 
theories really do fundamentally contradict each other – even though the 
theories are clearly two distinct theories and not one unified theory. They 
are at least both field theories; they both incorporate Lorentz invariance, 
at least locally; and they are both classical and deterministic. What is dra-
matically apparent is that the fundamental contradiction of theoretical 
physics after 1930 concerns, not the clash between classical general rel-
ativity and classical electrodynamics, but rather the clash between gen-
eral relativity and quantum theory. (One can add that it is perverse to 
continue to take the unification of gravitation and electromagnetism as 
the unification to strive for, sufficient to create the comprehensive unified 
field theory, after the discovery of the strong and weak forces in addition 
to the forces of gravitation and electromagnetism.)
Why did Einstein so crudely and wilfully misapply his rational 
method of discovery? The answer is straightforward:  because of his 
abhorrence of quantum theory given its orthodox interpretation (OQT).13 
Einstein was absolutely correct to find OQT fundamentally defective from 
the crucial standpoint of “inner perfection”. As I shall argue in a moment, 
Einstein’s attitude towards OQT exemplifies yet again his (sound) com-
mitment in scientific practice to aim- oriented empiricism and scientific 
realism. Where Einstein went wrong was to conclude that quantum the-
ory was therefore entirely devoid of heuristic value – that it “offers no 
useful point of departure for future development” (Einstein, 1969, p. 87).
What is striking about this is that it is actually a vital feature of 
Einstein’s method of discovery that one deals with theories that are 
intrinsically defective. The defects are clues as to how the theory may be 
fruitfully modified. As we have seen above, Einstein indicates a number of 
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fundamental defects inherent in Newtonian mechanics and Maxwellian 
electrodynamics. Einstein even knew, by 1901, as a result of Planck’s 
work, that both theories are fundamentally incorrect. This did not stop 
him taking these theories as “points of departure”. Indeed, it is the defects 
in the theories, as perceived by Einstein, which make his method of dis-
covery so successful: for it is these defects which indicate how the the-
ories are to be modified to overcome the contradictions between them. 
For Einstein to argue, after 1930, that the defective character of quantum 
theory ensures that the theory cannot form a proper point of departure 
does violence to the very heart of Einstein’s own earlier method of dis-
covery, used in the discovery of special and general relativity with such 
striking success.
Why did Einstein fail to recognize the fairly obvious point just 
made? In essence, because his abhorrence of OQT was so intense, so pro-
found, that it was emotionally impossible for him to work seriously with 
the theory. He did not want to contribute to what he interpreted as a sick-
ness which had entered physics, and which he regarded as symptomatic 
of the basic sickness of our times. In a sense, Einstein turned his back on 
quantum theory, and devoted himself to the task of unifying general rel-
ativity and classical electromagnetism as a kind of moral protest against 
the tenor of our times.
In order to substantiate this point I must now break off my discus-
sion of Einstein’s successes and failures in implementing aim- oriented 
empiricism so that I can consider in a little more detail the question of 
Einstein’s attitude to OQT.
3.5 Einstein and quantum theory
His mature attitude can be summarized like this. From the standpoint of 
empirical criteria, OQT must be judged to be an immense success. From 
the equally important standpoint of criteria having to do with “inner per-
fection”, with unification, OQT must be judged to be a disaster. This is 
because the theory cannot be interpreted to be about some hypothetical 
reality. It was not so much the lack of determinism that came to worry 
Einstein as the lack of realism. In his “Autobiographical Notes” he puts it 
like this:
Physics is an attempt conceptually to grasp reality as it is thought 
independently of its being observed. In this sense one speaks of 
“physical reality”. In pre- quantum physics there was no doubt as 
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to how this was to be understood. In Newton’s theory reality was 
determined by a material point in space and time; in Maxwell’s 
 theory, by the field in space and time. (Einstein, 1969, pp. 82– 3)
Einstein goes on to point out that as far as OQT is concerned, there is no 
quantum equivalent to the classical material point or field. OQT makes 
probabilistic predictions about the results of performing measurements 
on an ensemble of similarly prepared systems, but cannot be interpreted 
as specifying the physical state of the individual system as it evolves 
in space and time independent of measurement. As Einstein puts it in 
 volume 2 of the same book, in his “Reply to Criticisms”:
What does not satisfy me … [about OQT], from the standpoint of 
principle, is its attitude towards that which appears to me to be the 
programmatic aim of all physics:  the complete description of any 
(individual) real situation (as it supposedly exists irrespective of 
any act of observation or substantiation). (Einstein, 1969, p. 667)
In a letter to Schrödinger in 1950, Einstein expresses himself even more 
emphatically:
You are the only contemporary physicist, besides Laue, who sees 
that one cannot get around the assumption of reality – if only one 
is honest. Most of them simply do not see what sort of risky game 
they are playing with reality – reality as something independent 
of what is experimentally established. They somehow believe that 
the quantum theory provides a description of reality, and even a 
complete description; this interpretation is, however, refuted, most 
elegantly by your system of radioactive atom + Geiger counter + 
amplifier + charge of gun powder + cat in a box, in which the 
ψ-function of the system contains the cat both alive and blown to 
bits. Is the state of the cat to be created only when a physicist inves-
tigates the situation at some definite time? Nobody really doubts 
that the presence or absence of the cat is something independent 
of the act of observation. But then the description by means of the 
ψ- function is certainly incomplete, and there must be a more com-
plete description. If one wants to consider the quantum theory as 
final (in principle), then one must believe that a more complete 
description would be useless because there would be no laws for 
it. If that were so then physics could only claim the interest of shop-
keepers and engineers; the whole thing would be a wretched bun-
gle. (Przibram, 1967, p. 39)
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Einstein’s opposition to OQT – arising from the lack of realism of 
the theory – was implacable, even vehement. It was this, after all, which 
had led to the great rupture between mainstream theoretical physics and 
Einstein’s own work. From 1905 to 1926 Einstein was at the centre of 
developments in theoretical physics. But from 1926 onwards the ways 
parted, essentially because Einstein was not able to bring himself to con-
tribute to the development of OQT (confining himself to critical analy-
sis of it). Robert Shankland, who met Einstein a number of times during 
the years 1950– 4, has remarked on the uncharacteristic vehemence of 
Einstein’s opposition to OQT:
His well- known scepticism on this subject [of quantum mechanics] 
was clearly evident and his comments on both the subject itself and 
its leading proponents were often highly critical and even emo-
tional, in contrast to his restrained and quiet explanations of rela-
tivity. (In French, 1979, p. 39)
Something of the strength of Einstein’s opposition to OQT also emerges 
from a correspondence which he had with Born on the subject. Einstein 
makes it quite clear that he finds OQT unacceptable because of its lack 
of realism. Born persists in a stance of somewhat patronizing incom-
prehension, Einstein rather sharply writes that he does not wish to con-
tinue the discussion, and Pauli is obliged to step in and tick Born off 
for misunderstanding Einstein, even though he agrees with Born that 
Einstein’s position amounts to asking “how many angels are able to sit 
on the point of a needle” (see Born, 1971, pp. 199– 229).
The strongest statement of Einstein against OQT that I have come 
across is quoted by Fine (1986, p. 1): “This theory [the present quantum 
theory] reminds me a little of the system of delusions of an exceedingly 
intelligent paranoiac, concocted of incoherent elements of thoughts.”
These quotations establish beyond all possible doubt that Einstein 
was committed to full- blooded scientific realism, at least as far as the 
basic aim of physics is concerned.14
Einstein is absolutely correct to hold that OQT cannot be inter-
preted realistically. As he points out in his letter to Schrödinger, if one 
attempts to interpret the ψ- function of OQT as providing a complete 
description of reality, one is led to the (apparently) absurd conclusion 
that Schrödinger’s cat persists as a superposition of being alive and being 
dead until we open the box and look. And similarly, we would have to con-
clude that the outcome of any quantum measurement is not some defi-
nite state of the apparatus but rather a superposition of macroscopically 
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distinct states – the superposition only collapsing miraculously when we 
look. The simplest way to demonstrate the impossibility of interpreting 
OQT realistically, however, arises from the following consideration. If 
we interpret the ψ- function as describing quantum reality directly, and 
exclude measurement from the basic postulates of the theory, we are 
left with a theory that is fully deterministic, since quantum states, cor-
responding to ψ- functions, evolve deterministically in accordance with 
Schrödinger’s equation. Such a version of OQT fails to make contact with 
the most basic feature of the quantum world – its probabilistic charac-
ter. In short, just as Einstein declares, OQT must be regarded as a theory 
which makes probabilistic predictions about the results of performing 
measurements on systems, but which does not specify the actual physical 
state of the individual system in the absence of measurement.15
How did this extraordinary state of affairs arise? Essentially 
because, as quantum theory (QT) developed with the work of Bohr, 
Heisenberg, Schrödinger, Born and others, no solution was found to 
the quantum wave/ particle problem. As we have seen, this problem was 
first discovered by Einstein with his invention of light quanta – or “pho-
tons” as they subsequently came to be called. The problem was further 
intensified in 1923 when de Broglie proposed that electrons, up till then 
believed to be particles, have a wave- like aspect associated with them, as 
was subsequently confirmed experimentally by Davisson and Germer. In 
order to develop QT as a realistic theory, it would have been necessary 
to solve the quantum wave/ particle problem in such a way that it is pos-
sible to specify, consistently and precisely, what sort of physical entities 
photons and electrons are as they evolve in space and time independently 
of measurement. This did not happen. Instead, Heisenberg invented 
matrix mechanics in 1925, intending, from the outset, that the theory 
should predict the outcome of measurements but should remain silent 
about what exists physically in the absence of measurement. Schrödinger 
invented wave mechanics in 1926 with the hope that the wave aspect 
of quantum entities would turn out to be fundamental. This hope was 
dashed when it became clear that the ψ- function could not be regarded 
as describing quantum reality directly, but had to be interpreted as con-
taining probabilistic information about the results of performing mea-
surements on an ensemble of similarly prepared systems – as Born was 
the first to point out.
We can begin to see some of the reasons for Einstein’s vehement 
rejection of OQT as a satisfactory theory (despite its immense empiri-
cal success). It was Einstein after all who, in a sense, invented quantum 
theory. Planck introduced the idea that the energy E of an oscillator of 
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frequency ν is quantized in accordance with E = nhν as a calculational 
device, not as a new hypothesis incompatible with classical physics. 
Planck’s aim was to deduce his empirical law of black-body radiation 
from the basic postulates of classical physics. He was dismayed to dis-
cover that the quantization of energy contradicted classical physics, and 
he spent the next fifteen years or so trying to remove this defect from his 
derivation. It was Einstein, and initially Einstein alone, who appreciated 
that Planck’s work spelt the downfall of classical physics, a new beginning 
being required. In this sense, Einstein initiated quantum theory with his 
paradoxical “heuristic” hypothesis that light consists of discrete quanta 
with energy E = hν, even though light also undeniably has a continuous 
wave-like character. For Einstein around 1905, the fundamental task of 
the new theory, needed to replace classical physics, would be to solve the 
riddle of the nature of quantum reality in view of its ostensibly contradic-
tory particle and field aspects. No wonder Einstein was dismayed when 
the new theory was developed deliberately to evade and not to solve this 
basic quantum riddle.
But there is more than this to Einstein’s opposition to OQT. As 
I  have stressed above, the failure to solve the quantum wave/particle 
problem ensures that OQT cannot be interpreted realistically, which in 
turn ensures that OQT must be interpreted as making (probabilistic) pre-
dictions about the results of performing measurements. But this in turn 
has a variety of disastrous – though rarely noticed – consequences. For it 
means that OQT only issues in actual physical predictions if some part of 
classical physics (CP) is adjoined to OQT for a treatment of measurement. 
OQT alone can only issue in conditional predictions of the type: if a mea-
surement of observable A is made, the outcome will be one or other of the 
values (a1 … an) with probabilities (p1 … pn), with:
pr
r
n
=
=
∑ 1
1
And even this goes too far: strictly speaking, according to OQT, a quan-
tum mechanical state ψ can only be attributed to a system in so far as the 
system has been subjected to some preparation procedure, which must 
be specified by means of CP. Thus OQT, devoid of CP, has no physical 
content whatsoever. It is only OQT + CP which has physical content. But 
OQT + CP, considered as a fundamental theory of physics, is a disaster. 
It is (i)  grossly ad hoc or aberrant, in that it consists of two conceptu-
ally incoherent parts, OQT and CP. It is (ii) imprecise, because the cir-
cumstances in which CP is to be applied are only specified in terms of 
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measurement, and the notion of measurement cannot be made precise 
(Maxwell, 1972b). It is (iii) ambiguous because the theory does not 
decide unambiguously between probabilism and determinism. It is (iv) 
non- explanatory, not only because of the ad hoc character of the theory, 
but also because the theory is obliged to presuppose some part of what 
it is intended to explain, namely CP. The theory is (v) severely restricted 
in scope in that it cannot be applied to conditions which exclude the 
possibility of measurement, such as early states of the universe. It (vi) 
excludes the possibility of quantum gravity and quantum cosmology, since 
these would require measuring instruments, described in terms of CP, to 
exist outside space- time and beyond the cosmos, and clearly this is not 
possible. (These are points I have developed over a number of years: see 
Maxwell, 1972b, 1973a, 1973b, 1975, 1976b, 1982, and especially 1988, 
pp. 1– 8.)16
These six gross defects, especially (i) to (iv), ensure that OQT + CP 
is unacceptable as a fundamental physical theory. OQT + CP cannot jus-
tifiably be held to be part of theoretical scientific knowledge. (OQT + CP 
encompasses a great deal of empirical knowledge, but cannot be said to 
be an acceptable theory, constituting theoretical knowledge.) OQT + CP 
is as unacceptable as the absurd, empirically successful but grossly aber-
rant theories considered in previous chapters. In practice this point is 
beyond dispute. The vast majority of physicists, from soon after 1926 
down to the present day (or down to 1993, when a version of this chapter 
was first published), have regarded OQT as an entirely acceptable part 
of scientific knowledge: they have been able to do this because they have 
been able to pretend that OQT + CP is really just OQT. In almost all the 
textbooks and physical journals, quantum theory is treated as if its pos-
tulates are purely quantum mechanical ones. As a result, OQT appears 
to be thoroughly non- ad hoc, precise and explanatory, as conceptually 
coherent and unified as any classical theory. But all this is an illusion. It 
is the outcome of pretending that the physical theory – the theory that 
has physical content  – is OQT rather than OQT + CP. No such thing is 
possible. OQT, devoid of CP, has no physical content whatsoever. Only 
an all- pervasive intellectual dishonesty makes it possible to pretend that 
OQT alone has physical content (or that OQT + CP is really, somehow, 
just OQT).
All this demonstrates just how sound Einstein’s instincts were 
when he judged OQT to be an unacceptable theory. How unerringly 
correct Einstein was to declare that Bohr and company “do not see 
what sort of risky game they are playing with reality”; and how sound 
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his comparison is between OQT and “the system of delusions of an 
exceedingly intelligent paranoiac, concocted of incoherent elements of 
thoughts”, namely QT and CP!
It is important to appreciate that the above six defects of OQT, 
even though consequences of the impossibility of interpreting OQT 
realistically, are not defects that only realists will recognize. Any phys-
icist, whether realist or instrumentalist, aim- oriented empiricist or 
standard empiricist ought, in practice, to regard the above defects as 
sufficient grounds for finding OQT unacceptable.17 We have here, in 
effect, an additional general argument against instrumentalism and for 
realism. Any fundamental physical theory, and not just OQT, which is 
interpreted instrumentalistically as predicting only the (observable) 
 outcomes of measurements will be, in the same way, unacceptably (i) ad 
hoc, (ii) imprecise, and (iv) non- explanatory. In other words, theoreti-
cal unity implies realism; anti- realism, built into a physical theory (as it 
is built into OQT) must inevitably, at some point, lead to unacceptable 
ad hocness or aberrance (see Maxwell, 1993b, where this argument is 
spelled out in more detail).
Even though it is not essential to be an aim- oriented empiricist in 
order to find OQT unacceptable, it helps. For aim- oriented empiricism 
provides a clear and cogent raison d’être for finding OQT unacceptable 
even though the theory has met with such outstanding empirical suc-
cess. Standard empiricism, on the other hand, can provide no such rai-
son d’être. If scientific theories ought in the end to be judged solely on 
the basis of empirical success and failure, then there can be no rational 
grounds for rejecting OQT, given its immense, its unprecedented, empir-
ical success.
It is in just this way that most of Einstein’s contemporaries tended 
to view his rejection of OQT: as the outcome of unscientific, metaphysi-
cal prejudice, or even as an indication of “senility” (as Einstein himself 
put it). Even Abraham Pais, so knowledgeable about, and so sympathetic 
towards Einstein, nevertheless regards Einstein’s objections to OQT as 
“unfounded” (Pais, 1982, p. 464).
Einstein’s attitude towards OQT, so strikingly at odds with most 
of his contemporaries, provides further evidence in support of my con-
tention that aim- oriented empiricism is implicit in Einstein’s scientific 
work. If Einstein had assessed OQT in purely standard empiricist terms, 
he could have had no rational grounds for rejecting OQT – no grounds 
even for rejecting OQT as a “point of departure” (since this is an epis-
temological judgement, to the effect that OQT is fundamentally false). 
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From the standpoint of standard empiricism, Einstein’s implacable oppo-
sition to OQT is just plain irrational prejudice. From the standpoint of 
aim- oriented empiricism, however, Einstein’s rejection of OQT emerges 
as entirely well founded, scientific, rational and objective. OQT is entirely 
acceptable from the standpoint of empirical considerations, but unac-
ceptable from the equally important standpoint of theoretical unity, 
comprehensibility. The scandal is that the majority of contemporary 
physicists do not see this obvious point – or did not, until quite recently.
What is irrational, in other words, is not Einstein’s rejection of OQT, 
but the majority acceptance of OQT, the general blindness to its gross 
defects. Einstein, I believe, held this to be the result of the fact that too 
many physicists put fame before understanding the universe. Einstein 
felt that, given a choice between winning a Nobel Prize and improving 
our understanding of the universe, too many physicists would choose 
the former over the latter. This, for Einstein, amounted to a betrayal of 
the soul of theoretical physics, the pursuit of a corrupt goal, fame (not 
for Einstein so very different from the pursuit of power), in preference 
to the pursuit of the noble goal of improving understanding. And this 
in turn was, for Einstein, I believe, characteristic of a general sickness 
of our age: the pursuit of shallow or corrupt goals in life in preference 
to goals of genuine value.18 Here is the source of Einstein’s inability to 
contribute to OQT after 1926. It is in this sense that Einstein’s pursuit of 
his unified field theory is a kind of moral protest; this was the clearest 
way in which he could express his conviction as to what physics ought 
to be, at its best.
Einstein did not get everything right about OQT. He assumed that 
the ostensibly highly non- local features of OQT, which seem to contradict 
special relativity, do not correspond to reality. Here he was wrong.
If two particles, 1 and 2, interact at time t1 and then separate 
widely then, in certain circumstances, a measurement performed on 1 
at time t2 enables one to predict with certainty what the result would 
be of measuring 2. A measurement of the momentum of 1 enables one 
to predict the precise momentum of 2; or, alternatively, a measurement 
of the position of 1 enables one to predict the position of 2. It is possible 
that 2 only acquires a precise momentum or position at time t2, when 
one or other kind of measurement is performed on 1.  This possibility 
requires that an influence of some kind travels instantaneously from 1 
to 2 to inform 2 as to whether it should acquire a precise momentum or 
position. If we reject the existence of such instantaneous influences, then 
in order to explain the correlations between measurements on 1 and 2 
we are obliged to hold, it seems, that these correlations are the outcome 
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of correlations established at time t1, when 1 and 2 interact. But this has 
the consequence that at time t2 particle 2 must simultaneously have a 
precise position and momentum (since 2, by hypothesis, cannot “know” 
instantaneously, at time t2, whether particle 1, far away, is subjected to a 
position or momentum measurement). But, according to OQT, no system 
can be in a state which corresponds to having simultaneously a precise 
position and momentum. Thus OQT implies that correlations cannot be 
established at t1 when 1 and 2 interact; they must be established instanta-
neously, at t2, when one or other measurement is performed on 1.
That OQT does have this highly non- local character was discovered 
by Einstein, and was expounded in a famous paper by Einstein, Podolsky 
and Rosen (1935). Because of the evident clash with special relativity, 
Einstein concluded that this kind of non- local prediction of OQT is false. 
Particle 2 does have a precise position and momentum at time t2 irrespec-
tive of whether measurements are performed on 1 or not, and QT must 
be interpreted as a purely statistical theory which gives only an incom-
plete description of the evolution of the individual system.
Einstein held that the only reasonable option available was to inter-
pret QT in this way, as an inherently incomplete, statistical theory of 
“particles”. There can be no doubt that this reinforced his conviction that 
QT did not constitute a proper starting point for future developments, 
which in turn reinforced Einstein’s search for a unified field theory.
Subsequent developments, due to Bohm (Bohm and Aharonov, 
1957), Bell (1964), Aspect et al. (1982) and others, have shown that 
Einstein was wrong to dismiss the non-local predictions of OQT as not 
corresponding to reality: these predictions have now been experimen-
tally confirmed!
This concludes my case for saying Einstein invented and applied 
aim- oriented empiricism in scientific practice in developing the special 
and general theories of relativity, and in critically examining quantum 
theory.
But, it may be asked, did Einstein explicitly advocate aim- oriented 
empiricism? I turn now to a discussion of this question.
3.6 Did Einstein advocate aim- oriented empiricism?
There can be, to begin with, no doubt that Einstein devoted his life to 
the goal of discovering the unified structure of the universe and that, 
for him, this constituted an entirely proper aim for science, indeed, 
the noblest motive for pursuing scientific inquiry. Something of what 
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the desire to understand meant to Einstein emerges from the following 
passage:
The most beautiful experience we can have is the mysterious. It 
is the fundamental emotion which stands at the cradle of true art 
and true science. Whoever does not know it and can no longer 
wonder, no longer marvel, is as good as dead, and his eyes are 
dimmed. It was the experience of mystery, even if mixed with 
fear, that engendered religion. A  knowledge of the existence of 
something we cannot penetrate, our perceptions of the profound-
est reason and the most radiant beauty, which only in their most 
primitive forms are accessible to our minds – it is this knowledge 
and this emotion that constitute true religiosity; in this sense, and 
in this alone, I  am a deeply religious man. I  cannot conceive of 
a God who rewards and punishes his creatures, or has a will of 
the kind that we experience in ourselves. Neither can I nor would 
I  want to conceive of an individual that survives his physical 
death; let feeble souls, from fear or absurd egoism, cherish such 
thoughts. I am satisfied with the mystery of the eternity of life and 
with the awareness and a glimpse of the marvelous structure of 
the existing world, together with the devoted striving to compre-
hend a portion, be it ever so tiny, of the Reason that manifests 
itself in nature. (Einstein, 1973, p. 11)
On one occasion in 1925 he expressed himself to the novelist Esther 
Salaman in the following terms:
I want to know how God created this world. I’m not interested 
in this- or- that phenomenon, in the spectrum of this- or- that ele-
ment. I want to know His thoughts, the rest are details. (Salaman, 
1979, p. 22)
That a basic aim of science is to unify all phenomena is affirmed in numer-
ous passages, such as this, from 1936:
The aim of science is, on the one hand, a comprehension, as com-
plete as possible, of the connection between the sense experiences 
in their totality, and, on the other hand the accomplishment of this 
aim by use of a minimum of primary concepts and relations. (Seeking, 
as far as possible, logical unity in the world picture, i.e. paucity in 
logical elements.) (see Einstein, 1973, p. 293)
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Einstein also makes it clear that science at its best assumes that this goal 
of unification is realizable:
Certain it is that a conviction, akin to religious feeling, of the ratio-
nality or intelligibility of the world lies behind all scientific work of 
a higher order. This firm belief, a belief bound up with deep feel-
ing in a superior mind that reveals itself in the world of experience, 
represents my conception of God. In common parlance this may be 
described as “pantheistic” (Spinoza). (First published 1929; see 
Einstein, 1973, p. 262)
And on another occasion:
From the very beginning there has always been present the attempt 
to find a unifying theoretical basis for all [the] single sciences, con-
sisting of a minimum of concepts and fundamental relationships, 
from which all the concepts and relationships of the single disci-
plines might be derived by logical process. This is what we mean by 
the search for a foundation of the whole of physics. The confident 
belief that this ultimate goal may be reached is the chief source of 
the passionate devotion which has always animated the researcher. 
(First published 1940; see Einstein, 1973, p. 324)
As for scientific realism, Einstein expresses himself with his usual clarity 
and brevity:
The belief in an external world independent of the perceiving 
subject is the basis of all natural science. Since, however, sense 
perception only gives information of this external world or of “phys-
ical reality” indirectly, we can only grasp the latter by speculative 
means. (First published 1931; see Einstein, 1973, p. 266)
And, on another occasion, as we have already seen:
Physics is an attempt to grasp reality as it is thought independently 
of its being observed. (Einstein, 1969, p. 82)
It is all summed up succinctly in a letter to Cornelius Lanczos in 1942:
You are the only person I know who has the same attitude toward 
physics as I  have:  belief in the comprehension of reality through 
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something basically simple and unified. (Dukas and Hoffmann, 
1979, p. 68.)
All this might seem more than enough to demolish decisively the views 
of those, like Fine and Popper, who hold that Einstein upheld some ver-
sion of standard empiricism. Unfortunately it is not. In all the above 
quotations, Einstein can be interpreted as asserting no more than that 
he, and science, seek to discover, and presuppose the existence of, a 
unified structure to the universe, in the context of discovery. According 
to this interpretation, Einstein would hold that, in the context of justifi-
cation, nothing must be permanently assumed about the nature of the 
universe, the sole aim being empirical adequacy, empirical consider-
ations alone in the end deciding what is to constitute theoretical scien-
tific knowledge.
On this issue  – the crucial issue which divides off standard from 
aim- oriented empiricism – Einstein seems to have wavered. Consider the 
following passage:
Can we hope to be guided safely by experience at all when there 
exist theories (such as classical mechanics) which to a large extent 
do justice to experience, without getting to the root of the matter? 
I answer without hesitation that there is, in my opinion, a right way, 
and that we are capable of finding it. Our experience hitherto jus-
tifies us in believing that nature is the realization of the simplest 
conceivable mathematical ideas. I am convinced that we can dis-
cover by means of purely mathematical constructions the concepts 
and the laws connecting them with each other, which furnish the 
key to the understanding of natural phenomena. Experience may 
suggest the appropriate mathematical concepts, but they most 
certainly cannot be deduced from it. Experience remains, of course, 
the sole criterion of the physical utility of a mathematical construc-
tion. But the creative principle resides in mathematics. In a certain 
sense, therefore, I hold it true that pure thought can grasp reality, 
as the ancients dreamed. (First published 1933; see Einstein, 1973, 
p. 274, italics mine)
This comes tantalizingly close to aim- oriented empiricism. A central tenet 
of aim- oriented empiricism is that we are rationally entitled to assume 
that the universe is knowable – there being some fallible, non- mechanical 
but rational method of discovery available to us – the knowability of the 
universe implying its comprehensibility. It is just this key element of 
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aim- oriented empiricism which Einstein asserts here, his epistemological 
and methodological instincts as usual getting almost everything right. 
(The point is also brilliantly made in one of Einstein’s most famous say-
ings:  “Raffiniert ist der Herrgott, aber boshaft ist er nicht”– “God is sub-
lime but not malicious”.) Unfortunately, in the quotation given above, 
the italicized sentence provides Popper or Fine with the perfect excuse 
for interpreting the passage as a defence of standard empiricism. One 
can argue, of course, that the whole passage only really makes sense if 
interpreted as asserting: experience remains the sole criterion of physical 
utility granted that we restrict our attention to simple, unified theories. This 
would of course violate standard empiricism. But the text, as it stands, is 
sufficiently ambiguous to leave the matter undecided. Consider next the 
following passage:
The very fact that the totality of our sense experiences is such 
that by means of thinking (operations with concepts, and the cre-
ation and use of definite functional relations between them, and 
the coordination of sense experiences to these concepts) it can be 
put in order, this fact is one which leaves us in awe, but which we 
shall never understand. One may say “the eternal mystery of the 
world is its comprehensibility”. It is one of the great realizations of 
Immanuel Kant that the postulation of a real external world would 
be senseless without this comprehensibility.
In speaking here of “comprehensibility”, the expression is 
used in its most modest sense. It implies: the production of some 
sort of order among sense impressions, this order being produced 
by the creation of general concepts, relations between these con-
cepts, and by definite relations of some kind between the concepts 
and sense experience. It is in this sense that the world of our sense 
experiences is comprehensible. The fact that it is comprehensible 
is a miracle.
In my opinion, nothing can be said a priori concerning the 
manner in which the concepts are to be formed and connected, and 
how we are to coordinate them to sense experiences. In guiding us 
in the creation of such an order of sense experiences, success alone 
is the determining factor. All that is necessary is to fix a set of rules, 
since without such rules the acquisition of knowledge in the desired 
sense would be impossible. One may compare these rules with the 
rules of a game in which, while the rules themselves are arbitrary, 
it is their rigidity alone which makes the game possible. However, 
the fixation will never be final. It will have validity only for a special 
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field of application (i.e., there are no final categories in the sense of 
Kant). (First published 1936; see Einstein, 1973, p. 292)
This, once again, is tantalizingly close to aim- oriented empiricism. 
Einstein recognizes clearly that only in a very special kind of universe – a 
comprehensible universe – is scientific explanation and understanding 
possible. He recognizes that the particular way the universe is assumed 
to be comprehensible at any stage in the development of science will lead 
to rules or principles – such as Galilean or Lorentz invariance, the prin-
ciple of equivalence, conservation of momentum and energy – without 
which physics would be impossible. And he points out that these rules are 
not final: it is to be expected that they will change as science advances. 
All this accords beautifully with aim- oriented empiricism. What violates 
aim- oriented empiricism is the suggestion that there is no Kantian syn-
thetic a priori proposition built into scientific knowledge. According to 
aim- oriented empiricism, there are two such propositions, namely, par-
tial knowability and meta- knowability at levels 7 and 6 of Figure 2.1 (see 
Chapter 2).19 We cannot of course know for certain that these proposi-
tions are true. They must remain forever conjectures – all our knowledge 
being conjectural in character. Nevertheless, we can be confident that we 
will always accept these propositions as a part of scientific knowledge. 
We are rationally entitled to accept partial knowability as a part of scien-
tific knowledge because, if it is false, we cannot acquire knowledge of our 
local circumstances whatever we assume. There can be no circumstances 
in which it would be in the interests of the pursuit of knowledge of truth 
to reject partial knowability. And as for meta- knowability, accepting this 
proposition can only help, and cannot hinder, the pursuit of knowledge 
of truth, whatever the universe may be like. Both are synthetic a priori 
conjectures, accepted permanently because of the crucial role that they 
play in the pursuit of knowledge.20 In short, these two propositions are 
synthetic a priori statements not in the full- blooded Kantian sense that 
they can be known to be true of all possible experience with absolute 
certainty, but in the radically qualified Kantian sense that they are con-
jectures about reality – about the noumenal world – which must remain 
permanently an integral part of conjectural human knowledge, and 
which are adopted as knowledge on non- empirical grounds. This cru-
cial tenet of aim- oriented empiricism is, it seems, explicitly rejected by 
Einstein in the above passage – even though the whole point of the pas-
sage, ironically enough, is to affirm it, affirm, that is, that science can-
not proceed without the assumption that the universe is knowable, even 
comprehensible.
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Einstein’s ambivalent attitude to the crucial issue which separates 
off standard from aim- oriented empiricism gains explicit expression in 
the following quotation:
[The aim of science is to arrive] at a system of the greatest con-
ceivable unity, and of the greatest poverty of concepts of the logical 
foundations, which is still compatible with the observations made 
by our senses. We do not know whether or not this ambition will 
ever result in a definite system. If one is asked for his opinion, he is 
inclined to answer no. While wrestling with the problems, however, 
one will never give up the hope that this greatest of all aims can 
really be attained to a very high degree. (First published 1936; see 
Einstein, 1973, p. 294)
We might interpret this to mean that when Einstein is thinking pri-
marily as a theoretical physicist, he unthinkingly takes the ultimate 
comprehensibility of the universe for granted – the key component of 
aim- oriented empiricism. When he comes to reflect philosophically 
about the aims and methods of his work, however, his (misconceived) 
philosophical conscience gets the better of him, and he lapses into 
standard empiricism. Einstein’s scientific instincts, in short, are more 
enlightened than his philosophical reflections  – an important point, 
implicit in my claim that aim- oriented empiricism arose, for Einstein, 
out of scientific practice, adopted in response to a severe scientific 
problem.
Are we to conclude, then, that Einstein did not in the end manage 
to free himself explicitly from the trap of standard empiricism? One point 
to remember is that throughout his scientific life Einstein’s views on the 
philosophy of science evolved from something close to Machian positiv-
ism at the outset (an extreme version of standard empiricism) to a view 
that comes to resemble aim- oriented empiricism more and more closely 
towards the end of his life. Einstein himself put the matter like this, in a 
letter to Lanczos in 1938:
Coming from sceptical empiricism of somewhat the kind of 
Mach’s, I was made, by the problem of gravitation, into a believ-
ing rationalist, that is, one who seeks the only trustworthy source 
of truth in mathematical simplicity. The logically simple does 
not, of course, have to be physically true; but the physically true 
is logically simple, that is, it has unity at the foundation. (see 
Holton, 1973, p. 241)
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This, to begin with, sounds like a clear enough confession of a convinced 
aim- oriented empiricist. As it stands, it is perhaps something of an over-
simplification. In the first place, as we have seen above, elements of aim- 
oriented empiricist thinking can be found in Einstein’s scientific work 
almost from the outset  – from Einstein’s first great creative period in 
1902– 5. Second, Einstein’s views concerning the philosophy of science 
went on developing long after the creation of general relativity, right to 
the end of his life. Our best hope, then, of finding a clear, unambiguous 
formulation of aim- oriented empiricism is to look at Einstein’s very last 
writings on philosophy of science. I provide two final quotations. The first 
comes from Einstein’s “Autobiographical Notes”, written when he was 
67. Einstein is discussing the points of view from which physical theories 
can be critically assessed, quite generally:
The first point of view is obvious:  the theory must not contradict 
empirical facts. … The second point of view is not concerned with 
the relation to the material of observation but with the premises 
of the theory itself, with what may briefly but vaguely be charac-
terized as the “naturalness” or “logical simplicity” of the premises 
(of the basic concepts and of the relations between these which 
are taken as a basis). This point of view, an exact formulation of 
which meets with great difficulties, has played an important role 
in the selection and evaluation of theories since time immemorial. 
The problem here is not simply one of a kind of enumeration of the 
logically independent premises (if anything like this were at all 
unequivocally possible), but that of a kind of reciprocal weighing of 
incommensurable qualities … Of the “realm” of theories I need not 
speak here, inasmuch as we are confining ourselves to such theories 
whose object is the totality of all physical appearances. The second 
point of view may briefly be characterized as concerning itself with 
the “inner perfection” of the theory, whereas the first point of view 
refers to the “external confirmation”. The following I reckon as also 
belonging to the “inner perfection” of a theory: We prize a theory 
more highly if, from the logical standpoint, it is not the result of 
an arbitrary choice among theories which, among themselves, 
are of equal value and analogously constructed. (Einstein, 1969, 
pp. 21– 3)
It is surely clear from this that Einstein came quite explicitly to repudi-
ate all versions of standard empiricism towards the end of his life. There 
is no suggestion here that the second requirement of “inner perfection” 
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or unity is somehow to be reduced to the first requirement of empirical 
adequacy: empirical considerations do not, for Einstein, alone determine 
choice of theory. Furthermore, Einstein has made it abundantly clear 
already that, in his view, in choosing only theories which satisfy the 
requirement of inner perfection, we are in effect assuming that the uni-
verse itself is comprehensible – this being a permanent presupposition of 
scientific knowledge upheld on non- empirical grounds. But in case there 
is any doubt on this score, here is a passage written in 1950 in which the 
thesis that there can be no knowledge without the presupposition that 
the universe is comprehensible is explicitly affirmed:
It is of the very essence of our striving for understanding that, on 
the one hand, it attempts to encompass the great and complex vari-
ety of man’s experience, and that on the other, it looks for simplicity 
and economy in the basic assumptions. The belief that these two 
objectives can exist side by side is, in view of the primitive state 
of our scientific knowledge, a matter of faith. Without such faith 
I could not have a strong and unshakable conviction about the inde-
pendent value of knowledge. (Einstein, 1973, p. 357)
I conclude that Einstein came close to articulating aim- oriented empiri-
cism towards the end of his life, even if he did not recognize that this posi-
tion is required to solve the problem of induction, and did not appreciate 
that it provides a more rational conception of science than does standard 
empiricism – and not a less rational conception, as Einstein’s references 
to “faith” and “miracle- creed” tend to suggest.
In the end, however, what really matters is the philosophy of sci-
ence implicit in Einstein’s scientific deeds. Einstein himself held this 
view. As he put it: “If you want to find out anything from the theoreti-
cal physicists about the methods they use, I advise you to stick closely 
to one principle: don’t listen to their words, fix your attention on their 
deeds” (Einstein, 1973, p.  270). As we have seen above, in order to 
make rational sense of Einstein’s scientific judgements and deeds it is 
essential to see them from the standpoint of aim- oriented empiricism. 
More important, Einstein can be said to have invented aim- oriented 
empiricism in scientific practice during the course of discovering the 
special and general theories of relativity. His success in discovering 
these theories owes much to the invention and exploitation of the 
rational method of discovery of aim- oriented empiricism. This aspect 
of Einstein’s work transformed the whole character of subsequent 
theoretical physics. Einstein’s contributions to theoretical physics are 
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intimately interrelated with his contribution to the philosophy of phys-
ics:  after Einstein, indeed, physics and philosophy of physics ought 
to form one integrated discipline  – aim- oriented empiricist natural 
philosophy. The various versions of standard empiricism defended by 
Popper, van Fraassen and Fine (and most contemporary philosophers 
of science) all fail to do justice to this vital dimension of Einstein’s con-
tribution to science. Indeed, advocacy of standard empiricism after 
Einstein amounts in itself to a failure to understand an important 
aspect of Einstein’s contribution to science.21
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4
Non- empirical requirements  
scientific theories must satisfy:  
simplicity, unity, explanation, beauty*
4.1 The problem
A scientific theory, in order to be accepted as a part of theoretical scien-
tific knowledge, must be sufficiently:
(1) empirically successful;
(2) empirically contentful;
(3) simple, unified, explanatory, beautiful, elegant, harmonious, non- 
ad hoc, conceptually coherent, invariant, symmetrical, organic, 
inwardly perfect, non- aberrant (all terms used in this context by 
scientists and philosophers of science).
It is important to note that this third non- empirical requirement plays a 
crucial role in science, especially in physics, to the extent, even, of per-
sistently overriding empirical requirements. Given any accepted physical 
theory, T, however successful empirically, it will always be possible to con-
coct endlessly many empirically more successful theories, T1, T2, etc., if 
non- empirical requirements can be ignored. T will make endlessly many 
predictions concerning phenomena not yet observed. Rivals to T can be 
concocted by modifying T in ad hoc ways so that each rival makes a differ-
ent prediction for some unobserved phenomenon. Then independently 
testable and corroborated hypotheses can be added to these rivals, the 
result being a series of theories, T1, T2, etc., which have all the empirical 
success of T, and have excess empirical content over T, this excess content 
*  An earlier version of this chapter was posted on the PhilSci Archive in 2004 (see http:// philsci- 
archive.pitt.edu/ 1759/ ).
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being empirically corroborated. T1, T2, etc., are thus empirically more 
successful than T.  Furthermore, almost all accepted physical theories 
run into empirical difficulties for some phenomena and are, on the face 
of it, refuted. T1, T2, etc., can be further modified in an entirely ad hoc, 
arbitrary fashion, so that these theories predict correctly the phenomena 
that ostensibly refute T, so that T1, T2, etc., are, in addition, empirically 
successful where T is refuted. In scientific practice, of course, these rivals 
to T, much more empirically successful than T, are never considered at all 
because of their failure to satisfy non- empirical requirements. The fact 
that such empirically more successful theories are persistently ignored 
because of their unacceptably ad hoc, complex, disunified character 
means that non- empirical considerations are persistently overriding 
empirical considerations in physics.1 Non- empirical considerations thus 
play an irreplaceable and fundamental role in science.
But what is this mysterious non- empirical feature of simplicity, 
unity, etc., that any acceptable scientific theory must possess? This is the 
problem I set out to solve in this chapter.
It deserves to be noted that this is an absolutely fundamental 
problem in the philosophy of science. The solution is required for (a) a 
specification of scientific method, and (b)  the solution to the prob-
lem of induction. Both points are demonstrated by the point made 
above, namely that non- empirical considerations persistently override 
empirical considerations when it comes to the acceptance of scientific 
theories.
Non- empirical considerations can have a purely pragmatic role in 
science:  in certain contexts, we choose one formulation over another, 
or even one theory over another, not because we judge our choice to be 
more likely to be true, but because it is such that the equations are easier 
to solve, it is easier to extract useful predictions from the choice we make. 
Here, I ignore such pragmatic considerations, at least initially, and con-
centrate exclusively on non- empirical requirements judged to be indica-
tive of truth or knowledge (however fallibly).
The following seven aspects of the problem can be distinguished:
(1) The terminological problem: How can simplicity, unity (etc.) be 
significant notions, having methodological significance, when 
the question of whether a theory is simple or complex, unified or 
disunified, will depend crucially on how the theory in question 
is formulated? A change of formulation can turn a simple theory 
into a complex one, and vice versa.
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(2) How can degrees of simplicity, unity (etc.) be assessed?
(3) How many dierent features of theories are involved? The pleth-
ora of terms used by scientists and philosophers of science in this 
context does not inspire confidence that people know what they 
are talking about.
(4) How can one do justice to the fact that conceptions of simplic-
ity or unity evolve with evolving knowledge? Three of Newton’s 
four  rules of reasoning concern simplicity (Newton, 1962, 
pp. 398–400), and yet Newton’s notions are dierent from those 
of a modern physicist.
(5) How can one do justice to ambiguity of judgements concerning 
the relative simplicity or unity of theories? Thus Newton’s theory 
of gravitation seems in one way much simpler than Einstein’s, but 
in another way more complex, or at least less unified.
(6) How is persistent preference for simple or unified theories in sci-
ence, even against the evidence, to be justified? This is, it should 
be noted, the problem of induction. Solve this, and the problem of 
induction is solved.
(7) What implications does the solution to these problems have for 
science itself?
By far the most serious item on this list is (1). I shall concentrate on (1), 
and at the end will make a few remarks about (2) to (7).
Richard Feynman has provided the following amusing illustration 
of problem (1) (see (Feynman et al., 1965, 25-10 – 25-11). Consider an 
appallingly complex universe governed by 1010 quite dierent, distinct 
laws. Even in such a universe, the true “theory of everything” can be 
expressed in the dazzlingly simple, unified form: A = 0. Suppose the 1010
distinct laws of the universe are:
(1) F = ma; (2) F = Gm1m2/d
2; etc.
 Let A1 = (F – ma)
2, A2 = (F – Gm1m2/d
2)2, etc., for all 1010 distinct 
laws. Let
A Ar
r
=
=
∑
1
1010
The true “theory of everything” of this universe can now be formulated 
as: A = 0. (This is true if and only if each Ar = 0, for r = 1, 2, … 10
10.)
Most scientists and philosophers of science recognize that non-
empirical considerations of simplicity, etc., play an important role 
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in science, but no one has been able so far to solve the terminological 
 problem – problem (1). Weyl (1963, p. 155) remarked correctly that “The 
problem of simplicity is of central importance for the epistemology of the 
natural sciences”. Einstein (1982, p. 23) recognized the problem but con-
fessed that he was not “without more ado, and perhaps not at all” able to 
solve it. Jeffreys and Wrinch (1921) suggested that simplicity could be 
identified with paucity of adjustable constants in equations, but unfortu-
nately number of constants can be changed by changes of formulation. 
Popper (1959, ch. 8) proposed that simplicity is falsifiability, but unfortu-
nately falsifiability can always be increased by adding on independently 
testable hypotheses which, in general, will drastically decrease simplicity. 
(Popper’s adjunct proposal, in terms of dimension, does not work either, 
and is in any case subservient to falsifiability.) More recently, Friedman 
(1974), Kitcher (1981) and Watkins (1984) have sought to identify sim-
plicity or unity with structural, formal or axiomatic features, but these 
attempts fail (see Salmon, 1989; Maxwell, 1998, pp. 65– 8). Even more 
recently, Weber (1999), Schurz (1999) and Bartelborth (2002) have 
tackled the problem without success – but see the excellent paper by 
Maudlin (1996) on unification of theoretical physics.2 McAllister (1996) 
constitutes an interesting attempt to solve the problem, and this will be 
discussed in Chapter 6.
4.2 The proposed solution
Previous attempts at solving the problem have failed because of mistakes 
concerning two crucial preliminary points.3
The first mistake is to formulate the problem, in the first instance, 
too generally as a problem about scientific theories. It is vital, in the 
first instance, to restrict the problem to fundamental, dynamical phys-
ical theories. Branches of the natural sciences are not independent of 
one another; they are interconnected. Biology presupposes chemistry, 
and even physics; chemistry presupposes physics; geology and astron-
omy presuppose physics; and phenomenological physics presupposes 
fundamental physics. All branches of natural science besides theoreti-
cal physics, in other words, are constrained by results from some more 
fundamental science that, in the end, can be traced back to theoretical 
physics. This is neither a pro- nor anti- reductionist thesis; it is just the 
simple observation that theories in non- physical branches of natural 
science are, in the end, in general, exceptions aside, constrained by 
physics. Only in fundamental theoretical physics does the question of 
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the nature of non- empirical constraints on theories arise in something 
like a naked, pure form. We must, in the first instance, restrict the prob-
lem to that of fundamental, dynamical physical theory.
The second mistake is to suppose that simplicity, unity, etc., is a 
feature of the theory itself, its axiomatic structure, its simplicity of for-
mulation, its number of postulates, its characteristic pattern of deriva-
tions, its number of adjustable constants. But all this involves looking 
at entirely the wrong thing. What one needs to look at is not the theory 
itself, but at the world, or rather at what the theory says about the world, 
the content of the theory, in other words. At a stroke, the worst aspect of 
the problem of what unity is vanishes. No longer does one face the termi-
nological problem of unity – the problem of the formulation- dependent 
nature of unity. Suppose we have a given theory, T, which is formulated 
in N different ways, some formulations exhibiting T as beautifully uni-
fied, others as horribly complex and disunified, but all formulations 
being interpreted in precisely the same way, so as to make precisely the 
same assertion about the world. If unity has to do exclusively with con-
tent, then all these diverse formulations of T, having the same content, have 
precisely the same degree of unity. The variability of apparent unity with 
varying formulations of one and the same theory, T, (given some specific 
interpretation), which poses such an insurmountable problem for tradi-
tional approaches to the problem, poses no problem whatsoever for the 
thesis that unity has to do with content. Variability of formulation of a 
theory which leaves its content unaffected is wholly irrelevant: the unity 
of the theory is unaffected.
But now we have a new problem: How is the unity of the content 
of a theory to be assessed? What exactly does it mean to assert that a 
dynamical physical theory has a unified content?
What it means is that the theory has the same content throughout 
the range of possible phenomena to which the theory applies. Unity, in 
other words, means that there is just one content throughout the range 
of possible phenomena to which the theory applies. If the theory pos-
tulates different contents, different laws, for different ranges of possible 
phenomena, then the theory is disunified, and the more such different 
contents there are, so the more disunified the theory is. Thus “unity” 
means “one”, and “disunity” means “more than one”, the disunity 
becoming worse and worse as the number of different contents goes up, 
from two to three to four, and so on. Not only does this enable us to 
distinguish between “unified” and “disunified” theories, it enables us to 
assign “degrees of unity” to theories, or to partially order theories with 
respect to their degree of unity.4
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To give an elementary example, Newton’s theory of gravitation, 
F  =  GM1M2/ d
2 is unified in that what the theory asserts is the same 
throughout all possible phenomena to which it applies (all bodies of all 
possible masses, whatever their constitution, shape, relative velocity or 
distance apart, at all times and places). An aberrant version of this the-
ory, which asserts that F = GM1M2/ d
2 for times t ≤ t0, where t0 is some 
definite time, and F = GM1M2/ d
3 for times t > t0, is disunified, because 
what the theory asserts is not the same throughout the range of possible 
phenomena to which the theory applies.
Note that special terminology could be introduced to make 
Newtonian theory look disunified, and the aberrant version of 
Newtonian theory look unified. All we need do is interpret dN to mean 
“dN if t ≤ t0 and d
N+1 if t > t0”. In terms of this (admittedly somewhat 
bizarre) terminology, the aberrant theory has the form “F = GM1M2/ 
d2”, and Newtonian theory has the “aberrant” form “F = GM1M2/ d
2 for 
times t ≤ to and F = GM1M2/ d for times t > to”. But this mere termi-
nological reversal of aberrance or disunity does not affect the content 
of the two theories: the content of Newtonian theory remains unified, 
and the content of the aberrant version (which looks unified) remains 
disunified.
This almost suffices to solve the problem. A  little more needs 
to be added, however, because in practice in physics, assessments of 
degrees of unity are somewhat more complex than I  have indicated 
so far, owing to the following consideration. In assessing the extent 
to which a theory is disunified we may need to consider how different, 
or in what way different, one from another, the different contents of a 
theory are. A  theory that postulates different laws at different times 
and places is disunified in a much more serious way than a theory that 
postulates the same laws at all times and places, but also postulates 
that distinct kinds of physical particle exist, with different dynamical 
properties, such as charge or mass. This second theory still postulates 
different laws for different ranges of possible phenomena: laws of one 
kind for possible physical systems consisting of one type of particle, 
and slightly different laws for possible physical systems consisting of 
another type of particle. But this second kind of difference in content is 
much less serious than the first kind (which involves different laws at 
different times and places).
What this means is that there are different kinds of disunity, dif-
ferent dimensions of disunity, as one might say, some more serious than 
others, but all facets of the same basic idea. We can, I suggest, distinguish 
at least eight different facets of disunity, as follows.
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Any dynamical physical theory, T, can be regarded as specify-
ing an abstract space, S, of possible physical states to which the theory 
applies, a distinct physical state corresponding to each distinct point in S. 
(S might be a set of such spaces.) For unity, we require that T asserts that 
the same dynamical laws apply throughout S, governing the evolution 
of the  physical state immediately before and after the instant in ques-
tion. If T postulates N distinct dynamical laws in N distinct regions of S, 
then T has disunity of degree N. For unity, we require N = 1. The eight 
 different kinds of disunity can be characterized like this.
(1) T divides space- time up into N distinct regions, R1 … RN, and 
asserts that the laws governing the evolution of phenomena are 
the same for all space- time regions within each R- region, but are 
different within different R- regions.
Example:  the aberrant version of Newtonian theory (NT) 
indicated above, for which the degree of disunity N  =  2 in a 
type (1) way.
(2) T postulates that, for distinct ranges of physical variables (other 
than position and time), such as mass or relative velocity, in 
 distinct regions, R1 … RN of the space of all possible phenomena, 
distinct dynamical laws obtain.
Example: T asserts that everything occurs as NT asserts, except 
for the case of any two solid gold spheres, each having a mass of 
between one and two thousand tons, moving in otherwise empty 
space up to a mile apart, in which case the spheres attract each 
other by means of an inverse cube law of gravitation. Here, N = 2 
in a type (2) way.
(3) In addition to postulating non- unique physical entities (such as 
particles), or entities that are unique but not spatially restricted 
(such as fields), T postulates, in an arbitrary fashion, N – 1 dis-
tinct, unique, spatially localized objects, each with its own 
 distinct, unique dynamic properties.
Example: T asserts that everything occurs as NT asserts, except 
there is one object in the universe, of mass 8 tons, such that, for 
any matter up to 8 miles from the centre of mass of this object, 
gravitation is a repulsive rather than attractive force. The 
object only interacts by means of gravitation. Here, N = 2 in a 
type (3) way.
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(4) T postulates physical entities interacting by means of N distinct 
forces, different forces affecting different entities, and being spec-
ified by different force laws. (In this case one would require one 
force to be universal so that the universe does not fall into distinct 
parts that do not interact with one another.)
Example:  T postulates particles that interact by means of 
Newtonian gravitation; some of these also interact by means of 
an electrostatic force F = Kq1q2/ d
2, this force being attractive if 
q1 and q2 are oppositely charged, otherwise being repulsive, the 
force being much stronger than gravitation. Here, N = 2 in a type 
(4) way.
(5) T postulates N different kinds of physical entity,5 differing with 
respect to some dynamic property, such as value of mass or 
charge, but otherwise interacting by means of the same force.
Example:  T postulates particles that interact by means of 
Newtonian gravitation, there being three kinds of particles, of 
mass m, 2m and 3m. Here, N = 3 in a type (5) way.
(6) Consider a theory, T, that postulates N distinct kinds of entity 
(e.g. particles or fields), but these N entities can be regarded as 
arising because T exhibits some symmetry (in the way that the 
electric and magnetic fields of classical electromagnetism can be 
regarded as arising because of the symmetry of Lorentz invari-
ance, or the eight gluons of chromodynamics can be regarded as 
arising as a result of the local gauge symmetry of SU(3)). If the 
symmetry group, G, is not a direct product of subgroups, we can 
declare that T is fully unified; if G is a direct product of subgroups, 
T lacks full unity; and if the N entities are such that they cannot be 
regarded as arising as a result of some symmetry of T, with some 
group structure G, then T is disunified.6 Example: Classical elec-
trodynamics postulates two fields: the electric and the magnetic 
fields. However, the relative strengths of these fields differ when 
measured in different inertial reference frames travelling with 
uniform velocity with respect to each other, although the strength 
of the combined electromagnetic field does not. But, according to 
special relativity, laws have the same form with respect to all iner-
tial reference frames. We may hold that the electric and magnetic 
fields are not two distinct entities. They are, rather, two aspects of 
one unified entity, the electromagnetic field. To this extent, N = 1 
as far as classical electrodynamics is concerned.
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(7) If (apparent) disunity of there being N distinct kinds of particle 
or distinct fields has emerged as a result of cosmic spontaneous 
symmetry- breaking events, there being manifest unity before 
these occurred, then the relevant theory, T, is unified. If current 
(apparent) disunity has not emerged from unity in this way, as a 
result of spontaneous symmetry- breaking, then the relevant the-
ory, T, is disunified.
Example: Weinberg’s and Salam’s electroweak theory, accord-
ing to which at very high energies, such as those that existed 
soon after the big bang, the electroweak force has the form 
of two forces, one with three associated massless particles, two 
charged, W–  and W+, and one neutral, Wo, and the other with 
one neutral massless particle, Vo. According to the theory, the 
two  neutral particles, Wo and Vo, are intermingled in two differ-
ent ways, to form two new neutral particles, the photon, γ, and 
another neutral massless particle, Zo. As energy decreases, the 
W+, W–  and Zo particles acquire mass, due to the mechanism 
known as spontaneous symmetry- breaking (involving the Higgs 
particle), while the photon, γ, retains its zero mass. This theory 
unifies the weak and electro magnetic forces as a result of exhib-
iting the symmetry of local gauge invariance; this unification is 
only partial, however, because  the   symmetry group  is a direct 
product of two groups, U(1)  associated with Vo, and SU(2) asso-
ciated with W– , W+ and Wo.7
(8) According to GR, Newton’s force of gravitation is merely an 
aspect of the curvature of space- time. As a result of a change 
in our ideas about the nature of space- time, so that its geomet-
ric properties become dynamic, a physical force disappears, or 
becomes unified with space- time. This suggests the following 
requirement for unity: space- time on the one hand, and physical 
“particles- and- forces” on the other, must be unified into a single 
self- interacting entity, U.  If T postulates space- time and physi-
cal particles- and- forces as two fundamentally distinct kinds of 
entity, then T is not unified in this respect.
Example:  one might imagine that the quantization of space- 
time leads to the appearance of particles and forces as only 
apparently distinct from empty space- time. Here, N  =  1 in a 
type (8) way: there is just the one self- interacting entity, empty 
space- time.
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For unity, in each case, as I have said, we require N = 1. As we go 
from (1) to (5), the requirements for unity are intended to be accumu-
lative: each presupposes that N = 1 for previous requirements. As far as 
(6) and (7) are concerned, if there are N distinct kinds of entity which 
are not unified by a symmetry, whether broken or not, then the degree of 
disunity is the same as that for (4) and (5), depending on whether there 
are N distinct forces, or one force but N distinct kinds of entity between 
which the force acts.
(8) does not introduce a new kind of unity, but rather a new, more 
severe way of counting different kinds of entity. (1)  to (7)  require, for 
unity, that there is one kind of self- interacting physical entity evolving 
in a distinct space- time, the way this entity evolves being specified, of 
course, by a consistent physical theory. According to (1)  to (7), even 
though there are, in a sense, two kinds of entity, matter (or particles- 
and- forces) on the one hand, and space- time on the other, nevertheless 
N = 1. According to (8), this would yield N = 2. For N = 1, (8) requires 
that matter and space- time are no more than aspects of one basic entity 
(unified by means of a spontaneously broken symmetry, perhaps).
As we go from (1)  to (8), then, requirements for unity become 
increasingly demanding, with (6) and (7) being at least as demanding as 
(4) and (5), as explained above.
(1) to (8) may seem very different requirements for unity. In fact 
they all exemplify the same basic idea:  disunity arises when differ-
ent dynamical laws govern the evolution of physical states in different 
regions of the space, S, of all possible physical states. For example, if a 
theory postulates more than one force, or kind of particle, not unified by 
symmetry, then in different regions of S different force laws will operate. 
If (8) is not satisfied, there is a region of S where only empty space exists, 
the laws being merely those which specify the nature of empty space or 
space- time. The eight distinct facets of unity, (1) to (8), arise, as I have 
said, because of the eight different ways in which content can vary from 
one region of S to another.8
4.3 Objections
It may be objected that we never encounter the naked content of a the-
ory, formulation free; we only encounter theories given some formu-
lation. How, then, can we judge whether the content does or does not 
vary through the space S? The answer is that theories are not natural 
objects we stumble across; we formulate theories, and it is for us to 
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ensure, granted we want our theories to be unified, that the content 
does not change as we move through S. We can arrange, however, that 
formulation matches content by ensuring that the terminology, the 
concepts, we use to formulate a theory do not surreptitiously change as 
we move through S. Given invariant concepts, if the form of the theory 
is also invariant throughout S, its content will be too, but if, for exam-
ple, we surreptitiously change our units of length as we move through 
space, then a theory whose content is spatially invariant will change 
its form with changes of spatial position (a point which will be taken 
up again below).
It may be objected that, given any theory, however unified, special 
regularities will always arise in restricted regions of S, which means dis-
unity. Whether or not the theory is unified is, at best, ambiguous. Thus, 
given NT, in some regions of S there will be solar systems with planets 
that rotate in the same direction and conform to Bode’s law, whereas 
in other regions of S these regularities or “laws” will be violated. The 
answer is to distinguish sharply between accidental and law- like regu-
larities; only the latter are relevant for the assessment of unity. But how 
is this distinction to be made? The answer is to adopt a suggestion made 
elsewhere (Maxwell, 1968; 1998, pp. 141– 55) that physical laws are true 
if and only if corresponding physical dynamical (or necessitating) prop-
erties exist. According to this suggestion, Newton’s law of gravitation 
can be interpreted as attributing the dynamical property of Newtonian 
gravitational charge to massive objects. Objects that have this property of 
necessity obey Newton’s law of gravitation. (The empirical content of NT, 
on this interpretation, is concentrated in the factual assertion: all mas-
sive objects possess Newtonian gravitational charge equal to their mass.) 
If no such property corresponds to a true regularity, then it is merely a 
true accidental regularity, and not a true law. For unity we require that 
dynamical properties remain the same throughout S; the regularities of 
(some) solar systems, mentioned above, are not relevant because these 
regularities are not law- like, and no dynamical property exists corre-
sponding to them.9
It may be objected that physical systems that possess symmetries, 
which are also symmetries of the theory that determines their evolution, 
will evolve in accordance with a simplified version of the theory. Thus 
systems consisting of two spheres equal in every way rotating in a fixed 
circle about their centre of mass obey a simplified version of the dynam-
ical laws of NT. This means there are regions of S where the dynamical 
laws are especially simple, and thus different from other regions. Does 
this mean the theory is correspondingly disunified? The answer is no. We 
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need, again, to consider dynamical properties corresponding to dynami-
cal laws. In the example just considered, if NT is true (interpreted essen-
tialistically) then the spheres in question possess gravitational charge 
just like all other massive objects. It is just that, in the case of the systems 
possessing some rotational symmetry, the full, rich implications of the 
dynamical property of gravitational charge is not made manifest.
It may be objected that we may not know whether two formula-
tions of a theory are just that, two formulations with the same physical 
content, or two distinct theories with distinct contents. Heisenberg’s 
and Schrödinger’s distinct formulations of quantum theory might be 
an example. This is correct but beside the point. The terminological 
problem arises when we reformulate a given theory, T, in a variety of 
ways, some simple and unified, some horribly complex and disunified, 
but we do this in such a way as to ensure quite specifically that the dif-
ferent formulations have precisely the same content, make precisely 
the same assertions about the world, this being something that we can 
always do. The solution to the problem proposed above is not in any 
way undermined by the fact that it sometimes happens that we do not 
know whether two formulations of a theory have the same or differ-
ent contents. Nor is the distinction between form and content under-
mined: form has to do with what we write down on paper, content with 
what is being asserted. That we sometimes do not know whether differ-
ence of formulation ensures difference of content does not in the least 
undermine the distinction between form and content. It deserves to be 
noted, in addition, that one and the same formulation of a theory may 
be interpreted in more than one way, and thus may have different con-
tents associated with it – a point which, again, does not undermine the 
theory presented here.
It may be objected that the distinction between dynamical laws 
which do, and do not, remain the same throughout the space S can-
not be maintained. Consider the following two functions: (1) y = 3x 
for all x, and (2) y = 3x for x ≤ 2 and y = 4x for x > 2.  It is tempt-
ing to say that (1)  remains the same as x changes, but (2) does not, 
since what (2) asserts changes at x = 2. But given the mathematical 
notion of function as a rule, (2) is just as good a function as (1) and, 
like (1), “remains the same” as x varies. Functions corresponding to 
physical theories are somewhat more elaborate than this, but the 
above point is not affected by that consideration: it seems that the very 
distinction between “remains the same” and “changes” as one moves 
through S collapses. Clearly, in order to meet this objection, functions 
corresponding to physical theories need to be restricted to a narrower 
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notion of function than the above standard mathematical one, if we 
are to be able to distinguish between functional relationships which 
do, and which do not, “remain the same” as values of variables change. 
We need to appeal to what may be called “invariant functions”, func-
tions which specify some fixed set of mathematical operations to be 
performed on “x” (or its equivalent) to obtain “y” (or its equivalent). In 
the example just given, (1) is invariant, but (2) is not. (2) is made up of 
two truncated invariant functions, stuck together at x = 2. Functions 
that appear in theoretical physics are analytic; that is, they are repeat-
edly differentiable. Such functions have the remarkable property that 
from any small bit of the function, the whole function can be recon-
structed uniquely, by a process called “analytic continuation”. All ana-
lytic functions are thus invariant. The latter notion is, however, a wider 
one, and theoretical physics might, one day, need to employ this wider 
notion explicitly, if space and time turn out to be discontinuous, and 
analytic functions have to be abandoned at a fundamental level.
A similar remark needs to be made about Goodman’s (1954) para-
dox concerning “grue” and “bleen”. Modifying the paradox slightly, an 
object is grue if it is green up to time t, blue after t; it is bleen if it is 
blue up to time t, green after t. Sometimes it is held that there is per-
fect symmetry between blue and green, on the one hand, and grue and 
bleen on the other, especially as “emeralds are green” is equivalent to 
“emeralds are grue up to t, and bleen afterwards”. But this symmetry 
is merely terminological and, as we have already seen in connection 
with the aberrant version of Newton’s theory of gravitation, discussed 
in section 4.2, terminological symmetry does not mean there is sym-
metry of content. That there is not symmetry of content in the grue/ 
bleen case can be demonstrated as follows. If emeralds are grue, a per-
son convinced of this can determine whether t is future or past merely 
by looking at emeralds. But if emeralds are green, a person convinced 
of this cannot say whether t is in the future or past by just looking at 
emeralds. The content, the meaning, of grue and bleen contains an 
implicit reference to t in a way in which that of green and blue do not. 
Doubtless symmetry can be created by considering two possible worlds, 
ours and a Goodmanesque one with special physics and/ or physiology 
of vision so that grue emeralds do not appear to change at t, whereas 
green ones do. This, however, is to consider conditions quite different 
from those specified by Goodman. The crucial point to make, in any 
case, is that dynamical or physical properties, of the kind attributed 
to physical entities by physical theories (interpreted in a conjecturally 
essentialistic way), are like blue and green, and unlike grue and bleen, 
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in not containing any implicit reference to specific times or places (or 
hypersurfaces of S that distinguish one region of S from another). 
Physical properties must be invariant in a sense that corresponds to the 
invariance of allowed functions in physics. The more general notion of 
property, which includes Goodmanesque properties, is excluded, just 
as the more general notion of function, which includes (2) above as an 
“unchanging” function, is excluded.
4.4 Further issues
What of the other aspects of the problem of non- empirical requirements 
in science mentioned in the introduction? Here are a few brief remarks 
concerning some of these further issues.
Most of the other terms used to refer to non- empirical requirements 
can be straightforwardly related to unity. We have seen that this is true 
of symmetry and invariance. Non- ad hoc, organic, inwardly perfect and 
non- aberrant can be interpreted as appealing to unity, and harmonious, 
beautiful and conceptually coherent can be interpreted as presupposing 
unity. A dynamical physical theory can be held to be explanatory in char-
acter to the extent that it is (1) empirically contentful, and (2) unified.
Simplicity, however, is quite different. The simplicity of a theory 
can be interpreted as having to do, not with whether the same laws apply 
throughout the space S, but rather with the nature of the laws, granted 
that they are the same. Some laws are simpler than others. In order to 
overcome the objection that simplicity is formulation- dependent it is 
essential, as in the case of unity, to interpret “simplicity” as applying 
to the content of theories, and not to their formulation, their axiomatic 
structure, etc. Theories can only, at best, be partially ordered with respect 
to degrees of simplicity. Even when two theories are amenable to being 
assessed with respect to relative simplicity, there is always the problem 
that a change of variables may reverse the assessment. Let the two the-
ories be (1) y = x, and (2) y = x2. We judge (1) to be simpler than (2). 
Let x2 = z. We now have (1) y =  z , and (2) y = z. Now (2) is simpler 
than (1). Assessment of relative simplicity of two theories may only be 
unambiguous when restrictions are placed on the form that physical vari-
ables can take, so that only linear transformations of the type z = Ax + B 
(where A and B are constants) are permitted, for example. It is a further 
great success of the theory presented here that it succeeds in distinguish-
ing sharply between these two aspects of physical theory, the unity and 
simplicity aspects, and succeeds in explicating both.10
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We can use these two notions to solve the problem of ambiguity 
of judgement concerning the relative non- empirical merits of Newton’s 
and Einstein’s theories of gravitation. Newton’s theory is simpler, but 
Einstein’s is more unified in that it eliminates gravitation as a force, and 
reformulates Newton’s first law so that it becomes the assertion that bod-
ies move along geodesics in curved space- time, curvature being caused by 
mass, or by stress- energy- density more generally. As theoretical physics 
draws closer to capturing the true theory of everything, it is reasonable 
to expect that the totality of fundamental physical theory will become 
increasingly unified and complex.
So far I have stressed that terminological unity and simplicity are 
irrelevant when it comes to assessing unity and simplicity in a physically 
significant sense. In scientific practice, however, terminology is chosen 
so as to reflect physically significant unity and simplicity (Maxwell, 1998, 
110– 3). Thus if the content of a theory exhibits certain symmetries, ter-
minology is chosen so that it too exhibits these symmetries, so that if the 
theory is invariant with respect to position or orientation in space, ter-
minology is chosen which reflects this fact. Once a theory is formulated 
in such “physically appropriate” terminology (as it may be called), two 
versions of symmetry operations arise as a result: “active” (which make 
changes to physical systems) and “passive” (which make corresponding 
changes to the description of unchanged physical systems). Granted that 
we formulate physical theories exclusively in such “physically appro-
priate” terminology, then terminological unity and simplicity comes to 
reflect physical unity and simplicity, and is thus, to that extent, physically 
significant.
What of the simplicity and unity of theories in sciences other than 
fundamental physics? Much needs to be said on this topic; the following 
brief remarks can serve only as pointers to a more adequate treatment. 
Solutions to the equations of fundamental physical theory, specifying 
precisely how increasingly complex physical systems evolve in space and 
time, rapidly become horrendously complex in character. In carrying out 
derivations, physicists invariably “simplify” results obtained by discard-
ing variable quantities or higher order terms judged to be insignificant in 
the physical situations under considerations. Just this is done when NT is 
“derived” from Einstein’s theory, or Kepler’s and Galileo’s laws of motion 
are “derived” from NT.11 The outcome is a range of more or less termino-
logically simple phenomenological laws of only approximate validity. But 
the simplicity is not, here, merely pragmatic, since such a law has been 
“approximately derived” from some fundamental physical theory for-
mulated in a “physically appropriate” way, the “approximate derivation” 
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showing what the range of applicability of the law is with what degree of 
accuracy. Even though such laws are incompatible with the fundamen-
tal physical theory from which they have been “approximately derived”, 
nevertheless what the “derivations” reveal is that pragmatic simplicity 
has been obtained by sacrificing strict derivability and precise empirical 
accuracy, there being nothing here to counter the underlying unity in 
nature postulated by fundamental physical theory (in so far as it does 
postulate this). Laws such as these are prevalent throughout phenom-
enological physics, astrophysics and parts of physical chemistry. Even 
where such “approximate derivations” cannot be carried through, for 
large parts of chemistry, and for biology, nevertheless, as I have already 
remarked, laws and theories of these sciences are constrained by funda-
mental physics, and must endeavour to be compatible with fundamental 
physics, at least in the qualified way just indicated in connection with 
phenomenological physics. Thus, much of the great explanatory power of 
Darwinian theory stems from the fact that it postulates mechanisms for 
evolution – random inheritable variation and natural selection – which 
are capable of designing living things able to pursue the goals of survival 
and reproductive success in their given environments, these mechanisms 
nevertheless being compatible with the purposeless cosmos depicted by 
physics. Biology must accord with physics in much more specific ways 
as well, in that the mechanisms of inheritance and development must 
accord with physics, and so too the multitude of processes that take place 
in living things.
What implications does the account of non- empirical requirements 
for theories, given here, have for science? How can justice be done to 
evolving non- empirical requirements? How is persistent preference for 
unified theories, even against the evidence, to be justified? I take these 
three problems together.
At the beginning of this chapter I demonstrated that, in physics, 
theories that are unified, in senses (1) and (2) at least, are persistently 
chosen in preference to available, empirically more successful, but 
disunified theories. To proceed in this way is to make the permanent 
assumption that the phenomena under consideration are such that 
all theories of these phenomena that are disunified in senses (1)  and 
(2) are false. If physicists persistently accepted theories that postulate 
atoms in preference to available, empirically more successful field theo-
ries, it would be clear that physicists are thereby assuming that all field 
theories are false. Just the same holds for the persistent rejection of 
empirically more successful disunified theories.
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But rigour demands that assumptions that are substantial, influen-
tial, problematic and implicit need to be made explicit, so that they can 
be critically assessed, so that alternatives can be developed and consid-
ered, the hope being that in this way such assumptions can be improved. 
Thus rigour demands that science makes explicit, and so criticizable 
and improvable, the substantial, problematic, influential and implicit 
assumption that the universe, or the phenomena, are such that all dis-
unified theories are false. This assumption, M, can easily be shown to 
be metaphysical, as follows. Persistent acceptance of theories unified 
in ways (1) and (2) involves rejecting infinitely many empirically more 
successful disunified rivals, T1, T2, … T∞, because they clash with M. In 
effect, M = notT1 and notT2 … and notT∞. In order to verify M we would 
need to falsify all of T1, T2, … and T∞, but as there are infinitely many 
theories, this cannot be done. In order to falsify M we need to verify just 
one of T1, T2, … or T∞, but physical theories cannot be verified. Hence 
M, being neither verifiable nor falsifiable, is metaphysical. It is a perma-
nent metaphysical assumption of science – permanent, at least, as long 
as all theories disunified in senses (1) and (2) are rejected whatever their 
empirical success might be.
At once the question arises: how is this assumption M to be criti-
cally assessed and, perhaps, improved? In Chapter 2 I argued that once 
the metaphysical assumption implicit in persistent preference in sci-
ence for unified theories is acknowledged, it becomes apparent that we 
need to adopt a new conception of science, which construes science as 
making a hierarchy of such assumptions, these assumptions asserting 
less and less as one goes up the hierarchy, and thus becoming more and 
more likely to be true.12 These are assumptions about the knowability 
and comprehensibility of the universe. As we descend the hierarchy, 
assumptions become more substantial and specific, and much more 
likely to be false, and in need of revision. Revision is, however, kept 
as low down in the hierarchy as possible. Those physical theories are 
accepted which best accord with the evidence and the best available 
metaphysical assumption, B, say, lowest down in the hierarchy. But 
B may itself be revised if a rival assumption, B*, is developed which 
(a) is compatible with the assumption above it in the hierarchy, and 
(b) supports an empirical research programme that is more successful 
than the one supported by B. Relatively problematic assumptions high 
up in the hierarchy thus form a fixed framework within which much 
more specific, problematic assumptions can be revised in the light of 
empirical success and failure. As knowledge improves, assumptions 
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and associated methods improve as well; there is something like 
positive feedback between improving knowledge and improving 
knowledge- about- how- to- improve- knowledge, the methodological 
key to the success of modern science. Non- empirical requirements 
for theory acceptance, corresponding to metaphysical assumptions, 
improve with improving knowledge. Newton’s requirements of sim-
plicity evolve into the symmetry principles of modern physics. For my 
view as to how acceptance of the hierarchy of metaphysical assump-
tions is to be justified, see Chapter 7 (see also Maxwell, 1998, ch. 5; 
2007, ch. 14; 2017a).
143
  
5
Scientific metaphysics
5.1 Introduction
The idea that science cannot proceed without the assumption that the 
universe is comprehensible in some way  – the thesis that it is physi-
cally comprehensible being a more secure item of knowledge than any 
accepted physical theory  – represents a profound and dramatic revo-
lution in our whole conception of science. It is perhaps not surprising 
that, even though this idea dates back at least to 1974,1 and has been 
expounded and argued for in considerable detail on a number of occa-
sions since,2 nevertheless, at the time of writing (2016), few scientists 
or philosophers of science have taken note of, or responded to the argu-
ments for, this revolutionary view.3 Given the momentous consequences 
of the idea, and its neglect, it seems to me appropriate to reformulate, 
in as careful and critical a way as I can, the central argument for aim- 
oriented empiricism. The argument developed in this chapter improves 
on the earlier versions, to be found in Chapters 2 and 4.
I argue, first, that persistent acceptance of (more or less) uni-
fied fundamental dynamic theories in physics, even though endlessly 
many empirically more successful disunified rivals are always available, 
means that physics makes a persistent untestable (or metaphysical) 
assumption about the nature of the universe: it is such that some yet- 
to- be- discovered, more or less unified physical theory is true, and all 
seriously disunified theories are false. I then invoke the account of what 
it means to assert of a physical theory that it is unified, developed in 
the last chapter, to throw light on the question of what physics does, 
and ought to, assume in assuming that some more or less unified the-
ory is true. This provides us with a way of classifying – indeed, of par-
tially ordering – all metaphysical theses which assert that the universe 
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possesses some kind of comprehensive, more or less disunified dynamic 
structure – the universe being more or less physically comprehensible, 
in other words.
At once the fundamental problem arises: how can physics choose 
between these infinitely many metaphysical theses  – versions of physi-
calism, as I call them? Two considerations drive us in opposite directions. 
On the one hand, we ought to choose that version of physicalism most 
fruitful for promoting progress in theoretical physics, if true. On the 
other hand, we ought to choose that minimalist version of physicalism 
just sufficiently substantial to make physics possible, and thus least likely 
to be false.
I take these in turn. First, I  spell out how the account of unity 
given in the last chapter provides the means for assessing the rela-
tive fruitfulness of rival versions of physicalism; I  go on to specify 
that version of physicalism that is the most fruitful, given the his-
tory of physics up till today, and argue that physics should accept this 
version as its basic metaphysical assumption. Second, I  consider the 
grounds for physics accepting the least substantial version of physi-
calism that makes physics possible. The problem of choosing between 
these conflicting considerations is solved by the hierarchical view of 
aim- oriented empiricism (AOE). This does justice to both apparently 
conflicting considerations  – a strong argument in favour of AOE. In 
conclusion, I consider two versions of AOE, and indicate, briefly, how 
the circularity problem can be solved.
The title of this chapter is intended to be provocative. “Scientific 
metaphysics” sounds like a contradiction in terms in view of Popper’s 
well- known demarcation criterion that rules that metaphysical theses, 
being unfalsifiable, are not scientific.4 But of course Popper’s falsifi-
cationist conception of science, along with others, will be found to be 
defective precisely because of a failure to acknowledge the role that 
metaphysical assumptions play in science. Furthermore, as I  have 
indicated, a framework will be developed which makes it possible to 
appraise (untestable) metaphysical theses empirically, in terms of 
their “empirical fruitfulness”, or fruitfulness for the empirical research 
programme of theoretical physics. For physics to be rigorous, it will be 
argued, it is essential that metaphysical theses are acknowledged as 
key components of theoretical knowledge in physics, and are appraised 
empirically in terms of their “empirical fruitfulness”. Once the concep-
tion of physics defended here is accepted, the title entirely loses its air 
of being self- contradictory.5
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5.2 Intellectual rigour requires that  
metaphysical presuppositions be made explicit
Almost all views about science deny that science makes a substantial, 
persistent, metaphysical (i.e. untestable) assumption about the uni-
verse. This is true, for example, of logical positivism, inductivism, logi-
cal empiricism, hypothetico- deductivism, conventionalism, constructive 
empiricism, pragmatism, realism, Bayesianism, induction- to- the- best- 
explanationism, and the views of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos. All these 
views, diverse as they are in other respects, accept a thesis that may be 
called standard empiricism (SE):  in science, theories are accepted on 
the basis of empirical success and failure, and on the basis of simplic-
ity, unity or explanatoriness, but no substantial thesis about the world is 
accepted permanently by science, as a part of scientific knowledge, inde-
pendently of empirical considerations. Both Kuhn and Lakatos maintain, 
it is true, that a “paradigm” or “hard core” may be accepted for a time 
as a key item of scientific knowledge independently of evidence, even 
against the evidence; both hold, however, that such a paradigm or hard 
core will eventually be rejected when an empirically more successful 
paradigm or hard core emerges. Both Kuhn and Lakatos take SE for 
granted.6
Recently, a new research industry has grown up in the philosophy 
of science, devoted to “the metaphysics of science”.7 It might be thought 
that here, SE is repudiated. It is not. SE is implicit in all the works referred 
to in note 7.
Thus, SE is widely, almost unthinkingly, taken for granted by 
 scientists and non- scientists alike. SE is nevertheless untenable. This is 
established decisively by the following argument.
Whenever a fundamental physical theory is accepted as a part of 
theoretical scientific knowledge, there are always endlessly many rival 
theories which fit the available evidence just as well as the accepted the-
ory. Consider, for example, Newtonian theory (NT). One rival theory 
asserts: everything occurs as NT asserts up until midnight tonight when, 
abruptly, an inverse cube law of gravitation comes into operation. A sec-
ond rival asserts:  everything occurs as NT asserts, except for the case 
of any two solid gold spheres, each having a mass of a thousand tons, 
moving in otherwise empty space up to a mile apart, in which case the 
spheres attract each other by means of an inverse cube law of gravita-
tion. There is no limit to the number of rivals to NT that can be concocted 
in this way, each of which has all the predictive success of NT as far as 
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observed phenomena are concerned but which makes different predic-
tions for some as yet unobserved phenomena.8 Such theories can even be 
concocted which are more empirically successful than NT, by arbitrarily 
modifying NT, in just this entirely ad hoc fashion, so that the theories 
yield correct predictions where NT does not, as in the case of the orbit of 
Mercury, for example (which very slightly conflicts with NT).9 And quite 
generally, given any accepted fundamental physical theory, T, there will 
always be endlessly many ad hoc rivals which meet with all the empirical 
success of T, make untested predictions that differ from T, are empirically 
successful where T is ostensibly refuted, and successfully predict phe-
nomena about which T is silent (as a result of independently testable and 
corroborated hypotheses being added on).
As most physicists and philosophers of physics would accept, two 
criteria are employed in physics in deciding what theories to accept and 
reject: (1) empirical criteria, and (2) criteria that have to do with the sim-
plicity, unity or explanatory character of the theories in question. (2) is 
absolutely indispensable, to such an extent that there are endlessly many 
theories empirically more successful than accepted theories, all of which 
are ignored because of their lack of unity.
Now comes the crucial point. In persistently accepting unifying 
theories (even though ostensibly refuted), and excluding infinitely many 
empirically more successful, unrefuted, disunified or aberrant rival the-
ories, science in effect makes a big assumption about the nature of the 
universe, to the effect that it is such that some yet- to- be- discovered, more 
or less unified physical theory is true, and no seriously disunified theory 
is true,10 however empirically successful it may appear to be for a time. 
Furthermore, without some such big assumption as this, the empirical 
method of science would collapse. Science would be drowned in an 
infinite ocean of empirically successful disunified theories.11
If scientists only accepted theories that postulate atoms, and per-
sistently rejected theories that postulate different basic physical enti-
ties, such as fields  – even though many field theories can easily be, 
and have been, formulated which are even more empirically success-
ful than the atomic theories  – the implications would surely be quite 
clear. Scientists would in effect be assuming that the world is made up 
of atoms, all other possibilities being ruled out. The atomic assumption 
would be built into the way the scientific community accepts and rejects 
theories  – built into the implicit methods of the community, methods 
which would include rejecting all theories that postulate entities other 
than atoms, whatever their empirical success might be. The scientific 
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community would accept the assumption that the universe is such that 
no non- atomic theory is true.
Just the same holds for a scientific community which rejects all 
disunified or aberrant rivals to accepted theories, even though these 
rivals would be even more empirically successful if they were considered. 
Such a community in effect makes the assumption that the universe is 
such that no disunified theory is true. Or rather, more accurately, such 
a community makes the assumption that “no disunified theory is true 
that is not entailed by a true unified theory (plus, possibly, true relevant 
initial and boundary conditions)”. (A true unified theory entails infinitely 
many approximate, true, disunified theories.) Let us call this assumption 
“physicalism”.
That physicalism is metaphysical can be shown as follows. 
Physicalism asserts, “not T1 and not T2 … and not T∞“, where T1, T2, … T∞ 
are infinitely many disunified rivals to accepted physical theories. 
Physicalism cannot be empirically verified, because this would require 
that all of T1, T2, … T∞ are falsified, but as there are infinitely many of 
these theories, each requiring a different falsifying experiment, this can-
not be done. Equally, physicalism cannot be falsified, as this requires the 
verification of at least one of T1, or T2, … or T∞, which cannot be done, 
as physical theories cannot be verified empirically. Hence physicalism, 
being neither verifiable nor falsifiable, is metaphysical.
Thus in persistently rejecting empirically more successful but dis-
unified rivals to accepted physical theories, science makes a persistent 
metaphysical assumption about the world, namely physicalism. Standard 
empiricism (SE), and all the above doctrines that include SE as a compo-
nent, which hold that science makes no persistent metaphysical assump-
tion, are thus untenable.
Let us call the view that science presupposes physicalism “pre-
suppositionism”. Presuppositionism is more rigorous than all the above 
versions of SE entirely independent of any justification for accepting physi-
calism as a part of scientific knowledge (that is in addition to the one given 
above). In saying this, I am appealing to the following, wholly uncontro-
versial, requirement for rigour:
The principle of intellectual rigour (PIR): In order to be rigorous, it 
is necessary that assumptions that are substantial, influential and prob-
lematic be made explicit  – so that they can be criticized, so that alter-
natives may be developed and assessed, with the aim of improving the 
assumptions.12
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All versions of SE fail to satisfy PIR in just the way in which presuppo-
sitionism does satisfy PIR. Presuppositionism makes the assumption of 
physicalism explicit (and so criticizable and, we may hope, improvable), 
while all versions of SE deny that science does make any such assumption 
as physicalism. Thus, quite independent of any claim to solve the problem 
of induction, presuppositionism is more rigorous, and thus more accept-
able, than any of the above versions of SE. And this is the case even though 
presuppositionism can provide no justification for accepting physicalism. It 
is, indeed, above all when we have no reason whatsoever for supposing 
physicalism is true that it becomes all the more important to implement 
PIR, and make the probably false assumption of physicalism explicit, so 
that it can be critically assessed, so that alternatives can be considered, in 
the hope that a thesis nearer the truth can be discovered.
Why has this simple argument been ignored by the vast literature on 
the problem of induction (or underdetermination), referred to in note 8? 
Three factors are perhaps at work. First, accepting the argument involves 
acknowledging that science, as it is ordinarily understood (in terms of 
standard empiricism), lacks rigour. Our understanding of science, and 
even science itself, need to change if science is to become rigorous and 
make explicit, and critically assess, implicit, problematic metaphysical 
presuppositions. Philosophers, tackling the problem of induction, have 
perhaps been reluctant to take seriously that science, as ordinarily under-
stood, is irrational and needs to be changed. Second, invoking a meta-
physical presupposition of unity looks superficially like a well- known 
and hopelessly invalid approach to the problem of induction: justify sci-
entific theory by an appeal to a metaphysical principle uniformity, and 
then justify this metaphysical principle by an appeal to the success of 
science. Aware of the vicious circularity of any such argument, philoso-
phers have instinctively resisted considering the superficially similar, but 
actually very different, point that rigour requires that substantial, influ-
ential, problematic and implicit metaphysical presuppositions need to be 
made explicit – so that they can be critically assessed and, we may hope, 
improved. Third, the above elementary argument that physics makes a 
persistent metaphysical assumption about the nature of the universe has 
seemed impossible to accept because it has seemed impossible that the 
metaphysical assumption in question could ever be shown to be true, or 
probably true. But this objection profoundly misses the point. As I have 
already stressed, it is precisely because the metaphysical thesis implicit 
in persistent acceptance of unified theories when endlessly many empir-
ically more successful disunified rivals are available is nothing more 
than a pure conjecture, very likely to be false in the specific version of it 
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accepted at any stage in the development of physics, that it is vital that 
it be made explicit within physics so that it may be critically assessed, 
so that alternatives may be developed and assessed, in an attempt to 
improve the specific conjecture that is adopted. The impossibility of pro-
viding some kind of a priori proof of the truth of the metaphysical con-
jecture, far from being a good reason for ignoring its existence is, on the 
contrary, an overwhelming reason to make the conjecture explicit within 
the context of physics.
Presuppositionism does not, perhaps, entirely solve the problem 
of induction – the problem of underdetermination – but it does, when 
further developed, transform that philosophical and scientifically sterile 
problem into the scientifically fruitful problem of developing and choos-
ing the most fruitful metaphysics for physics, as we shall see below.
5.3 Unity of physical theory
We have seen that physics only accepts theories that are unified, and this 
commits physics to presupposing physicalism. But what ought physical-
ism to be interpreted to assert, especially if physics is to comply with PIR? 
In order to answer this question we first need to solve the problem of 
what it means to assert of a physical theory that it is unified. This problem 
has long resisted solution.13 Even Einstein (1969, p. 23) confessed that he 
did not know how to solve the problem.
However, in Chapter 4, section 4.2, we saw how the problem is to 
be solved. Above, in the present chapter, I have indicated ways in which 
theories can be disunified. The solution to the problem of what it is for a 
theory to be unified, spelled out in the previous chapter, in effect extends 
and develops the above remarks about disunity.
A dynamical physical theory is disunified if its content, what it 
asserts about the world, is different, from one region to another in the 
space of all possible phenomena to which the theory applies. If the con-
tent of the theory differs in N ways, throughout the space of phenomena 
predicted by the theory, then the theory is disunified to degree N.  For 
unity, we require that N = 1.
But, as we saw in the last chapter, there is a refinement. There 
are different ways in which the content of a theory may differ, from one 
region in the space of possible phenomena to another, some ways being 
more substantial, more serious as it were, than others. The most seri-
ous kind of difference, perhaps, is when the content of a theory differs 
in different space- time regions. A  less serious kind of difference arises 
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when a theory predicts no variation in dynamical laws in space- time, but 
predicts that there is more than one kind of force, or more than one kind 
of particle or field (there being one force, or one kind of particle or field 
in one sub- region of the space of all possible phenomena, and another 
force, or another kind of particle or field in another sub- region). In all, 
as we saw, there are eight different ways, (1) to (8), in which the content 
of a theory can differ, in different regions of the space of all possible phe-
nomena that the theory predicts.
As we go from (1) to (8), the requirements for unity become 
increasingly demanding, with (6) and (7) being at least as demanding 
as (4) and (5), as explained in section 4.2 of Chapter 4.14 It is important 
to appreciate, however, that (1) to (8) are all versions of the same basic 
idea that T is unified if and only if the content of T is the same through-
out the range of possible phenomena to which it applies. When T is dis-
unified, (1) to (8) specify different kinds of difference in the content of 
T in diverse regions of the space, S, of all possible phenomena to which 
T applies. Or, equivalently, (1) to (8) divide S into sub- regions in differ-
ent ways, T having a different content in each sub- region. For (1), sub- 
regions contain physical systems in different locations in space- time, the 
content of T being different in different space- time locations. For (2), 
sub- regions contain physical systems with different values of physical 
variables such as mass or relative velocity. For (3), sub- regions contain 
systems with different dynamically unique objects. For (4), sub- regions 
contain systems composed of physical entities interacting by means of 
different forces. For (5), sub- regions contain systems composed of enti-
ties interacting by means of the same force, but with different dynamical 
properties such as values of mass or charge. For (6), sub- regions contain 
systems composed of different entities that cannot be transformed into 
each other by means of symmetry operations. For (7), sub- regions con-
tain systems composed of different entities that cannot be construed to 
differ only because of the product of spontaneous symmetry breaking. 
For (8), S contains one sub-system consisting of empty space- time, and 
another consisting of space- time plus some physical entity, and the one 
cannot be transformed into the other by means of a symmetry operation. 
We have here eight facets of a single conception of unity.15
It needs now to be appreciated that, corresponding to these eight 
facets of unity, (1) to (8), there are eight different metaphysical theses, 
eight different versions of physicalism, any one of which might be held to 
be the best choice of presupposition for physics. If T is the true theory of 
everything,16 then we have eight different theses, each of the form “T is 
unified up to sense (n)” where n = 1, 2, … 8, corresponding to the eight 
 
 
 
ScieNtif ic MetaPhySicS 151
  
different kinds of unity. Let us call these eight theses “physicalism(n)”, 
where n = 1, 2, … 8. It is assumed, here, that in each case, (1) to (8), 
the degree of unity, N, is 1. If we allow N = 1, 2, 3, …, then there are not 
eight, but infinitely many different versions of physicalism, depending on 
the degree of unity, N, that is asserted for any value of n = 1, … 7. (n = 8 
is exceptional in this respect in that, in this case, N can only equal 1 or 2, 
depending on whether space- time and matter are, or are not, unified.17)
The different versions of physicalism can be specified to be: 
 physicalism(n, N), with n = 1, … 7 and N = 1, 2, … ∞, or with n = 8 and 
N = 1, 2. A two- dimensional grid is placed over an infinite set of meta-
physical theses, distinct versions of physicalism corresponding to distinct 
appropriate values of the coordinates (n, N), these theses being ordered 
with respect to degrees of unity.18
It deserves to be noted in passing that there is a close connection 
between the “unity” of a physical theory and its “explanatory power”. 
Explanatory power, one might say, is unity plus empirical content. The 
explication of “unity” indicated here, and spelled out in more detail in 
Chapter 4, is thus also an explication of “explanatory power”.19
5.4 Conflicting desiderata for acceptability 
of metaphysical theses
Physics must exclude empirically successful disunified theories from 
consideration if theoretical knowledge in physics is to be possible at 
all. In persistently excluding such disunified theories, physics thereby 
makes a persistent metaphysical presupposition, as we saw in sec-
tion  4.2. But what ought this presupposition to be? Section 4.3 has 
revealed that there are at least eight candidates, namely physicalism(n) 
with n  =  1,  … 8 (and, potentially, many more if N > 1 for some n). 
Which of these is the best choice if physics is to comply with PIR?
This question is particularly hard to answer because conflicting 
desiderata arise when it comes to considering what metaphysical thesis 
physics should accept.
On the one hand it is reasonable to argue that that thesis should 
be accepted which can be shown to be the most conducive to progress in 
theoretical physics so far. In the next section I will demonstrate that this 
picks out the relatively specific and contentful thesis of physicalism(8) 
with N = 1.
On the other hand, however, it is reasonable to argue that that 
 thesis should be accepted which has the least content that is just 
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sufficient to exclude the empirically successful disunified theories that 
current methods of physics do exclude. We have almost no grounds for 
holding that any version of physicalism is true, or is more likely to be 
true than some other version. Whatever we choose, we are very likely to 
choose a thesis that is false. Our best bet, then, is to choose that thesis 
which has the least possible content which suffices to exclude those dis-
unified theories that are excluded from physics, since the less the con-
tent of a thesis – other things being equal – the more likely it is to be true. 
As we shall see in section 5.6 below, this leads to a choice quite different 
from physicalism(8).
Which of these conflicting lines of argument should be accepted?
In answering this question, I proceed as follows. In section 5.5, 
I  spell out the argument for holding that physicalism(8) is the most 
fruitful version of physicalism for physics. In section 5.6, I  spell out 
the argument for accepting the minimal version of physicalism. And 
in section 5.7, I argue that a new conception of physics resolves the 
conflict.
5.5 Empirically fruitful metaphysics
Before I plunge into my argument for accepting physicalism(8), there is 
a preliminary question I must answer: why does the unique fruitfulness 
of physicalism(8) for physics, supposing it can be established, provide 
grounds for its acceptance?
The basic idea of PIR, as it applies to physics, is that substantial, 
problematic, influential and implicit metaphysical assumptions need to 
be made explicit so that they can be critically assessed, so that alterna-
tives can be developed and considered, in the hope that assumptions 
more conducive to progress can be developed and accepted. In other 
words, according to PIR, that assumption ought to be accepted which 
seems to be the most conducive to progress in theoretical physics.
It is important to appreciate just how profoundly influential over 
the success or failure of theoretical physics choice of metaphysical thesis, 
of the kind we are considering, is likely to be. This influence is exercised 
in two ways. First, the metaphysical presupposition of a community of 
physicists influences  – even determines  – the direction in which phys-
icists look in order to develop new physical theories. If physicists are 
convinced – as many were for much of the nineteenth century – that the 
universe is made up of point atoms which interact by means of centrally 
directed, rigid forces, then physicists will persistently seek to develop 
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theories which postulate such entities. Physicists who believe that the 
basic stuff of the universe is energy may be prompted to develop theories 
of a rather different type. Second, and even more important, the meta-
physical presupposition of physics, implicit in non- empirical methods of 
physics, influences – or co- determines (with evidence) – what theories 
are accepted and rejected. The success or failure of physics will be highly 
dependent on whether the non- empirical methods adopted – and thus 
the corresponding metaphysical theses presupposed  – are, or are not, 
conducive to the selection of theories capable of meeting with empiri-
cal success. Adopting the methodological principle “accept only theories 
that postulate atoms” amounts to presupposing that the universe is made 
up of atoms (or at least behaves, to a high degree of approximation, as if 
it is):  if this is correct, this presupposition and associated methodolog-
ical principle may well lead to empirical success. But if the universe is 
not made up of atoms, and does not even behave as if it is, adopting this 
methodological principle and presupposing the associated metaphysical 
thesis is likely to severely stifle scientific progress.
In short, physics must make some metaphysical presupposition for 
there to be any theoretical knowledge in physics at all. Since the meta-
physical theses in question are about the ultimate nature of the universe, 
the domain of our ignorance, whatever we assume is almost bound to be 
false. Accepting a false assumption is likely to severely stifle progress in 
the theoretical physics. It matters enormously, for the progress of phys-
ics, that a good choice of metaphysical thesis is made. Just about the only 
grounds we have for preferring one thesis to another is that one seems to 
be more conducive to progress in theoretical physics than another. Thus 
we ought to prefer that thesis which seems to be the most conducive to 
progress in physics. This is the choice physics needs to make in order to 
comply with the requirement of rigour of PIR.
Here, now, are the reasons for holding that physicalism(8) should 
be the preferred metaphysical thesis for physics, largely because this the-
sis has proved to be more fruitful for progress in physics than any rival 
thesis.
First, it deserves to be noted that what needs to be made explicit 
and accepted, if physics is to comply with PIR, is that thesis which is 
implicit in the current non- empirical methods of physics – methods that 
determine which theories are to be accepted and rejected on grounds 
of simplicity, unity, explanatoriness. There can be no doubt that, as far 
as non- empirical considerations are concerned, the more nearly a new 
fundamental physical theory satisfies all eight of the above require-
ments for unity, with N = 1, the more acceptable it will be deemed to be. 
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Furthermore, failure of a theory to satisfy elements of these criteria is 
taken to be grounds for holding the theory to be false even in the absence 
of empirical  difficulties. For example, high- energy physics in the 1960s 
kept discovering more and more different hadrons, and was judged to be 
in a state of crisis as the number rose to over one hundred. Again, even 
though the standard model (the current quantum field theory of funda-
mental particles and forces) does not face serious empirical problems, 
it is nevertheless regarded by most physicists as unlikely to be correct 
just because of its serious lack of unity. In adopting such non- empirical 
 criteria for acceptability, physicists thereby implicitly assume that the 
best conjecture as to where the truth lies is in the direction of physical-
ism(8). PIR requires that this implicit assumption  – or  conjecture  – be 
made explicit so that it can be critically assessed and, we may hope, 
improved. Physics with physicalism(8) explicitly acknowledged as a 
part of conjectural knowledge is more rigorous than physics without 
this being acknowledged, because physics pursued in the former way is 
able to subject non- empirical methods to critical appraisal as physical-
ism(8) is critically appraised, whereas physics pursued in the latter way 
cannot do this.
The really important point, however, in deciding what metaphysical 
assumption of unity to accept, is that what needs to be considered is not 
just current theoretical knowledge, or current methods, but the whole 
way theoretical physics has developed during the last four hundred, or 
possibly two thousand years. The crucial question is this: what metaphys-
ical thesis does the best justice to the way theoretical physics has devel-
oped during this period in the sense that successive theories increasingly 
successfully exemplify and give precision to this metaphysical thesis in a 
way that no rival thesis does? The answer is physicalism(8), as the fol-
lowing considerations indicate.
All advances in theory in physics since the scientific revolution 
have been advances in unification, in the sense of (1) to (8) above. Thus 
Newtonian theory (NT) unifies Galileo’s laws of terrestrial motion and 
Kepler’s laws of planetary motion (and much else besides): this is unifi-
cation in senses (1) to (3). Maxwellian classical electrodynamics, (CEM), 
unifies electricity, magnetism and light (plus radio, infrared, ultraviolet, 
X- rays and gamma rays): this is unification in sense (4). Special relativity 
(SR) brings greater unity to CEM, in revealing that the way one divides 
up the electromagnetic field into the electric and magnetic fields depends 
on one’s reference frame: this is unification in sense (6). SR is also a step 
towards unifying NT and CEM in that it transforms space and time so 
as to make CEM satisfy a basic principle fundamental to NT, namely the 
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(restricted) principle of relativity. SR also brings about a unification of 
matter and energy, via the most famous equation of modern physics, 
E = mc2, and partially unifies space and time into Minkowskian space- 
time. General relativity (GR) unifies space- time and gravitation, in that, 
according to GR, gravitation is no more than an effect of the curvature 
of space- time:  this is a step towards unification in sense (8). Quantum 
theory (QM) and atomic theory unify a mass of phenomena having to do 
with the structure and properties of matter, and the way matter interacts 
with light: this is unification in senses (4) and (5). Quantum electrody-
namics unifies QM, CEM and SR. Quantum electroweak theory unifies 
(partially) electromagnetism and the weak force: this is (partial) unifi-
cation in sense (7). Quantum chromodynamics brings unity to hadron 
physics (via quarks) and brings unity to the eight kinds of gluons of the 
strong force: this is unification in sense (6). The standard model unifies to 
a considerable extent all known phenomena associated with fundamen-
tal particles and the forces between them (apart from gravitation): this is 
partial unification in senses (4) to (7). The theory unifies to some extent 
its two component quantum field theories in that both are locally gauge 
invariant (the symmetry group being U(1) × SU(2) × SU(3)). All the 
current programmes to unify the standard model and GR known to me, 
including string theory or M- theory, seek to unify in senses (4) to (8).20
In short, all advances in fundamental theory since Galileo have 
invariably brought greater unity to theoretical physics in one or other, 
or all, of senses (1) to (8): all successive theories have increasingly suc-
cessfully exemplified and given precision to physicalism(8) to an extent 
which cannot be said of any rival metaphysical thesis, at that level of gen-
erality. The whole way theoretical physics has developed points towards 
physicalism(8), in other words, as the goal towards which physics has 
developed. Furthermore, what it means to say this is given precision by 
the account of theoretical unity given in section 5.3 above.
In assessing the relative fruitfulness of two rival metaphysical the-
ses, Ma and Mb, for some phase in the development of theoretical physics 
that involves the successive acceptance of theories T1, T2, … Tn, two con-
siderations need to be born in mind. First, how potentially fruitful are Ma 
and Mb, how specific or precise, and thus how specific in the guidelines 
offered for the development of new theories? Second, how actually fruit-
ful are Ma and Mb, in the sense of how successful or unsuccessful has the 
succession of theories, T1, T2, … Tn, been when regarded as a research 
programme with Ma or Mb as its key idea? When both considerations are 
taken into account, physicalism(8) comes out as more fruitful for theo-
retical physics from Newton to today than any rival thesis (at its level of 
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generality). Physicalism(7) is not as specific as physicalism(8), and thus 
not as potentially fruitful; it does not do justice to the way GR absorbs 
the force of gravitation into the nature of space- time, and does not do 
justice to current research programmes which seek to unify matter and 
space- time. (All of physicalism(n), n = 1, 2, … 7, are scientifically fruit-
ful to some extent, but decreasingly so as n goes down from 7 to 6 … to 
1, in view of the decreasing specificity and content of these versions of 
physicalism.)
The notion of “research programme” appealed to here is simi-
lar to, but not the same as, the notion developed by Lakatos (1970). 
The main differences are as follows. For Lakatos, the “hard core” of a 
research programme was a testable theory rendered metaphysical by 
a methodological decision; the main research activity associated with 
a research programme involved developing successful applications of 
the theory, guided by the “positive heuristic” stemming from the “hard 
core”. (In all this, Lakatos followed Kuhn’s conception of “normal sci-
ence”, giving Lakatosian terms to Kuhnian ideas [see Kuhn, 1970a].) In 
the text, I have assumed that the metaphysics of a research programme 
is authentic, inherently untestable metaphysics, the main research 
task being to develop a succession of theories that progressively cap-
ture the metaphysics more and more successfully. The account of 
“degrees of disunity” given in section 5.3 above provides a precise way 
of assessing the extent to which successive “totalities of fundamental 
physical theory” do, or do not, increasingly successfully capture phys-
icalism. Thus, given such a succession, T1, T2, … Tm, with degrees of 
disunity N1, N2, … Nm, of type (5– 7), with N1 > N2 > … > Nm, then T1, 
T2, … Tm do progressively capture physicalism(5– 7) more and more 
successfully. There is nothing like this in the Lakatosian account of 
research programme, lacking as it does the solution to the problem of 
unity of theory. Finally, there is a substantial difference in the intended 
application of the two notions. Whereas I  see science as a whole as 
one gigantic research programme, the hierarchy of versions of physi-
calism being presupposed as the metaphysical “hard core”, it is essen-
tial to Lakatos’s quasi- Popperian conception of science that science 
is made up of competing research programmes. This means that, for 
Lakatos, science cannot be viewed as one gigantic Lakatosian research 
programme (since, if it were, there could be no competitor). Lakatos 
does say, it is true, “Even science as a whole can be regarded as a huge 
research programme with Popper’s supreme heuristic rule: ‘devise con-
jectures which have more empirical content than their predecessors’ ” 
(Lakatos, 1970, p. 132). But there is here no overall Lakatosian “hard 
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core” or “positive heuristic”. This is Popper’s conception of science and, 
for Lakatos, his own conception of research programme is strictly inap-
plicable to science as a whole. (For a more detailed comparison and 
critical assessment of the two views, see Chapter 2, section 2.8).21
Some philosophers of science hold that the successive revolutions 
in theoretical physics that have taken place since Galileo or Newton make 
it quite impossible to construe science as steadily and progressively hon-
ing in on some definite view of the natural world (Kuhn, 1970a; Laudan, 
1980). If attention is restricted to standard empiricism and physical the-
ory, this may be the case. But the moment some form of presupposition-
ism is accepted, and one considers metaphysical theses implicit in the 
methods of science, a very different conclusion emerges: all theoretical 
revolutions since Galileo exemplify the one idea of unity in nature. Far from 
obliterating the idea that there is a persistent thesis about the nature 
of the universe in physics, as Kuhn and Laudan suppose, all theoretical 
revolutions, without exception, do exactly the opposite in revealing that 
theoretical physics draws ever closer to capturing the idea that there is 
an underlying dynamic unity in nature, as specified by physicalism(8).
There is a further point to be made in favour of physicalism(8). 
So far, every theoretical advance in physics has revealed that theories 
accepted earlier are false. Thus Galileo’s laws of terrestrial motion and 
Kepler’s laws of planetary motion are contradicted by Newtonian theory, 
in turn contradicted by special relativity, in turn contradicted by general 
relativity. The whole of classical physics is contradicted by quantum the-
ory, in turn contradicted by quantum field theory. Science advances from 
one false theory to another. Viewed from a standard empiricist perspec-
tive, this seems discouraging, and has prompted the view that all future 
theories will be false as well, a view that has been called “the pessimistic 
induction” (Newton- Smith, 1981, p. 14). Viewed from the perspective of 
science presupposing physicalism(8), however, this mode of advance is 
wholly encouraging, since it is required if physicalism(8) is true. Granted 
physicalism(8), the only way a dynamical theory can be precisely true 
of any restricted range of phenomena is if it is such as to be straightfor-
wardly generalizable so as to be true of all phenomena. Any physical the-
ory inherently restricted to a limited range of phenomena, even though 
containing a wealth of true approximate predictions about these phe-
nomena, must nevertheless be strictly false: only a theory of everything 
can be a candidate for truth!
Not only does the way physics has advanced from one false theory 
to the next accord with physicalism(8); the conception of unity sketched 
in section 5.3 successfully accounts for another feature of the way 
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theoretical physics has advanced. Let T1, T2, … Tn stand for successive 
stages in the totality of fundamental theory in physics. Each of T1, T2, … 
Tn contradicts physicalism(8), in that each of T1 etc. asserts that nature 
is disunified, whereas physicalism(8) asserts that it is unified. This might 
seem to make a nonsense of the idea that T1, T2, … Tn is moving steadily 
and progressively towards some future Tn+r which is a precise, testable 
version of physicalism(8). But what section 5.3 shows is that, even 
though all of T1, T2, … Tn are incompatible with physicalism(8), because 
they are disunified, nevertheless a precise meaning can be given to the 
assertion that Tr+1 is closer to physicalism, or more unified, than Tr. This 
is the case if Tr+1 is (a) of greater empirical content than Tr (since these 
are candidate theories of everything), and (b) of a higher degree of unity 
than Tr in ways specified in section 5.3. Thus the account of unity given 
above, involving physicalism(1– 8), gives precision to the idea that a suc-
cession of false theories, T1, … Tn, all of which contradict physicalism(8), 
nevertheless can be construed as moving ever closer to the goal of speci-
fying physicalism(8) as a precise, testable, physical theory of everything.
5.6 Metaphysical minimalism
I turn now to the argument designed to show that that version of phys-
icalism should be accepted which is the weakest available which just 
suffices to exclude theories more disunified than currently accepted 
physical theories – at present the standard model (SM) and general rel-
ativity (GR). We may take this to be the strongest version of physicalism 
that is compatible with SM+GR. This, it may be argued, leads to physi-
calism(n = 3) being accepted – or possibly physicalism(n = 4, N = 4), 
where N = 4 does justice to the fact that SM+GR includes four distinct 
forces, electromagnetism, the weak and strong forces, and gravitation 
(electromagnetism and the weak force being only partially unified in 
quantum electroweak theory).
But physicalism(n  =  3) is, it may be argued, much too strong. It 
assumes that SM+GR is consistent. Quantum field theory ordinarily 
assumes flat Minkowskian space- time, but it can be extended to apply 
in the curved space- time of GR. Problems arise, however, when attempts 
are made to treat quantum mechanically described matter or energy as 
the source of gravitation, and so of the curvature of space- time, accord-
ing to GR. No version of SM+GR can be applied satisfactorily to the 
interior of black holes. Insuperable problems arise if one tries to incor-
porate the quantum measurement of orthodox quantum theory into the 
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framework of GR. SM+GR is, it seems, not a consistent theory. Even GR 
on its own faces a problem of consistency, in that GR predicts that a sin-
gularity forms inside a black hole, which constitutes a breakdown of the 
continuity of space- time, and thus a kind of inconsistency of the theory. 
In order to assess the degree of disunity of SM+GR one has to consider a 
version patched up in an ad hoc way so as to create a theory that is at least 
consistent. Such an ad hoc patching up will further increase the kind and 
degree of disunity of the theory.
There is a further point. Orthodox quantum theory (OQT) holds 
that electrons, atoms, even molecules can be in superpositions of states – 
at different spatial locations at the same time, for  example  – whereas 
macroscopic measuring instruments cannot (measuring instruments 
detecting one outcome and not a superposition of outcomes). This means 
OQT holds that different laws hold at different levels – different masses, 
levels of complexity or whatever it may be. This in turn means that OQT 
is disunified in way n = 2. Physicalism(n=2, N=2) is perhaps compatible 
with OQT, but any more unified version of physicalism is not. This is a 
very serious level of disunity. What makes the matter even worse is that 
OQT does not specify what variables are involved – let alone what value 
of what variables – in the transition from quantum states and superposi-
tions to classical states without such superpositions.22
5.7 The hierarchical view
Should physics accept physicalism(8) in line with the argument of sec-
tion 5.5, and risk committing physics to a highly specific and contentful 
version of physicalism all too likely to be false, despite its fruitfulness for 
physics up to the present? Or should physics accept some clumsy version 
of physicalism indicated in section 5.6, less contentful and thus more 
likely to be true, but entirely lacking in fruitful guidelines for the devel-
opment of new physical theories?
No version of presuppositionism which restricts itself to adopting 
a single (if composite) metaphysical thesis can satisfactorily resolve the 
conflicting desiderata that are highlighted in these two questions. But 
this conflict is resolved if we adopt a version of presuppositionism which 
holds that we need to see physics as adopting a hierarchy of theses, from 
physicalism(8) near the bottom of the hierarchy to physicalism(1) at the 
top (see Figure 5.1). Physicalism(5– 7) are on the same level since they 
are all but equivalent to one another. As we descend the hierarchy, from 
level (9) to level (3), theses become increasingly contentful and specific, 
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increasingly potentially fruitful for future progress in theoretical phys-
ics but also increasingly likely to be false and in need of revision. As one 
moves from level (9)  to level (3), the corresponding methodological 
requirements for unity, depicted as sloping dotted lines in Figure  5.1, 
become increasingly demanding, but also increasingly speculative and 
uncertain. The totality of physical theory, at any given stage in the devel-
opment of physics (except when a candidate unified theory of everything 
has been proposed and accepted) will only satisfy these methodological 
rules partially; a new theory, in order to be an advance from the stand-
point of unity, must lead to a new totality of theory satisfying the meth-
odological rules better than the previous totality.
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
Level 5
Level 6
Level 7
Level 8
Level 9
Empirical Data
T
B
P8
P5–7
P4
P3
P2
Physicalism (1)
Physicalism (2)
Physicalism (3)
Physicalism (4)
Physicalism (5–7)
Physicalism (8)
Best Blueprint
Totality of
Fundamental
Physical Theory
P1
Figure 5.1 Another version of aim- oriented empiricism (Source: author)
 
ScieNtif ic MetaPhySicS 161
  
This hierarchical view has the following advantages over any ver-
sion of presuppositionism that restricts itself to a single (possibly com-
posite) thesis. First, the hierarchical view does justice to both apparently 
conflicting desiderata, indicated above, which cannot be done if a single 
metaphysical assumption is made. The hierarchical view includes both 
the uniquely scientifically fruitful thesis of physicalism(8) and the much 
less specific and problematic theses of physicalism (1)  or (2). Second, 
the hierarchical view, as a result of making explicit metaphysical theses 
implicitly presupposed in adopting methods associated with levels (4) to 
(8), facilitates criticism and revision of these methods, which may well 
need to be done at some stage (if the corresponding metaphysical theses 
are false). Such criticism and revision is not facilitated if a single thesis 
is presupposed. Third, the hierarchical view assists revision of the more 
contentful and specific versions of physicalism low down in the hierar-
chy by providing a framework of relatively unproblematic assumptions 
and methods, at levels (9)  to (6), which place restrictions on the way 
the more specific, problematic versions of physicalism may be revised, 
should the need to do so arise. If a succession of increasingly empirically 
successful theories are developed, T1, T2, …, all of which clash with phys-
icalism(8), but which accord increasingly well with physicalism(7), this 
might be taken as grounds for rejecting or modifying physicalism(8).
The reasons given above for including the relatively specific, sci-
entifically fruitful metaphysical thesis of physicalism(8) in the hier-
archy of accepted theses are reasons also for accepting an even more 
specific, scientifically fruitful metaphysical thesis, should one be avail-
able. A glance at the history of physics reveals that a succession of much 
more specific metaphysical theses have been accepted, or taken very 
seriously, for a time, each thesis being an attempt to capture aspects 
of physicalism. Ideas at this level include the following:  the universe 
is made up of rigid corpuscles that interact by contact; it is made up of 
point atoms that interact at a distance by means of rigid, spherically 
symmetrical forces; it is made up of a unified field; it is made up of a 
unified quantum field; it is made up of quantum strings. These ideas 
tend to reflect the character of either the current best accepted physical 
theory, or assumptions made by current efforts to develop a new theory. 
This is not sufficient to be scientifically fruitful in the way that physical-
ism(8) is. For this, we require that the thesis in question is such that all 
accepted fundamental physical theories since Newton can be regarded 
as moving steadily towards capturing the thesis as a testable physical 
theory, in the manner indicated in section 5.3. One candidate for such 
a thesis is Lagrangianism.
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Lagrangianism asserts that the universe is such that all phenom-
ena evolve in accordance with Hamilton’s principle of least action, 
formulated in terms of some unified Lagrangian (or Lagrangian den-
sity), L. We require, here, that L is not the sum of two or more distinct 
Lagrangians, with distinct physical interpretations and symmetries, for 
example, one for the electroweak force, one for the strong force and 
one for gravitation, as at present; L must have a single physical inter-
pretation, and its symmetries must have an appropriate group structure 
(the group not being a product of subgroups). We require, in addition, 
that current quantum field theories and general relativity emerge when 
appropriate limits are taken.23
All accepted fundamental physical theories, from Newton on, 
can be given a Lagrangian formulation. Furthermore, if we consider 
the totality of fundamental physical theory since Newton (empirical 
laws being included if no theory has been developed) then, as in the 
case of physicalism(8), every new accepted theory has brought the 
totality of physical theory nearer to capturing Lagrangianism. Thus 
Lagrangianism is at least as scientifically fruitful as physicalism(8). In 
fact it is more scientifically fruitful since it is very much more specific 
and contentful. The reasons for accepting physicalism(8) are reasons 
for accepting Lagrangianism too as the lowest thesis in the hierarchy of 
metaphysical theses, very much more potentially scientifically fruitful 
than physicalism(8), but also more speculative, more likely to need 
revision (see Figure 5.1).
It deserves to be noted that something like the hierarchy of meta-
physical theses, constraining acceptance of physical theory from above, 
is to be found at the empirical level, constraining acceptance of theory 
from below. There are, at the lowest level, the results of experiments per-
formed at specific times and places. Then, above these, there are low- level 
experimental laws, asserting that each experimental result is a repeat-
able effect. Next up, there are empirical laws such as Hooke’s law, Ohm’s 
law or the gas laws. Above these there are such physical laws as those of 
electrostatics or of thermodynamics. And above these there are theories 
which have been refuted, but which can be “derived”, when appropri-
ate limits are taken, from accepted fundamental theory – as Newtonian 
theory can be “derived” from general relativity. This empirical hierarchy, 
somewhat informal perhaps, exists in part for precisely the same episte-
mological and methodological reasons I have given for the hierarchical 
ordering of metaphysical theses: so that relatively contentless and secure 
theses (at the bottom of the hierarchy) may be distinguished from more 
contentful and insecure theses (further up the hierarchy) to facilitate 
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pinpointing what needs to be revised, and how, should the need for revi-
sion arise. That such a hierarchy exists at the empirical level provides 
further support for my claim that we need to adopt such a hierarchy at 
the metaphysical level.
5.8 Alternative versions of aim- oriented empiricism
The hierarchical view depicted in Figure 5.1 may need to be rejected 
in its entirety as physics advances. If we exclude from consideration 
physicalism(n  =  1, N  = ∞), which permits anything, the hierarchi-
cal view assumes that the universe is at least partially physically com-
prehensible in the sense that phenomena occur in accordance with 
physical laws which are more or less disunified, the traditional dis-
tinction between laws and initial conditions being presupposed. But 
even though the universe is physically comprehensible, the traditional 
distinction between laws and initial conditions might not be observed. 
The true theory of everything might be cosmological in character, and 
might specify unique initial conditions for the universe.24 This possi-
bility, and other possibilities of this kind, could no doubt be accom-
modated within a modified version of the above hierarchical view. 
But there are other possibilities, of philosophical interest even if of 
no interest to physics as at present constituted, which cannot be so 
accommodated. Perhaps God is ultimately responsible for all natural 
phenomena, or some kind of cosmic purpose or cosmic programme 
analogous to a computer program (as has been suggested). In these 
cases the universe would be comprehensible but not physically com-
prehensible – even though it might mimic a physically comprehensible 
universe, to some extent.
In order to accommodate these, and other such, possibilities 
we need to embed the above hierarchical view in the broader view 
I have called “aim- oriented empiricism” (AOE), depicted in Figure 2.1. 
However, in order to do this, AOE, as depicted in Figure 2.1, needs to be 
modified. In this modified figure, we would have in succession, as we go 
up the hierarchy, empirical phenomena (level 1); accepted fundamental 
physical theory (level 2); best blueprint (level 3); then, at level 4, the 
thesis that the universe is perfectly comprehensible physically  – physi-
calism(n=8); at level 5 the thesis that the universe is all but perfectly 
comprehensible physically  – physicalism(n>4, N=1); at level 6, the 
thesis that the universe is partially comprehensible physically  – physi-
calism(n>4, N<10); at level 7, the thesis that the universe is partially 
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comprehensible, either physically or in some other way; at level 8, the 
thesis of meta- knowability: the universe is such that we can discover how 
to improve our methods of learning; and finally, at level 9, the thesis of 
partial knowability: the universe is such that we can acquire some knowl-
edge of our local circumstances.
The level 8 thesis, here, asserts that the universe is such that there 
is some rationally discoverable proposition about its nature (relative to 
existing knowledge) which, if accepted, makes it possible progressively 
to improve methods for the improvement of knowledge. “Rationally dis-
coverable” means at least that the thesis is not an arbitrary choice from 
infinitely many analogous theses. This thesis is to be interpreted as assert-
ing that the universe is not epistemologically malicious, in the sense that 
apparently improved methods lead to apparent new knowledge which 
turns out, subsequently, to be illusory, there being no possibility of dis-
covering this before it is revealed. (This is clarified in the next section.) 
Level 9 asserts that the universe is such that we can continue to acquire 
knowledge of our local circumstances, sufficient to make life possible.
Such an amalgam of Figures  5.1 and 9.1 (see Chapter  9) is 
not altogether satisfactory. It is somewhat arbitrary to declare that 
physicalism(n>4, N=9) represents a partially physically comprehensi-
ble universe, but physicalism(n>4, N=10) does not. Some may question 
that the alternative thesis at level 7 – the thesis that the universe is com-
prehensible non- physically – has anything to do with physics, or science. 
One can imagine circumstances, however, in which this thesis might well 
be preferred to any thesis of partial physical comprehensibility. Suppose 
God manifests Himself in the sky, and responds to our requests to per-
form specific miracles by doing just that – converting the orbit of Mercury 
into a square orbit, for example, or lifting everyone on earth one foot into 
the air, except where this is impossible or dangerous. How could we not 
accept, in such circumstances, that God is ultimately in charge of Nature?
Reasons for accepting these theses are similar to those given for 
accepting the hierarchy of theses of the view depicted in Figures 2.1 and 
5.1. As a result of accepting this hierarchy of theses, physics provides 
itself with a framework of assumptions, and associated methods, high up 
in the hierarchy, which it will never benefit the pursuit of knowledge to 
reject; in this way, a framework is created within which very much more 
substantial and dubious theses, low down in the hierarchy, can be criti-
cally scrutinized and, we may hope, improved. The thesis at the top of the 
hierarchy, at level 9, asserts that the universe is such that we can acquire 
some knowledge of our local circumstances. If this assumption is false, 
we will not be able to acquire knowledge whatever we assume. We are 
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justified in accepting this assumption permanently as a part of our knowl-
edge, even if we have no grounds for holding it to be true, since accepting 
it can only help, and cannot hinder, the acquisition of knowledge what-
ever the universe is like. The thesis at level 4, physicalism(8), deserves to 
be accepted because of its extraordinary scientific fruitfulness. All major 
theoretical developments in physics point towards, and draw closer to, 
physicalism(8), in that they are invariably major steps in unification, as 
we saw in section 5.5 above. From the standpoint of scientific fruitful-
ness, at this level, physicalism(8) has no rival, unless it is the even more 
substantial thesis of Lagrangianism. Nevertheless, physicalism(8) may 
be false, and physics may, at some stage, need to adopt a different thesis. 
Accepting physicalism(8) within the framework of theses just indicated 
facilitates the development of alternatives, should this be necessary.
The view depicted in Figure 5.1 has, perhaps, a more direct rele-
vance to theoretical physics; AOE as depicted in Figure 2.1 would become 
relevant if it emerged that the universe differs radically from the way 
modern science assumes it to be. AOE is more relevant to the philosophy 
of physics; it is required to solve the problem of induction, as we shall 
see in Chapter  7 (see also Maxwell, 1998, ch. 5; 2007, ch. 14; 2017a; 
2017b.) It is also required to rebut objections of circularity, as we shall 
now see.
5.9 The circularity problem solved
One feature of the views depicted in Figures 2.1 and 5.1 may be deemed 
puzzling. They hold that when metaphysical thesis and physical theory 
clash, physical theory may be revised, but also that metaphysical thesis 
may be revised. How is such a two- way influence possible? In what fol-
lows I consider AOE as depicted in the previous section.
The first point to note is that just such a two- way influence occurs 
when theory and experiment clash. In general, if a theory clashes with 
an experiment that has been subjected to expert critical scrutiny and 
repeated, the theory is rejected. But on occasions, it turns out that it is 
the experimental result that is wrong, not the theory.25 In a somewhat 
similar way, if a new theory increases the conflict between the totality of 
physical theory and the currently accepted metaphysical thesis, at level 
3 of the previous section, the new theory will be rejected (or not even 
considered or formulated).26 On occasions, however, a new theory may 
be developed which increases the conflict between the totality of theory 
and the current thesis at level 3 but decreases the conflict between the 
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totality of theory and physicalism at level 4. In this case the new theory 
may legitimately be accepted and the thesis at level 3 may be revised. In 
principle, as I have already indicated, theses even higher up in the hierar-
chy may legitimately be revised in this way. A virtue of these hierarchical 
views is that they make possible and facilitate such two- way revisions.
However, another, potentially more serious, problem faces the two 
hierarchical views indicated above. Both incorporate what seems to be 
vicious circularity. Acceptance of theories is influenced by their degree 
of accord with metaphysical principles, the acceptance of which is in 
turn, in part, influenced by an appeal the empirical success of physical 
theories. The claim is that as theoretical knowledge and understanding 
improves, metaphysical theses and associated methods improve as well. 
There is something like positive feedback between improving knowl-
edge, and improving knowledge- about- how- to- improve- knowledge. 
This, it is claimed, is the methodological key to the great success of 
modern science, namely that it adapts its metaphysical assumptions and 
methods (its aims and methods) to what it finds out about the nature 
of the universe.27 But how can such a circular procedure conceivably 
be valid?
This is not an objection to the arguments and views put forward so 
far. No attempt has been made to justify claims to theoretical knowledge. 
The argument has been modest: granted acceptance of current physical 
theories and adoption of current methods, then physics is more rigorous 
(in that it accords better with PIR) if implicit metaphysical assumptions 
are made explicit, and those assumptions chosen which seem best to 
promote what we take to be scientific progress. The circularity objection 
would arise, however, if we were to go beyond the modest aspirations of 
sections 5.2 to 5.8, and attempt to solve the problem of induction,28 and 
justify acceptance of empirically successful unifying theories, within the 
context of AOE. But this does, in effect, amount to an objection to AOE. 
For it may be argued that AOE cannot be acceptable because the prob-
lem of induction cannot conceivably be solved within its framework: the 
moment the attempt is made to justify acceptance of scientific theories 
and metaphysical theses as claims to knowledge, vicious circularity sets 
in. How is this circularity objection to be met?
Here, in a nutshell, is the answer. Permitting metaphysical assump-
tions to influence what theories are accepted, and at the same time 
permitting theories to influence what metaphysical assumptions are 
accepted, may (if carried out properly), in certain sorts of universe, lead to 
genuine progress in knowledge. The level 6 thesis of meta- knowability, of 
AOE, asserts that this is just such a universe. And furthermore, crucially, 
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reasons for accepting meta- knowability make no appeal to the success of 
science. In this way, meta- knowability legitimises the potentially invalid 
circularity of AOE depicted in Figure 2.1.
Relative to an existing body of knowledge and methods for the 
acquisition of new knowledge, possible universes can be divided up, 
roughly, into three categories:  (i)  those which are such that the meta- 
methodology of AOE can meet with no success, not even apparent suc-
cess, in the sense that new metaphysical ideas and associated methods 
for the improvement of knowledge cannot be put into practice so that 
success (or at least apparent success) is achieved; (ii) those which are 
such that AOE can meet with genuine success; and (iii) those which are 
such that AOE appears to be successful for a time, but this success is 
illusory, this being impossible to discover during the period of illusory 
success. Meta- knowability asserts that this universe is a type (i) or (ii) 
universe; it rules out universes of type (iii).
Meta- knowability asserts, in short, that the universe is such that 
AOE can meet with success and will not lead us astray in a way in which 
we cannot hope to discover by normal methods of scientific inquiry (as 
would be the case in a type (iii) universe). If we have good grounds for 
accepting meta- knowability as a part of scientific knowledge – grounds 
which do not appeal to the success of science  – then we have good 
grounds for adopting and implementing AOE (from levels 8 to 3).
But what grounds are there for accepting the thesis of meta- 
knowability at level (6)? There are two:29
(a) Granted that there is some kind of general feature of the universe 
which makes it possible to acquire knowledge of our local envi-
ronment (as guaranteed by the thesis at level 8), it is reasonable 
to suppose that we do not know all that there is to be known about 
what the nature of this general feature is. It is reasonable to sup-
pose, in other words, that we can improve our knowledge about 
the nature of this general feature, thus improving methods for the 
improvement of knowledge. Not to suppose this is to assume, arro-
gantly, that we already know all that there is to be known about 
how to acquire new knowledge. Granted that learning is possible 
(as guaranteed by the level 8 thesis), it is reasonable to suppose 
that, as we learn more about the world, we will learn more about 
how to learn. Granted the level 8 thesis, in other words, meta- 
knowability is a reasonable conjecture.
(b) Meta- knowability is too good a possibility, from the standpoint 
of the growth of knowledge, not to be accepted initially, the idea 
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only being reluctantly abandoned if all attempts at improving 
methods for the improvement of knowledge fail.
(a) and (b)  are not, perhaps, very strong grounds for accepting meta- 
knowability; both are open to criticism. But the crucial point, for the 
present argument, is that these grounds for accepting meta- knowability, 
(a) and (b), are independent of the success of science. This suffices to 
avoid circularity.
If AOE lacks meta- knowability, its circular procedure, interpreted 
as one designed to procure justified knowledge, becomes dramati-
cally invalid, as the following consideration reveals. Corresponding 
to the succession of accepted fundamental physical theories devel-
oped from Newton down to today, there is a succession of aberrant 
rivals which postulate that gravitation becomes a repulsive force from 
the beginning of 2050, let us say.30 Corresponding to these aberrant 
theories there is a hierarchy of aberrant versions of physicalism, all 
of which assert that there is an abrupt change in the laws of nature 
at 2050. The aberrant theories, just as empirically successful as the 
theories we accept, render the aberrant versions of physicalism just 
as scientifically fruitful as non- aberrant versions of physicalism are 
rendered by the non- aberrant theories we actually accept. If we take 
it as given that we accept non- aberrant theories, the question of what 
reasons there are for rejecting empirically successful aberrant theo-
ries and associated aberrant versions of physicalism does not arise. 
But the moment we seek to justify acceptance of non- aberrant theories 
and rejection of aberrant theories, within the framework of AOE, the 
question of what reasons there are for rejecting aberrant theories and 
associated aberrant versions of physicalism arises. If AOE is bereft of 
meta- knowability, it is not easy to see what these reasons can be. But 
AOE with meta- knowability included does provide a reason: the aber-
rant versions of physicalism assert that this is a type (iii) universe, 
which violates meta- knowability.
Versions of physicalism(n) for which n = 1 or 3, and N > 1 would 
seem to violate meta- knowability. But other versions of physicalism 
with N > 1 need not clash with meta- knowability.31
5.10 Conclusions
I have argued that if science is to be rigorous it needs to accept explicitly, 
as a core component of theoretical scientific knowledge, a hierarchy of 
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metaphysical theses (and associated methods) concerning the dynamic 
unity, the physical comprehensibility, of the universe. I have shown that 
the notorious problem concerning the unity, the explanatory character, 
of physical theory can be solved within this hierarchical view of science. 
This solution, in turn, provides a precise way of assessing the scientific 
fruitfulness of rival metaphysical theses, from the standpoint of the 
empirical progressiveness of the research programmes to which they 
give rise.
These results have dramatic implications for science, for our 
understanding of science, and for the relationship between science 
and philosophy. There is a major increase in the (acknowledged) 
scope of scientific knowledge. Whereas standard empiricism implies 
that science at present provides us with no knowledge about the ulti-
mate nature of the universe (all current fundamental physical theories 
being false), the hierarchical view holds the opposite. Current science 
does include knowledge about the ultimate nature of the universe  – 
knowledge which, though theoretical and conjectural, is nevertheless 
more secure than any accepted theory such as quantum theory or gen-
eral relativity: physicalism(5– 7) is true, even perhaps physicalism(8). 
Science becomes much more like natural philosophy, in that it incor-
porates sustained exploration and assessment of metaphysical theses, 
and associated metholodogical rules, as an integral, vital part of scien-
tific research. Instead of metaphysics and philosophy being banished 
from science, they become a vital part of science.
Furthermore, as I  have argued in detail elsewhere (Maxwell, 
1976a, 1984a or 2007, 2000a, 2001a, 2004, 2010a, 2014b, 2016b, 
2017a, 2017b), the arguments of this chapter, when extended to take 
into account, not just the implicit metaphysical assumptions of science, 
but its implicit value and political assumptions as well, have even more 
dramatic implications not just for physics or natural science, but for social 
science, for the humanities, for academic inquiry as a whole.
Perhaps the time has come for philosophers to take note of these 
arguments that have such revolutionary implications for our intellectual 
landscape.
170
  
6
Comprehensibility rather than beauty
6.1 Beauty or comprehensibility?
Many scientists, and some philosophers of science, have acknowledged 
that aesthetic considerations play, quite properly, an important role in 
influencing acceptance and rejection of theories in science, in addition to 
empirical considerations. A famous example is Dirac, who went as far as 
to declare: “It is more important to have beauty in one’s equations than to 
have them fit experiment” (quoted in McAllister, 1996, p. 15).
The view that beauty ought to influence choice of theory in science 
faces, however, a serious problem. Why should beauty be a good indi-
cation of truth? Unless the truth is beautiful, and unless we have valid 
grounds for holding this to be the case, there can be no good reasons, it 
would seem, for giving preference to beautiful theories in science.
Not only may it seem dubious that we can have grounds for holding 
that the truth is beautiful; there may well seem to be grounds for holding 
that it is wildly implausible that the truth should be beautiful, especially 
in theoretical physics.
Whether we find something beautiful or ugly must depend, to 
some extent at least, on our personal, subjective, emotional responses 
to that thing. Aesthetic criteria have their roots deep in the human psy-
che, and in human culture. But physical reality, that which theoretical 
physics seeks to grasp, is utterly remote from the human psyche, from 
human culture. It may well seem utterly implausible that something as 
anthropomorphic, as personal, as quintessentially human and subjec-
tive, as ideas about beauty, should have anything to do with the ultimate 
nature of the physical universe, utterly impersonal and remote from the 
circumstances of human life. Beauty may seem to be the last consider-
ation to take into account in assessing the merits of rival fundamental 
theories in physics.
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An extremely interesting and original defence of the thesis that aes-
thetic considerations do quite properly influence theory choice in science 
has, however, been put forward recently by James McAllister (1996; see 
also his 1989, 1990 and 1991). Quite independently, I have, over a num-
ber of years, developed a view which resembles McAllister’s view in a 
number of striking ways, but which is also different in important respects, 
namely aim- oriented empiricism (see Chapters 2, 4 and 5).1 In this chap-
ter I  compare and contrast the two views. My own view, aim- oriented 
empiricism, has already been expounded and defended. I begin with a 
sketch McAllister’s view. I then discuss how the two views resemble, and 
differ from, each other. And finally, I discuss the question of which is to 
be preferred.
6.2 The model of the aesthetic induction
In what follows I call McAllister’s account of the role of non- empirical, 
aesthetic factors in the selection of theories in science “the model of the 
aesthetic induction” (MAI). Here, in summary, is his view.
According to MAI, the basic aim of science is to develop a body of 
theory that successfully predicts all observable phenomena. MAI holds 
that from this aim of “empirical adequacy”, we can arrive at the follow-
ing criteria for assessing theories: success in predicting existing empirical 
data, success in predicting new phenomena, consistency with other high- 
level theories, explanatory power and internal consistency.
Many scientists have, however, declared that aesthetic consider-
ations, in addition to the above, play a vital role in both the discovery 
and acceptance of theories in science. Dirac, Einstein and many others 
have stressed the importance of aesthetic considerations, such as beauty, 
elegance, harmony, uniformity amidst variety, simplicity, symmetry. MAI 
holds that such criteria do indeed have an important role to play in decid-
ing what theories are accepted, to the extent, even, on occasions, of over-
riding empirical considerations.
But, according to MAI, in so far as such aesthetic considerations 
exercise a rational influence over choice of theory in science, two crucial 
points need to be borne in mind. First, theories must be considered to be 
abstract entities, distinct from this or that linguistic formulation. Second, 
what matters is not the (subjective) aesthetic judgements themselves, 
but rather objective, non- aesthetic properties that theories, construed as 
abstract entities, do actually possess, in virtue of which scientists make 
their aesthetic judgements.
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There are, according to MAI, five classes of properties of theories 
that are relevant:  symmetry, invocation of a model, visualizability/ 
abstractness, metaphysical allegiance and simplicity (related to unity). 
MAI stresses that many different properties fall under each of these 
headings. There are different kinds of symmetry; different theories have 
different kinds of models; some scientists, in some contexts, hold visu-
alizability to be a virtue, while others, in other contexts, prize almost its 
opposite, namely abstractness; scientists have upheld different meta-
physical views at different stages in the development of science, in terms 
of which they have sought to interpret scientific theories; and there are 
many different ways of assessing the simplicity of theories, yielding quite 
different results.
How, then, does the scientific community decide which of these 
very many different kinds of properties of theories are the relevant or 
important ones to employ in order to assess the acceptability of theories 
on non- empirical, or aesthetic, grounds? And what is the justification for 
so assessing theories, in terms of the preferred properties? How, in par-
ticular, can MAI do justice to the fact that aesthetic criteria in science 
change over time?
The answer is that, at any given stage, a scientific community 
prefers those new theories that have properties which earlier theories, 
which have proved to be empirically successful, also possess. If a certain 
kind of theory, with characteristic aesthetic properties, has met with 
empirical success in the past then, understandably enough, scientists are 
influenced to give preference to similar kinds of theories, with similar 
properties, in the future. This is “the aesthetic induction”. At a stroke, the 
above three questions are answered.
In a little more detail, we can imagine that a scientific community 
can consider many different aesthetic properties of theories, P, Q, R, …. 
The community will assign a different weighting, WP, WQ, WR, … to each 
of these properties, each weighting determining how influential the 
corresponding property is in theory choice. The weightings are in turn 
determined by what kinds of theory, with what properties, have (or have 
not) met with empirical success in the past. WP, WQ, WR, … are, in other 
words, determined by the aesthetic induction.
According to MAI, then, two kinds of criteria are employed in sci-
ence to choose theories. On the one hand there are criteria, listed above, 
arrived at by analysis of the basic aim of science of achieving empirical 
adequacy. And, on the other hand, there are criteria arrived at by the 
aesthetic induction. The second presupposes the first.
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Aesthetic criteria will tend to be conservative, based as they are on 
empirical performance of theories in the past. New theories, with the 
potential for great predictive success, may violate existing, conservative 
aesthetic criteria. When such a theory is developed, there is a rupture 
in accepted aesthetic criteria. Initially the new theory is judged to be 
“ugly”; but as its empirical potential becomes manifest, aesthetic criteria 
are changed to suit the new theory. This is what a scientific revolution 
amounts to, according to MAI, a conception somewhat different from 
Kuhn’s. In terms of this conception, neither Copernicus’s theory, nor 
Einstein’s theory of special relativity, were revolutionary, because nei-
ther broke with aesthetic criteria of the past. But Kepler’s laws of plane-
tary motion, and quantum theory, were both revolutionary, in that these 
theories broke dramatically with aesthetic criteria generally accepted at 
the time.
Finally, though the aesthetic induction might one day favour 
some particular metaphysical world view, so far this has not happened 
(McAllister, 1996, 102– 4).
6.3 Comparison of the two views
What is rather astonishing about aim- oriented empiricism (AOE) and 
MAI is that, though arrived at independently, and though giving what 
are, in some respects, very different pictures of the scientific enterprise, 
nevertheless the two views have much in common. Both seek to uphold 
what McAllister calls “the rationalist image of science”. Both hold that 
(some) criteria of theory choice can be justified by an appeal to the aims 
of science. Both hold that non- empirical criteria of theory choice have an 
enormously important part to play in science. Both hold that these non- 
empirical criteria are, in practical applications, quite diverse in character. 
Both hold that they change over time, as science progresses. And there is 
considerable agreement as to what these non- empirical criteria are: sim-
plicity, unity, symmetry and compatibility with some metaphysical world 
view, are all important, for both views.
Both hold that these criteria apply, not to specific formulations of 
theories, but to what all possible formulations have in common. And 
both give accounts of scientific revolutions that differ substantially from 
Kuhn’s account.
But there are also dramatic differences. MAI is, for McAllister, 
“a medium- level model of scientific practice, of a scope intermediate 
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between the loftiest generalization and the historical study” (1996, 
p. 2). AOE is put forward as a “highest- level model”, with implications 
and applications for all of natural science. (Strictly speaking, it is what 
I  call “generalized AOE” [Maxwell, 1998, pp.  191– 2, 185, 191, 208 
and 223– 4]  – embodying the hierarchical structure of AOE, but lack-
ing specific, lower- level theses of AOE – that is a model at the highest 
level, applying to science throughout history; AOE is restricted to post- 
Galilean science.)
Again, MAI is a version of standard empiricism (SE), whereas 
AOE emphatically rejects SE. That MAI is a version of SE is clear from 
the way the aim of science is characterized as “empirical adequacy”. It is 
also apparent in the way science can, according to MAI, establish a meta-
physical world view. This can only happen via the aesthetic induction, 
and has not as yet come about. According to AOE, by contrast, at lev-
els 7 and 6 there are metaphysical, cosmological theses that are perma-
nently accepted by science, and at levels 5 to 3, there are metaphysical 
theses which are a part of current scientific knowledge, but which are 
increasingly likely to require revision with the advance of science, as one 
descends from level 5 to level 3 (see Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2).
Whereas MAI gives to science just one aim (empirical adequacy), 
AOE sees science as having a hierarchy of aims, from empirical adequacy, 
perhaps, at the highest level, down to the aim to turn the best available 
level 3 blueprint into a precise, true theory of everything, at the lowest 
level. (And even more specific, and different, aims are assigned to differ-
ent branches of natural science.)
That AOE postulates this hierarchical structure to the aims of sci-
ence, whereas MAI does not, leads to different treatments of changing 
criteria for theory choice. According to MAI, criteria of theory choice 
are of two kinds:  those that are justified by an appeal to the basic 
aim of science (empirical adequacy), and those that are justified by 
inductive projection – the aesthetic criteria arrived at by the aesthetic 
induction. These latter are weaker than the former, and presuppose, 
for logical reasons, the former (McAllister, 1996, p. 76). According to 
AOE, by contrast, all criteria of theory choice are arrived at by aim 
analysis:  those that evolve do so because the level 3 aim of science 
evolves.
Even though MAI and AOE agree that non- empirical criteria of 
theory choice change with time, they disagree about which criteria 
change, and what this change involves. According to AOE, something 
close to physicalism has been implicit in the methods of theoretical 
physics since Galileo or Newton; the demand for theoretical unity, 
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associated with physicalism, has been more or less unchanging. What 
has changed is the form that the demand for unity takes, as manifest in 
dramatically changing level 3 metaphysical blueprints. MAI does not 
claim that physicalism, and the requirement of unity associated with it, 
is a part of the unchanging criteria of theory choice (since Galileo, at 
least). Nor could MAI claim this, as long as it is a version of SE.
According to AOE, the level 4 thesis of physicalism, and the level 3 
best metaphysical blueprint, are arrived at by a quasi- Popperian process 
of conjecture and criticism, the whole direction of progress in theoreti-
cal physics since the birth of modern science (or since the Presocratics) 
being taken into account. The claim is that these theses make explicit 
what theoretical physics hopes to achieve: they are intended to be the 
best conjectures as to what the basic aims of theoretical physics should 
be, at different levels of specificity. These theses are intended to lead to 
criteria, to methodological principles such as symmetry principles, that 
will be relevant for future theories, not yet developed. Indeed, accord-
ing to AOE, the activity of further articulating the best blueprint, and 
solving problems of unity to which it gives rise, provides science with a 
rational, if fallible method of discovery.2 All this contrasts dramatically 
with criteria arrived at by the aesthetic induction, according to MAI, 
which are almost bound to be conservative, and more or less inapplica-
ble to revolutionary developments. AOE criteria anticipate and provoke 
revolution, and judge the existing body of fundamental physical theory 
as unsatisfactory because of its failure to comply with the demand for 
unity (the standard model postulates too many particles and forces, and 
clashes with general relativity); by contrast, MAI criteria are conser-
vative, and are almost bound to be at odds with revolutionary devel-
opments (McAllister, 1996, pp.  81– 5 and 128– 33). AOE criteria are 
heuristically powerful; MAI criteria are the opposite. Furthermore, AOE 
criteria, associated with level 3 blueprints, evolve or improve as physics 
makes progress, and in a way which admits some elements of continuity 
(see, in particular, Maxwell, 1998, pp. 80– 9). MAI sees change, but no 
overall progress, in non- empirical criteria, and holds, in a quasi- Kuhnian 
fashion, that revolutions create a rupture in aesthetic criteria, there 
being no account of the modification and generalization of blueprints, 
which AOE provides.
MAI and AOE agree that non- empirical criteria apply, not to any 
specific formulation of a theory, but to what all formulations have in com-
mon. But there are somewhat different accounts of what this is. According 
to MAI, a formulation- independent theory is an abstract entity that exists 
in its own right, with its own properties distinct from the phenomena the 
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theory postulates (see, for example, McAllister, 1996, pp. 98– 100). This 
leaves obscure what sort of thing such an abstract entity is, and what 
its relationship is with a linguistic formulation of the theory, and with 
the phenomena it predicts. According to AOE, the matter is much more 
straightforward: a formulation- independent theory, T, is the content of 
T, what T predicts, or asserts to be the case. AOE does not appeal to the 
abstract entities of MAI; it appeals only to possible phenomena, not as 
actually existing entities, but merely as possibilities. The claim that T 
exhibits a certain symmetry thus amounts to the claim that the phenom-
ena predicted by T exhibit this symmetry. There is here no mystery about 
the relationship between a linguistic formulation of T, the abstract entity 
T, and the phenomena T predicts: the “abstract entity” is just what any 
linguistic formulation of T asserts to be the case, the content of T. This 
leads to an account of the importance of linguistic- dependent criteria 
of simplicity (Maxwell, 1998, pp. 110– 3), something that MAI does not 
provide.
A fundamental difference between MAI and AOE, encapsulated in 
the title of this chapter, is that, whereas MAI holds that aesthetic crite-
ria are important in science, AOE denies this, all non- empirical criteria 
for theory choice being reducible to the demand that the totality of fun-
damental physical theory exemplify the level 4 thesis of physicalism or, 
more specifically, the best available blueprint at level 3. For AOE, what 
matters is unity or comprehensibility, not beauty.
But this difference is terminological rather than substantial. 
McAllister defends a projectivist, subjectivist account of the beauty of 
theories. Beauty is in the eye of the beholder, rather than in the the-
ory itself.3 Scientists judge certain theories to be beautiful because of 
non- aesthetic properties that they possess objectively; it is these non- 
aesthetic properties that are important methodologically and epis-
temologically, and play the crucial role in the aesthetic induction. 
One of these is metaphysical allegiance. The demand that the totality 
of fundamental physical theory should exemplify physicalism, and 
the best available blueprint, are special cases of metaphysical alle-
giance. Comprehensibility is just one of McAllister’s aesthetic prop-
erties. Comprehensibility, one might say, is beautiful. It fits perfectly 
Hutchinson’s characterization of beauty (McAllister, 1996, pp. 17– 23) 
as involving “uniformity amidst variety” (see the discussion of “unity 
through diversity” in Maxwell, 1998, ch. 3).
A more serious disagreement would seem to be that whereas AOE 
recognizes only one methodologically significant non- empirical property, 
namely unity or comprehensibility, MAI stresses that there are endlessly 
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many, falling under the five headings of symmetry, invocation of a model, 
visualizability/ abstractness, metaphysical allegiance and simplicity 
(related to unity).
This disagreement is not quite as big as it might at first appear to be. 
Here, very briefly, are the similar, but also different, ways in which AOE 
and MAI treat unity, symmetry, metaphysical allegiance and simplicity.
Unity: AOE and MAI both recognize that the demand for unity takes 
a number of different forms, but AOE alone holds that these are aspects 
of just one, single conception of unity. According to AOE, dynamic unity, 
postulated to exist by physicalism, can be broken in thought in a number 
of different ways, this creating a number of different kinds of (relative) 
disunity, and hence a number of different ways in which degrees of unity 
(or disunity) can be assessed. But these different kinds of disunity all 
relate to just one conception of unity, namely that which is postulated to 
exist by physicalism (see Chapter 4, and Maxwell, 1998, pp. 89– 93, and 
p. 280, note 22). MAI, too, stresses that there are different kinds of uni-
fication (McAllister, 1996, p. 110) but, unlike AOE, does not relate these 
to one basic conception of unity.
Symmetry: Here, again, AOE and MAI both recognize that the 
demand for symmetry takes a number of different forms, but AOE alone 
holds that these, in so far as they are methodologically legitimate within 
theoretical physics, all relate to the one basic demand for unity. One of 
the achievements of AOE is to demonstrate clearly how different kinds of 
symmetry relate to unity, the demand that theories exhibit symmetries 
itself being an aspect of the demand for unity (Maxwell, 1998, pp. 89– 
103, 123– 40 and 257– 65). MAI recognizes that theories exhibit different 
kinds of symmetry (McAllister, 1996, 41– 4), but fails to recognize that 
different kinds of symmetry, in theoretical physics at least, are aspects 
of unity.
Metaphysical allegiance: Once again, both AOE and MAI recog-
nize that an important non- empirical requirement in theoretical physics, 
upheld by some physicists at least, is that fundamental physical theo-
ries should accord with some metaphysical view. Both recognize that 
metaphysical views associated with physics since Galileo have changed 
dramatically over time; both recognize that different physicists espouse 
different metaphysical views at the same time. But AOE and MAI differ 
here too, in that AOE holds that diverse, evolving level 3 blueprints, in 
order to be acceptable, need to accord with physicalism, whereas MAI 
makes no such demand. For AOE, the requirement that a theory exem-
plifies a metaphysical view, in so far as it is methodologically legitimate, 
is but an aspect of the basic requirement that the body of fundamental 
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physical theory exemplifies the unity of physicalism (as much as possi-
ble). MAI makes no such demand.
Simplicity: Here, yet again, both AOE and MAI recognize that 
the demand for simplicity takes a number of different forms; both see 
 simplicity as being related to unity, but in somewhat different ways 
(compare Maxwell, 1998, pp. 111– 3 and 157– 9, with McAllister, 1996, 
pp.  109– 11). But AOE alone relates the demand for simplicity to the 
more basic demand for just one kind of unity, dynamic unity postulated 
by physicalism. According to AOE, unity requires that a theory makes the 
same assertion throughout all possible phenomena to which it applies; 
simplicity concerns what is asserted for any given phenomenon, and thus 
presupposes unity. Simplicity presupposes unity, but is quite distinct from 
unity (see Chapter 4, and Maxwell, 1998, pp. 157– 9; 2004a, pp. 172– 4).
The difference that this reveals in the two views can be summed 
up like this. AOE postulates just one basic non- empirical requirement, 
unity, and relates different requirements, of different kinds of unity  – 
 symmetry, metaphysical allegiance and simplicity – to this one demand 
for unity. MAI, by contrast, holds that there just are many different kinds 
of requirements  – unity, symmetry, metaphysical allegiance and sim-
plicity. Unlike AOE, MAI sees no unity in these diverse kinds of require-
ments  – unity, symmetry, metaphysics and simplicity. (In this respect, 
AOE might be said to give a more unified, and hence more beautiful, 
account of scientific method than MAI.)
More substantial differences arise in connection with the two 
remaining kinds of aesthetic properties of theories which MAI holds to 
be methodologically significant, which I now consider in turn.
Invocation of a model: AOE recognizes that an important consid-
eration in assessing a new physical theory is that it has a form similar to 
existing empirically successful physical theories. Thus the acceptability 
of quantum electroweak theory, and chromodynamics is much helped 
by the fact that these theories are similar in form to the highly empiri-
cally successful theory of quantum electrodynamics. All three theories, 
despite their differences, are locally gauge invariant quantum field the-
ories. According to AOE, this requirement of similarity of form or struc-
ture derives, once again, from the requirement of unity (Maxwell, 1998, 
p. 112). If T1 and T2 have some similar structures, then some part of T1 
can be modelled by some part of T2, and vice versa. According to AOE, 
having a model is only methodologically significant to this extent, and 
once again this requirement turns out to be derived from the demand for 
unity. (Of course, that physical reality is a model of a theory, in the sense 
that the theory is true, is highly significant for AOE; but this is not what 
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MAI means by a “model”.) MAI is, once again, much more open- ended in 
the kind of models that it is prepared to recognize as methodologically 
significant, and does not attempt to derive from the demand for unity the 
requirement that a theory should have some kind of model.
Visualizability/ abstractness: According to AOE, neither visualiz-
ability nor abstractness are methodologically significant for theoretical 
physics. What does matter is that a theory can at least be interpreted 
realistically, as postulating that such and such a physical entity, (or enti-
ties), such as a field (or particles) exists, a stepping stone towards the 
ubiquitous, unified something of physicalism. (Actually, AOE demands 
more. It demands that fundamental physical theories are open to being 
interpreted in terms of conjectural essentialism (see Maxwell, 1998, 
pp. 141– 55.) If one has acquired an intuitive understanding of a real-
istic theory, then one may well be able to “visualize” what the theory 
is about:  to this extent, visualizability is methodologically significant, 
according to AOE, but once again derives from the demand for unity, 
via the demand for realism. MAI, by contrast, once again, is much more 
open- ended about visualizability, and makes no attempt to relate it to 
the demand for unity.
McAllister claims that opposition to orthodox quantum theory 
(OQT), by Schrödinger, Einstein and others, stemmed from the loss of 
visualizability and determinism associated with the new theory. But this 
overlooks the key, entirely legitimate objection to OQT, namely its loss of 
microrealism, due to the failure to solve the quantum wave/ particle prob-
lem. Because it failed to specify a consistent quantum ontology, OQT had 
to be developed as a theory which can, at most, make predictions about 
the results of performing measurements on quantum systems – measure-
ment being described classically. But this in turn meant that OQT is, quite 
essentially, made up of two quite different parts stitched together in a 
grossly ad hoc way, namely (1) the quantum part, and (2) some part of 
classical physics for a treatment of measurement. Despite its immense 
empirical success, OQT is still today deeply and genuinely problematic, 
to the point, almost, of being unacceptable, because of its grossly ad hoc 
character, due to its lack of micro- realism (see Chapter 8, and Maxwell, 
1972b; 1976b; 1982; 1988; 1998, ch. 7). The mature Einstein was well 
aware that this is the basic objection to OQT, not lack of visualizability or 
loss of determinism, as we saw in Chapter 3. Elsewhere I have argued that 
the grossly ad hoc character of OQT, stemming from its lack of micro- real-
ism, provides us with a general argument against instrumentalism and 
for realism (Maxwell, 1993b). I have also suggested how the quantum 
wave/ particle problem may be solved, and how a fully micro- realistic 
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version of quantum theory may be developed, free of any reference to 
measurement or classical physics in its basic postulates, able to recover 
all the successful predictive content of OQT, but also making experimen-
tal predictions different from OQT for as yet unperformed experiments 
(see Chapters 3 and 8, and Maxwell, 1976b; 1982; 1988; 1998, ch. 7; 
and especially 1994a). (This was done in an attempt to put the rational, 
but fallible, method of discovery of AOE into scientific practice.) There 
are, of course, other attempts at developing fully micro- realistic versions 
of quantum theory (see Bohm, 1952; Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber, 1986; 
Penrose, 1986; Tumulka, 2006; and Wallace, 2012).4
Einstein’s mature objection to OQT had to do with the lack of real-
ism of the theory, but he did also, especially earlier, object to its lack of 
determinism. But here, too, there is a methodologically significant issue 
at stake, related once again to the demand for unity. A realistic version 
of quantum theory must be unified, first with special relativity, and 
then, ultimately, with general relativity. This is a much graver problem, 
granted probabilistic quantum theory, than it is if quantum theory is 
deterministic. The demand for unity speaks against probabilistic quan-
tum theory  – but not decisively:  nature may well be probabilistic, and 
the task may be to develop probabilistic versions of special and general 
relativity (Maxwell, 1985a).
As for abstractness, this is, for AOE, without methodological signifi-
cance, except that, as physical theory draws closer to capturing physical-
ism, it is almost bound to specify entities increasingly remote from those 
of ordinary experience. We begin with corpuscles, minute billiard balls, 
in the seventeenth century; these then transmute into point particles that 
interact by means of forces; these, in turn, transmute into classical fields, 
into quantum fields, into curved space- time, into superstrings in ten- 
dimensional space- time – entities increasingly remote from the familiar 
billiard ball.
We have seen, so far, that AOE recognizes, ultimately, just one non- 
empirical criterion, unity or compatibility with physicalism,5 whereas 
MAI recognizes many, and makes no attempt to show that these all 
devolve from just one basic criterion. But I come now to a non- empirical 
criterion which AOE holds to be absolutely central, but which MAI does 
not even recognize as an aesthetic criterion at all: explanatory power.
Explanatory power is an ambiguous concept. We may hold that T1 
has more explanatory power than T2 if (1) T1 has greater empirical con-
tent than T2, or if (2) T1 has greater unity than T2 even though it has the 
same empirical content. Let us call these type (1) and type (2) explana-
tory power respectively.
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We need also to recognize that criteria legitimately employed in 
science to assess theories can be put into three categories: (a) empirical, 
(b)  empirical- dependent, and (c)  non- empirical. By (a)  I  mean simply 
the predictive success of the theory in question; by (b) I mean properties 
of theories that have to do with how amenable they are to being assessed 
empirically, such as testability and empirical content; and by (c) I mean 
properties of theories that have nothing directly to do with empirical 
success but which are deemed to be indicative of truth, or of potential 
empirical success.
Type (1) explanatory power is a typical type (b) property of theo-
ries. But, according to AOE, type (2) explanatory power is the key type 
(c) non- empirical property of theories from which, as we have seen, all 
others, such as symmetry, simplicity or metaphysical allegiance, arise. 
In seeking to acquire knowledge about the world, we actively hunt for 
clues as to the kind of universe we are in, and hence the kind of theo-
ries we need to develop. The big clue that we have (apparently) discov-
ered, is that the universe is more or less comprehensible in some way or 
other, it being possible to discover explanations for phenomena; this is 
enshrined in theses of comprehensibility and physical comprehensibil-
ity, at levels 5 and 4 of Figure 2.1. The level 5 thesis of comprehensibil-
ity is the bold conjecture that the universe is perfectly comprehensible 
in some way or other – the universe being such that there is some one 
kind of explanation for all phenomena, couched in terms of God, a 
cosmic purpose (which everything is designed to fulfil), a cosmic pro-
gramme, a unified physical entity, or something else. From Galileo on, 
science has, in effect, made the even bolder conjecture that the universe 
is physically comprehensible, at level 4, and comprehensible in terms 
of the best available blueprint, at level 3. Type (2) explanatory power, 
to repeat, is the key type (c) non- empirical criterion of theory choice, 
from which all other type (c) criteria arise. If any property of theories 
cries out to be the aesthetic property of beauty, which scientists quite 
properly take note of as being methodologically significant, it is type 
(2) explanatory power.
And yet, astonishingly, MAI does not even include explanatory 
power in its list of aesthetic properties of theories, despite its open- 
ended, all- inclusive approach to listing such properties (in such sharp 
contrast to AOE).
MAI does hold that the requirement of type (2)  explanatory 
power is a permanent criterion of science, one that can be arrived at 
by aim- analysis, taking the aim of science to be empirical adequacy 
(McAllister, 1996, p.  11). It is clear that type (2), and not merely 
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type (1), explanatory power is intended here, for McAllister writes that 
a successful explanatory theory is deemed to have “identified a pattern 
or mechanism underlying the data” (1996, p. 11). But such an analysis 
could only, at most, justify adopting the requirement of type (1) explan-
atory power; it does not justify adopting type (2) explanatory power as a 
requirement – not unless the truth, the universe that is, is permanently 
presumed to have a more or less unified dynamic structure (a presump-
tion which contradicts SE). McAllister provides no argument in support 
of the contention that favouring theories with type (2)  explanatory 
power can be justified by an appeal to the aim of empirical adequacy. 
He does refer to an approach to the problem of induction, espoused 
by Braithwaite and Mellor, according to which we are justified in pro-
ceeding as if regularities or patterns exist in nature because this gives 
us the best hope of acquiring knowledge whatever the universe may be 
like (McAllister, 1996, pp. 100– 1). It is this argument, perhaps, which 
McAllister assumes justifies taking type (2) explanatory power as a per-
manent criterion for theory choice, arrived at by aim- analysis, taking 
the aim of science to be empirical adequacy.
But there are three things wrong with this.
First, the Braithwaite– Mellor justification of induction does not 
work, as I shall show in the next section.
Second, many different kinds of explanation are possible; the uni-
verse may be comprehensible (phenomena being explainable) in many 
different ways, and to many different degrees, as the different theses 
from levels 3 to 7 of AOE attest. Here, above all, science needs to be flex-
ible and responsive, constantly modifying the kind of explanations to be 
sought in the light of empirical success and failure, in the kind of way in 
which the hierarchical methodological structure of AOE is designed to 
facilitate. If ever there was a role for the aesthetic induction, it would 
surely be here, in connection with explanatory power. But in excluding 
type (2) explanatory power from the list of aesthetic properties, and in 
making it a fixed, unchanging requirement of theory choice, MAI fails to 
exploit this vital need for science constantly to modify and improve the 
kind of explanations that it seeks. It is just this, by contrast, that is the key 
idea behind AOE.
Third, if McAllister’s argument were successful, so that giving pref-
erence to theories that exhibit type (2) explanatory power could be jus-
tified by an appeal to the aim of empirical adequacy, then this would be 
a disaster for MAI, for it would obviate entirely the need for science to 
consider aesthetic properties of theories, and to employ the aesthetic 
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induction. As I have argued above, all aesthetic properties of theories that 
have any methodological significance can be derived from the demand 
for unity – that is, the demand for type (2) explanatory power. Once type 
(2)  explanatory power is acknowledged to be methodologically signif-
icant, no other aesthetic properties of theories are required by science.
I conclude this section by mentioning three further differences 
between AOE and MAI.
First, reasons given in defence of MAI for holding that aesthetic 
considerations are methodologically significant in science arise from the 
fact that scientists themselves have stressed their importance, and they 
do indeed seem to influence what theories are chosen in science. Reasons 
given in defence of AOE for holding that type (c) non- empirical consid-
erations are methodologically important are much stronger:  science 
becomes impossible if such considerations are not deployed to rule out 
endlessly many empirically successful but grossly ad hoc theories.
Second, MAI, despite being a contribution to the rationalist con-
ception of science, does not provide a basis for systematically correcting 
scientific practice. But AOE does. As I have already remarked, if a view 
genuinely increases our understanding of science, it would be surprising 
if it did not have implications for scientific practice. AOE passes this test, 
in emphasizing the need for explicit articulation of metaphysical theses 
at levels 3 and 4, and explicit tackling of the problems thereby generated.
Third, MAI and AOE conceive of the relationship between science 
and the philosophy of science differently. MAI takes the conventional 
view for granted: philosophy of science is a meta- discipline which seeks 
to spell out and justify methods implicit in successful scientific practice, 
but which is quite distinct from science itself. AOE upholds the unorth-
odox view that the philosophy of science is an integral part of science 
itself, influenced by and seeking to influence science, articulating and 
critically assessing actual and possible aims and methods for science, at 
various levels, the fundamental aim being to contribute to scientific prog-
ress. A new level 3 aim for physics, i.e. a new blueprint, plus associated 
new methods, might constitute a major contribution to theoretical phys-
ics, as well as being a contribution to the philosophy of physics. Einstein’s 
special theory of relativity is an example. It puts forward both a modified 
blueprint (Newtonian space- time becoming Minkowskian space- time), 
and modified methods (Galilean invariance becoming Lorentz invari-
ance): it is thus a major contribution to physics itself, which is also a con-
tribution to the aims and methods of physics – that is, to the philosophy 
of physics.
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6.4 Assessment
Which is to be preferred, AOE or MAI? The two views need not, of course, 
be regarded as rivals. AOE is a highest- level model, whereas MAI is a 
medium- level model; one could consider accommodating MAI within 
AOE. This would require, however, that MAI be modified quite exten-
sively, as the previous section has shown.
Interpreting AOE and MAI as rival rationalist accounts of science, 
my chief criticism of MAI is that it is a version of SE, and thus suffers 
from the defects that all versions of SE suffer from. Given any empirically 
successful theory, T, there will always be endlessly many ad hoc rivals to 
T, even more empirically successful than T, which will never even be con-
sidered within science, let alone considered and rejected. In persistently 
rejecting such ad hoc rivals, even more empirically successful than T, 
science makes a persistent assumption about the nature of the universe. 
This contradicts SE – and contradicts MAI.6
McAllister might seek to evade this conclusion by arguing, as he 
does in his book, that non- empirical, aesthetic criteria that rule out 
acceptance of empirically successful, ad hoc rival theories, are too diverse 
in character, too changeable over time, to amount to the implicit accep-
tance of any persistent assumption. But such an argument collapses the 
moment one takes into account radically ad hoc theories of the kind 
considered in this book, in Chapters  2 and 5, and in Maxwell (1998, 
pp. 47– 54). Rejection (or rather complete neglect) of such radically ad 
hoc theories persists throughout revolutions and all changes in aesthetic 
fashions in science. The persistent rejection of such theories unquestion-
ably commits science to making a substantial metaphysical assumption 
about the nature of the universe.
McAllister might, at this point, appeal to the pragmatic justifica-
tion of induction of Braithwaite and Mellor, already referred to above 
(McAllister, 1996, pp.  100– 1). According to this argument, science 
proceeds, and is justified in proceeding, as if it assumes there are regu-
larities to be discovered, but does not actually assume that regularities 
exist. But even if this argument is valid, it does not in any way invalidate 
my point above, that in persistently rejecting empirically successful ad 
hoc theories, science implicitly makes a persistent metaphysical assump-
tion about the world. It should be noted that kinds of ad hoc theories 
can be formulated that specify regularities, in that these theories are 
invariant with respect to position and time (no specific places or times 
being specified by the theories). These theories might be said to specify 
ad hoc regularities.
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But, in any case, the Braithwaite– Mellor attempt at solving the 
problem of induction does not succeed. Restricting science to the search 
for regularities is both too narrow, and not narrow enough. Too narrow, 
because it is conceivable that we can live and acquire knowledge but 
not by searching for regularities in phenomena. God might get in touch 
with us, explain His purposes, keep us informed about what is going 
to happen. Getting in touch with God by means of prayer and medita-
tion, and not by searching for regularities, might be the way to acquire 
knowledge; and various other science fiction possibilities can be imag-
ined (see Maxwell, 1998, p. 185). Such possibilities are excluded by the 
search for knowledge as characterized by Braithwaite and Mellor; this 
means these possibilities are just dogmatically assumed to be false. But 
the Braithwaite– Mellor approach is also not narrow enough, because, 
as I have indicated above, if science is to be possible, ad hoc regularities 
must be persistently excluded from consideration. And, as we have seen, 
there is no sharp distinction between the ad hoc and the non- ad hoc. In 
Chapter 4 I listed eight kinds of disunity – in effect, eight different ways 
in which regularities might be ad hoc, which range from the severely ad 
hoc (distinct regularities in different space- time regions) to the scarcely 
ad hoc at all (space- time and matter not being unified). What does the 
policy of “inductive projection” (McAllister, 1996, p.  101) amount to? 
Does it involve merely excluding permanently all theories that are type 
(1) ad hoc (distinct regularities in different space- time regions)? Again, 
this is both too narrow, and not narrow enough. Exactly the same objec-
tion arises wherever the line is drawn, between regularities that are too 
ad hoc to be considered by science, and those that are sufficiently non- ad 
hoc to be open to scientific consideration. We cannot, at this point, simply 
invoke the aesthetic induction, and declare that we discover, by induc-
tion, where the line is to be drawn between the acceptably and unac-
ceptably ad hoc, because, as McAllister himself has so clearly shown, for 
logical reasons, the aesthetic induction can only proceed once methods 
have been arrived at by aim- analysis (McAllister, 1996, p. 76).
Another approach might be to favour permanently in science the-
ories that are as non- ad hoc as possible, in all eight senses, but not to 
draw a rigid line between the acceptably and unacceptably ad hoc. This 
would allow something like the aesthetic induction to proceed in science 
(although not in quite the open- ended way in which McAllister envis-
ages). But even this attempt at solving the problem is both too narrow 
and not narrow enough. Endlessly many universes are possible in which 
we may live and acquire knowledge, and yet this inductive policy would 
not be appropriate for acquiring knowledge. It biases the search for 
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knowledge in the direction of physicalism. But physicalism may be false; 
the universe may be comprehensible in some other way, or not compre-
hensible at all.
My claim is that the best possible way in which we can go about seek-
ing knowledge is to do so employing the hierarchical aims- and- methods 
structure of (generalized) AOE. We must make some kind of guess as to 
what kind of universe we are in, in order to proceed at all. At the top of 
the hierarchy we need to put those relatively contentless guesses which 
are such that their truth is required for acquisition of knowledge to be 
possible at all. These are justifiably permanent items of scientific knowl-
edge. As we descend the hierarchy, we need to put increasingly content-
ful guesses, chosen because these seem to be the most fruitful from the 
standpoint of engendering methods that seem to offer the best help with 
acquiring empirical knowledge. As we proceed, we revise these guesses 
in the light of the relative empirical success and failure of rival research 
programmes, based on rival low- level metaphysical guesses. We try to 
keep such revisions as low as possible in the hierarchy when we seem to 
be achieving overall success, and only allow revisions to ascend higher 
up in the hierarchy when success is not being achieved, and higher- level 
revisions seem to be required.
This hierarchical conception of scientific method enables science 
to respond sensitively to what it seems to discover about the nature of 
the universe, lower- level aims and methods being adjusted in the light 
of apparent empirical success and failure, and within a framework of 
fixed, relatively unproblematic, higher- level aims and methods. All 
attempts at justifying induction pragmatically that are known to me, 
along lines advocated by Braithwaite and Mellor, fail because they fail 
to take note of the resources of (generalized) AOE. They all attempt to 
justify methods that are demonstrably not as efficient as those of AOE 
in enabling us to acquire knowledge of nature. They fail to encapsulate 
the responsiveness, the flexibility, the open- endedness and precision, 
of AOE.
And this is true of MAI as well. Indeed, as we saw in section 6.4 
above, the aesthetic induction has conservatism built into it, and cannot 
help engender revolutionary new ideas for revolutionary new theories, 
whereas AOE is designed to do just that. It embodies a rational, if fallible, 
method of discovery for theoretical physics.
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A mug’s game? Solving the  problem 
of induction with metaphysical 
presuppositions
I think that I have solved a major philosophical problem: the prob-
lem of induction. This solution has been extremely fruitful, and 
it has enabled me to solve a good number of other philosophical 
problems. However, few philosophers would support the thesis 
that I have solved the problem of induction. Few philosophers have 
taken the trouble to study – or even to criticize – my views on this 
problem, or have taken notice of the fact that I  have done some 
work on it. (Popper, 1972, p. 1)
This is how Karl Popper opens his book Objective Knowledge. There are at 
least two oddities about what Popper says here. First, Popper is wrong; he 
did not solve the problem of induction. Second, even by 1971, when this 
passage was first published, Popper’s work on the problem of induction 
had received a great deal of attention.1
Popper’s words might, however, be uttered by me with far greater 
justice. For I  really have solved the problem of induction. The solution 
has been extraordinarily fruitful, and has enabled me to solve a number 
of other philosophical problems.2 But few philosophers – if any – would 
agree that I have solved the problem. Few, indeed, have taken the trouble 
to study, or criticize, my work, or are even aware that I have done some 
work on the problem.3
I think I  know why this is the case. First, it is no doubt the fate 
of most of us seeking to contribute to philosophy: our work sinks with-
out trace, without comment. Second, the problem of induction has 
been around for a very long time; anyone claiming to solve the prob-
lem is almost bound to be wrong. Third, there is a kind of “negative 
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judgement through persistent neglect” effect. The first version of my 
proposed solution was published over forty years ago in 1974: if there 
was anything in it, surely someone would have noticed and taken up 
the idea by now. Fourth, as Popper points out elsewhere (1963, ch. 2), 
“analytic” philosophy has tended to be more interested in analysis of 
concepts than in proposed solutions to fundamental philosophical prob-
lems. Fifth, my solution amounts to a radical improvement of Popper’s 
attempted solution. Popper was hostile to this, and Popperians today 
are hostile to it, precisely because I  have the temerity to claim that 
I  have radically improved Popper’s ideas. Anti- Popperians are indif-
ferent because they know Popper has failed to solve the problem, and 
they assume my approach inherits Popper’s failure. Finally, and perhaps 
most damagingly, my proposed solution involves recognizing that sci-
ence makes a persistent metaphysical assumption of “uniformity” or 
“unity”. Philosophers at once know that any attempt to solve the prob-
lem of induction along these lines is hopeless. As Bas van Fraassen once 
put it: “From Gravesande’s axiom of the uniformity of nature in 1717 to 
Russell’s postulates of human knowledge in 1948, this has been a mug’s 
game” (van Fraassen, 1985, pp. 259– 60). There is no need to study or 
criticize my proposed solution to the problem of induction: I am playing 
a well- known mug’s game.
There is not much that I  can do about the first five reasons for 
 ignoring my work on the problem of induction; I can, however, at least 
set out to demolish the sixth reason. This is what I propose to do in what 
follows. I first give a brief sketch of my proposed solution to the prob-
lem of induction (spelled out in much greater detail elsewhere); I then 
demolish the thesis that it amounts to van Fraassen’s “mug’s game”.4 My 
hope is that this may provoke one or two readers to take note of what 
I have done elsewhere.5
7.1 Aim- oriented empiricism and  
the problem of induction
In order to solve the problem of induction, it is both necessary and suf-
ficient to construe science from the standpoint of aim- oriented empir-
icism6 (already encountered in Chapters  2, 3, 5 and 6).7 Profound, 
far- reaching consequences come from rejecting all versions of the current 
orthodoxy of standard empiricism, and accepting aim- oriented empiri-
cism instead. The reasons for rejecting standard empiricism and accept-
ing aim- oriented empiricism deserve to be subjected to especially fierce 
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scrutiny. I therefore, in this section, carefully spell out these reasons once 
more. Any reader already convinced may skip this section. In subsequent 
sections, I argue that aim- oriented empiricism solves the “methodolog-
ical” and “theoretical” problems of induction, demolish the thesis that 
aim- oriented empiricism represents a mug’s game, and conclude by 
showing how the view solves what may be called the “practical” problem 
of induction.
The fundamental line of thought behind aim- oriented empiricism 
(AOE) can be indicated like this. Theoretical physics, and therefore all 
of natural science (since theoretical physics is fundamental for natural 
science), persistently selects fundamental physical theories that help 
to unify the whole of theoretical physics. Thus Newtonian theory (NT) 
unifies Galileo’s laws of terrestrial motion and Kepler’s laws of planetary 
motion (and much else besides). Maxwellian classical electrodynam-
ics, (CEM), unifies electricity, magnetism and light (plus radio, infra-
red, ultraviolet, X- rays and gamma rays). Special relativity (SR) brings 
greater unity to CEM (in revealing that the way one divides up the elec-
tromagnetic field into the electric and magnetic fields depends on one’s 
reference frame). SR is also a step towards unifying NT and CEM in that 
it transforms space and time so as to make CEM satisfy a basic princi-
ple fundamental to NT, namely the (restricted) principle of relativity. SR 
also brings about a unification of matter and energy, via the most famous 
equation of modern physics, E = mc2, and partially unifies space and time 
into Minkowskian space- time. General relativity (GR) unifies space- time 
and gravitation, in that, according to GR, gravitation is no more than an 
effect of the curvature of space- time. Quantum theory (QM) and atomic 
theory unify a mass of phenomena having to do with the structure and 
properties of matter, and the way matter interacts with light. Quantum 
electrodynamics unifies QM, CEM and SR. Quantum electroweak the-
ory unifies (partially) electromagnetism and the weak force. Quantum 
chromodynamics brings unity to hadron physics (via quarks) and brings 
unity to the eight kinds of gluons of the strong force. The standard model 
unifies to a considerable extent all known phenomena associated with 
fundamental particles and the forces between them (apart from gravita-
tion). The theory unifies to some extent its two component quantum field 
theories in that both are locally gauge invariant (the symmetry group 
being U(1) × SU(2) × SU(3)). String theory, or M- theory, holds out the 
hope of unifying all phenomena.8
It might be thought that, during the last four hundred years or so, 
science has been pursued in a thoroughly open- minded, unbiased fash-
ion, theories being selected impartially on the basis of empirical success 
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alone, the emergence of increasing theoretical unity being a surprising 
and purely empirical discovery – unifying theories just being much more 
empirically successful than disunified rivals. Nothing could be further 
from the truth. In fact, in connection with every accepted unifying the-
ory  – NT, CEM and the rest  – there have always been endlessly many, 
easily formulated, disunified rival theories very much more empirically 
successful than the theories that have been accepted.9
Thus, given NT, for example, one rival theory might assert: every-
thing occurs as NT asserts up till midnight tonight when, abruptly, an 
inverse cube law of gravitation comes into operation. A second rival the-
ory might assert: everything occurs as NT asserts, except for the case of 
any two solid gold spheres, each having a mass of 1,000 tons, moving 
in otherwise empty space up to a mile apart, in which case the spheres 
attract each other by means of an inverse cube law of gravitation. A third 
rival asserts that everything occurs as NT asserts until 3 kilograms of gold 
dust and 3 kilograms of diamond dust are heated in a platinum flask to a 
temperature of 450ºC, in which case gravitation will instantly become a 
repulsive force everywhere. And so on. There is no limit to the number of 
rivals to NT that can be concocted in this way, each of which has all the 
predictive success of NT as far as observed phenomena are concerned but 
makes different predictions for some as yet unobserved phenomena.10 
Such theories can even be concocted which are more empirically suc-
cessful than NT, by arbitrarily modifying NT, in just this entirely ad hoc 
fashion, so that the theories yield correct predictions where NT does not, 
as in the case of the orbit of Mercury, for example (which very slightly 
conflicts with NT).11
This last point may be made more generally, as follows. Most 
accepted physical theories, for most of the time that they exist, are con-
fronted by various empirical difficulties. Let T be any one of the above 
unifying accepted theories – NT, CEM, or whatever. Typically, T is con-
fronted by the following empirical conditions. There is a domain A  of 
phenomena for which the predictions of T are wholly successful; there 
is a domain B for which T fails to predict the phenomena because the 
equations of the theory cannot be solved; there is a domain C where T is 
ostensibly refuted (because the predictions of T clash with the phenom-
ena of C, but this may be due, not to T yielding false predictions, but to 
experimental error, or relevant physical conditions not being taken into 
account); and finally there is a domain D of phenomena which T fails to 
predict because they lie outside the scope of T. (Here the phenomena, in 
A to D, are to be understood as consisting of low- level empirical or exper-
imental laws.) It is now easy to concoct rivals to T that are much more 
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empirically successful than T, as follows. One such rival asserts:  as far 
as phenomena in A are concerned, everything occurs as T asserts; as far 
as phenomena in B are concerned, the phenomena occur in accordance 
with established empirical laws; and the same for C, and for D. This rival 
to T, T* let us call it, reproduces all the empirical success of T (in A), 
successfully predicts phenomena that T is not able to predict (in B), suc-
cessfully predicts phenomena that refute T (in C), and successfully pre-
dicts new phenomena that lie beyond the predictive scope of T (in D). 
It might be demanded that T* should predict new phenomena; but this 
demand can be met too, since “phenomena”, here, are laws with content 
in excess of actual experiments that have been performed. T* satisfies 
every imaginable requirement for being an empirically more successful 
theory than T.12
And this has been the situation for all the accepted fundamental 
physical theories indicated above, for most of the time that they have 
been in existence:  endlessly many rival, disunified theories have been 
available, far more successful empirically than the accepted, unifying 
theories, and these empirically more successful, grossly disunified or, as 
I have called them, “aberrant” theories (see Maxwell, 1974, p. 128) are 
all ignored.
As most physicists and philosophers of physics would accept, two 
criteria are employed in physics in deciding what theories to accept and 
reject: (1) empirical criteria, and (2) criteria that have to do with the sim-
plicity and unifying capacity of the theories in question. (2) is absolutely 
indispensable, to such an extent that there are endlessly many theories 
empirically more successful than accepted theories, which lack unity, 
and are not even considered as a result.
Now comes the crucial point. In persistently accepting unifying 
theories, and excluding infinitely many empirically more successful, 
disunified or aberrant rival theories, science in effect makes a big 
assumption about the nature of the universe, to the effect that it is such 
that no disunified theory is true, however empirically successful it may 
appear to be for a time. Furthermore, without some such big assump-
tion as this, the empirical method of science collapses. Science would 
be drowned in an infinite ocean of empirically successful disunified 
theories.
If scientists only accepted theories that postulate atoms, and per-
sistently rejected theories that postulate different basic physical entities, 
such as fields – even though many field theories can easily be, and have 
been, formulated which are even more empirically successful than the 
atomic theories – the implications would surely be quite clear. Scientists 
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would in effect be assuming that the world is made up of atoms, all other 
possibilities being ruled out. The atomic assumption would be built into 
the way the scientific community accepts and rejects theories – built into 
the implicit methods of the community, methods which include reject-
ing all theories that postulate entities other than atoms, whatever their 
empirical success might be. The scientific community would accept the 
assumption that the universe is such that no non- atomic theory is true.
Just the same holds for a scientific community which rejects all dis-
unified or aberrant rivals to accepted theories, even though these rivals 
would be even more empirically successful if they were considered. Such 
a community in effect makes the assumption: the universe is such that no 
disunified theory is true.
Thus the idea that science has the aim of improving knowledge of 
factual truth, nothing being presupposed about the nature of the universe 
independently of evidence, is untenable. Science makes one big, persistent 
assumption about the universe, namely that it is such that no disunified 
or aberrant theory is true.13 It assumes that the universe is such that there 
are no pockets of peculiarity, at specific times and places, or when specific 
conditions arise (gold spheres, gold and diamond dust, etc.), that lead 
to an abrupt change in laws that prevail elsewhere. Science assumes, in 
other words, that there is a kind of uniformity of physical laws through-
out all phenomena, actual and possible. Furthermore, science must make 
this assumption (or some analogous assumption) if the empirical method 
of science is not to break down completely. The empirical method of sci-
ence of assessing theories in the light of evidence can only work if those 
infinitely many empirically successful but disunified theories are perma-
nently excluded from science independently of, or rather in opposition 
to, empirical considerations; to do this is just to make the big, permanent 
assumption about the nature of the universe.14
Let us call this assumption of unity U; and let us call the view, just 
outlined, that in persistently only accepting unifying theories science 
presupposes U, “presuppositionism”.
Most current views about science deny that science makes a 
substantial, persistent assumption about the universe. This is true, 
for example, of logical positivism, inductivism, logical empiricism, 
hypothetico- deductivism, conventionalism, constructive empiricism, 
pragmatism, realism, induction- to- the- best- explanationism, and the 
views of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos.15 It is true, too, of more recent work 
on the methods and metaphysics of science.16 All these views, diverse 
as they are in other respects, accept a thesis which may be called stan-
dard empiricism (SE):  in science, theories are accepted on the basis 
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of empirical success and failure, and on the basis of simplicity, unity 
or explanatoriness, but no substantial thesis about the world is accepted 
permanently by science, as a part of scientific knowledge, independently of 
empirical considerations. It deserves to be noted that even Feyerabend, 
and even social constructivist and relativist sociologists and historians of 
science, uphold SE as the best available ideal of scientific rationality. If 
science can be exhibited as rational, they hold (in effect), then this must 
be done in a way that is compatible with SE. The failure of science to live 
up to the rational ideal of SE is taken by them to demonstrate that science 
is not rational. That it is so taken demonstrates convincingly that they 
hold SE to be the only possible rational ideal for science (an ideal which 
cannot, it so happens, in their view, be met).
Presuppositionism is of course incompatible with SE, and thus 
incompatible will all the above doctrines. One crucial point needs to be 
noted about the argument so far:  presuppositionism is more rigorous 
than all the above versions of SE entirely independent of any justification 
of U, or justification for accepting U as a part of scientific knowledge (that is 
in addition to the one given above). In saying this I am appealing to the 
following wholly uncontroversial requirement for rigour.
(R) In order to be rigorous, it is necessary that assumptions that are 
substantial, influential and problematic be made explicit – so that 
they can be criticized, so that alternatives may be developed and 
assessed (see Maxwell, 1984a, p. 224; 1998, p. 21).
All versions of SE fail to satisfy (R)  in just the way in which presup-
positionism does satisfy (R). Presuppositionism makes the assumption 
U explicit (and so criticizable and, we may hope, improvable), while 
all versions of SE deny that science does make any such assumption 
as U. Thus presuppositonism is more rigorous than all versions of SE 
even in the absence of any kind of justification of U. Indeed, it is pre-
cisely because the version of U that is implicitly accepted by physics 
at any stage in its development is a pure conjecture, bereft of justifica-
tion, almost bound to be false, that it needs to be acknowledged, made 
explicit within physics, so that it can be critically assessed and, we may 
hope, improved. In short, quite independent of any claim to solve the 
problem of induction, presuppositionism is more rigorous, and thus 
more acceptable, than any of the above versions of SE. This has a major 
implication for all attempts at solving the problem of induction:  no 
such attempt can succeed if any version of SE is presupposed, since 
these all lack rigour. Attempts at solving the problem of induction must 
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at least begin with presuppositionism, unless a better view of science 
emerges.
Far from presupposing the uniformity or unity of nature being a 
mug’s game, it is the other way round: attempting to construe science in 
such a way that science does not presuppose the uniformity or unity of 
nature is the mug’s game, since all such views of science fail to satisfy ele-
mentary requirements for rigour, namely (R), and thus cannot provide 
a basis for solving the problem of induction that can hope to succeed. 
Presuppositionism is the only non- mug’s game in town unless, as I have 
said, something better turns up.
Presuppositionism is, however, as it stands, untenable. This is 
because it is not at all clear what the assumption U is, or ought to be. It 
is vital to appreciate that there are endlessly many different assumptions 
of unity which science may be construed to make, almost all of which 
are false (since they contradict each other). Even more urgent than any 
problem of justification, there is the following problem:  How can the 
assumption of unity being made by science at present, which is implicit in 
current scientific views as to what counts as theoretical unity, and almost 
bound to be false, be improved?
What is at issue is not the traditional philosophical problem of 
justification (which presupposes that U is true), but rather the scien-
tific (and quasi- Popperian) one of improving what is almost bound to 
be false.17
In surveying the different possible ways in which the universe may 
be unified, one important point to appreciate is that there is no single, 
sharp distinction between unity and disunity or aberrance. By “unity” we 
could mean merely that physical laws are the same throughout space and 
time. Or we could mean, in addition, that physical laws remain the same 
as other variables change, such as velocity, temperature, or mass (so that, 
for example, Newton’s inverse square law of gravitation does not abruptly 
become an inverse cube law as masses of 1,000 tons are reached). Or, 
more restrictively still, we could mean (in addition) that there is only one 
force in nature, and not three or four distinct forces (such as gravitation, 
the electromagnetic force, and the weak and strong forces of nuclear 
physics). More restrictively still, we could mean that there is just one kind 
of particle in existence, or one kind of physical entity, a self- interacting 
field spread throughout space and time. Finally, and even more restric-
tively, we could mean that space, time, matter and force are all unified 
into one, unified, self- interacting entity.
Even more restrictive assumptions can be made, which specify the 
kind of entity or entities out of which everything is composed. And at 
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the other end of the spectrum, much looser, less restrictive assumptions 
could be made which, if true, would still make science possible. Thus sci-
ence could assume that the universe is such that local observable phe-
nomena occur, most of the time, to a high degree of approximation, in 
accordance with some yet- to- be- discovered physical theory that is not 
too seriously disunified.
It is always possible, of course, that the universe only appears to 
be physically unified (to some extent). Perhaps, as theoretical phys-
ics advances, everything will become increasingly complex (as even 
some physicists believe18). Perhaps a malicious God is in charge, who 
has been controlling the universe up to now in such a way that it is as 
if physics prevails everywhere, but who, shortly, will startle us all by 
causing a series of dramatic, large- scale miracles to occur which vio-
late all known laws. Perhaps as we probe deeper into physical reality 
we will discover that the universe exemplifies, not physical laws, but 
something that is closer to a computer program (as some people have 
suggested). The universe may be comprehensible, but not physically 
comprehensible. That is, it may be that something exists – God, a soci-
ety of gods, an overall cosmic purpose, a cosmic “computer” program – 
which controls or determines the way events occur, and in terms of 
which, in principle, everything can be explained and understood: but 
this something may not be a unified physical entity, a unified pattern 
of physical law, and thus the universe, though comprehensible, is not 
physically comprehensible. Finally, the universe may not be compre-
hensible at all, and yet it might still be possible for us to live, and to 
acquire some knowledge of our local circumstances.
How do we choose between these endless possibilities? Science 
must make some kind of choice. It is all- important that science makes the 
correct choice, or at least a good choice, since this choice will determine 
what (non- empirical) methods are employed by science to assess theo-
ries. If science chooses a cosmological thesis that is radically false, then 
science will only consider false theories, and will exclude from consider-
ation all theories that might take us towards the truth. Science will come 
to a dead end. The more restrictive the chosen cosmological assumption 
is, so the more potentially helpful it will be in selecting theories, but also 
the more likely the assumption is to be radically false, thus imposing a 
block on scientific progress. On the other hand, the looser, the more unre-
strictive the assumption is, so the more likely it is to be true, but the less 
helpful it will be in excluding empirically successful “disunified” theories. 
(Other things being equal, the less one says, the more likely it is that what 
one says is true. “The universe is not a chicken” is almost certainly true 
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about ultimate reality, just because it says so little, there being an awful 
lot of ways in which the universe can not be a chicken.)
It is all- important that science makes the right assumption about 
the ultimate nature of reality; and yet it is just here, concerning the ulti-
mate nature of reality, that we are most ignorant, and are almost bound 
to get things wrong. How on earth are we to proceed?
The solution to this dilemma  – the fundamental epistemological 
and methodological dilemma of science  – is to make, not one cosmo-
logical assumption, but a hierarchy of assumptions, the assumptions 
becoming less and less restrictive, asserting less and less, as one goes up 
the hierarchy (see Figures 2.1 and 5.1), and associated text spelling out 
aspects of this hierarchical view.
The figures make things look complicated, but the basic idea is 
extremely simple. By displaying assumptions and associated methods – 
aims and methods – in this hierarchical fashion, we create a framework 
of high- level, relatively unspecific, unproblematic, fixed assumptions 
and methods within which low- level, much more specific, problematic 
assumptions and methods may be revised as science proceeds, in the light 
of the relative empirical success and failure of rival scientific research pro-
grammes to which rival assumptions lead. If currently adopted cosmo-
logical assumptions, and associated methods, fail to support the growth 
of empirical knowledge, or fail to do so as apparently successfully as rival 
assumptions and methods, then assumptions and associated methods 
are changed, at whatever level appears to be required.19 Every effort is 
made, however, to confine such revisions to cosmological theses as low 
down in the hierarchy of theses as possible. Only persistent, long- term, 
dramatic failure (at levels 1 and 2) would lead us to revise ideas above 
level 3, let alone above level 4; only an earthquake in our understanding 
of the universe would lead us to revise ideas above level 5. In this way we 
give ourselves the best hope of making progress, of acquiring authentic 
knowledge, while at the same time minimizing the chances of being taken 
up the garden path, or being stuck in a cul de sac. The hope is that as we 
increase our knowledge about the world, we improve the cosmological 
assumptions implicit in our methods, and thus in turn improve our meth-
ods. As a result of improving our knowledge, we improve our knowledge 
about how to improve knowledge. Science adapts its own nature to what 
it learns about the nature of the universe, thus increasing its capacity to 
make progress in knowledge about the world – the methodological key to 
the astonishing, accelerating, explosive growth of scientific knowledge.
It is this conception of science, postulating more or less specific, 
problematic, evolving aims and methods for science within a framework 
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of more general, relatively unproblematic, more or less fixed aims and 
methods, that I call aim- oriented empiricism (AOE).20 (For further details 
see previous chapters, and Maxwell, 1998, chs. 1 and 3– 6; 2004a; 2007, 
especially ch. 14; 2017a; 2017b.) The basic idea, let me re- emphasize, 
is that the fundamental aim of science of discovering how, and to what 
extent, the universe is comprehensible is deeply problematic; it is essen-
tial that we try to improve the aim, and associated methods, as we pro-
ceed, in the light of apparent success and failure. In order to do this in 
the best possible way, we need to represent our aim at a number of levels, 
from the specific and problematic to the highly unspecific and unprob-
lematic, thus creating a framework of fixed aims and meta- methods 
within which the (more or less specific, problematic) aims and methods 
of science may be progressively improved in the light of apparent empir-
ical success and failure.21
This hierarchical view of AOE is put forward to solve the funda-
mental problem confronting presuppositionism, indicated above. It is 
put forward to solve the problem of improving the basic metaphysical 
assumption of science, implicit in persistent scientific preference for 
unifying theories even against the evidence, granted that some such 
assumption must be made, and that it is almost bound to be false. The 
claim is that the hierarchical framework of AOE provides the best possi-
ble means for discovering metaphysical assumptions which best aid the 
task of improving knowledge of truth; AOE provides the best possible 
means for improving choice of metaphysical assumption. There is no 
attempt to justify the truth of metaphysical assumptions. At most, there 
is a justification for choosing metaphysical thesis A over B granted that 
the aim is to make that choice which gives the best promise of aiding 
the search for knowledge of truth. Justification is involved only in the 
quasi- Popperian sense that the best possible justification of metaphysi-
cal assumptions that we can have is to expose these assumptions to the 
most searching criticism possible, to criticism best designed to promote 
progress in knowledge.
Something like AOE has always been implicit in scientific practice 
(otherwise science would have come to an end). AOE becomes all but 
scientifically explicit with the work of Einstein in discovering special and 
general relativity (as we saw in Chapter 3). Aspects of this work that are 
characteristic of AOE are the fundamental role played by the search for 
theoretical unity, and the vital role played by symmetry principles (such 
as Lorentz invariance and the principle of equivalence). These latter are 
fallible and revisable, and have the dual role of being both physical and 
methodological principles, all of which is integral to AOE.
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AOE, as indicated above, is intended to depict the metaphysical 
components of scientific knowledge given science as it exists today. 
AOE takes the specific form that it does in part because of what we 
have learned from Galileo onwards (or from the Presocratics onwards). 
History, in other words, is built into AOE. In the future, when we have 
learned more, AOE will be somewhat different. But however dramatic 
future revolutions in knowledge may be, we still ought to represent our 
knowledge in the same hierarchical form, with the same thesis, at level 7, 
at the top. Let us call this view “generalized AOE”. When it comes to 
considering whether AOE succeeds in solving the problem of induction 
in a non- circular way, we need to consider various possible versions of 
generalized AOE which differ from AOE. The crucial question is, “Can 
sufficiently good grounds be given for preferring AOE to all other rival 
versions of generalized AOE that one can think of?” That is the proper 
way to formulate the problem of induction. (One striking feature of 
the problem of induction, as it is usually formulated, is its scientific 
sterility:  work on the problem of induction has made no contribution 
to science, with the possible exception of Popper’s work. But when 
the problem is formulated in the way just indicated, it is clear that it is 
potentially a highly fruitful problem for science: a version of generalized 
AOE that is genuinely an improvement over AOE is likely to be a major 
contribution to science itself.)
7.2 How aim- oriented empiricism solves  
the problem of induction
At this point, the basic objection to the whole approach being advocated 
here may be reiterated. Either AOE solves the problem of induction, or 
it does not. If it does not, no more needs to be said. If it does, then an 
element of justification must enter in. This in turn means that AOE must 
commit van Fraassen’s mug’s game. Choice of theory, at level 2, is jus-
tified in part by being compatible with choice of metaphysical thesis at 
level 3 or 4; this latter choice is in turn justified in terms of the success 
of science. We have here the vicious circularity of the mug’s game. And 
it is inescapable. Interpreting AOE as a framework for detecting error, 
for criticism, does not help; even given this interpretation, there must 
be some justification for regarding metaphysical thesis U2 as a better 
choice, an improvement over, more likely to be true than, thesis U1: here, 
unavoidably, justification is present, which introduces the vicious circu-
larity of the mug’s game.
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The first thing that needs to be said in response to this is that, as 
I have already emphasized, there is no question of justifying the truth (to 
some degree of certainty or probability) of any of the theses at levels 3 
to 7. These theses remain, throughout, pure conjectures. I concur with 
Popper’s thesis that all our knowledge is ultimately conjectural. (Whether 
such a view can claim to be the solution to the problem of induction is an 
issue I will take up below.)
At most, then, there is a justification for accepting such and such a 
thesis as a part of (conjectural) scientific knowledge, or preferring thesis 
A to thesis B. Second, the top thesis is accepted on grounds which have 
nothing to do with the success of science at all. It is accepted because its 
truth is a necessary precondition for the acquisition of knowledge to be 
possible at all.
The thesis at level 7 asserts that the universe is such that it is pos-
sible for us to acquire some knowledge of our local circumstances (suf-
ficient for it to be possible for us to continue to live). We are justified 
in accepting this thesis entirely in the absence of any justification for its 
truth (or probable truth), just because we have nothing to lose; accept-
ing this thesis as a part of our knowledge can only help, and cannot 
obstruct, the task of acquiring knowledge whatever the universe is like 
(see Maxwell, 1998, pp. 186– 7).
This elementary argument for permanently accepting this level 7 
thesis can of course be challenged. What is beyond question, however, 
is that no circularity is involved here at all. The argument in support of 
accepting the level 7 thesis makes no appeal to the success of science 
whatsoever. Science is not even mentioned.
I might add that a part of the point of exhibiting the metaphysi-
cal assumptions of science in the form of a hierarchy, from level 3 to 7, 
is to overcome a fatal objection to one traditional approach to solving 
the problem of induction, versions of which have been argued for by, 
for example, Reichenbach (1961, sections 38– 41), Braithwaite (1953, 
pp.  255– 92) and Mellor (1991). This argues that we are rationally 
entitled to assume that there are sufficient regularities in nature for 
the inductive methods of science to meet with success because, if such 
regularities do not exist, no method will procure knowledge. But this 
argument tries to establish too much; it is not valid. Counterexamples 
can be imagined. The world might be such that “the inductive meth-
ods of science” meet with no success at all, and yet we can still acquire 
sufficient knowledge to live. Natural phenomena might be governed by 
gods: in order to get nature to do what we want it to do, we might need 
to make sacrifices, or pray. (For further suggestions along these lines, 
Karl PoPPer ,  Sc ieNce aNd eNlighteNMeNt200
  
see Maxwell, 1998, p. 185.) The thesis of AOE, at level 7, might be called 
a “principle of uniformity”, but it is very much weaker than the assertion 
that there are regularities such that “the inductive methods of science” 
meet with success. The fatal objection to the Reichenbach– Braithwaite– 
Mellor (RBM) approach is that (1) either it seeks to justify acceptance of 
a “principle of regularity” which, if accepted, suffices to justify science, 
but the argument is invalid; or (2) it is valid, but the “principle of regu-
larity or uniformity” whose acceptance is justified is much too weak to 
justify science. AOE adopts (2), and recognizes that the acceptance of 
other, more restrictive “principles of uniformity” needs to be justified on 
other grounds; RBM, not acknowledging the hierarchy of principles, are 
doomed to opt for (1). There is another, related objection to RBM: “the 
inductive methods of science”, at least as conceived of by RBM, are not 
the best available. They do not have the flexibility of the methods of 
AOE, which allow for the possibility of methods (associated with the-
ses low down in the hierarchy) being improved in the light of improving 
knowledge, feedback being facilitated by the hierarchical structure of 
AOE between improving knowledge and improving knowledge- about- 
how- to- improve- knowledge (i.e. improving aims and methods). The tra-
ditional “inductive methods of science”, as a result of their inflexibility, 
are both too restrictive, and not restrictive enough. Like most other tra-
ditional attempts at solving the problem of induction, RBM try to justify 
the unrigorous, and thus the unjustifiable. The status quo needs to be 
changed, improved, not justified.
What about the thesis of “meta- knowability” at level 6?
Here are two arguments for accepting meta- knowability which 
make no appeal whatsoever to the success of AOE science.
(i) Granted that there is some kind of general feature of the universe 
which makes it possible to acquire knowledge of our local envi-
ronment (as guaranteed by the thesis at level 7), it is reasonable 
to suppose that we do not know all that there is to be known about 
what the nature of this general feature is. It is reasonable to sup-
pose, in other words, that we can improve our knowledge about 
the nature of this general feature, thus improving methods for the 
improvement of knowledge. Not to suppose this is to assume, arro-
gantly, that we already know all that there is to be known about 
how to acquire new knowledge. Granted that learning is possible 
(as guaranteed by the level 7 thesis), it is reasonable to suppose 
that, as we learn more about the world, we will learn more about 
how to learn. Granted the level 7 thesis, in other words, meta- 
knowability is a reasonable conjecture.
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(ii) Meta- knowability is too good a possibility, from the standpoint 
of the growth of knowledge, not to be accepted initially, the idea 
only being reluctantly abandoned if all attempts at improving 
methods for the improvement of knowledge fail.
  (i) and (ii) are not, perhaps, very strong grounds for accept-
ing meta- knowability; both are open to criticism. But the crucial 
point, for the present argument, is that these grounds for accept-
ing meta- knowability, (i) and (ii), are independent of the success 
of science. This suffices to avoid circularity.22
But what about reasons for accepting theses at levels 5, 4 and 3? Are not 
these inevitably viciously circular? The thesis that the universe is compre-
hensible, at level 5, is accepted because no other idea, compatible with 
meta- knowability, has been so fruitful in generating empirically progres-
sive research programmes; the thesis that the universe is physically com-
prehensible, at level 4, is accepted because no other thesis, compatible 
with the level 5 thesis, has been so fruitful in generating empirically pro-
gressive research programmes;23 and likewise for the thesis at level 3. In 
short, theories at level 2 are accepted because of empirical success and 
compatibility with level 3, 4 or 5 theses; and these theses are accepted 
because of their empirical fruitfulness. This would seem to be viciously 
circular in the most blatant fashion imaginable.
I have three arguments in refutation of this charge.
First, there is no question of the truth of theories being justified by 
an appeal to metaphysical theses, the truth of which is in turn justified 
by the success of science, for the simple reason that AOE is thoroughly 
conjectural, and to that extent Popperian, in character, there being no 
attempt to justify the truth of either theories or metaphysical theses.
Second, physicalism is incompatible with accepted fundamental 
physical theories, so there could be no question of the truth of one being 
justified by an appeal to the truth of the other. Physicalism is deployed 
to criticize, and to try to improve, accepted fundamental theories, not to 
justify their truth.
Third, and decisively, in so far as acceptance of physical theories is 
in part justified by an appeal to physicalism, whose acceptance is in turn 
justified by an appeal to the (apparent) success of science, which does 
involve a kind of circularity, this is licensed and legitimized by the level 
6 thesis of meta- knowability. This asserts that the universe is such that 
there is some rationally discoverable thesis which, if accepted, makes 
possible the progressive improvement of more specific assumptions and 
methods in the light of the empirical success and failure of the research 
programmes to which they give rise. If meta- knowability is true, then 
 
 
Karl PoPPer ,  Sc ieNce aNd eNlighteNMeNt202
  
progressively improving more specific metaphysical assumptions in the 
light of which seem to lead to the greatest empirical success, while at 
the same time choosing those empirically successful theories which best 
accord with these metaphysical assumptions, is just what needs to be 
done to make scientific progress. Meta- knowability, if true, justifies the 
element of circularity that is involved.
The gross invalidity of the genuinely viciously circular argument 
can be highlighted as follows. The argument seeks to justify acceptance 
of theory T by an appeal to metaphysical thesis M, and then justify accep-
tance of M by an appeal to the empirical success of T. But this argument 
works just as well (or ill) if we choose some empirically successful but 
horribly ad hoc rival to T, say T*, and a suitably ad hoc variant of M, 
say M*. We can now argue, with equal validity (i.e. none) that we justify 
acceptance of T* by appealing to M*, and justify acceptance of M* by 
appealing to the empirical success of T*. We have here a way of testing 
whether or not a putative solution to the problem of induction is, or is 
not, viciously circular: it must provide some valid way of ruling out argu-
ments that appeal to ad hoc theories and theses like T* and M*.
AOE, granted the level 6 thesis of meta- knowability, does provide 
this. Given that M accords with meta- knowability in being rationally dis-
coverable, all ad hoc rivals of M (i.e. M*) are ruled out because these are 
not “rationally discoverable”:  M* is just one of infinitely many equally 
viable theses. Thus, if meta- knowability is accepted, AOE is not viciously 
circular  – not circular in any invalid sense. Meta- knowability in effect 
asserts that the universe is such that no ad hoc or aberrant version of 
argumentation which appeals to T and M – a version which appeals to 
some T* and M* – can meet with success, because all M*- type metaphys-
ical theses are false.
It is of course absolutely vital that arguments for accepting meta- 
knowability do not themselves appeal to the success of science (for this 
would simply reintroduce vicious circularity at a higher level). The argu-
ment given above for accepting meta- knowability is weak, but it does not 
appeal, in any way whatsoever, to the success of science. Thus AOE is free 
of vicious circularity.24
7.3 Two versions of critical rationalism
Even if AOE does not play van Fraassen’s mug’s game, nevertheless how 
can it conceivably solve the practical problem of induction given its quasi- 
Popperian character?
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Let me say at once that two versions of Popperianism deserve to 
be distinguished. On the one hand there is Popper’s own view, which 
I  shall call, with ironic intent, “dogmatic critical rationalism”. This 
stresses merely the vital role that criticism has for rationality. Criticism 
is deployed, one might say, in an uncritical or almost dogmatic fashion. 
In contrast to this there is the version of critical rationalism which I wish 
to defend, which might be called “critical critical rationalism”. This takes 
seriously the implications of a point emphasized, but not adequately fol-
lowed up, by Popper, namely, that the whole point of rational criticism is 
to promote progress – and in connection with science, to promote prog-
ress in knowledge (and understanding). This means that theses which 
are demonstrably such that not accepting them can only harm and can-
not help progress in knowledge whatever the universe is like, do not 
require (rational) criticism. They deserve to be permanently accepted. 
The cosmological thesis at level 7 of the hierarchy of AOE is accepted on 
these grounds – in sharp contrast to anything found in Popper’s work. 
Furthermore, it is all important, according to critical critical rationalism, 
to highlight that part of our knowledge which, we conjecture, it is most 
fruitful to criticize, from the standpoint of achieving progress in knowl-
edge. Mere criticism is not good enough; we need to be critically critical, 
critical of criticism itself, directing criticism to that which we conjecture 
it is most fruitful to criticize from the standpoint of achieving progress. 
A basic idea behind the hierarchy of AOE is just to display the metaphys-
ical presuppositions of science in such a way that that which, we conjec-
ture, it is most fruitful to criticize be brought to the fore, fruitful criticism 
being especially facilitated. Criticism needs to be directed, above all, at 
theses at levels 1, 2 and 3  – theses from 4 to 6 becoming increasingly 
unfruitful to criticize as we ascend the hierarchy, due to their increasing 
lack of factual content and increasingly indispensable role in the search 
for knowledge.
7.4 The practical problem of induction
But how does any of this help  – the reader may ask with rising 
 impatience  – with solving the practical problem of induction? I  now 
address this question head on.
It is important to appreciate that there are three parts to the prob-
lem of induction. There is the methodological problem:  to specify the 
precise methods involved in the choice of theory in science. There is 
the theoretical problem:  to show that we are justified in accepting the 
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scientific theories we do accept, granted the aim is to improve theoret-
ical knowledge and understanding of the universe. And, perhaps hard-
est of all, there is the practical problem: to show that we are justified in 
accepting those results of science that we do accept, granted our aim is 
to use these results as a basis for action, such as constructing bridges and 
producing drugs, lives potentially being lost if the predictions of science 
turn out to be false. The vast literature on the problem of induction is 
almost entirely devoted to the practical problem, but this is like trying to 
fly before you can crawl. The proper place to begin is with the method-
ological problem: if this has not been solved, to the extent of specifying 
rigorous methods for science, all efforts to solve the other two problems 
will be squandered on trying to justify the unjustifiable. This, in essence, 
is the reason for the long- standing failure of attempts to solve the prob-
lem(s) of induction.
Popper’s falsificationism, like all other versions of SE, fails at the 
first hurdle (as I  have, in effect, already pointed out above). Methods 
actually employed in physics involve persistently choosing unifying theo-
ries in preference to more empirically successful disunified rival theories. 
This in turn involves making a big, persistent metaphysical assumption, to 
the effect that all disunified theories are false. Rigour demands that this 
(implicit) metaphysical assumption be made explicit, within science, so 
that it can be criticized and, we may hope, improved. But falsificationism 
cannot do this, because its criterion of demarcation declares metaphysics 
to be non- scientific. And no version of SE can do this either, because the 
metaphysical assumption, implicit in persistent scientific preference for 
unifying theories against the evidence, is repudiated, denied, by all ver-
sions of SE. All SE views about scientific method lack rigour.
And related to the lack of rigour, there is a lack of precise charac-
terization. Presuppositionism, as we have seen, leads to AOE, and to the 
view that metaphysical assumptions and associated methods evolve with 
evolving knowledge. No version of SE (including falsificationism) can do 
adequate justice to this evolving, positive feedback aspect of scientific 
method.25
Finally, in order merely to specify precisely what the methods of 
physics are, it is necessary to specify what unification in theoretical 
physics is. We have seen in Chapter  4 what this amounts to:  the more 
the content of the totality of fundamental theory in physics is the same 
throughout all the possible phenomena to which this totality of the-
ory applies, so the more unified it is. What matters is what the totality 
of theory asserts about the world, not the character or structure of the 
theory itself. As far as non- empirical requirements for acceptability are 
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concerned, in order to be ultimately acceptable, the totality of fundamen-
tal theory must be unified in the strongest sense.
This conception of unity of theory, and the associated non- empirical 
methodological requirement for theory acceptance, fall naturally out of 
AOE, and are unproblematic when viewed from that standpoint. But 
granted SE, this conception of unity of theory, and associated method-
ological requirements, are unacceptable. For, in demanding that the-
oretical physics accepts this conception of unity, and implements the 
associated methods, one thereby commits physics to presupposing phys-
icalism. That contradicts SE. Hence, those who take some version of SE 
for granted, cannot adopt this conception of theoretical unity.
Physicists and philosophers of physics have long been baffled by 
what theory unity is. Even Einstein was baffled (see Einstein, 1969, 
pp.  20– 5, and Maxwell, 1998, pp.  105– 6). In section 4.1, Chapter  4, 
I indicated some of the failed attempts that have been made to say what 
unity of theory really is.26 But all attempts to solve the problem within the 
framework of SE are doomed to fail. In order to solve the problem, one 
needs to abandon SE, accept that persistent preference for unified theo-
ries, in the relevant sense of “unified”, means that physics makes a per-
sistent metaphysical assumption about the nature of the universe, and 
thus follow the line of argument, spelled out above, which leads to AOE.
In short, the problem of induction cannot be solved, granted SE, 
partly because SE lacks rigour (to the extent of being inconsistent), 
partly because it cannot solve even the easiest part of the problem of 
induction – namely the methodological part. It cannot do this because it 
cannot specify those important, non- empirical methods that have to do 
with theoretical unity. AOE, by contrast, solves the purely methodologi-
cal problem with ease.
Having failed to solve the methodological problem, it follows at 
once, of course, that falsificationism and other versions of SE all fail to 
solve the theoretical and practical problems of induction as well.
This has a bearing on the question of whether the problem of induc-
tion is solvable at all. Most contemporary philosophers, historians and 
sociologists of science seem to have concluded that the practical or jus-
tificational problem is unsolvable, just because repeated efforts to solve 
the problem seem to have got nowhere. But what the above point shows 
is that there is an entirely straightforward reason for this failure. All these 
failed attempts failed even to formulate the problem correctly! To do that 
one needs first to have identified the correct methods of science.
There is another way in which the problem may be misformulated 
so as to render it insoluble. The formulation may make epistemological 
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demands that are so high that they are quite impossible to fulfil. One such 
formulation would be, “How can our confidence that empirically success-
ful, accepted scientific theories are true be justified?” This makes impos-
sibly high epistemological demands. All fundamental dynamical physical 
theories so far put forward, whatever empirical success they may have 
achieved, are false!27 Formulated in this way, the problem is insoluble. 
A slightly less epistemologically ambitious formulation would be, “How 
can our confidence that the empirical predictions of empirically success-
ful, accepted theories are true, be justified?” But this also asks for too 
much. All physical theories so far proposed, however empirically success-
ful, yield false empirical predictions. A still less epistemologically ambi-
tious formulation would be, “How can our confidence that empirically 
successful, accepted theories yield true empirical predictions, within 
the standard range of phenomena (and accuracy) for which they have 
already been shown to be successful, be justified?” But even this may ask 
for the impossible. Perhaps our customary confidence in science is mis-
placed. Perhaps just this is revealed by the correct solution to the practi-
cal or justificational problem.
In short, in order to avoid struggling to achieve the impossible, we 
need to formulate the problem in a somewhat more open- ended way 
than any of the above. The following stands a better chance of being 
solvable: How can our confidence that empirically successful, accepted 
theories yield true empirical predictions, within the standard range of 
phenomena (and accuracy) for which they have already been shown to 
be successful, be justified in so far as such confidence is justified?
We cannot just assume, from the outset, that the solution to the 
problem must justify our “pre- Humean” confidence in common sense 
and scientific knowledge – the confidence we had, that is, before learn-
ing of Hume’s devastating arguments. For this may, again, be asking for 
the impossible. Perhaps Hume demonstrated, decisively, that such “pre- 
Humean” confidence is misplaced and unjustifiable. The correct solution 
to the justificational problem would, in this case, demonstrate just this to 
be the case. This, of course, is the view defended here.
We have seen that theoretical scientific knowledge makes assump-
tions about the cosmos. But there is more to it than that. Even very mod-
est common- sense knowledge, such as, “I can walk across the room,” or, 
“This room will endure for the next ten seconds,” makes assumptions 
about the entire cosmos, about the nature of ultimate reality. Such very 
modest common- sense theses imply (a) that the entire cosmos is such that 
no cosmic explosion is occurring anywhere which will spread with nearly 
infinite speed to engulf and destroy the earth in the next few seconds. 
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We only possess knowledge of such modest common- sense items in so 
far as we possess knowledge of the cosmological thesis (a). Science and 
common sense both make cosmological assumptions.
If these cosmological assumptions can be established to be true in 
such a way that we are justified in being confident of their truth, then 
there is the hope that we can be justifiably confident of the truth of both 
some empirical predictions of empirically successful theories, and modest 
items of common sense. But if the relevant cosmological theses are such 
that they cannot conceivably be established to be true in such a way that 
we are justified in being confident of their truth, then it follows straight 
away, from elementary logic, that we cannot conceivably be confident 
of the truth of either the predictions of scientific theories or the items of 
common sense. If our most modest, immediate, apparently secure items 
of common sense have implications for the nature of the entire cosmos 
that are irredeemably speculative and conjectural, then our modest items 
of common sense must themselves be irredeemably speculative and con-
jectural as well.
The relevant cosmological theses are indeed irredeemably specu-
lative and conjectural, as everyone would surely admit. The conclusion 
is thus inescapable: scientific knowledge, and modest common- sense 
knowledge, are both irredeemably speculative and conjectural as well. If 
we demand of the solution to the justificational problem of induction that 
it restores our pre- Humean confidence in scientific and common- sense 
knowledge, then we demand the impossible. The attempt to restore such 
pre- Humean confidence can only undermine the rationality of science, 
in so far as it lulls us into a false sense of security, and leads us to believe 
that parts of our knowledge do not need critical scrutiny.
One demand that can be made of the correct solution to the justifi-
cational problem of induction is that it puts empirical data and scientific 
theories onto an equal epistemological footing. Ordinarily we assume we 
can be confident of the truth of factual statements about our immediate, 
observed surroundings:  this is a table, that is a book, this is a Bunsen 
burner, and so on. Before encountering Hume (and his twentieth- century 
descendents, such as Einstein, Popper and Kuhn), we may feel equally 
confident of the truth (or approximate truth) of empirically successful, 
accepted scientific theories. But Hume’s argument, reformulated a little, 
has the effect of opening up a gulf between evidence and theory. Any the-
ory has infinitely many empirical consequences – and  consequences for 
distant times and places. However many consequences we verify empiri-
cally, we will always be infinitely far away from verifying the theory. Even 
if particular items of evidence are known with absolute certainty, theories 
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must, it seems, remain pure conjectures. They can be falsified, perhaps, 
but remain permanently unverifiable, to any degree whatsoever. The 
solution to the justificational problem must, it may be felt, remove this 
gulf in epistemological status between empirical data and theory.
AOE does just that, by making clear that empirical data, just like 
theories, contain permanently conjectural cosmological implications. All 
knowledge, theoretical, empirical and common sense, is irredeemably 
conjectural because of these conjectural cosmological implications.
But if this is the case, what grounds are there for holding that AOE 
solves the justificational problem of induction? How does AOE do any 
better than Popper’s conjecturalist position?
AOE, as we have seen, solves the methodological problem, whereas 
Popper’s falsificationism fails to do this. As a result, AOE is able to solve 
a very important part of the justificational problem which falsification-
ism, notoriously, fails to solve. This is the problem of discriminating deci-
sively between those conjectures about whose truth we are so confident 
that we are prepared to entrust our lives to their truth, and conjectures 
about whose truth we have no confidence at all. Every time we fly in an 
aeroplane, cross a suspension bridge, or imbibe medicine, we entrust 
our lives to the correctness of relevant items of scientific knowledge, and 
confidently take for granted that rival conjectures that can be concocted 
(ostensibly even more empirically successful but horribly ad hoc) which 
predict we will die are all false. Accounting for this difference deserves 
to be regarded as the nub of the justificational problem. AOE accounts 
fully for this dramatic difference, whereas falsificationism entirely fails 
to do this.
John Worrall has dramatized the problem as follows. We are, let us 
suppose, standing on top of the Eiffel Tower, and we are confronted by 
two rival conjectures: one says that if we jump we will float gently down 
to earth without harm; the other says we will fall in the usual way to our 
death (Worrall, 1989). Only lunatics think the first a viable possibility; 
the rest of us are absolutely confident in the truth of the second conjec-
ture. How is this confidence to be justified? No version of SE comes up 
with an adequate answer, especially as aberrant versions of Newtonian 
theory or general relativity can be concocted which predict that jump-
ing on this occasion will lead to a soft, harmless landing, and which are 
empirically more successful than the non- aberrant versions of these the-
ories. Can AOE justify our confidence that if we jump we will be killed?
If we grant the truth of the theses of AOE, from level 4 to 7, a 
straightforward answer can be given. Physicalism tells us that a unified 
pattern of physical law governs all phenomena. By far our best efforts at 
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discovering invariant (or unified) laws governing such things as bodies in 
free fall near the earth’s surface are Newton’s theory of gravitation and, 
better still, Einstein’s theory. No rival theory is even remotely as good 
at complying with the two requirements of (1)  empirical success and 
(2)  compatibility with physicalism. Theories that are empirically more 
successful and predict a gentle landing can be concocted, but these clash 
horribly with physicalism, and deserve to be rejected for that reason. But 
Newton’s or Einstein’s theory (plus additional information about such 
things as the mass of the earth) predict with stark clarity: jumping leads 
to rapid acceleration at roughly 32 feet per second squared. Above all, a 
theory which accords with physicalism as well as Newton’s or Einstein’s 
theory, but predicts that jumping will lead to a gentle floating to the 
ground, is nowhere on the horizon. Thus, given the truth of physicalism, 
there is absolutely no question, no grounds for serious doubt, whatso-
ever: jumping is for suicides only.
But we are not given the truth of physicalism. At most, arguments 
deployed above give grounds for accepting physicalism granted our aim 
is to improve our conjectural knowledge of truth. There are arguments 
justifying acceptance of theses at levels 3 to 7, but no arguments justi-
fying the truth of these theses. And it is the latter we require, it seems, 
to solve Worrall’s problem, and the practical problem of induction more 
generally.
I have two replies to this objection.
First, even in the absence of any kind of justification of the truth 
of physicalism AOE succeeds, nevertheless, in distinguishing decisively 
between conjectures we are confident are true, to the extent even of 
entrusting our lives to their truth, and conjectures (even empirically more 
successful conjectures) about whose truth we have no such confidence.
Second, the demand that the truth of physicalism must receive 
some kind of justification before it becomes rationally acceptable for 
practical purposes is not just impossible to fulfil; it deserves to be rejected 
in that it stems from an unrigorous, untenable conception of science, and 
human knowledge more generally. If, and only if, some version of SE is 
correct, and science is based on evidence, and on metaphysical theses 
whose truth has been justified (if there are any), is the demand to justify 
the truth of physicalism itself justifiable. But all versions of SE are unrig-
orous and untenable. Hence, the SE demand to justify physicalism is itself 
unjustifiable, and must be rejected. What has been demonstrated above 
is that all significant factual knowledge, common sense and scientific, 
implies (and thus presupposes) cosmological theses: rigour requires that 
these unjustifiable cosmological theses are made explicit, so that they 
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can be critically assessed and, we may hope, improved. To demand that 
such cosmological theses cannot be accepted unless their truth is justified 
condemns science to lack of rigour, because it ensures that unjustifiable 
cosmological theses will not be, and cannot be, accepted as a part of sci-
entific knowledge. The demand deserves to be rejected.
Human knowledge has always had this inescapable cosmological 
dimension built into it. The illusion that science could dispense with 
such unjustifiable cosmological conjectures only crept in with the gen-
eral acceptance of SE, some time after Newton and before the end of the 
nineteenth century. What needs to be done is not to justify the truth of 
physicalism, but rather to justify the claim that this cosmological con-
jecture has played a more fruitful role in the advance of science than 
any rival at that level. Just this was done above. Science does not prove 
its cosmological conjectures; it sets out to improve those it has inherited 
from the past. Physicalism is the best available, at that level of general-
ity, and that suffices to solve the Worrall problem, and the justificational 
problem of induction. We are justified in entrusting our lives to the stan-
dard empirical predictions of those theories (a)  which have met with 
sufficient empirical success, and (b)  which, together with other such 
empirically successful theories, are more nearly compatible with our best 
metaphysical theses concerning the comprehensibility and knowability 
of the universe. Our best metaphysical theses, in turn, are those which 
have generated the most empirically progressive scientific research pro-
grammes. The circularity that seems to be involved here is legitimized by 
acceptance of meta- knowability.
7.5 Cosmological conjectures need acknowledgement 
and improvement
I now spell out in a little more detail the point just made, which is central 
to the solution to the practical problem of induction.
When viewed from the perspective of SE, it looks as if, in order to 
solve the practical problem, sufficiently good grounds must be given for 
the truth of physicalism, from scratch as it were. Acknowledging, initially, 
only knowledge of particular empirical facts, we must somehow provide 
an argument for the truth of physicalism which is so good that it justifies 
us in being entirely confident of the truth of physicalism even when our 
lives are at stake. Let us call this the “SE requirement” for solving the 
practical problem of induction. Given this requirement, the prospects for 
solving the practical problem of induction seem hopeless.
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But this requirement itself deserves to be rejected. It is only accept-
able if what I shall call “the SE prescription” is acceptable. But this lat-
ter is an intellectual disaster and deserves to be rejected. Hence the SE 
requirement must be rejected as well.
By the SE prescription I  mean this:  in order to develop science 
in a properly scientific, rigorous way, so that it is capable of delivering 
authentic, reliable knowledge, science must eschew all metaphysical 
presuppositions in the context of justification and base acceptance of 
scientific theories as far as possible solely on empirical considerations 
without reference to conjectural metaphysics. If this is correct, then it 
makes perfect sense to demand of any attempt to solve the practical prob-
lem of induction that it satisfies the SE requirement. But the SE prescrip-
tion – eschewing metaphysical presuppositions in order to render science 
scientific and rigorous – is, we have seen, an intellectual disaster. It has 
entirely the opposite effect of the one intended. If taken seriously, instead 
of enhancing the rigour of science, it would destroy science and, indeed, 
all knowledge. The arguments of this and previous chapters demonstrate 
that science devoid of metaphysics is not possible. Selecting theories on 
the basis of empirical success and failure, no kind of assumption being 
made about what kind of world this is, cannot succeed if rigorously 
pursued, because science would be overwhelmed by endlessly many 
empirically successful aberrant theories which would stultify science 
and render technological application impossible. (Or, if requirements of 
simplicity and unity are invoked, in addition to empirical requirements, 
then metaphysical assumptions of unity are being presupposed, but in a 
surreptitious fashion.) Science has survived and progressed despite, and 
not because of, acceptance of SE by the scientific community. Science has 
managed to do this by implementing SE in only a highly unrigorous and 
hypocritical fashion (implicit metaphysical presuppositions exercising a 
highly influential role over choice of theory).
The SE prescription is, then, an intellectual disaster. Unfounded 
metaphysical or cosmological conjectures about the comprehensibility 
and knowability of the universe are essential for science, and cannot be 
eliminated without disaster. What needs to be implemented, instead, 
is the “AOE prescription”:  roughly, endeavour to improve metaphysical 
assumptions explicit or implicit in current science and knowledge; do this 
by modifying existing assumptions in that direction which seems to be 
the most fruitful from the standpoint of acquiring empirical knowledge 
within a fixed framework of assumptions and methods which are such 
that these are required for the acquisition of knowledge to be possible at 
all. In other words, put generalized AOE into practice.
Karl PoPPer ,  Sc ieNce aNd eNlighteNMeNt212
  
Before the advent of SE, the pursuit of science, or of knowledge 
more generally, invariably went on within a framework of religious and 
metaphysical assumptions. Christianity, the corpuscular hypothesis, 
and Galileo’s thesis that the book of nature is written in the language 
of mathematics, played especially important roles in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries as far as the birth and development of modern sci-
ence was concerned. The orthodox SE prescription insists that science 
must be dissociated from such dubious, unfounded religious and meta-
physical doctrines. But this cannot be done; at best, unrigorous and hyp-
ocritical science results. The impression that it has been done creates the 
insoluble problem of induction (as traditionally construed, from the SE 
perspective).
Instead, we need to see AOE science as explicitly improving on 
antecedently upheld religious and metaphysical theses. There is, in sci-
ence, a substantial component of faith – but, ideally, it is rational faith, 
openly acknowledged as conjectural in character, subjected to sustained 
criticism, and undergoing persistent modification in the direction of that 
which seems to lead to the most empirically progressive research, at 
levels 1 and 2. Science does not eliminate metaphysics; it implements a 
method which makes it possible for us to develop and choose those meta-
physical ideas most fruitful for progress in empirical knowledge.
But once the SE prescription has been rejected as intellectually 
disastrous, and the AOE prescription accepted instead, it is clear that 
the SE requirement for solving the practical problem of induction must 
itself be rejected as intellectually unreasonable and unacceptable. The 
only rationale for adopting it arises from the idea that it is entirely proper 
to put the SE prescription into practice. But putting this into practice 
makes science impossible (for reasons wholly in addition to the resulting 
insolubility of the practical problem of induction). The SE requirement 
presumes a state of knowledge that has resulted from implementing 
the intellectually destructive SE prescription: this state of knowledge is 
an intellectual disaster, and must be rejected, and along with it the SE 
requirement.
Taking the SE requirement seriously is rather like an athlete hav-
ing both legs amputated and then expecting to win the 100 metres at 
the Olympics. Render science, and indeed all knowledge, impossible (by 
throwing away vital metaphysics) and it should occasion no surprise 
that a situation is created in which the practical problem of induction 
becomes impossible to solve as well.
For the last four centuries ever since Galileo, or perhaps for the last 
two and a half thousand years ever since the Presocratics, physicalism 
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has been by far the most fruitful metaphysical thesis available from the 
standpoint of promoting progress in science, or in knowledge more gen-
erally. No rival metaphysical thesis has been remotely as fruitful. AOE 
correctly depicts our current scientific knowledge. Physicalism, in short, 
is justifiably a basic tenet of current (conjectural) scientific knowledge, 
our best attempt, at that vital level, of acquiring knowledge of truth, more 
secure, indeed, than any fundamental physical theory, such as quantum 
theory or general relativity. It makes very good sense not to jump off the 
Eiffel Tower if you want to stay alive, for the reasons given above.
But if science must accept, and not eschew, religious or metaphys-
ical ideas, what grounds are there, it may be asked, for preferring phys-
icalism to a thesis such as that God exists and benevolently arranges for 
the cosmos to be such as to make science possible? For my reply, see 
Maxwell (1998, pp. 206– 8; 2001a, pp. 6– 10; 2002c).
The argument given above is a special case of a more general argu-
ment concerning Cartesianism. The proper fundamental problem of epis-
temology is the problem of how we can best improve knowledge (improve 
what we have inherited from the past). The Cartesian prescription 
says: throw everything away we have inherited from the past except that 
which cannot be doubted, or is most secure; taking this as a secure base, 
build up rigorous, reliable knowledge. This Cartesian prescription has 
exercised a profound influence on philosophy, on both so- called rational-
ists and on empiricists. Influencing the former it leads to the search for 
secure principles founded on reason; influencing the latter it leads to the 
idea that observational knowledge alone constitutes the only acceptable 
Cartesian secure base, it being necessary to build the rest of knowledge 
up from this secure base. This, of course, is the SE prescription; it is a ver-
sion of the Cartesian prescription. But the Cartesian prescription must be 
rejected. The proper way to set about improving knowledge is to acknowl-
edge the conjectural character of what we have inherited from the past, 
subject it to critical scrutiny, and put generalized AOE into practice. In 
direct opposition to Cartesianism, this involves in part taking most seri-
ously ideas that are most vulnerable to being found to be false, namely the 
falsifiable theories of science. Far from giving priority to ideas immune to 
doubt, we need to give priority to ideas most vulnerable to doubt. In this 
way, as Popper stresses, we make it possible for us to learn from our mis-
takes. But this Popperian prescription needs itself to be modified, as we 
have seen, so that some unfalsifiable, metaphysical ideas, inherited from 
the past, continue to be accepted and developed as a part of scientific 
knowledge, those in particular being accepted which either (a) must be 
true if knowledge is to be possible at all, or (b) are most fruitful in leading 
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to progress in empirical knowledge. The Cartesian prescription deserves 
to be resoundingly rejected, and along with it the SE prescription and SE 
requirement.
The problem of induction is not just a philosophical puzzle à la 
Wittgenstein. Its long- standing insolubility is indicative of a funda-
mental defect in our understanding of science and its relationship with 
metaphysics and philosophy – a fundamental defect in our whole cul-
ture. Science does not stand opposed to metaphysics and philosophy; 
it is metaphysics and philosophy carried on employing the improved 
methods of investigation of empiricism:  observation and, above all, 
experimentation (a point enshrined in the seventeenth- century terms 
of “experimental” and “natural” philosophy). A basic task for philos-
ophers today is to try to get across to the scientific community just 
how vital metaphysics and philosophy, properly conducted, are for sci-
ence, so that scientists and philosophers can begin to collaborate on 
implementing AOE science, thus recreating natural philosophy.28 But 
this is unlikely to happen as long as AOE continues to be dismissed, so 
unjustly, as a mug’s game.
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8
Does probabilism solve  
the great quantum mystery?
8.1 Orthodox quantum theory is the best  
and worst of theories
What sort of entities are electrons, photons and atoms given their wave- 
like and particle- like properties? Is nature fundamentally deterministic 
or probabilistic? Any decent theory of the quantum domain, able to pro-
vide us with genuine knowledge and understanding of its nature, ought 
to provide answers to these childishly elementary questions. Orthodox 
quantum theory (OQT) evades answering these questions by being a the-
ory, not about quantum systems as such, but rather about the results of 
performing measurements on such systems.1
This state of affairs came about as follows. Bohr, Heisenberg, Dirac 
and the other creators of OQT did not know how to solve the quantum 
wave/ particle dilemma. This created a grave problem for those seeking 
to develop quantum theory:  How can one develop a consistent theory 
about entities that seem to be both wave- like and particle- like, as in the 
two- slit experiment, for example? Around 1925, Heisenberg hit upon 
the strategy of evading this fundamental dilemma by developing what 
subsequently became matrix mechanics as a theory exclusively about the 
results of performing measurements on quantum systems, this version 
of quantum theory thus not needing to specify the nature of quantum 
systems when not undergoing measurement. Schrödinger, a little later in 
1926, developed wave mechanics in the hope that it would be a precise 
theory about the nature of quantum systems. This theory, Schrödinger 
hoped, would show the electron to be wave- like in character. But then 
Born successfully interpreted the Ψ function of Schrödinger’s wave 
mechanics as specifying the probability of detecting the particle in ques-
tion. According to Born’s crucial interpretative postulate, |Ψ|2.dV gives 
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the probability of detecting the particle in volume element dV if a posi-
tion measurement is performed. Schrödinger proved that his theory and 
Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics are equivalent:  the outcome, a sort of 
synthesis of the two theories, is OQT.
OQT is an extraordinarily successful theory empirically, perhaps 
the most successful in the whole of physics when one takes into account 
the range, immense diversity, and accuracy of its predictions. But not 
only does it fail to solve the great quantum mystery of what sort of enti-
ties electrons and atoms can be in view of their apparently contradictory 
particle and wave properties. It also fails to answer the other childishly 
elementary question: Is the quantum domain deterministic or probabilis-
tic? The basic dynamic equation of OQT, Schrödinger’s time- dependent 
equation, is deterministic in character. It tells us that quantum states, 
given by Ψ, evolve deterministically in time, as long as no measure-
ments are made. But this does not mean OQT asserts that the quantum 
domain is deterministic. First, given OQT, Ψ cannot be interpreted as 
specifying the actual physical state of a quantum system, just because 
OQT fails to solve the wave/ particle dilemma, and thus fails to provide a 
consistent specification of the physical nature of quantum systems when 
not being measured. Given OQT, Ψ must be interpreted as containing 
no more than information about the outcome of performing measure-
ments. Second, OQT in general makes probabilistic predictions about 
the outcome of performing measurements, not (apart from exceptional 
circumstances) deterministic predictions. But one cannot conclude from 
this that OQT asserts that the quantum domain is fundamentally proba-
bilistic in character, some physical states of affairs only determining what 
occurs subsequently only probabilistically. This is because, according to 
OQT, probabilistic outcomes only occur when we intervene, and make 
a measurement. In the absence of measurement, nothing probabilistic 
occurs at all, according to OQT. Indeed, if the process of measurement 
is treated quantum mechanically, then nothing probabilistic occurs at 
all, precisely because the basic dynamic equation of OQT, Schrödinger’s 
time- dependent equation, is deterministic.
The inability of OQT to answer these two elementary questions is 
in itself a serious failure of the theory. But there are, as a consequence, 
a host of further failures and defects. Because OQT is about the results 
of performing measurements on quantum systems (and not about 
quantum systems per se, due to its failure to solve the wave/ particle 
problem), in order to come up with physical predictions, OQT must 
consist of two parts, (1)  quantum postulates, and (2)  some part of 
classical physics for a treatment of measurement. (2) is indispensable. 
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(1) alone, precisely because OQT lacks its own quantum ontology, can-
not predict anything physical at all – or at least can only make condi-
tional predictions of the form: if such and such a measurement is made, 
such and such will be the outcome with such and such a probability. 
Thus OQT = QP + CP, where “QP” stands for the quantum mechanical 
postulates of the theory, and “CP” stands for the classical postulates, 
required for measurement.
In what follows, a quantum “measurement” is a process that actu-
ally detects quantum systems; a process which prepares a quantum sys-
tem to be in a certain quantum state, but does not detect the system, is a 
“preparation” rather than a “measurement”.
OQT, construed as QP + CP, as it must be, is a seriously defective 
theory. (a)  OQT is imprecise, due to the inherent lack of precision of 
the notion of “measurement”. How complex and macroscopic must a 
process be before it becomes a measurement? Does the dissociation of 
one molecule amount to a measurement? Or must a thousand or a mil-
lion molecules be dissociated before a measurement has been made? Or 
must a human being observe the result? No precise answer is forthcom-
ing. (b) OQT is ambiguous, in that if the measuring process is treated 
as a measurement, the outcome is in general probabilistic, but if this 
process is treated quantum mechanically, the outcome is determinisitic. 
(c) OQT is very seriously ad hoc, in that it consists of two incompati-
ble, conceptually clashing parts, QP and CP. OQT only avoids being a 
straightforward contradiction by specifying, in an arbitrary, ad hoc way, 
that QP applies to the quantum system up to the moment of measure-
ment, and CP applies to the final measurement result. (d) OQT is non- 
explanatory, in part because it is ad hoc, and no ad hoc theory is fully 
explanatory, in part because OQT must presuppose some part of what 
it should explain, namely classical physics. OQT cannot fully explain 
how classical phenomena emerge from quantum phenomena because 
some part of classical physics must be presupposed for measure-
ment. (e)  OQT is limited in scope in that it cannot, strictly speaking, 
be applied to the early universe in conditions which lacked prepara-
tion and measurement devices. Strictly speaking, indeed, it can only 
be applied if physicists are around to make measurements. (f) OQT is 
limited in scope in that it cannot be applied to the cosmos as a whole, 
since this would require preparation and measurement devices that are 
outside the cosmos, which is difficult to arrange. Quantum cosmology, 
employing OQT, is not possible. (g) For somewhat similar reasons, OQT 
is such that it resists unification with general relativity. Such a unifica-
tion would presumably involve attributing some kind of quantum state 
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to space- time itself (general relativity being a theory of space- time). 
But, granted the basic structure of OQT, this would require that prepa-
ration and measurement devices exist outside space- time, again not 
easy to arrange.
These nine defects, the two basic failures with which we began 
and the seven consequential defects, (a) to (g), are, taken together, very 
serious indeed.2 Despite its immense empirical success, OQT must be 
declared to be an unacceptably defective theory. It is the best of theories, 
and the worst of theories.3
In opposition to this conclusion, it may be argued that all phys-
ical theories, even a classical theory such as Newtonian theory (NT), 
must call upon additional theory to be tested empirically. In testing pre-
dictions of NT concerning the position of a planet at such and such a 
time, optical theory is required to predict the results of telescopic obser-
vations made here on earth. But this objection misses the point. NT is 
perfectly capable of issuing in physical predictions without calling upon 
additional theory, just because it has its own physical ontology. NT, plus 
initial and boundary conditions formulated in terms of the theory, can 
issue in the physical prediction that such and such a planet is at such 
and such a place at such and such a time, whether anyone observes the 
planet or not, without calling upon optical theory or any other theory. 
This OQT cannot do. It cannot do this because it lacks its own quantum 
ontology, having failed to solve the quantum wave/ particle problem. 
In order to deliver an unconditional physical prediction, OQT must call 
upon some part of classical physics, as a matter of necessity, so that the 
theory can refer to something physically actual. The case of NT and OQT 
are quite different, because NT postulates actually existing physical bod-
ies whether observed or not, whereas QP does not; for that, one requires 
OQT, that is, QP + CP.
It may be objected that even if non- relativistic quantum theory 
fails to solve the wave/ particle problem, relativistic quantum theory, or 
quantum field theory, does solve the problem in that it declares that what 
exists is the quantum field, “particles” being discrete excitations of the 
field. But this objection misses the point as well. Orthodox quantum field 
theory (OQFT) is just as dependent on measurement, and thus on some 
part of classical physics, as non- relativistic OQT is. The quantum states 
of the quantum field of OQFT have to be interpreted as making probabi-
listic predictions about the results of performing measurements, just as 
in the case of OQT. A version of quantum field theory which succeeded 
in specifying the nature of the quantum field in a fully satisfactory way, 
so that the theory has its own quantum ontology entirely independent 
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of any part of classical physics, would be able to issue in physical pre-
dictions about actual physical states of affairs entirely independently of 
measurement. Such a theory would be able to predict and explain mac-
roscopic, quasi- classical phenomena as arising from the quantum field 
alone, without calling upon some part of classical physics for a treatment 
of measurement. This OQFT cannot do.
8.2 Probabilism to the rescue
What needs to be done to cure OQT of its serious defects? The primary 
task must be to specify precisely and unambiguously the nature of quan-
tum entities so that quantum theory (QT) can be formulated as a test-
able theory about how these entities evolve and interact, without there 
being any mention of measurement or observables in the postulates of 
the theory at all. The key point that needs to be appreciated, I suggest, 
in order successfully to complete this task, is that the quantum domain 
is fundamentally probabilistic.4 It is this that the manifestly probabilistic 
character of QT is trying to tell us.
The approach to solving the mysteries of the quantum domain that 
I am suggesting here has been long ignored largely because of the acci-
dents of history. When quantum theory (QT) was being developed and 
interpreted, during the first three decades of the last century, two oppos-
ing camps developed: the Bohr– Heisenberg camp, which argued for the 
abandonment of micro- realism, and the abandonment of determinism; 
and the Einstein– Schrödinger camp, which argued for the retention of 
realism, and the retention of determinism. One result of this polariza-
tion of views was that the idea of retaining realism but abandoning deter-
minism was overlooked. But it is just this overlooked option, I maintain, 
which gives us our best hope of curing the defects of QT. One might call 
this option probabilistic micro- realism.
Once we acknowledge that the quantum domain is fundamentally 
probabilistic, so that the basic laws governing the way quantum systems 
interact with one another are probabilistic, it is clear that measurement 
cannot be a satisfactory necessary and sufficient condition for probabi-
listic transitions to occur. Probabilistic transitions must be occurring in 
nature whether or not physicists are around to dub certain processes 
“measurements”. The very notion of measurement is in any case, as we 
have seen, inherently imprecise. We require a new, precise, necessary 
and sufficient condition for probabilistic transitions to occur, to be speci-
fied in fundamental, quantum mechanical terms.
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Furthermore, once the fundamentally probabilistic character of the 
quantum domain is acknowledged, it immediately becomes clear how 
the key quantum wave/ particle problem is to be solved. If the quantum 
domain is fundamentally probabilistic, then the physical entities of this 
domain  – electrons, atoms and the rest  – cannot possibly be classical, 
deterministic entities – classical particles, waves or fields. Quite gener-
ally, we should hold that there is a one- to- one correspondence between 
the dynamical laws of a physical theory on the one hand, and the entities 
and their physical properties postulated by the theory, on the other hand. 
In speaking of the entities, and the properties of entities, postulated by a 
physical theory, we are thereby speaking, in other terms, of the dynami-
cal laws of the theory. Hence, change dynamical laws in some basic way, 
and we thereby change postulated physical entities and their properties. 
In particular, change dynamical laws dramatically, so that they become 
probabilistic instead of being deterministic, and the nature of postulated 
physical entities must change dramatically as well. Quantum entities, 
interacting with one another probabilistically, must be quite different 
from all physical entities so far encountered within deterministic classi-
cal physics.5
The defects of OQT have arisen, in other words, because physicists 
have sought to interpret probabilistic quantum theory in terms of clas-
sical waves and particles, deterministic metaphysical ideas appropriate 
to earlier classical physics but wholly inappropriate to the new quantum 
theory. The failure of this entirely misguided attempt then led to despair 
at the possibility of solving the (misconstrued) wave/ particle problem, 
despair at the possibility of specifying the precise physical nature of 
quantum entities. This despair in turn led to the development of OQT as 
a theory about the results of performing measurements – a theory which, 
it seemed, did not need to specify the precise nature of quantum enti-
ties. But the outcome is a theory burdened with the nine serious defects 
indicated above.
Thus the traditional quantum wave/ particle problem is the wrong 
problem to pose. We should ask, not “Are quantum entities waves or par-
ticles?”, but rather, (1)  what kinds of possible, unproblematic, funda-
mentally probabilistic physical entities are there? And (2) are quantum 
entities one kind of such unproblematic probabilistic entity? The failure 
to put right the serious defects of OQT has persisted for so long because 
physicists have abandoned hope of solving the traditional quantum 
wave/ particle problem, not realizing that this is entirely the wrong prob-
lem to try to solve in the first place. Once it is appreciated that (1) and 
(2)  are the right problems to try to solve, new possibilities, long over-
looked, immediately spring to mind.
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First, physical entities that interact with one another probabilisti-
cally may be dubbed propensitons. Two kinds of unproblematic propen-
siton can immediately be distinguished: continuous propensitons, which 
evolve probabilistically continuously in time, and intermittent propensi-
tons, which evolve deterministically except for intermittent moments in 
time when appropriate physical conditions arise, and the propensitons 
undergo probabilistic transitions.
There is a second obvious distinction that can be made, between 
propensitons which spread out spatially in time, increasing the volume 
of space they occupy with the passage of time, and propensitons which 
do not spread spatially in this way. Let us call the first spatially spreading 
propensitons, and the second spatially confined propensitons.
We are in new territory. In our ordinary experience of the world, 
and within deterministic physics, we never encounter propensitons. 
Probabilistic outcomes, obtained when we toss a penny or a die, can 
always be put down to probabilistic changes in initial conditions. Classical 
statistical mechanics presupposes that the underlying dynamic laws are 
deterministic. Having no experience of them, propensitons will, inevita-
bly, when we first encounter them, strike us as mysterious, even unac-
ceptably weird. But these feelings of unfamiliarity ought not to lead us 
into deciding that theories which postulate such entities are inherently 
unacceptable. In particular, the four kinds of propensity indicated above 
should be regarded as equally viable, a priori. Whether a theory that pos-
tulates one or other type of propensiton is acceptable or not should be 
decided upon in the usual way, in terms of its empirical success, and the 
extent to which it is unified, simple, explanatory.
Granted that quantum systems are some kind of propensiton, 
which of the four kinds of unproblematic propensiton just indicated 
should we take quantum systems to be? There is here a very import-
ant consideration to be borne in mind. Despite suffering from the 
nine defects indicated above, nevertheless OQT is perhaps the most 
empirically successful physical theory ever formulated. The range, 
variety and accuracy of its empirical predictions are unprecedented. 
No other physical theory has been subjected to such sustained severe 
experimental testing, and has survived without a single refutation. 
There are good grounds for holding that OQT has got quite a lot right 
about the nature of the quantum world. Our strategy, then, ought to 
be, in the first instance at least, to stick as close to OQT as possible, 
and modify OQT just sufficiently to remove the defects of the theory. 
The structure of OQT mirrors that of the intermittent, spatially spread-
ing propensiton. On the one hand, quantum states evolve determin-
istically, in accordance with Schrödinger’s time- dependent equation;  
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on the other hand, there are, on the face of it, probabilistic transitions 
associated with measurement. Quantum states spread out spatially 
when evolving deterministically, and tend to become localized when 
measurements are made. All this mirrors the character of the intermit-
tent, spatially spreading propensiton, the only unsatisfactory feature 
of OQT being that the theory stipulates that probabilistic transitions 
occur when measurements are made.
A very elementary kind of spatially spreading intermittent propen-
siton is the following. It consists of a sphere, which expands at a steady 
rate (deterministic evolution) until it touches a second sphere, at which 
moment the sphere becomes instantaneously a minute sphere, of definite 
radius, somewhere within the space occupied by the large sphere, proba-
bilistically determined. The second sphere undergoes the same instanta-
neous probabilistic transition. Then both minute spheres again undergo 
steady, deterministic expansion, until they touch once more, and another 
probabilistic localization occurs.
A slightly more sophisticated version of this elementary spatially 
spreading intermittent propensiton is the following. The sphere is made 
up of variable “position probability density”, such that, when the sphere 
localizes probabilistically, in the way just indicated, it is most probable 
that it will be localized where the position probability density is most 
dense. A  law specifies how position probability density is distributed 
throughout the sphere. We might even imagine that the position proba-
bility density exhibits a wave-like distribution. Such a propensiton, given 
appropriate conditions for probabilistic localization, might even exhibit 
interference phenomena in a two-slit experiment!
Quantum entities, such as electrons, photons and atoms, are, I sug-
gest, spatially spreading intermittent propensitons. Their physical state 
is specified by the ψ function of QT. The deterministic evolution of these 
quantum propensitons is specified by Schrödinger’s time-dependent
equation:
i h
t
h
m
t V
∂
∂
− ∇ +
ψ
ψ ψ
(t)
=
2
2
2
( ) ( )t
The crucial questions that need to be answered to specify precisely the 
probabilistic properties – or propensities – of quantum systems are these:
(a) What is the precise quantum mechanical condition for a probabi-
listic transition to occur?
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(b) Given the quantum state, ψ, at the instant before the probabilistic 
transition, how does this determine what the possible outcome 
states are, ϕ1, ϕ2, … ϕN?
(c) How does ψ determine the probability, pr, that the outcome of the 
probabilistic transition will be ϕr, for r = 1, 2, … N?
(d) How can (a) to (c) be answered so that the resulting fundamen-
tally probabilistic version of quantum theory reproduces all the 
empirical success of OQT?
A number of different answers can be given to (a) to (d).
One possibility is the proposal of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (see 
Ghirardi and Rimini, 1990), according to which the quantum state of a 
system such as an electron collapses spontaneously, on average after the 
passage of millions of years, into a highly localized state. When a mea-
surement is performed on the quantum system, it becomes quantum 
entangled with millions upon millions of quantum systems that go to 
make up the measuring apparatus. In a very short time there is a high 
probability that one of these quantum systems will spontaneously col-
lapse, causing all the other quantum entangled systems, including the 
electron, to collapse as well. At the micro level, it is almost impossible 
to detect collapse, but at the macro level, associated with measurement, 
collapse occurs very rapidly all the time.
Another possibility is the proposal of Penrose (1986; 2004, ch. 30), 
according to which collapse occurs when the state of a system evolves 
into a superposition of two or more states, each state having associated 
with it a sufficiently large mass located at a distinct region of space. The 
idea is that general relativity imposes a restriction on the extent to which 
such superpositions can develop, in that it does not permit such superpo-
sitions to evolve to such an extent that each state of the superposition has 
a substantially distinct space- time curvature associated with it.
The possibility that I  favour, put forward before either Ghirardi, 
Rimini and Weber’s proposal, or Penrose’s proposal, is that probabilistic 
transitions occur whenever, as a result of inelastic interactions between 
quantum systems, new “particles”, new bound or stationary systems, 
are created (Maxwell, 1972b, 1976b, 1982, 1988, 1994a).6 A little more 
precisely:
Postulate 1A: Whenever, as a result of an inelastic interaction, 
a system of interacting “particles” creates new “particles”, bound 
or stationary systems, so that the state of the system goes into 
a superposition of states, each state having associated with it 
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dierent particles or bound or stationary systems, then, when the 
interaction is nearly at an end, spontaneously and probabilisti-
cally, entirely in the absence of measurement, the superposition 
collapses into one or other state.
Two examples of the kind of interactions that are involved here are the 
following:
e H
e H e H
e H
e e p
−
− −
−
− −
+
+ → +
+ +
+ +
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Here e–, e+, H, H*, γ, p and (e+/e–) stand for electron, positron, hydrogen 
atom, excited hydrogen atom, photon, proton and bound system of elec-
tron and positron, respectively.
What exactly does it mean to say that the “interaction is very nearly 
at an end” in the above postulate? My suggestion, here, is that it means 
that forces between the “particles” are very nearly zero, except for forces 
holding bound systems together. In order to indicate how this can be for-
mulated precisely, consider the toy interaction:
a b c a b c
a bc B
+ + → + +
+
( )A
( ) ( )
Here, a, b and c are spinless particles, and (bc) is the bound system. Let 
the state of the entire system be Ψ(t), and let the asymptotic states of the 
two channels (A) and (B) be Ψ A(t) and Ψ B(t) respectively. Asymptotic 
states associated with inelastic interactions are fictional states towards 
which, according to OQT, the real state of the system evolves as t → + ∞.
Each outcome channel has its associated asymptotic state, which evolves 
as if forces between particles are zero, except where forces hold bound 
systems together.
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According to OQT, in connection with the toy interaction above, 
there are states ϕA(t) and ϕB(t), such that:
(1) For all t, ψ(t) = cAϕA(t) + cBϕB(t), with |cA|2 + |cB|2 = 1;
(2) as t → + ∞, ϕA(t) → ΨA(t) and ϕB(t) → ΨB(t).
The idea is that at the first instant t for which ϕA(t) is very nearly the 
same as the asymptotic state ΨA(t), or ϕB(t) is very nearly the same as 
ΨB(t), then the state of the system, ψ(t), collapses spontaneously either 
into ϕA(t) with probability |cA|2, or into ϕB(t) with probability |cB|2. Or, 
more precisely:
Postulate 1B: At the first instant for which 
|⟨Ψ A(t)|ϕA(t)⟩ |2 > 1 – ε or |⟨Ψ B(t)|ϕB(t)⟩|2 > 1 – ε,
the state of the system collapses spontaneously into ϕA(t) with 
probability |cA|
2, or into ϕB(t) with probability |cB|2, ε being a uni-
versal constant, a positive real number very nearly equal to zero.
The evolutions of the actual state of the system, ψ(t), and the asymp-
totic states, ΨA(t) and ΨB(t), are governed by the respective channel 
Hamiltonians, H, HA and HB, where:
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Here, ma, mb and mc are the masses of “particles” a, b and c respectively, 
and ħ = h/2π where h is Planck’s constant.
The condition for probabilistic collapse, formulated above, can 
readily be generalized to apply to more complicated and realistic inelas-
tic interactions between “particles”.
According to the micro-realistic, fundamentally probabilistic 
version of quantum theory, indicated above, the state function, ψ(t),
describes the actual physical state of the quantum system, from moment 
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to moment. Quantum systems may be called “propensitons”. The phys-
ical (quantum) state of the propensiton evolves in accordance with 
Schrödinger’s time-dependent equation as long as the condition for a 
probabilistic transition to occur does not obtain. The moment it does 
obtain, the state jumps instantaneously and probabilistically, in the man-
ner indicated above, into a new state. (All but one of a superposition of 
states, each with distinct “particles” associated with them, vanish.) The 
new state then continues to evolve in accordance with Schrödinger’s 
equation until conditions for a new probabilistic transition arise.
Propensiton quantum theory (PQT), as we may call this micro-realis-
tic, fundamentally probabilistic version of quantum theory, can recover all 
the experimental success of OQT. This follows from four points. First, OQT 
and PQT use the same dynamical equation, namely Schrödinger’s time-
dependent equation. Second, whenever a position measurement is made, 
and a quantum system is detected, this invariably involves the creation of 
a new “particle” (bound or stationary system, such as the ionization of 
an atom or the dissociation of a molecule, usually millions of these). This 
means that whenever a position measurement is made, the conditions for 
probabilistic transitions to occur, according to PQT, are satisfied. PQT will 
reproduce the predictions of OQT (given that PQT is provided with a spec-
ification of the quantum state of the measuring apparatus). Third, all other 
observables of OQT, such as momentum, energy, angular momentum or 
spin, always involve (i) a preparation procedure which leads to distinct 
spatial locations being associated with distinct values of the observable to 
be measured, and (ii) a position measurement in one or other spatial loca-
tion. This means that PQT can predict the outcome of measurements of 
all the observables of OQT. Fourth, in so far as the predictions of OQT and 
PQT dier, the dierence is extraordinarily dicult to detect, and will not 
be detectable in any quantum measurement so far performed.
In principle, however, OQT and PQT yield predictions that dier 
for experiments that are extraordinarily dicult to perform, and which 
have not yet, to my knowledge, been performed. Consider the following 
evolution:
collision superposition reverse collision
a  +  b  +  c
a  +  b  +  c a  +  b  +  c
  a  +  (bc) 
−→ −→
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3 4 5
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Suppose the experimental arrangement is such that, if the superposi-
tion at stage (3)  persists, then interference effects will be detected at 
stage (5). Suppose, now, that at stage (3) the condition for the super-
position to collapse into one or other state, according to PQT, obtains. 
In these circumstances, OQT predicts interference at stage (5), whereas 
PQT predicts no interference at stage (5) (assuming the above evolution 
is repeated many times). PQT predicts that in each individual case, at 
stage (3), the superposition collapses probabilistically into one or other 
state. Hence there can be no interference.
8.3 Further questions
It may be asked how ψ(t) can possibly represent the real physical state 
of a quantum system given that ψ(t) is a complex function of space and 
time. The answer is that ψ(t) can always be construed to depict two real 
functions of space and time.
It may be asked how ψ(t) can possibly represent the real physical 
state of a quantum system consisting of two (or more) quantum entan-
gled “particles”, since in this case ψ(t) is a function of six- dimensional 
configuration space plus time (or, in general, a function of 3N configu-
ration space plus time, where N is the number of quantum entangled 
“particles” that go to make up the system in question). In the case of two 
“particles”, we can construe ψ(r1, r2, t), where r1 and r2 are the spatial 
coordinates of “particles” 1 and 2 respectively, as depicting the propen-
sity state of the system in real 3- dimensional physical space, as follows. 
|ψ(r1, r2, t)|2 dV1dV2 represents the probability of the system interacting 
in a localizing (wave- packet- collapsing) way such that “particle” 1 inter-
acts in volume element dV1 about spatial coordinates r1, and “particle” 
2  interacts in volume element dV2 about spatial coordinates r2. The 
quantum entangled nature of the system means that as r2 is changed, so 
the probability of “particle” 1 interacting in dV1 about r2 will, in general, 
change too.
It may be objected that postulate 1(A+B) provides no mecha-
nism for quantum systems to be localized. This is not correct. If a 
highly localized system, S1, interacts inelastically with a highly 
unlocalized system, S2, in such a way that a probabilistic transition 
occurs, then S1 will localize S2. If an atom or nucleus emits a pho-
ton which travels outwards in a spherical shell, and which is subse-
quently absorbed by a localized third system, the localization of the 
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photon will localize the emitting atom or nucleus with which it was 
quantum entangled.
Postulate 1(A+B) above has been formulated for rearrangement 
collisions. But the postulate is intended to apply to inelastic interactions 
that lead to the creation (or annihilation) of new particles, as in interac-
tions such as e–  + e+ → 2γ. Such interactions require that one employs 
relativistic QT, which is beyond the scope of the present chapter. It 
deserves to be noted, however, that the root idea that probabilistic tran-
sitions occur when new “particles” are created can be interpreted in a 
number of different ways:
(1) There is the option considered above. The inelastic interaction 
must be such that distinct “particle” channels have, associated 
with them, distinct asymptotic states which evolve in accordance 
with distinct Hamiltonians. This means at least that distinct “par-
ticles” have different masses associated with them (so that an 
excited state of a bound system is, potentially, a different “parti-
cle” from the ground state, since the excited state will be slightly 
more massive than the ground state).
(2) As above, except that, for two interaction channels to differ it is 
not sufficient that “particles” associated with the two channels 
have distinct masses; either there are different numbers of “parti-
cles” (counting a bound system as one “particle”) associated with 
different channels, or there is at least one “particle” which has a 
different charge, or force, associated with it.
(3) For a probabilistic transition to occur, rest mass must be con-
verted into energy of “particles” without rest mass (e.g. photons), 
or vice versa.
(4) For a probabilistic transition to occur, fermions must be converted 
into bosons, or vice versa.
Only experiment can decide between these options. The import of this 
chapter, and of previous papers published by the author,7 is that a major 
research effort ought to get underway, both theoretical and experimen-
tal, devoted to exploring and testing rival collapse hypotheses. Only in 
this way will a version of quantum theory be developed that is free of 
the defects of OQT and which also meets with greater empirical success 
than OQT. Only in this way will physics succeed in providing some kind 
of answer to the two childishly elementary, interrelated questions with 
which we began this chapter.
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8.4 Quantum confusions a part of a historical pattern
I conclude with a historical remark. I have argued that the long- standing 
failure to solve the mysteries of the quantum domain – and so to develop 
a fully acceptable version of quantum theory – is due to the misguided 
attempt to understand the probabilistic quantum domain in terms of 
deterministic metaphysical ideas appropriate to the earlier theories of 
classical physics. As a result of the failure to solve the wholly misguided 
traditional wave/ particle problem, Heisenberg, Bohr, Born and others 
developed quantum theory as a theory about the results of performing 
measurements, which seemed successfully to avoid the need to specify 
precisely the nature of quantum systems, but which unintentionally 
led to the creation of a theory with severe, if somewhat surreptitious, 
defects.
This pattern of confusion has occurred on at least two earlier occa-
sions in the history of physics. On these occasions, too, physicists have 
attempted to interpret a new theory in terms of old, inappropriate meta-
physics; the failure of this misguided effort then leads to despair at the 
possibility of interpreting the new theory realistically. It leads to instru-
mentalism, in other words, to the view that physical theories have to 
be interpreted as being about observable phenomena, and not about 
unobservable physical entities such as particles and fields. Eventually, 
however, the new theory may be interpreted in terms of new appropri-
ate metaphysics. Physicists, one might say, are brilliant when it comes 
to equations, but not so brilliant – or at least very conservative – when it 
comes to metaphysics.
An example is Newton’s theory of gravitation, which postulates a 
force at a distance between bodies with mass. The reigning metaphys-
ical idea in Newton’s time was the corpuscular hypothesis, the thesis 
that nature is made up of tiny corpuscles which interact only by con-
tact. This thesis functioned as a standard of intelligibility:  no funda-
mental physical theory could claim to be intelligible if it could not be 
interpreted in terms of the corpuscular hypothesis. The impossibility of 
interpreting Newton’s theory of gravitation in terms of the corpuscular 
hypothesis initially led some of Newton’s most eminent contemporaries 
to reject Newton’s theory. Thus Huygens, in a letter to Leibniz, writes:
Concerning the Cause of the flux given by M. Newton, I am by no 
means satisfied [by it], nor by all the other Theories that he builds 
upon his Principle of Attraction, which seems to me absurd … I have 
 
Karl PoPPer ,  Sc ieNce aNd eNlighteNMeNt230
  
often wondered how he could have given himself all the trouble of 
making such a number of investigations and difficult calculations 
that have no other foundation than this very principle. (Quoted in 
Koyré, 1965, pp. 117– 8)
Newton in a sense agreed, as is indicated by his remark:
That gravity should be innate, inherent and essential to matter, so 
that one body may act upon another, at a distance through a vac-
uum, without the mediation of anything else … is to me so great an 
absurdity, that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a 
competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it. (Quoted in Burtt, 
1932, pp. 265– 6)
The impossibility of interpreting the law of gravitation in terms of the 
corpuscular hypothesis, in terms of action- by- contact, led Newton to 
interpret the law instrumentalistically, as specifying the way bodies move 
without providing any kind of explanation for the motion, in terms of 
unobservable forces. Subsequently, however, Boscovich and others were 
able to conceive of a metaphysical view more appropriate to Newton’s 
new theory, according to which nature is made up of point particles, with 
mass, each point particle being surrounded by a rigid, spherically sym-
metric, centrally directed field of force which varies with distance. Reject 
the corpuscular hypothesis and adopt, instead, this new Boscovichean 
metaphysics, and Newton’s theory ceases to be incomprehensible, and 
becomes the very model of comprehensibility.
Another example is provided by James Clerk Maxwell’s theory of 
electrodynamics. Maxwell himself, and most of his contemporaries and 
immediate successors, sought to interpret the electromagnetic field 
in terms of a material substratum, the hypothetical aether, itself to be 
understood in Newtonian terms. A  tremendous amount of effort was 
put into trying to understand Maxwell’s field equations in terms of the 
aether. Faraday, who appreciated that one should take the electromag-
netic field as a new kind of physical entity, and explain matter in terms 
of the field rather than try to explain the field in terms of a kind of hypo-
thetical matter (the aether), was ignored. The unrealistic character, and 
ultimate failure, of mechanical models of the electromagnetic field led 
many to hold that the real nature of the field must remain a mystery. 
The most that one could hope for from Maxwell’s equations, it seemed, 
was the successful prediction of observable phenomena associated with 
electromagnetism. This instrumentalistic attitude remained even after 
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the advent of Einstein’s special theory of relativity in 1905, which might 
be interpreted as giving credence to the idea that it is the field that is 
fundamental. Gradually, however, Einstein and others came to adopt the 
view that one should see the field as a new kind of physical entity, quite 
distinct from corpuscle and point particle.
There are two lessons to be learned from these episodes, one for 
quantum theory specifically, the other for theoretical physics in gen-
eral. In the first place, quantum theory, if fundamentally probabilistic, 
needs to be formulated as a theory about fundamentally probabilistic 
physical entities – propensitons – however weird these may seem given 
our common sense and classical intuitions. We require a fully micro- 
realistic version of quantum theory which, though testable, says noth-
ing about “observables” or “measurement” in the basic postulates of 
the theory at all. Second, if theoretical physics is to free itself from the 
obstructive tendency to interpret new theories in terms of old, inap-
propriate metaphysics, physicists need to recognize that metaphysical 
ideas are inevitably an integral part of theoretical physics, and need 
to be developed and improved in the light of new theoretical develop-
ments. In previous chapters I  have argued that, in order to construe 
science as a rational enterprise, we need to see physics as making a 
hierarchy of metaphysical assumptions concerning the comprehensi-
bility and knowability of the universe, these assumptions becoming 
increasingly insubstantial, and thus increasingly likely to be true, as 
we ascend the hierarchy.8 According to this “aim- oriented empiricist” 
view, this hierarchy creates a framework of reasonably secure, perma-
nent assumptions (and associated methods) high up in the hierarchy, 
within which much more specific, substantial and fallible assumptions 
(and associated methods), low down in the hierarchy, can be revised 
and improved. If ever the physics community came to accept and put 
into scientific practice this aim- oriented empiricist methodology, then 
the best available metaphysical ideas might lead the way to the dis-
covery of new physical theories, instead of obstructing interpretation 
and understanding of theories that have been discovered (and thus 
also obstructing the discovery of new theories). In one exceptional 
case in the history of physics, the new metaphysics came first, led the 
way, and actually made possible the subsequent discovery of the new 
theory. This happened when Einstein discovered general relativity. 
Einstein first hit upon the metaphysical idea that gravitation is due to 
the curvature of space- time, and then subsequently discovered how 
to capture this idea precisely in the field equations of general rela-
tivity. In stark contrast to the cases of Newtonian theory, Maxwellian 
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classical electrodynamics and quantum theory, general relativity was 
discovered as a result of the prior development of new appropriate 
metaphysics, instead of the discovery of the new theory, if anything, 
being obstructed by current metaphysical ideas, the theory being mis-
understood and misinterpreted by such ideas, once discovered. That 
Einstein’s discovery of general relativity should stand out in this way 
is not, in my view, surprising: in Chapter 3 I argued that Einstein both 
put into practice, and upheld, a conception of science close to that of 
aim- oriented empiricism.
233
  
9
Science, reason, knowledge and  
wisdom: a critique of specialism
9.1 Introduction
In this chapter I  argue for a kind of intellectual inquiry which has, as 
its basic aim, to help all of us to resolve rationally the most important 
problems that we encounter in our lives, problems that arise as we seek 
to discover and achieve that which is of value in life. Rational problem 
solving involves articulating our problems, proposing and criticizing pos-
sible solutions. It also involves breaking problems up into subordinate 
problems, creating a tradition of specialized problem solving – special-
ized scientific, academic inquiry, in other words. It is vital, however, that 
specialized academic problem solving be subordinated to discussion of 
our more fundamental problems of living. At present specialized aca-
demic inquiry is dissociated from problems of living – the sin of special-
ism, which I criticize.
I proceed by discussing two rival views about the nature of intel-
lectual inquiry that I call universalism and specialism.1 My claim is that 
at present the whole institutional structure of academic inquiry, by and 
large, presupposes specialism. Of the two views under consideration it 
is, however, universalism, and not specialism, which provides us with a 
rational conception of intellectual inquiry. Failure to put universalism 
into practice has profoundly damaging consequences for science and 
scholarship, and indeed for life, for our whole modern world. Ideally 
intellectual inquiry ought to help us to tackle rationally those problems of 
living which we encounter in seeking to discover and achieve that which 
is of value in life. Intellectual inquiry ought, in other words, to devote 
reason to the enhancement of wisdom (wisdom being defined here as 
the capacity to discover and achieve that which is of value in life, for one-
self and others – wisdom thus including knowledge and understanding, 
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but much else besides). In fact, at present, scientific, academic inquiry 
gives priority to the achievement of knowledge only, rather than to the 
achievement of wisdom. It is essentially the general adoption of special-
ism which is responsible for the persistence of this highly undesirable 
state of affairs.
9.2 Universalism
According to universalism, a proper, basic task of intellectual inquiry is 
to help us to improve our answers to four universal – or fundamental – 
questions, namely:
(1) What kind of world is this?
(2) How do we fit into the world and how did we come to be?
(3) What is of most value in life and how is it to be achieved?
(4) How can we help develop a better human world?2
In particular, according to universalism, it is a basic task of intellectual 
inquiry to help us to tackle these four fundamental problems in a rational 
fashion and, where many people are involved, in a cooperatively rational 
fashion. Rational problem solving is understood here to involve, at the 
very least, putting into practice the two rules or methods:
(a) Articulate, and seek to improve the articulation of, the problem to 
be solved.
(b) Propose and critically assess possible solutions.3
There is of course more to rational problem solving than this.4 But 
these two rules are understood by universalism to constitute the nub of 
rationality.
Thus, according to universalism, the central and fundamental task 
of intellectual inquiry is to improve the articulation of the above four 
problems, and to propose and critically assess possible solutions to them. 
All other intellectual activity is subservient to this.
It deserves to be noted, in passing, that these four fundamental 
problems can be regarded as components of just one, even more funda-
mental problem – the fundamental problem of all thought and life: How 
can our human world, and the world of sentient life more generally, 
imbued with perceptual qualities, consciousness, free will, meaning and 
value, exist and best flourish, embedded as it is in the physical universe?5 
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It is important that the four basic problems are coalesced into this one 
fundamental problem, so that we are brought face to face with the hor-
rendous issues that arise as to how all that we hold precious in life can 
conceivably exist and flourish if we really are just a part of the physi-
cal universe, everything we do and are being precisely determined by 
physics.
A basic idea of universalism is that ideally it is we ourselves who 
answer the above four questions, as we live. The proper task of reason, of 
thought, of intellectual inquiry, is to help us to arrive at answers that we 
really do wish to give to these questions, answers that do justice to what 
is true and genuinely of value, rather than to determine the answers for 
us. Intellectual inquiry is our servant, not our master. It is not in itself any 
kind of authority or oracle.
There are two further extremely important, elementary rules or 
methods of rational problem solving:
(c) Break up the basic problem to be solved into subordinate, special-
ized, easier- to- solve problems.
(d) Interconnect attempts to solve basic and specialized problems, so 
that the one may influence and be influenced by the other.6
According to universalism, an immense amount of intellectual activity 
arises, quite properly, as a result of putting these two heuristic rules into 
practice. That is, in order to improve our answers to our four basic prob-
lems, we create a vast network of sub- problems and preliminary prob-
lems  – the specialized, technical problems of science and scholarship. 
A great deal of intellectual activity consists in seeking to solve these lim-
ited, technical problems of specialized scientific, academic disciplines. It 
is, however, of supreme importance – according to universalism – that 
we do not lose our way within this network, this maze, of sub- problems. 
If intellectual inquiry is to be rational, it is essential that intellectual 
priority be given to the four fundamental problems, and to the tasks of 
proposing and critically assessing possible solutions to them. In order to 
tackle specialized problems in a rational fashion, in short, it is essential to 
tackle such problems as sub- problems of the four fundamental problems. 
Specialized scientists and scholars, in other words, in order to be ratio-
nal, must also be philosophers or generalists, concerned in their special-
ized work to help us solve our fundamental problems.
Figure 9.1 gives an indication of the way in which specialized aca-
demic disciplines may be conceived, in critical fundamentalist terms, as 
being designed to help us solve the above four basic problems. As the 
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figure indicates, it is essential for the intellectual integrity and rationality 
of intellectual inquiry as a whole that there be a constant two- way flow 
of information between specialized problem solving and fundamental 
problem solving.
A major feature of specio- universalism, as depicted in Figure 9.1, 
is that philosophy is quite different from all the other disciplines of aca-
demic inquiry – physics, history, anthropology, sociology and the rest. It 
is not a specialized discipline at all. It has, as its primary task, to engage in 
rational, that is, imaginative and critical, thinking about our fundamental 
problems, intellectual and practical. Philosophy, so conceived, is not the 
exclusive preserve of trained, expert, academic philosophers; everyone is 
encouraged to do a bit of philosophy, to engage in a bit of thinking about 
fundamental problems  – academics and non- academics, five- year- olds 
and ninety- five- year- olds. In so far as there are professional, academic 
philosophers, their basic job is to encourage non- philosophers, anyone 
and everyone, to do a bit of philosophical pondering. No professional 
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qualifications are required to make a contribution to philosophy. All that 
matters is the quality of the contribution, not the academic status or qual-
ifications of the contributor. Philosophy is open to everyone, but seeks to 
highlight the best of the contributions that have been made over time.
Philosophy differs from other academic disciplines, not only in 
being open to everyone (the qualified and the unqualified), not only in 
everyone being encouraged to participate, but also in its relationship to 
other disciplines, and to other aspects of life. In order to fulfil its vital 
role of ensuring that all four elementary rules of rational problem solv-
ing are implemented by academic inquiry, philosophy must ensure that 
there is a two- way interaction between specialized problem solving in all 
the specialized disciplines and the sustained attempts to solve the four 
fundamental problems of the whole endeavour. Philosophy, according to 
this view, constantly gives rise to new specialized problems, and is itself 
profoundly influenced by our success and failure in seeking to solve spe-
cialized problems. In so far as professional, academic philosophers do 
need to have a qualification, it is in order to have an expert knowledge 
and understanding of one or more specialized fields of study, so that they 
may actively participate in ensuring that fundamental and specialized 
problem solving interact with one another.
In the end, of course, it does not matter what we call those aca-
demics who actively ensure that academia keeps thinking about our 
fundamental problems, and thus implements all four basic rules of prob-
lem solving, as long as the job gets done. There are, however, histori-
cal grounds for holding that it is the proper job of philosophy to do it. 
Once upon a time, in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, philosophers 
instinctively sought to solve fundamental problems – and even tackled 
specialized problems of science and mathematics as well. This is true, for 
example, of Descartes and Leibniz; and thinkers we now regard as scien-
tists, such as Galileo or Newton, did not hesitate to tackle fundamental 
philosophical problems. Since then, however, academic philosophy has 
dwindled in scope and significance until, in the twentieth century, it 
reached its nadir of specialized triviality in the form of Oxford, linguistic 
or analytic philosophy, or of bombastic, anti- scientific obscurity in the 
form of so- called “Continental” philosophy.7
If academic philosophy is to take on the role that specio- 
universalism assigns to it, then it must be radically reformed. A  rev-
olution in philosophy is required. As it is, academic philosophy has 
become so much an esoteric, irrelevant speciality that even those all 
too aware of the failure of academia to keep alive thinking about fun-
damental problems that cut across all disciplinary boundaries never 
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think to blame philosophy for this situation. And yet that is where the 
blame lies. Philosophy has abandoned its proper responsibility to keep 
alive, at the heart of academia, sustained, influential thinking about 
what our fundamental problems are, and how they are to be solved. 
The situation has become so bad that scarcely anyone thinks that that 
is what philosophy ought to be doing.8 And the result is astonishingly 
damaging. It means that academia fails to put rules (a) and (b)  into 
practice and, as a result, fails to put rule (d) into practice as well. Rule 
(c)  is implemented splendidly. As we shall see, academia today is an 
intricate maze of ever more specialized research. But, disastrously, 
rules (a), (b) and (d) are violated. As a result of the retreat of philoso-
phy into specialized triviality, three of the four most elementary rules 
of rational problem solving are violated in a wholesale, structural way, 
by academia today – and this has very damaging consequences for our 
world, as we shall see.
In one important respect, specio- universalism, as just characterized, 
needs to be qualified. It is quite wrong – it may be argued – to suggest that 
the enterprise of seeking to improve our answers to the above four fun-
damental questions is somehow exclusively the concern of intellectual 
inquiry. Literature, theatre, music, art, religion can all be interpreted as 
being concerned to illuminate our responses to these basic questions – 
especially the last two questions. Our whole culture can, in other words, 
be conceived of in universalist terms as being designed, ideally, to help 
us to discover and create that which is of most value in life. In engaging 
in our work, in social and political activity, we should ideally – it may be 
argued – be seeking to develop improved answers in practice to the last 
two questions, in one way or another. Indeed, in our whole way of life – 
in our way of being on this earth – we give implicitly our actual answers 
to such questions, whether we are aware of this or not. And in so far as 
we seek to improve our lives, we seek to improve the actual answers that 
we give to these questions, in the fabric of our actions. Universalism, in 
short, needs to be conceived as a philosophy of life, a social philosophy, a 
philosophy of culture: universalism interpreted as a philosophy of intel-
lectual inquiry is simply a fragment of all this.
Universalism, as just characterized, may seem at first sight to be a 
somewhat autocratic, doctrinaire position, in that it seems to determine 
for us what our problems are and how they should be conceived. For this 
reason, it may at first sight seem unacceptable. For do not our problems – 
even our “universal” or fundamental problems  – change, quite legiti-
mately, from circumstance to circumstance, from person to person, from 
 
ScieNce ,  reaSoN, KNowledge aNd wiSdoM: a crit ique of SPecial iSM 239
  
culture to culture? Can we really ever know for certain what our funda-
mental problems are, how they should be conceived?9
It will I hope become clear, as the argument unfolds, that my basic 
purpose in this chapter is to depict – and argue for – a kind of intellectual 
inquiry specifically designed to offer us maximum help with discovering 
for ourselves, whoever we may be, what our own unique problems of liv-
ing are, how we are to conceive of them, and how we are to set about 
resolving them. My claim is that intellectual inquiry, so designed, is 
universalism. It is intellectual inquiry so designed that it has the kind of 
intellectual– institutional structure depicted in Figure 9.1 above, accord-
ing to which, problems and their discussion are, as it were, hierarchi-
cally organized, with four vague, general, fundamental problems at the 
top, a maze of specific, restricted, precise, specialized problems at the 
bottom, and in between a continuous range of problems, more and less 
specific, interconnecting the top and the bottom by means of the rela-
tionship “Problem P1 is more fundamental than problem P2,” or, equiv-
alently, “Problem P2 is subordinate to problem P1.”
10 A  few universal, 
fundamental problems are needed so that we do not get lost in the maze 
of restricted, specialized problem solving. These fundamental problems 
must be formulated informally, imprecisely, without restricting specific 
presuppositions, just so that all people everywhere, in all societies, cul-
tures and circumstances, can in principle interpret their own more or less 
specific, basic problems as specific versions or interpretations of the four 
fundamental problems, as formulated above. Only this can ensure that 
no one is excluded a priori from entering into rational inquiry by their 
own specific circumstances, view of the world or philosophy of life. In 
addition, we need discussion of more precise, restricted problems so that 
we can make progress with solving our problems, as a result of putting 
into practice the third and fourth of the above four rules of rational prob-
lem solving, (c) and (d).
Universalism needs to be implicit in the way in which our own per-
sonal thinking and problem solving is organized, so that we may have the 
best opportunity to understand and learn from others, even from those 
who think very differently from ourselves – learning from others being 
essential for the development of our own capacity to recognize and solve 
our own problems.11 Universalism needs to be built into education, into 
the intellectual– institutional structure of scientific, academic inquiry, 
and generally, into our whole social, political, economic and cultural 
order, on a worldwide basis, so that learning, understanding and cooper-
ation between people is given every opportunity to flourish.
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There is nothing autocratic or doctrinaire in what I am advocating 
here, just because universalism amounts to a kind of intellectual inquiry, 
a way of thinking or problem solving which, when put into practice, gives 
us our maximum chances of discovering for ourselves what our own 
unique problems are and how they are to be solved, enabling us, ideally, 
to exploit for this purpose the very best thinking or problem solving that 
humanity has to offer. The autocratic and doctrinaire, the dogmatic, arise 
to the extent that we fail to put universalism into practice.
A central task of a kind of academic inquiry that puts universalism 
into practice is, then, actively to promote imaginative and critical – that 
is, rational – thinking about fundamental problems in personal and social 
life. What ultimately matters is the quality of the thinking we engage in 
as we live, guiding our personal and social actions and enabling us, at its 
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best, and if all goes well, to resolve conflicts and problems in increasingly 
cooperative ways so that we may realize what is genuinely of value to us in 
life. Academic thought has, as its ultimate purpose, to promote personal 
and social thought guiding personal and social life. In order to highlight 
this aspect of specio- universalism, here, in Figure 9.2, is another depic-
tion of the view, emphasizing that thinking at its most important and 
fundamental is the thinking we engage in as we live, academic thought 
having, as a basic task, to promote the excellence of personal and social 
thinking guiding personal and social life.
Critical fundamentalist intellectual inquiry can thus incorporate 
all possible conceptions of the world, all religious views, all philosophies 
of life, in all possible social and cultural milieux  – all possible ways of 
conceiving of life’s problems and how they should be tackled. There is 
just one proviso: all these diverse views and values, in being plugged into 
critical fundamentalist inquiry, as it were, must take note of the following 
basic points: many ways of conceiving of the world, life and its problems, 
exist and are possible; whoever we may be, our view as to what sort of 
world this is, and what is of most value in life, is guesswork; we have much 
to learn from others – especially by taking the achievements and failures, 
the views, values and arguments of others seriously, by ourselves engag-
ing, with others, in critical fundamentalist inquiry, as we live. Sincere 
attention to the lives, views and values of others is  desirable – and ought 
to be held to be desirable – within all viewpoints and value systems, since 
this is absolutely essential for mutual understanding in the world, mutual 
learning, mutual cooperation, peace, friendship and love. Much of the 
real richness in life comes from the good things that go on between peo-
ple; and for these good things to happen, sincere attention to the lives, 
views and values of others  – universalism built into the pattern of our 
lives, into the structure of society – is essential.
Universalism takes into account the point, stressed especially by 
Popper in The Open Society and Its Enemies (Popper, 1966a), that social, 
cultural pluralism or diversity is essential for the development of reason 
and science – the development of what Popper has called critical ratio-
nalism. I shall even argue, somewhat analogously to Popper, that ratio-
nal inquiry can be understood as developing as a result of our departure 
from tribal life – from the human compactness and unity of tribal life. 
In sharp disagreement with Popper, however, I wish to argue that such 
things as mutual cooperation, mutual learning, understanding and com-
munication can only flourish within social and cultural diversity if some 
kind of common unity can be discovered within this diversity. We must 
be able to agree at some level about what sort of world this is, and what is 
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desirable and of value. Engaging in cooperative intellectual inquiry – the 
very act of participating in rational discussion – presupposes that it is at 
least possible to discover or create, at some level, common purposes and 
assumptions, an agreed framework, an agreed outlook on life and the 
world. This agreement must, however, accommodate equably the exist-
ing differences. It is in order to do justice to this requirement of unity 
in diversity – essential for cooperative rational discussion and inquiry – 
that universalism postulates or stipulates the above kind of hierarchical 
ordering of problems and their attempted resolution. The hierarchical 
structure of critical fundamentalist inquiry is precisely what we need if 
we are to discover or create, as readily as possible, just, equable agree-
ment within disagreement, unity within diversity. Agreement can be 
sought at the fundamental level:  disagreement and doubt can then be 
rationally explored at less fundamental levels, wherever it arises.
In his best epistemological, social and political thought, Popper is 
centrally concerned to attack authoritarianism, the dogmatic attitude. 
In The Open Society and Its Enemies (Popper, 1966a) this concern takes 
the form of a mighty onslaught upon those major figures in the history 
of Western thought who, in Popper’s view, have failed to come to terms 
with the strains of civilization – the strain of living in an open, pluralistic 
society – and, as a result, have given way to romantic longings for the 
cohesion of the closed society, the tribal way of life. It is this longing, 
this potent false nostalgia for a golden past, which Popper argues has led 
even some of the greatest minds, with the best of intentions, to become 
the enemies of the open society, the enemies of democracy, reason and 
pluralism, and as a result, tragically, actually helping totalitarianism and 
fascism to grow, with all the consequent appalling human suffering of 
our history.
Popper’s diagnosis is of fundamental importance. However, in 
the midst of his ferocious determination to establish once and for all 
the intellectual disreputability and appalling potential human destruc-
tiveness of views which value the tribal way of life, Popper neglects to 
consider the possibility that there is indeed much to value, potentially, 
in the cohesiveness of the tribal way of life which humanity – science, 
reason and civilization – cannot do without.12 It is just this possibility that 
is affirmed here. I shall argue that our departure from the human com-
pactness and unity of tribal life does indeed involve serious loss. Mere 
pluralism is not enough. It is essential that we develop a common unified 
view of the world and ourselves through cultural and social diversity if 
there is to be mutual learning, understanding, and cooperation through 
diversity  – minimal requirements for reason and for civilization. Only 
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universalism can do justice to these apparently conflicting requirements 
of unity and diversity. In our emergence from tribal life into the modern 
world a basic task confronting us is to create and develop unity within 
diversity: only by putting universalism into practice can we achieve this 
in a just, equable, genuinely rational and humane way. Popper’s ideal of 
the “Open Society” needs to be replaced by the ideal advocated in this 
essay of the “Fundamental Society”. It is precisely our failure to establish 
universalism on a worldwide basis that is responsible for so much suf-
fering in modern times, and which indeed at present threatens us all. (I 
refer here to our present worldwide incapacity to cope with fundamental 
problems posed by such things as the population explosion; the continu-
ing rapid depletion of vital, finite natural resources; widespread poverty 
and malnutrition in the developing world; global warming; the prolifer-
ation, indeed the mere existence, of nuclear weapons, which threatens 
to engulf us all in the nuclear holocaust. A critical fundamentalist world 
order is, almost by definition, a world order capable of recognizing its 
fundamental problems and, where possible, developing and putting into 
practice, in a cooperative fashion, just, humane, effective solutions.)
Popper’s failure to recognize the vital need to create or develop a 
version of tribal unity within the diversity, complexity and sheer immen-
sity of the modern world, in order to preserve and develop reason, 
mutual cooperation, humanity and civilization, is intimately connected 
with his analogous failure to recognize the vital role that fundamental 
unifying assumptions play in science, and in academic inquiry in gen-
eral. Scientific, academic inquiry has basic presuppositions about what 
sort of world this is, and what is important or of value in social life, built 
into its whole intellectual– institutional structure, built into the priori-
ties for research, built into its implicit methodology. According to uni-
versalism, these basic presuppositions need to be explicitly articulated 
and scrutinized – thus creating a tradition of discussion of presupposed 
solutions to fundamental problems  – if scientific, academic inquiry is 
to be genuinely rational and rigorous, of maximum human value and 
use. Only by putting universalism into scientific, academic practice can 
we do justice to  – and develop  – the inherent rationality, the intellec-
tually progressive character and the human value of the best of scien-
tific, academic work and thought. As we shall see below, Popper fails 
to characterize adequately the rationality and progressive character of 
science – in that, for example, he fails to solve the problem of induction – 
just because he fails to do justice to the need for fundamental metaphysi-
cal and evaluative assumptions persisting through scientific revolutions, 
scientific diversity.
Karl PoPPer ,  Sc ieNce aNd eNlighteNMeNt244
  
The Open Society and Its Enemies fails to characterize a genuinely 
rational society; The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Popper, 1959) fails to 
characterize a genuinely rational science: both failures are by- products 
of Popper’s basic failure to articulate and advocate the hierarchical struc-
ture of universalism, so essential for genuinely rational, cooperative 
problem solving and inquiry in life as well as thought.
Having argued that we need to recognize, quite generally, that our 
thinking goes on in the world, presupposing a view of the world and a 
view of what is of value in life, I am of course eager to acknowledge that 
my advocacy of universalism in this chapter is intimately bound up with 
a view of what sort of world this is and what is of value in life – a broad, 
general, fundamental answer to the fundamental questions (1)  and 
(3) above. As to the material universe, I hold a view not too dissimilar 
from the overall conception of the world implicit in much of modern 
science – a view of the world which does justice to the probable truth 
of Einstein’s remark that “all our science, measured against reality, is 
primitive and childlike – and yet it is [one of] the most precious thing[s] 
we have” (quoted in Hoffman, 1973, p. viii). I recognize, of course, the 
intellectual legitimacy of conceptions of the world – such as animistic 
and religious views – very different from that of modern science. Critical 
fundamentalist inquiry acknowledges such rivals, and retreats to a more 
modest “common sense” view of the world, designed to be indifferent 
between these rival, explanatorily fundamental views, so that there 
may be a common, agreed base, in terms of which the merits of the rival 
explanatorily fundamental views may be discussed. (Universalism recog-
nizes, in other words, that, in certain contexts, and for certain purposes, 
the epistemologically fundamental may differ from what is presumed to 
be ontologically and explanatorily fundamental.)
As to that which is of value, I hold that all that is of value in existence 
has to do with life, and especially, for us, with human life. Enjoyment 
in living; curiosity and wonder; perceptive awareness, understanding 
and appreciation of significant and beautiful aspects of the world; kind-
ness, laughter, honesty, friendship, love, intimacy, cooperative creative 
work, personal responsibility, happiness,  fulfilment: these are the kind 
of things that are of value. For each one of us, this short life is our only 
opportunity to discover, experience and take part in life of value; all too 
many people in the modern world – especially the developing world – 
lack this opportunity. We need to do all we can to change things so that 
all people everywhere have the opportunity to realize what is of most 
value in life. Value in the world has much to do with the diversity of 
life,  the unique particularity of each individual life. A  uniform world 
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would be a world denuded of value. It is of the essence of value – it is 
essentially desirable and of value – that there be multiplicity and vari-
ety, amongst people, amongst ways of life, amongst societies and cul-
tures. However, if this desirable variety is to flourish in this one crowded 
world, it is essential that we discover how to cooperate, to learn from 
and understand each other, in the midst of this variety. And there is a 
further point. As I have remarked above, much of what is of value in life 
comes directly from good things that go on between people  – mutual 
understanding and appreciation, sharing, intimacy, cooperative cre-
ative work. Such interpersonal or social things, of value in themselves, 
only become possible in a world full of variety if there is cooperation, 
communication, learning and understanding amidst variety. Variety is 
only enriching in so far as there is understanding and learning between 
people amidst variety. It is to help facilitate all this that I advocate uni-
versalism (or critical fundamentalism). Universalism is put forward as a 
conception of learning and problem solving designed, above all, to help 
us resolve more adequately the third and fourth of the above fundamen-
tal problems.
Amongst other things, universalism amounts to a reply to social 
and cultural relativism. Like relativism, universalism acknowledges the 
existence and value of social, cultural and intellectual diversity. Unlike 
relativism, universalism recognizes that we all live in a common world 
in which we all have a real value, and that we all need to learn from one 
another so that mutual understanding and cooperation may flourish – so 
that what is of value in all our lives, potentially and actually, may flour-
ish. The existence of a multiplicity of cultures need not prevent us from 
recognizing our common humanity, our common value, since it is at least 
possible for this multiplicity to be interlaced with and unified by a com-
mon acceptance of universalism.
Adoption of universalism is especially important for societies and 
cultures in the developing world. For in learning from the industrially 
advanced West  – in acquiring the science, technology and industry of 
the West – there is always the grave danger that the indigenous culture 
and social order will simply be annihilated, as opposed to being helped 
to develop and flourish.13 A developing society can only avoid this dan-
ger by articulating, at a fundamental level, basic presuppositions, values 
and problems of the society, so that it becomes possible to discover how 
to develop these presuppositions and values, to solve these problems, in 
the new social and cultural circumstances made possible by the importa-
tion of Western ideas and techniques. Only in this way can such a soci-
ety employ these ideas and techniques discriminatingly, for its own best 
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purposes, instead of becoming a hollow imitation of the Western way of 
life. In addition, of course, the industrially advanced West has a special 
responsibility, in its interactions with the developing world, to construe 
its own social and cultural order in universalist (or critical fundamental-
ist) terms. Only cooperative universalism can enable a mutually desir-
able kind of learning to go on in both directions.
Analogous considerations arise in connection with education. The 
most profound, instinctive and passionate fundamentalist thinkers are 
of course very young children, since all children must, as a practical 
necessity, arrive at working answers to the four fundamental questions 
in order to become human. If education is to develop, and not annihilate, 
instinctively fundamentalist childish thought, then education must itself 
be organized along universalist (or critical fundamentalist) lines.14 Only 
those teachers who learn from their pupils really educate.15
To sum up:  critical fundamentalist inquiry does justice to the 
Socratic and Kantian idea that reason forms a basis for the unity of man-
kind, in such a way as to encourage the flourishing of desirable kinds 
of diversity within this unity; it might be called “the tribal discussion of 
humanity”. Of course, universalism cannot of itself vanquish tyranny, 
exploitation, manipulation, war, terrorism, crime. Universalism does, 
however, hold out the hope that if it is actively promoted in our personal, 
social, intellectual, economic and political lives wherever possible, then 
the spirit and practice of mutual cooperation between people may grad-
ually grow, thus enabling us gradually to dismantle those social and cul-
tural arrangements which tend to breed misunderstanding and mistrust, 
manipulation and exploitation, the use and abuse of power, the dreadful 
spiral of threat, counter- threat and violence.
So much for my preliminary exposition of universalism. I turn now 
to a consideration of the rival doctrine of specialism.
9.3 Specialism
For most scientists, scholars and educationalists today, specialism is a 
much more familiar doctrine than universalism:  my exposition of spe-
cialism can therefore be much briefer. Specialism, unlike universalism, 
is almost exclusively a view of professional, expert, scientific, academic 
inquiry  – even though this view, being embodied in so much present- 
day scientific, academic practice, has far- reaching consequences for all 
our personal, social lives. In complete contrast to universalism, special-
ism insists that only the specialized, technical problems of the various 
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academic disciplines deserve serious intellectual attention. In order to 
be capable of serious scientific or scholarly treatment, in other words, 
a problem must satisfy certain conditions. It must be capable of being 
given an agreed, precise formulation. The problem must have an objec-
tive character, in that experts agree as to how the problem is to be for-
mulated. The nature of the problem must not depend on such subjective, 
personal or idiosyncratic matters as mood, feelings, personal desires, 
attitudes or convictions. There must exist agreed procedures for tack-
ling the problem. Above all, there must be general agreement as to what 
counts as the solution. It must be possible for the problem to receive a 
definitive solution. Academically respectable problems must, in short, 
have many of the characteristics of puzzles – chess or crossword puzzles, 
for  example – as emphasized by Kuhn in connection with what he has 
called “normal” science (Kuhn, 1970a, ch. 4). Such problems arise quite 
essentially within the context of specialized disciplines, where there are 
agreed methods, results, assumptions and procedures. It is precisely by 
excluding all that is vague, ambiguous, controversial, metaphysical or 
philosophical that such academically respectable problems can be for-
mulated or created. In order to be in a position to understand, solve and 
assess proposed solutions to such problems, one needs to be an expert, 
with specialized knowledge of the relevant discipline, its methods and 
results. It is not in general necessary to have broad intellectual or cultural 
sympathies and understanding. By and large, ignorance of social, polit-
ical, religious, moral and philosophical issues lying beyond the scope of 
his discipline does not in any way hamper or disqualify the expert in his 
professional work. A “mere” expert or specialist can be as well equipped 
as anyone to make outstanding contributions to his discipline.
Experts can be in a position to pronounce authoritatively and 
definitively on matters that fall within the field of their specialized 
knowledge. In addition, only experts can be in a position to make such 
authoritative pronouncements: the rest of us cannot legitimately chal-
lenge or criticize expert judgements unless we too have specialized 
knowledge. Scientists and scholars are thus fully justified in ignoring 
criticism of their work and results by “outsiders”, by those without 
expertise. The price that the expert pays, however, in being able to 
make unassailable, authoritative judgements, is that he must confine 
himself, qua expert, to delivering judgements that lie within the limited 
sphere of his professional competence – that small part of his discipline 
about which he does have expert knowledge. He must not in his capac-
ity as expert make pronouncements about broad political, moral, reli-
gious and philosophical issues – the immensely complex human, social 
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problems of real life – which, in their very nature, cannot be amenable 
to specialized, academic treatment.
Specialism may seem to represent an intolerably narrow- minded, 
dogmatic, scholastic conception of intellectual inquiry. All that is adven-
turous, imaginative, speculative, free- ranging and creative may seem to 
be excluded from science and scholarship. Those who defend specialism, 
however, usually do so in terms of the following kind of argument. It is 
precisely by eschewing consideration of imaginative, speculative, impon-
derable issues, and instead concentrating attention on much more lim-
ited, specialized “puzzles”, capable of definitive solutions, that science 
and scholarship have made such giant steps forward in recent times. In 
the end, sustained attention paid to limited, technical problems pays div-
idends, and may even result in a definite solution to some “profound” 
philosophical problem. The problem of how the human race has come 
into existence has been discussed fruitlessly for centuries. Not until the 
work of Darwin was any real contribution made towards solving this 
“philosophical” problem. The crucial point about Darwin’s contribution, 
however, so the argument goes, is that it arose out of painstaking atten-
tion to highly detailed, limited, specialized problems within zoology and 
botany.16
It is, I hope, obvious from the above that according to specialism, 
the four basic problems of universalism lie wholly outside the field of rep-
utable science and scholarship. Inevitably these four problems are such 
that there can be no general agreement as to how they ought to be for-
mulated, or what methods ought to be adopted in seeking to solve them. 
It is most improbable  – perhaps even undesirable  – that there should 
ever be general agreement as to what is to count as a correct, accept-
able solution to any of these problems. And it is extremely unlikely that 
any of them will receive a definitive solution. The four basic problems of 
universalism satisfy none of the requirements which specialism demands 
of academically reputable problems. Thus, according to specialism, dis-
cussion of these four problems has no place at all within scientific, aca-
demic inquiry. Academic inquiry may perhaps produce work that has 
some bearing on the answers we give to the four basic questions, as in the 
case of Darwin’s work. This comes about, however, as a result of aiming 
at solutions of exclusively specialist, technical problems. The four basic 
problems of universalism only have a place within academic inquiry at 
one remove, as it were, within anthropology, sociology or the history of 
ideas. A historian of ideas, for example, may quite legitimately discuss 
the writings of those who have speculated about such problems. Such 
a historian will, however, be concerned to solve specialized problems 
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within his field, concerning the evolution of ideas. He will not concern 
himself with the fundamental problems as such – not if he is to continue 
to function as an intellectually reputable academic.
Extreme versions of specialism  – such as logical positivism  – 
 condemn the four basic critical fundamentalist problems as metaphysical 
and evaluative, and therefore strictly meaningless. Less extreme versions 
of specialism merely place them outside the domain of intellectually 
respectable scientific, academic inquiry.
9.4 Universalism, specialism and intellectual standards
Universalism and specialism uphold diametrically opposed intellectual 
standards.
According to universalism, it is absolutely essential for the ratio-
nality, intellectual rigour and integrity of intellectual inquiry as a whole 
that sustained attention be given to the four basic problems. Indeed, 
this attention needs to be given intellectual priority over all else. All 
other intellectual activity needs to be subservient to the central and 
fundamental activity of imaginatively proposing and critically assess-
ing possible answers to the four basic problems. Only in this case can 
even the most elementary of requirements for rational problem solving 
be realized.
According to specialism, on the other hand, rationality, intellec-
tual rigour and integrity actually demand that the four “basic” problems 
of universalism be placed outside the domain of reputable intellectual 
inquiry. Mature science, authentic scholarship, genuine intellectual 
progress only really get underway when inconclusive philosophical 
debate about fundamental issues has been put firmly aside.17
One important aspect of this difference in intellectual standards is 
that universalism and specialism uphold different conceptions of intel-
lectual progress.
According to universalism, intellectual progress is to be con-
ceived in terms of the success that intellectual inquiry has in enabling 
us to improve our answers to the four fundamental problems, and to 
improve our capacity to tackle these problems in a rational fashion. One 
might say that universalism, ultimately, conceives of intellectual prog-
ress in personal and social terms – in that what is at issue are in fact 
the answers that people give to fundamental questions in their lives. 
Our assessment of intellectual progress will of course depend to some 
extent on the kind of tentative, broad answers that we give to these 
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questions. Intellectual progress itself is no doubt something absolute 
and definite; our assessment of intellectual progress, however, is bound 
to be somewhat tentative, it being possible for there to be a number of 
different legitimate assessments.
According to specialism, on the other hand, intellectual progress 
is to be conceived in terms of the success that intellectual inquiry meets 
with in solving specialized, technical, scientific/ academic problems. 
Progress – or the lack of it – is thus something definite, uncontroversial, 
something about which there can be general agreement. This is espe-
cially true for science. According to specialism, all scientific problems are 
essentially problems we encounter in seeking to predict more and more 
phenomena more and more accurately. Thus scientific progress is to be 
assessed simply in terms of the success we meet with in developing laws 
and theories which predict more and more phenomena more and more 
accurately.18
9.5 Specialism: its dominance and untenability
Actual scientific, academic inquiry, as it exists at present, and has existed 
during the last hundred years or so, amounts to an uneasy admixture 
of universalism and specialism. In many ways, however, specialism 
predominates.
It must of course be acknowledged that some aspects of scientific, 
academic inquiry do exemplify critical fundamentalist standards. For 
example, there can be no doubt that science, technology and scholarship 
have made great progress when viewed from a universalist (or critical 
fundamentalist) perspective. The special and general theories of relativ-
ity and quantum theory have changed profoundly our conception of the 
physical universe. The theory of evolution, and subsequent developments 
since Darwin’s day, have done much to improve our understanding of how 
we fit into the world and have come to be. Our whole conception of the 
cosmos has been utterly transformed during this period. Technological 
research has done much, potentially and actually, to provide us with the 
means to create a better human world. Research in history, archaeology, 
anthropology – and more questionably, research in other social sciences 
and humanities – has deepened our understanding of ourselves, our past, 
our potentialities.
In addition to this there have been many noteworthy “universalist” 
or “critical fundamentalist” thinkers who have consciously sought to help 
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solve one or other of the four fundamental problems. Almost at random, 
one might mention Albert Einstein, Sigmund Freud, Erwin Schrödinger, 
Arthur Eddington, Bertrand Russell, Alfred North Whitehead, Henri 
Poincaré, Carl Gustav Jung, Erich Fromm, Margaret Mead, Karl Popper, 
Carl Sagan, Ernst Friedrich Schumacher, Ivan Illich, Thomas Szasz, 
Friedrich Hayek, Arthur Koestler, George Orwell, Theodore Roszak, 
Jane Goodall, Thomas Nagel, Lynn Margulis, Roger Penrose, Mark Lynas, 
Ronald Higgins, and of course many others also of varying repute.19
In many ways, however, the influence of universalism on actual 
scientific, academic practice is submerged beneath the massive influ-
ence of specialism on all but a minute proportion of scientific, academic 
work. Most scientists and scholars are specialists, concerned only to solve 
specialist problems not consciously conceived of as sub- problems of the 
four fundamental problems. Almost all scientific, academic publications 
are concerned with the resolution of specialist problems. Education is 
shaped primarily by specialist assumptions and standards, especially 
towards the upper end of the educational ladder, culminating as it does 
in the extreme specialism of the PhD thesis. Academic appointments, 
academic honours, academic success, are all judged in terms of specialist 
standards – apart from quite exceptional cases.
Perhaps most crucially of all, the overall organization, the institu-
tional structure, of scientific, academic inquiry exemplifies specialism 
rather than universalism. Universities are split up into relatively auton-
omous faculties:  for example, faculties of physical sciences, biological 
sciences, technology, medicine, humanities or arts. Each faculty is subdi-
vided into a number of relatively autonomous departments correspond-
ing roughly to distinct academic disciplines. On the intellectual level, 
however, the subdivisions proceed further: each discipline is subdivided 
into a number of sub- disciplines; a specialist whose field of expertise 
lies within such a sub- discipline may not even be able to communicate 
 properly  – let  alone share problems  – with colleagues working within 
the same discipline. Such an expert will communicate almost exclusively 
with his fellow specialists scattered throughout the world – thus partici-
pating in what has been called an “invisible college” (Price, 1961).20
The striking point to note about all this is that nowhere is any pro-
vision made whatsoever for sustained, explicit, influential discussion of 
fundamental problems. This does not exist at the level of individual uni-
versities; nor does it exist at the level of published intellectual discussion, 
at the level of “invisible colleges”.21 Scientific, academic inquiry is, in 
other words, organized overwhelmingly in accordance with the intellec-
tual standards of specialism. And recently, this drive towards more and 
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more specialized research has become much, much worse as a result of 
the pressures academics are under to publish, or perish.
All this has dire intellectual consequences – especially, of course, if 
viewed from the perspective of universalism. The remorseless concern to 
solve exclusively specialist problems for their own sake; the  proliferation 
of specialized disciplines (disciplines within disciplines, the autonomy 
of each jealously guarded); the accumulation of specialized results and 
vocabulary; increasingly specialized education (specialist indoctrina-
tion); the absence of informed, critical, non- technical discussion of fun-
damental issues – all these factors combine to make it overwhelmingly 
difficult for anyone to discover, understand and use the fundamentalist 
implications of specialized results. Intellectual inquiry becomes increas-
ingly fragmented and incoherent, increasingly unusable from the stand-
point of helping us to improve our answers to the four fundamental 
questions.
That over- specialization can have undesirable consequences has, 
it is true, been rather widely recognized. This scarcely amounts, how-
ever, to a recognition of the inadequacy of specialism. For if we look 
at what has been done in an attempt to compensate for fragmentation 
brought about by over- specialization, we find that new interdisciplin-
ary subjects have been created, subjects such as biophysics, biochem-
istry, mathematical logic, industrial sociology. This typically specialist 
way of attempting to solve the problem actually, in many ways, serves 
only to make it worse. In seeking to facilitate communication between 
disciplines, additional buffer disciplines are created which only have 
the effect of further obstructing interdisciplinary communication. Thus 
even those who seek to combat some of the bad consequences of spe-
cialism can only adopt specialist methods in seeking to do so – so pow-
erful a hold does specialism exercise over the academic mind – the end 
result being in consequence the exact opposite of what was originally 
intended. What cannot be done, of course, is what is needed most: the 
development of a tradition of influential, informal discussion of funda-
mental problems, feeding into, and being fed by, diverse specialist dis-
cussion. This obvious solution cannot be adopted for the simple reason 
that it involves violating specialist intellectual standards!
A further powerful indication of the increasing predominance 
of specialism over universalism is provided by the way in which aca-
demic philosophy has developed in recent times. Increasingly, aca-
demic philosophers have been concerned to develop philosophy as an 
academically respectable specialized discipline, with its own particular 
problems and methods, existing alongside other academic disciplines. 
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For the vast majority of academic philosophers, progress in philosophy 
is to be achieved by pinpointing and solving technical problems mainly 
conceived as problems of “conceptual confusion” requiring “conceptual 
analysis”.22 Universalism, of course, becomes quite impossible if “philos-
ophy” is pursued in this specialized way. For universalism requires the 
existence of the Enlightenment conception of philosophy:  philosophy 
conceived as the open, non- professional, unspecialized discussion of 
fundamental problems, influencing and being influenced by specialized 
problem solving in all other scientific, academic disciplines. In seeking to 
develop academically respectable, professional, specialized philosophy, 
academic philosophers have sabotaged almost all possibility of develop-
ing intellectual inquiry in critical fundamentalist directions.
Consider the following specialist account of the way in which intel-
lectual inquiry has developed over the centuries.
Intellectual inquiry begins with myth, religion and philosophy. 
Originally, philosophy (or perhaps theology or metaphysics) is the 
queen of the sciences, other intellectual disciplines having only a highly 
subservient, specialized role to play within philosophy. This state of 
affairs exists in the thought of ancient Greece, in the thought of mediae-
val Europe, and, to some extent, in the thought of seventeenth- century 
Europe during the so- called scientific revolution. For Kepler, Galileo, 
Bacon, Descartes, Newton, Spinoza and Leibniz, philosophy and theol-
ogy represented the primary, central disciplines – so much so that sci-
ence was known as “natural” or “experimental” philosophy. Gradually, 
however, successive disciplines emerged out of philosophy, dissociating 
themselves from the parent discipline of philosophy, intellectual success 
and progress being essentially bound up with this long process of dis-
sociation. Over the centuries philosophy has given birth to the auton-
omous disciplines of mathematics, astronomy, physics, logic, biology, 
history, political science, sociology, psychology, cosmology, linguistics 
(the last three or four only having become autonomous in the twentieth 
century). As a result of having bred these autonomous disciplines, phi-
losophy itself has been left in a highly impoverished state. The nature 
and status of philosophy, in other words, have changed dramatically. 
Instead of being the queen of the sciences, overarching all other  sciences, 
philosophy has been transformed into a highly specialized, technical, 
somewhat meagre enterprise, concerned not with improving our knowl-
edge and understanding of the world  – for that is the business of the 
empirical sciences – but rather with clarifying concepts and solving con-
ceptual problems. In line with the general trend, academic philosophy 
seeks to transform itself into a specialized discipline, dissociated from 
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“philosophy” in the original sense of Plato, Spinoza, Leibniz, Diderot, 
Voltaire, Hume or Kant.23
It must be admitted, I think, that this specialist account of intellec-
tual history does considerable justice to the way intellectual inquiry has 
in fact developed over the centuries. Furthermore, this account is today 
in practice widely upheld throughout the scientific, academic world as 
providing us with an adequate description of how intellectual inquiry 
ought to develop. Scientists and scholars have had something like this 
account in mind in pursuing and developing diverse disciplines. Above 
all, most contemporary academic philosophers take for granted the con-
ception of modern philosophy that emerges from this account.24 All of 
which provides a strong indication of the extent to which specialism has 
come to be built into the institutional framework of contemporary scien-
tific, academic inquiry.
Universalism, of course, provides us with a quite different picture of 
how intellectual inquiry ought to develop. If intellectual inquiry begins 
with myth, religion, philosophy, metaphysics, this is because intellec-
tual inquiry begins quite properly with a concern with the above four 
fundamental questions. Intellectual progress requires, of course, the 
development of specialized disciplines concerned to solve diverse sub-
ordinate and preliminary problems. It is of crucial importance, however, 
according to universalism, that this development occurs in such a way 
that we can, all the more readily, tackle the four fundamental questions 
in a rational fashion. The development of autonomous disciplines – the 
essential feature of the specialist account – violates the most elementary 
rules of rational problem solving.
None of the above, however, captures that feature of present- day 
scientific, academic inquiry which constitutes the most blatant and harm-
ful institutional embodiment of specialism. This feature concerns, not so 
much the internal intellectual– institutional structure of scientific, aca-
demic inquiry, but rather the way in which scientific, academic inquiry 
is related to society, to life, and to the problem solving that goes on in all 
our personal and social lives. According to the version of universalism 
that I wish to defend, the basic task of professional scientific, academic 
inquiry is to help all of us to recognize and resolve rationally those prob-
lems we need to resolve in order to discover and achieve that which is 
most desirable and of value in life. The basic task of critical fundamental-
ist academic inquiry is to help us to put universalism into practice in our 
personal, social lives, and to help us to develop a social order, a world, in 
which cooperative rational resolving of our most important personal and 
social life- problems may receive every encouragement. For this goal to be 
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realized, there must be a constant two- way flow of ideas and arguments 
between discussion of fundamental problems in society, as a part of life, 
and discussion of fundamental problems within professional scientific, 
academic inquiry. An intimate, two- way, rational relationship needs to 
exist between society and science, life and scholarship.
At present this vital rational sociocultural relationship scarcely 
exists anywhere. This is largely due to the prevalence of specialism, which 
prohibits the above rational social relationship. Specialism demands pre-
cisely that scientific, academic inquiry, in order to be intellectually rig-
orous, must be such that the intellectual domain of scientific, academic 
inquiry is decisively dissociated from the discussion of problems that goes 
on in society, as a part of life. Scientists and academics, upholding spe-
cialist intellectual standards, have done their utmost to develop and pre-
serve this dissociation – in order, from their own standpoint, to preserve 
rigorous intellectual standards. As a result, the scientific, academic com-
munity has betrayed its most profound intellectual purpose (as seen from 
the perspective of universalism): to help us develop more rational, wiser 
ways of living, a more rational, wiser world. The result of this betrayal, 
not surprisingly, is that the production of specialist knowledge flourishes, 
while wisdom in life, worldwide wisdom, falters.25
Of the two views under consideration, it is universalism, and not 
specialism, which provides us with a rational, intellectually rigorous con-
ception of intellectual inquiry.
In assessing the relative merits of the competing doctrines of uni-
versalism and specialism, it is vital to recognize that universalism fully 
acknowledges the immense value of  – indeed the absolute necessity 
for – specialized scientific, academic work and thought. It is often only 
by putting into practice the two basic rules of rational problem solving 
(c) and (d), formulated above in section 9.2, that it is possible to make 
any headway with improving our solutions to our fundamental problems. 
Specialized problem solving, specialized scientific, academic work is 
absolutely essential, according to universalism, for rational problem solv-
ing in general.26 And of course most of the time it is quite specific, highly 
specialized versions of our four fundamental problems that we need to 
solve in any case – made quite specific to a time and place, a person or 
group of persons, a specific need or trouble. The decisive additional point 
insisted on by universalism is that it is absolutely essential to put into 
practice rules (a) and (b) too. There must be a sustained rational discus-
sion of our common, fundamental problems both within the scientific, 
academic community and within society, intimately interconnected with 
specialized scientific, academic problem solving, if intellectual inquiry is 
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to serve our best interests in a genuinely rigorous, rational fashion. It is 
legitimate, even desirable, that many individual scientists and scholars 
be absorbed by the pursuit of highly restricted, specialized topics and 
problems. What is vital is that the overall intellectual– institutional struc-
ture of scientific, academic inquiry, and of society itself, accords with 
the kind of hierarchical structure required by universalism – sustained, 
explicit attention being given to fundamental problems. Failure to put 
into practice – to institutionalize – this vital critical fundamentalist per-
spective must inevitably lead to the fragmentation and trivialization of 
intellectual inquiry, and to a general incapacity to tackle cooperatively 
and effectively mankind’s fundamental problems. The institutionalizing 
of specialism, however, obliges us to neglect the critical fundamentalist 
perspective. As a result we cease to tackle rationally just those problems it 
is most important for us to tackle rationally. While diverse sub- problems 
may be brilliantly tackled, our most general and important problems fall 
into neglect.
The motivation for insisting that it is of the essence of rationality 
to articulate our basic problems, and to propose and criticize possible 
solutions, is really very simple. If we do this, we give ourselves the best 
chance of seeking to solve those subordinate problems which are rele-
vant to our main objectives. If we do not do this, the chances are that we 
will become engaged in seeking to solve sub- problems which are entirely 
misconceived or wholly irrelevant from the standpoint of achieving 
our basic objectives. Putting specialism into practice, in other words, is 
almost bound to lead to a mass of problem- solving activity which is mis-
conceived or irrelevant from the standpoint of what matters most in life – 
a fair comment, I suggest, on a great deal of scientific, academic inquiry 
as pursued at present.27
What if no serious doubts really arose as to how we should answer 
the fundamental questions: What kind of world is this? How do we fit 
in? How have we come to be? What is of most value in life and how is 
it to be realized? How can we help develop a better human world? In 
that case universalism would be somewhat redundant. Serious doubts 
presumably would only arise in connection with much more specific, par-
ticular issues. But this is not our situation. The above questions are all 
profoundly problematic, even if many people appear not to recognize the 
fact. Our greatest uncertainties simply do arise in connection with our 
most general and important problems. This being the case, it is essential 
that we give due intellectual emphasis to the critical discussion of these 
problems, granted that we seek to develop a genuinely rational kind of 
intellectual inquiry.
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Specialism is thus to be rejected, on the grounds that it provides 
us with a conception of intellectual inquiry that is both irrational and 
humanly undesirable, these two features indeed being intimately con-
nected. Instead of prompting us to attend to what is most important and 
problematic, specialism does precisely the opposite!
The harmfulness of specialism does not lie in its tendency to 
encourage specialized puzzle solving. Universalism, too, insists on the 
vital importance of such puzzle solving. Nor need the harmfulness of spe-
cialism lie primarily in any tendency actively to suppress inquiry into fun-
damental problems. An upholder of specialism may simply see thought 
about fundamental problems as yet another specialized intellectual 
enterprise  – grotesquely bankrupt intellectually, it is true, but scarcely 
deserving to be suppressed for all that. No, the real harmfulness of spe-
cialism arises from the fact that it appears to justify the pursuit of spe-
cialized problem solving divorced from the consideration of fundamental 
assumptions and problems. Worse, specialism holds that intellectual 
integrity and respectability actually demand that fundamental assump-
tions – vague, conjectural, controversial – be excluded from specialized 
inquiry. As a result, the adoption of specialism leads to the development 
of specialized inquiries, within a multitude of diverse disciplines, all of 
which become immune to elementary, outside, fundamental criticism.
This feature of specialism is responsible for such widespread intel-
lectual corruption in present- day scientific, academic inquiry, that it 
deserves further comment. The key point that needs to be recognized 
is that it must always be irrational and undesirable to pursue special-
ized problems isolated from all consideration of fundamental problems. 
This is because the whole paraphernalia of specialized problem solving, 
as described above, actually requires us to give answers to fundamen-
tal problems. Choice of problems, formulation of problems, methods of 
attack, criteria for acceptable solutions, criteria for progress – all these 
essential features of specialized problem solving implicitly presuppose 
more or less broad answers to the four basic questions – answers all too 
likely to be more or less false or unacceptable and standing in need of 
improvement. If specialized puzzle solving cuts itself off from all critical 
consideration of fundamental issues (as specialism requires), then such 
puzzle solving becomes irrational in the straightforward and basic sense 
that implicit, influential and controversial assumptions are made which 
are permanently protected from critical assessment. Only by openly 
acknowledging the basic metaphysical and evaluative presuppositions 
implicit in specialized puzzle solving can such puzzle solving become 
genuinely rational.
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It is above all the enormous success of science – conceived of in tra-
ditional empiricist terms – which has seemed to provide the most pow-
erful case for specialism, and for the central assumption that specialized 
problem solving needs to be dissociated from fundamental assumptions 
and problems.
According to universalism, a basic task of science is to help us to 
improve our answers to the question “What kind of world is this?” Thus, 
according to universalism, a genuinely rational science, putting into 
practice the two most elementary rules of rational problem solving, gives 
intellectual priority to the task of proposing and criticizing answers to 
this question. Proposing and criticizing rival comprehensive metaphys-
ical views about the nature of the universe, the nature of reality, consti-
tutes, in other words, a central intellectual activity of a genuinely rational 
science.
Metaphysical assumptions at this level will influence drastically 
more restricted, specialized scientific problem solving  – the kind of 
methods adopted, the kind of theories developed and tested. Thus if 
we believe ourselves to be in some kind of animistic universe – or in an 
Aristotelian universe – we will adopt different methods and develop dif-
ferent theories from those which we will adopt and develop if we hold, 
in Galileo’s words, that “the book of Nature is written in the language of 
mathematics”. The success of modern science, according to this stand-
point, is due in large measure to the fortunate choice of a comprehensive 
metaphysical conception of Nature – shared by Kepler, Galileo and their 
successors – which sets the stage for a characteristic kind of specialized 
problem solving. According to this critical fundamentalist standpoint, 
then, science needs to be understood in terms of an interplay between 
fundamental and specialized problem solving, fundamental ideas and 
methods evolving with evolving specialized knowledge, this, in part, 
explaining the explosive growth of scientific knowledge. As our scientific 
knowledge improves, our knowledge about how to improve our knowl-
edge – our methods – improves as well. All this illustrates the four rules of 
rational problem solving formulated above.28
Just this critical fundamentalist conception of science – 
 exemplifying elementary rules of rational problem solving – is, how-
ever, rejected absolutely by almost all contemporary scientists and 
philosophers of science. For, according to traditional empiricist concep-
tions of science – almost universally taken for granted within the scien-
tific community – it is the essential, defining characteristic of science 
that scientific theories are selected impartially with respect to empir-
ical success, independently of their compatibility or incompatibility 
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with comprehensive metaphysical assumptions about the nature of the 
world. Many, of course, acknowledge that simplicity considerations 
play an important role in the assessment of scientific theories in 
addition to empirical considerations (for example Mach, Duhem and 
Poincaré); the decisive point, however, is that biased preference for 
simple theories in science is not interpreted as committing science to 
the metaphysical, and possibly false, assumption that the universe itself 
is simple. According to this traditional empiricist standpoint, science 
is successful precisely because theories are selected impartially with 
respect to empirical considerations isolated from all a priori metaphys-
ical assumptions about the nature of the world. This was one of Bacon’s 
main points. (Descartes disagreed; but with the downfall of Cartesian 
science, and the success of Newtonian science, generally and wrongly 
held to incorporate Baconian inductivism, Cartesian universalism was 
rejected by the scientific community.) The diverse philosophies of sci-
ence of inductivism (Bacon and Mill), conventionalism (Duhem and 
Poincaré) and logical empiricism (Carnap, Hempel and Nagel) all take 
for granted that in science theories are selected with respect to empir-
ical success alone, unbiased by metaphysical assumptions about the 
nature of the universe as a whole. Even those thinkers who acknowl-
edge the importance of a priori metaphysical ideas (Descartes, Spinoza, 
Leibniz, Kant) miss the essential point of the critical fundamentalist 
conception of science outlined above. For instead of emphasizing that 
our fundamental metaphysical ideas about the nature of the universe 
are conjectures, more or less bound to be false, and therefore needing 
constant critical scrutiny and development within science, these think-
ers, on the contrary, seek to show, in one way or another, that funda-
mental metaphysical assumptions or principles can be conclusively 
established by reason, by argument. In effect empiricists and so- called 
“rationalists” agree on one main point: metaphysical principles, unver-
ifiable by experience, have a legitimate place in science only if they can 
be conclusively established by reason. Rationalists defend the existence 
of such principles; empiricists, correctly, reject this possibility. Both 
parties miss the essential point: metaphysical principles play a decisive 
role in science; these principles are, however, conjectures, more or less 
bound to be false. Hence, if science is to be rational, it is essential that 
these principles be articulated, criticized and developed as an integral 
part of the scientific enterprise. Even Russell, it should be noted, misses 
this point. Russell (1948) recognizes that scientific method implicitly 
makes substantial metaphysical presuppositions about the world; he 
fails, however, to draw the critical fundamentalist conclusion from this, 
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namely that a genuinely rational science seeks to improve its metaphys-
ical presuppositions, and its methods, as it progresses.29
The point is decisively rejected even by Popper. Popper has many 
critical fundamentalist arguments and remarks to his credit. His book 
The Open Society and Its Enemies (1966a) tackles an issue central to uni-
versalism. Popper emphasizes that metaphysical ideas have often played 
a highly fruitful role in science (1959, pp.  19, 38 and 277– 8). He has 
emphasized the importance of “metaphysical research programmes” 
for science, some science, in his view, even amounting to metaphysi-
cal research programmes (for example, in his view, the theory of nat-
ural selection) (1976a, pp.  148– 51, and sections 33 and 37).30 He has 
argued that metaphysical ideas can be assessed rationally, as more or 
less adequate, tentative solutions to problems (1963, pp. 193– 200). He 
has stressed that intellectual inquiry needs to be organized, not in terms 
of subject matter and disciplines, but rather in terms of problems and 
attempts to solve problems (1963, pp.  66– 7). He has emphasized that 
science at its best is cosmology  – the attempt, in effect, to answer the 
question “What kind of world is this?” (1959, p. 15; 1963, p. 136). He has 
argued for philosophy conceived as a part of our attempt to improve our 
knowledge and understanding of the world, and against the view that 
philosophy is merely specialized “puzzle solving”, or conceptual analysis 
(1963, pp. 67– 96 and 136). Finally, he has explicitly condemned special-
ism. Thus, commenting on the attitude of mind of the normal scientist, as 
described by Kuhn, Popper remarks:
I admit that this kind of attitude exists: and it exists not only among 
engineers, but among people trained as scientists. I can only say 
that I see a great danger in it and in the possibility of its becoming 
normal (just as I see a great danger in the increase of specialization, 
which also is an undeniable historical fact): a danger to science 
and, indeed, to our civilization. (Popper, 1970, p. 53)
Elsewhere, as I have already noted, he remarks:
If the many, the specialists, gain the day, it will be the end of science 
as we know it – of great science. It will be a spiritual catastrophe 
comparable in its consequences to nuclear armament. (Popper, 
1976b, p. 296)
Nevertheless, the central tenet of Popper’s thought in effect lends strength 
to a mainstay of specialism, namely traditional empiricism. Much of 
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Popper’s later writings elaborate and apply the main thesis of his first 
book The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959). There Popper seeks to solve 
a problem central to traditional empiricism, namely how to demarcate 
science from metaphysics. Popper’s solution, of course, is that a theory, 
in order to be scientific, must be experimentally falsifiable. A discipline, 
in order to be scientific, must assess theories solely with respect to empir-
ical considerations, priority being given to those theories which have best 
survived severe testing and are most amenable to being severely tested. 
In other words, Popper, along with Bacon, Mill, Duhem, Hempel and oth-
ers, is centrally concerned to drive a sharp and decisive wedge between 
the assessment of specialized, partial solutions to scientific problems 
(laws and theories) and the assessment of solutions to the fundamental 
problem of science, namely metaphysical answers to the question: What 
kind of world is this? In Conjectures and Refutations Popper makes the 
matter altogether explicit when he defends “the principle of empiricism 
which asserts that in science, only observation and experiment may 
decide upon the acceptance or rejection of scientific statements, includ-
ing laws and theories” (1963, p. 54). Dramatically and decisively, Popper 
rejects the basic tenet of the critical fundamentalist conception of sci-
ence, as outlined above.
However, as we have seen, and as I have argued at greater length 
elsewhere,31 this “standard empiricist” viewpoint is unacceptable. The 
insolubility of the problem of induction as formulated, for example, by 
Popper, shows clearly that scientific laws and theories  – solutions to 
specialized scientific problems – cannot be assessed solely with respect 
to empirical success, in an entirely impartial fashion. If we honestly 
attempted to select theories in this way, we would always be over-
whelmed by a vast number of complex, empirically successful theories, 
and we would fail to select the theories we do actually select in science. 
In practice, in science selection of theories is permanently biased in 
the direction of simplicity and unity, even to the extent of overruling 
mere empirical success. This means that in scientific practice, whether 
we recognize it or not, we presuppose that the universe has some kind 
of underlying unified structure (or at least that it behaves as if it had 
such an underlying structure, to a high degree of approximation). In 
other words, science is only possible in so far as a more or less specific, 
tentative answer is given to the question “What kind of world is this?” 
Much of the success of modern science depends upon the aptness of 
this answer – so we may well judge. The answer is built into the whole 
methodology of science. In order to pursue science in a genuinely ratio-
nal fashion, in a fashion which gives us the best hope of making real 
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progress in improving our knowledge and understanding, we need to 
propose and criticize modified versions of our answer to the question 
“What kind of world is this?” as an integral part of science. We need 
to do this in an attempt to improve further the methods, and the suc-
cess, of science. We need in short to put universalism into practice. Any 
attempt, like Popper’s, to characterize science in terms of fixed methods 
which select theories solely with respect to empirical success (and the 
lack of it) must fail to solve the problem of induction – simply because 
science, so characterized, violates the two most basic rules of rational 
problem solving.32 In addition, the vital capacity of science to develop 
improved methods with improving knowledge, such an essential feature 
of scientific progress, must inevitably be missed out.33 Instead of hold-
ing speculation about the ultimate nature of the universe to be meta-
physical, philosophical, and thus of questionable scientific status, if not 
downright unscientific or even meaningless, we need, rather, actively to 
pursue such speculation, imaginatively and critically, as an integral part 
of science itself. We need to put into practice the kind of critical funda-
mentalist way of doing science so brilliantly initiated and exploited by 
Einstein, in developing the special and general theories of relativity.34
That specialized scientific problem solving requires some kind of 
answer to be given to the question “What kind of world is this?” has been 
vividly and dramatically demonstrated by Kuhn in his book The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions (1970a). Kuhn establishes convincingly that the 
“puzzle solving” of normal science depends upon the acceptance of a 
paradigm – in effect a Weltanschauung, a view of the world, for a given 
scientific discipline. One might well suppose that Kuhn, having realized 
this crucial point, this decisive objection to specialism, would go on to 
defend universalism, and the need for sustained development and criti-
cism of “paradigms” as an integral part of science. Kuhn, of course, does 
exactly the opposite. Discussion of fundamental issues has, for Kuhn, 
no place within a “mature” science.35 Furthermore, for Kuhn, changes 
of paradigm  – scientific revolutions  – inevitably involve a breakdown 
of rationality. Instead of emphasizing that rational assessment of para-
digms is essential for the rationality of the whole of science – as univer-
salism does – Kuhn, on the contrary, declares that choice of paradigm in 
general lies beyond the scope of reason (see Kuhn, 1970a, ch. 12). Kuhn, 
in short, is quite unable to conceive of non- specialist standards of ratio-
nality. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn, 1970a) brilliantly 
reveals the glaring defect of specialism, and yet, perversely, is itself a 
defence of specialism, of specialist intellectual standards. This provides 
yet another illustration of the powerful hold that specialism has over 
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the academic mind – especially when one takes into account the great 
success of Kuhn’s book in academic circles.
The profound irrationality of science as depicted by Kuhn in his 
book can perhaps be brought out by considering the following compari-
son. Our problem, let us suppose, is to wend our way through an obstacle- 
strewn path, from A to B (from ignorance to knowledge). Kuhn’s advice is 
to proceed as follows. Standing at A, arrive at a general idea as to how to 
get to B (a paradigm); then, with head down – one might almost say with 
eyes shut – set off, sticking rigidly to this general idea. Even if you bump 
into a wall, fall into a ditch, or get tangled in brambles (anomalies), nev-
ertheless adhere rigidly to your route (normal science). However, if you 
seem to have got into permanent difficulties (crisis), you may open your 
eyes, look around, and hit upon a new route (revolution), which, how-
ever, you must stick to as rigidly as before (new phase of normal science).
This blind blundering about may eventually bring you to your 
goal, B. It is hardly, however, the most intelligent, the most rational way 
to proceed.
A rather more sensible procedure is to keep one’s eyes open, and 
continuously adjust one’s route (paradigm) in the light of what one sees 
and learns on one’s way from A to B. In order to pursue science intelli-
gently and rationally, in other words, we need to reconsider, explicitly 
and persistently, our most fundamental paradigmatic ideas as an inte-
gral part of science. Instead of adhering blindly and dogmatically to some 
paradigm until our difficulties have become overwhelming and we are 
forced to reconsider, we need rather to attempt to improve our paradigm 
even before insoluble empirical problems overwhelm us, taking into 
account important a priori considerations such as simplicity, coherence, 
unity, intelligibility, comprehensiveness. This was the way Einstein devel-
oped the special and general theories of relativity; Einstein was much too 
intelligent, and much too interested in discovering the “thoughts of God”, 
to follow Kuhn’s advice.36
To sum up this part of the discussion, specialized scientific prob-
lem solving cannot proceed unless some kind of answer is given to the 
question “What kind of world is this?” This answer is almost bound to be 
more or less wrong, standing in need of improvement. Hence it needs 
explicit, sustained, critical discussion.37 Specialized scientific problem 
solving dissociated from such critical fundamentalist discussion is irra-
tional, as our glance at Popper’s and Kuhn’s work has shown.
Analogous considerations arise in connection with all other spe-
cialized academic disciplines, and in connection with the other three 
fundamental problems. Inevitably, in pursuing specialized lines of 
 
 
Karl PoPPer ,  Sc ieNce aNd eNlighteNMeNt264
  
research, in history, for example, in literary criticism, anthropology, 
sociology, psychology, medical research or engineering, we presuppose 
some kind of rough and ready answer to one or other – or to all – of the 
four fundamental questions, this answer influencing our choice of prob-
lems, criteria for successful solutions, and so on. Since such implicit and 
influential answers are all too likely to be more or less inadequate, it is 
essential, for rationality, that these answers be explicitly articulated and 
critically assessed, as an integral part of specialized problem solving.38
In recent years a number of writers  – so- called “externalist” his-
torians of science and sociologists of knowledge – have argued in effect 
that specialized scientific, academic problem solving is substantially 
influenced by the social and cultural circumstances in which it proceeds. 
Material conditions, religious, political, moral and social ideals, human 
interests and values of one kind or another, all influence intellectual 
inquiry.39 (This may be understood as a generalization of the Kuhnian 
point that specialized scientific problem solving is influenced by para-
digmatic assumptions.) Specialism insists that such non- rational influ-
ences must be kept to a minimum, and must be excluded altogether when 
results are being assessed, if intellectual inquiry is to retain its rationality 
and objectivity. Universalism, on the other hand, insists that such influ-
ences must be openly acknowledged and critically scrutinized if intel-
lectual inquiry is to be rational and objective. If our task is to discover 
what is of value in life, and to help develop a better human world, then of 
course our thinking must not be dissociated from our personal and social 
lives, from our material circumstances, our political, moral and religious 
ideals, our desires and values. A basic task of intellectual inquiry must be 
to promote more rational problem solving in life, thus gradually helping 
us to develop a more rational human world; intellectual inquiry must not 
merely seek to shield itself from the corrupting influences of an irrational 
society, as specialism would have it.
Most contemporary externalist historians of science and sociolo-
gists of knowledge would probably agree that the specialist programme 
of excluding social and cultural influences from intellectual inquiry can-
not succeed, and is even perhaps incoherent. One might suppose that as 
a result of recognizing the general untenability of specialism, these writ-
ers would advocate and practise universalism. In fact, one finds nothing 
of the kind. Perversely, like Kuhn, these writers continue to accept and 
practise specialism – contributing to the highly specialized disciplines of 
history of science and sociology of knowledge. The main implication of 
their work is to undermine specialism; but if those who do this work do 
not themselves see this implication, how can anyone else be expected to 
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see it? Once again we see the extraordinarily powerful hold that special-
ism has over the contemporary academic mind.40
Specialism, then, quite generally, must be rejected. All specialized 
problem solving dissociated from fundamental problem solving must be 
held to be seriously irrational.
This simple point has profound and far- reaching implications for 
the whole of scientific, academic inquiry, and for education. For we 
have seen that scientific, academic inquiry is on the whole at present 
organized, institutionalized, along specialist, rather than critical fun-
damentalist, lines. The urgently needed enterprise of discussing funda-
mental problems in an informal, informed, critical manner – in a manner 
capable of influencing, and being influenced by, specialized problem 
 solving – is obstructed by the prevalence of irrational specialist intellec-
tual standards.
9.6 Why does specialism prevail?
If universalism, and not specialism, provides us with a rational concep-
tion of intellectual inquiry, why is it that it is specialism which exercises 
the predominant influence over most actual scientific, academic work?
The question becomes all the more poignant when we realize how 
little is new or original in the critique of specialism offered here. Writing 
over seventy years ago now, Aldous Huxley said:
Artistic creation and scientific research may be, and constantly are, 
used as devices for escaping from the responsibilities of life. They 
are proclaimed to be ends absolutely good in themselves – ends so 
admirable that those who pursue them are excused from bother-
ing about anything else. This is particularly true of contemporary 
science. The mass of accumulated knowledge is so great that it is 
now impossible for any individual to have a thorough grasp of more 
than one small field of study. Meanwhile, no attempt is made to pro-
duce a comprehensive synthesis of the general results of scientific 
research. Our universities possess no chair of synthesis. All endow-
ments, moreover, go to special subjects – and almost always to sub-
jects which have no need of further endowment, such as physics, 
chemistry and mechanics. In our institutions of higher learning 
about ten times as much is spent on the natural sciences as on the 
sciences of man. All our efforts are directed, as usual, to produc-
ing improved means to unimproved ends. Meanwhile intensive 
 
 
Karl PoPPer ,  Sc ieNce aNd eNlighteNMeNt266
  
specialization tends to reduce each branch of science to a condi-
tion almost approaching meaninglessness. There are many men of 
science who are actually proud of this state of things. Specialized 
meaninglessness has come to be regarded, in certain circles, as a 
kind of hall- mark of true science. Those who attempt to relate the 
small particular results of specialization with human life as a whole 
and its relation to the universe at large are accused of being bad 
scientists, charlatans, self- advertisers. The people who make such 
accusations do so, of course, because they do not wish to take any 
responsibility for anything, but merely to retire to their cloistered 
laboratories, and there amuse themselves by performing delight-
fully interesting researches. Science and art are only too often a 
superior kind of dope, possessing this advantage over booze and 
morphia: that they can be indulged in with a good conscience and 
with the conviction that, in the process of indulging, one is leading 
the “higher life”. (Huxley, 1938, pp. 276– 7)
In fairness to Huxley – in order to excuse the mildness of his words here – 
we must remember how long ago this passage was written. Since that 
time, before the Second World War, everything that Huxley spoke of has 
of course become much worse.
How and why has this happened? In fact, of course, anyone who 
has sought to put universalism into practice, and who has explored spe-
cialized problems for the light they throw on fundamental problems, will 
have no difficulty in answering this question. Here, briefly, are seven fac-
tors responsible for the ever- increasing tyranny of specialism.
1. We fail to put universalism into practice primarily because, as Huxley 
points out, we fail to take up a measure of personal responsibility for the 
world in which we find ourselves. And we fail to take up such personal 
responsibility because of the enormous difficulties that we must inevita-
bly encounter at present in seeking to do so.
These difficulties have arisen as a kind of unforeseen side- effect of the 
way in which our human world has evolved throughout recorded history. 
For consider the way in which the problem arises for those who live in 
the kind of “human world” experienced by people in prehistorical times – 
small, closely knit hunting and gathering tribes. In such circumstances, 
the difficulties that we experience in attempting to assume some personal 
responsibility for our world do not really arise. Adults, and even children, 
can without great difficulty assume some measure of personal respon-
sibility for the welfare of the tribe as a whole. All the members of the 
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tribe are known to each individual personally. Relationships of mutual 
interdependence are experienced daily, on a personal basis, in hunting, 
gathering food and so on. Obligations, responsibilities towards the tribe, 
can be experienced in a personal, emotional way, in terms of known 
individuals, in much the same way as we can experience responsibilities 
towards our family today. (Perhaps the modern family should be under-
stood as a contraction of the prehistorical tribe.) All members of the tribe 
have a common outlook on things, a common cosmology and system of 
values. Thus barriers to intimacy, to mutual understanding, do not arise 
as a result of differences of outlook and values. Individuals do not face 
agonizing problems of deciding who they are, how they should live, what 
there is to give meaning and value to life. On the contrary, the meaning 
and value of life as lived by the tribe is assured, and is even beyond ques-
tion, in that no alternative is conceivable. Finally, because of the relative 
smallness of the tribe, each individual makes a personal impact on the 
life of the tribe as a whole, and can be well aware of this impact. The 
tribe, as it were, acknowledges the existence, value and potency of the 
individual, and is clearly affected by the actions of the individual.41
Time passes; agriculture is invented; societies become bigger, more 
complex, specialized and diversified, requiring much more elaborate, 
fixed organization. Inter- tribal trade develops; tribes coalesce. Modern 
methods of travel, transport and communication develop. As a result, our 
tribe has become the whole human world, humanity, even, perhaps, life 
on earth in general.
As a result of these historical developments, the task of assuming 
some personal responsibility for our common human world has been 
transformed utterly, and has become almost inconceivably more difficult. 
Our task is not only to take on some responsibility for the welfare of those 
who are known intimately to us; rather, in addition, our task is to assume 
some responsibility – at least to some extent – for the welfare of millions 
upon millions of complete strangers. No doubt our own welfare is closely 
bound up with the lives, actions and welfare of many of these millions 
of strangers through international relationships such as trade; such rela-
tionships of mutual interdependence are, however, remote, abstract, not 
experienced daily on a personal basis. We cannot conceivably experience 
direct, emotional ties with these millions upon millions of strangers as 
we do with our friends and members of our own family. Millions of our 
fellow human beings live lives, see the world and have values in many 
ways very different from our own. Not only does this create barriers to 
mutual sympathy and understanding; responsible concern to under-
stand others, to enter into their different worlds, must inevitably lead us 
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to question the basic assumptions, practices and values of our own world. 
The immense diversity of ways of life, cultures, social systems, views of 
the world and systems of values with which we are confronted in con-
sidering our common human life on this planet must inevitably, at some 
level, plunge us into doubt and indecisiveness about how to live, what 
to choose, what to believe and value. And finally, when put into the con-
text of the whole human world, our own life and actions must inevitably, 
and quite properly, seem to shrink almost to a vanishing point. Unless 
we possess quite exceptional personal power or influence  – something 
that is perhaps inherently undesirable – all that we do with our lives will 
have almost no kind of impact or effect whatsoever on the human world 
as a whole. From this standpoint we are, individually, insignificant and 
impotent – which may not exactly encourage us to conceive of our world 
and ourselves from such a standpoint.
For all these reasons it is extraordinarily difficult for the indi-
vidual today to assume some personal responsibility for our common 
world. In earlier times this failure did not perhaps matter so much 
since our power to bring about worldwide changes was strictly limited. 
Quite suddenly, however, we have developed the capacity to make 
drastic changes to our whole world. As a result, our common evasion 
of responsibility has become extremely dangerous for us all. Disasters 
result. War, starvation of millions, immense imbalances of wealth 
and power on a worldwide basis, the population explosion, reckless 
squandering of irreplaceable natural resources, international poli-
tics conducted like gang warfare, the widespread existence of brutal 
dictatorships, criminal psychopaths (like Hitler, Papa Doc, Amin and 
Assad) even seizing and holding power, the worldwide accumulation 
of armaments, the constant threat of the nuclear holocaust, and above 
all global  warming – all these familiar worldwide dangers and disas-
ters are the direct outcome of our general failure to assume personal, 
adult responsibility for our world.
The members of a small tribal society can, without great difficulty, 
confront and tackle common problems of the tribe, in a cooperative, 
responsible fashion. Tribal meetings can be convened at which every-
body can be free to articulate problems, and propose and criticize pos-
sible solutions.
In our modern world this cannot be done. The population of 
the earth cannot hold a meeting to discuss common problems where 
everyone is free to speak. And yet something like this must exist if gen-
eral understanding of, and responsibility towards, our common human 
problems is to develop at the personal level – something that we must 
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develop if we are to be able to cope with the dangers and disasters 
just indicated. We cannot rely on existing institutions, existing centres 
of power, existing governments, whether democratic or dictatorial: all 
this is all too blatantly failing at present to cope adequately, that is, 
humanely and rationally, with our problems. In the end the point is 
very simple. In the absence of general understanding of, and respon-
sibility towards, our problems, genuinely democratic governments 
responsive to public opinion will be unable to act responsibly as far as 
our most urgent, general, common problems are concerned.42 Public 
opinion will not permit it. In a sense, only undemocratic, dictatorial 
governments, capable of suppressing or ignoring public opinion, will 
be able to act in such a fashion. Dictatorships, however, put us at the 
mercy of the decisions and actions of those few individuals who have 
won the fight for power (thus being, almost inevitably, ruthless and 
power- mad). Either way it is most unlikely that global problems will 
be tackled responsibly. For this we need a widespread, even worldwide 
understanding of, and responsible attitude towards, our basic prob-
lems at the personal level. And for this in turn it is essential that we 
develop a modern, worldwide institutional equivalent of the tribal 
meeting.
It is in this way, I  suggest, that we need to conceive intellectual 
inquiry: as the open, sustained, responsible discussion of our common 
problems. Intellectual inquiry needs to be conceived and pursued as the 
tribal meeting of humanity, permanently in session, open to all, our joint 
endeavour to develop cooperative, personal responsibility for our com-
mon problems. Something must be created to replace the tribal meeting. 
Intellectual inquiry, at its best, constitutes such a replacement: it is from 
this standpoint that intellectual inquiry needs to be understood, contrib-
uted to and judged.
And only universalism can do justice to this conception of intellec-
tual inquiry. This, indeed, is universalism: intellectual inquiry conceived 
as the outcome of our personal, cooperative, responsible attempts to 
improve our solutions to our fundamental problems.43
The difficulty we experience, then, in putting universalism into 
practice is an important part of the difficulties we experience in seek-
ing to take on a degree of personal responsibility for our shared world. 
Specialism is, as Huxley correctly points out, an evasion of responsi-
bility, the outcome of a failure to cope with the stress of responsibility. 
Specialism can even be seen as the outcome of a kind of intellectual or 
professional tribalism, the specialist’s tribe being the “invisible college” 
of like- minded specialists.
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A number of writers have been concerned to emphasize – in terms 
somewhat analogous to those outlined here – that the blessings result-
ing from moving from the intimate, coherent tribe to the big, complex, 
diversified modern world are mixed. These writers all emphasize, in one 
way or another, that this transition makes possible the development of 
choice, freedom, reason, science, on the one hand, but can also lead to 
uncertainty, fear, loneliness, a sense of meaninglessness and impotence, 
on the other hand.
Thus in Coming of Age in Samoa Margaret Mead (1943) tells us that 
children in Samoa fail to experience anything like the trauma of adoles-
cence so familiar in Western society. She concludes that this is due to the 
absence in Samoa of the problem of choosing between rival ways of life 
and values. Adolescent trauma, then, is due to the great difficulties that 
we experience in coming to terms with cultural diversity in our  society – 
in turn due, without doubt, to a general failure of our culture to cope 
adequately with this central problem of diversity. As I have already indi-
cated, in The Open Society and Its Enemies Popper (1966a) argues that the 
open society – the society in which diverse ways of life are tolerated – is 
essential to our humanity, our reason, our civilization. It is only with the 
existence of social diversity that we can begin to doubt, to criticize, to 
learn, and perhaps to make progress. In Popper’s view, rationality is to be 
understood primarily in terms of the capacity to doubt, to criticize and 
thus to learn; criticism, however, is only really possible if a plurality of 
views and ways of life coexist in society. Thus, for Popper, rationality is 
to be understood primarily in social terms, arising as a result of social 
developments – the development of social and cultural diversity, and a 
tradition of criticism.44 The development of the open society makes pos-
sible the development of both freedom and reason. Popper is at pains 
to emphasize, however, the price we pay for these developments, the 
strain that civilization puts upon us. It is indeed a major thesis of The 
Open Society and Its Enemies that the uncertainties, the emotional stress, 
created by our movement towards the open society, can be so great that 
we long passionately for a return to the simplicities and certainties of the 
monolithic closed society. This anti- rational, anti- humanitarian longing 
is responsible for the totalitarianism of both left and right. The difficul-
ties that confront us in coming to terms with the open society are indeed, 
according to Popper, so extreme that even many of our greatest think-
ers in the past have failed to surmount them: Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, 
Hegel and Marx all in one way or another, in Popper’s view, sought to 
return us to the closed society. Many of our greatest philosophers and 
rationalists have been enemies of the open society.45
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It is scarcely surprising, then, that adolescents, emerging from the 
“closed” society of the family into our quasi- ”open” society, should expe-
rience difficulties. The problems of adolescence need to be understood 
in philosophical or rationalistic terms, in terms of emotional reactions to 
an intense awareness of possibilities and uncertainties, and not merely in 
terms of some psychological theory of emotional development.
Isaac Bashevis Singer, in his novels and short stories, has given us a 
wonderfully vivid and perceptive account of the enormous difficulties we 
encounter in emerging from a closed society.46 In The Manor (1965a) and 
The Estate (1975b) Singer provides us with a wholly convincing picture 
of the confusion, the sense of loss, that overwhelmed those enlightened 
Jews who, towards the end of the nineteenth century, emerged from the 
highly traditional, almost mediaeval, Jewish communities still existing 
then in Poland. Singer’s writings are especially noteworthy for the fact 
that many of his protagonists are themselves deeply conscious of the 
problem, and not merely affected emotionally by it without any under-
standing of its nature. Singer is concerned to show us, in a fictional form, 
individuals grappling passionately with the task of pursuing critical fun-
damentalist intellectual inquiry. Singer’s vivid and honest imagination 
takes us to the heart of the problems of our civilization.
Essentially the same problems  – explored by both Popper and 
Singer – have also been discussed by Erich Fromm, for example, in his 
The Fear of Freedom (1960; see also Fromm, 1963). Finally, Peter Gay, 
in his marvellous book The Enlightenment:  An Interpretation, provides 
us with a haunting account of the anguish experienced by the thinkers 
of the Enlightenment in attempting to come to terms with their doubts, 
their scepticism, as they emerged from the religious tribalism of contem-
porary Christianity (Gay, 1973, vol. 1, pp. 59– 71).
It is, I hope, clear that all these writers are concerned essentially 
with the same problem: the difficulties we encounter in coming to terms 
with something that is essentially desirable, namely social and cul-
tural diversity. One disastrous consequence of specialism is that it dis-
rupts understanding of problems as fundamental as this; the problem is 
scattered amongst a number of disparate disciplines, and lost sight of. 
Instead of discussion being organized around the problem, so that con-
tributions such as those of the above writers can fruitfully interact with, 
and supplement, each other, discussion is organized instead within the 
disciplines:  anthropology, epistemology, political philosophy, history, 
psychology, history of ideas, fiction. As a result, we fail to discover the 
interconnections between the contributions; we fail to improve our 
understanding of the underlying problem. We fail to understand the 
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problems of adolescence as those of moving from a closed to an open 
society – in part philosophical problems. We fail to appreciate the social, 
cultural and personal implications of Popper’s philosophical and epis-
temological discussions. We fail to grasp the universal significance of 
Singer’s fiction. We do not see that Popper and Singer are concerned 
with essentially the same problem. Fromm may be dismissed as pursuing 
the pseudoscientific discipline of sociocultural- psychoanalytic psychol-
ogy, instead of being understood as contributing to our understanding 
of the problems discussed in The Open Society and Its Enemies, and in 
Feyerabend’s “Problems of Empiricism” (1965).
Specialism thus prevents us from seeing our fundamental prob-
lems. As a result, we fail to see the urgent need to improve our thinking at 
this level, and the considerable difficulties that arise in connection with 
this task.
2. It is in the nature of universalism to raise questions and doubts that 
can be highly awkward for those who wield power in society. In par-
ticular, of course, universalism challenges all those who claim to have 
authoritative answers to fundamental problems – religious and secular 
centres of power and influence in society. Universalism calls into question 
cherished beliefs and values, and thus also is liable to collide with pub-
lic opinion. Powerful social forces, then, will inevitably discourage the 
development of critical fundamentalist intellectual inquiry – as Socrates, 
Galileo and Spinoza, for example, found out. Only a society which had, 
quite generally, taken universalism to heart would encourage the devel-
opment of critical fundamentalist intellectual inquiry; but of course no 
such society has as yet come into existence.
The case of specialism is, however, quite different. Specialist scientists 
and scholars may well be quite content to let non- academic authorities 
decide fundamental issues, scientific, academic inquiry confining itself 
to solving those specialized, technical problems whose solutions are 
required by those who wield power in society. Critical fundamentalist 
issues in any case lie beyond the reach of specialist intellectual standards 
and concerns. Specialism thus robs the scientist and scholar of the capac-
ity, from a professional standpoint, to criticize fundamentalist decisions 
made on the basis of power in society – except where those in authority 
are foolish enough to transgress specialist standards and results.
3. Specialism is especially appealing to those who uphold what may 
be called “oracular” conceptions of reason  – according to which, rea-
son, ideally, is something that reaches decisions authoritatively for us, 
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rather than being something which helps us to decide.47 Any academic 
who upholds such an oracular conception of reason (or method) quite 
clearly cannot pursue inquiry in accordance with universalism. For that 
would involve the appalling prospect of academic professors decid-
ing authoritatively for the rest of us how fundamental questions are to 
be answered, how we should live, what is of value in life, what our life 
 problems are and how they are to be resolved. This is a modern version 
of Plato’s vision of the dictatorship of the philosopher- king. If one is to 
hold on to an oracular conception of reason or method (which includes 
of course appeals to evidence), without incurring the charge of becoming 
a Platonic philosopher- king, a prophetic dictator, it becomes necessary to 
restrict the field of one’s research to some specialized, limited, factual, 
value- neutral domain over which, a bit more plausibly, one may seek to 
claim authoritative expertise. One must become, in other words, a spe-
cialist, and implement specialism.
The proper response to this is, of course, to reject all such oracular con-
ceptions of method (whether empiricist or rationalist) in all fields, in 
the contexts of both specialized and universalist inquiry. Even the most 
secure results of specialized research ought not to be held to be so secure 
that they are inherently immune to all possibility of being criticized use-
fully by non- specialists. And when it comes to exploration of fundamen-
tal questions, there may well be some individuals who deserve greater 
attention than others, and who are, to that extent, experts, but such indi-
viduals cannot conceivably be held to speak authoritatively for the rest 
of us about fundamental issues, as if Platonic prophets or popes whose 
pronouncements must be taken on trust.
Specialists can claim to reach their results by employing such an 
oracular conception of reason (which includes, of course, appeals to 
evidence), and on that basis, can claim full authoritative status for their 
pronouncements, immune to the sceptical doubts of the ignorant. Of 
course, even specialists should not think that the results of their special-
ist research is immune, in an a priori way as it were, from non- specialist 
criticism. Oracular conceptions of reason (of method), which claim to 
bequeath indubitability to results obtained by their means, need to 
be rejected in all fields, including specialized fields of research (even 
mathematics, where the boldest claims for certainty are made). It is, 
of course, crucial that such oracular conceptions of reason are rejected 
when it comes to universalism – otherwise we would have the appalling 
prospect of professors deciding authoritatively for the rest of us how we 
should live, what is of value in life, what our life problems are and how 
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they are to be resolved. This is Plato’s vision of the dictatorship of the 
philosopher- king.
Even if we do identify reason with some set of rules, laws, 
methods or criteria which, in some restricted field perhaps, dictate 
decisions to us, we ought always to be aware that it is our own deci-
sion to adopt these laws, methods, etc. Genuine rationality involves 
being able to choose and develop such laws to suit our purposes. 
Universalism is correct in insisting that genuine rationality involves 
recognizing that ultimately we choose and decide. And choose and 
decide fallibly.
4. According to specialism, the expert is entirely entitled to pronounce 
authoritatively on matters relating to his discipline, in a manner which 
ignores the contributions, the criticisms, of non- experts. This is because, 
according to specialism, only specialized considerations can be relevant 
for an assessment of specialized results. Only the expert can be compe-
tent to contribute to a specialized discipline. There can be no doubt that 
being able to pronounce authoritatively in this kind of way is something 
that is deeply appealing to many. Universalism, however, deprives the 
expert of this deeply appealing authoritative immunity from outside crit-
icism. Basic assumptions about the nature of the world, and about the 
meaning and value of life, must inevitably, according to universalism, 
pervade specialist work. It cannot be correct for experts to decide for the 
rest of us what these assumptions should be. It is thus entirely proper that 
non- experts should be able to challenge and contribute to critical funda-
mentalist assumptions implicit in specialized work. It is indeed important 
that experts do listen to non- expert comments and criticisms concerning 
fundamental assumptions, since it is all too easy for the expert to forget 
the prevalence and influence of such assumptions amidst his technical 
work – losing sight of the wood for the trees.
There is, of course, a very serious problem here, which confronts aca-
demic inquiry pursued along the lines of universalism. It is the problem 
of distinguishing between honest, potentially significant and fruitful 
criticism of academic work, and criticism that is dishonest, dogmatic, 
pathologically ignorant, merely destructive, and even possibly in the pay 
of corporations and other interests out to discredit authentic results, as 
when special interests seek to cast doubt on the reality of human- induced 
climate change to protect profits from oil and coal. Legitimate, authentic 
non- specialist comment and criticism must be distinguished from illegit-
imate, inauthentic comment and criticism. And academia must discover 
how to maintain this all- important and highly problematic distinction, 
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in order to preserve and enhance the intellectual integrity of academic 
thought.
5. Increasingly, during the last fifty to one hundred years, scientific, aca-
demic work has become something that is engaged in as a profession, a 
career, rather than out of amateur love. The scientific, academic enter-
prise has become increasingly institutional and bureaucratic in character. 
All this favours, and almost requires, specialism. For these factors require 
that scientific, academic work can be assessed in a definite, agreed way, 
sound work being distinguishable from unsound work in an uncontro-
versial manner. Promotions, funding of research work, professional sta-
tus, management of research – these career and institutional matters all 
favour the adoption of definite, agreed specialist intellectual standards. 
Sustained inquiry into fundamental problems is much more difficult to 
professionalize and institutionalize. Crucial institutional questions such 
as whose work is to receive funds, to be taught, to be rewarded with pro-
motion and academic honours, become almost impossible to decide in a 
standard, bureaucratic manner.48
6. Once a conception of intellectual inquiry has become  established  – 
built into the institutional and bureaucratic structure of intellectual 
inquiry – all sorts of mechanisms tend to preserve this institutionalized 
conception. Education will tend to indoctrinate pupils and students in 
this conception. Only those who conform to the standards of the con-
ception will be able to do research work, publish, obtain academic jobs. 
Only that work which conforms to the accepted standards will be pub-
lished, and will be accepted on publication. Even those who disagree 
with the institutionalized viewpoint will be obliged to pay lip service 
to it, simply in order to teach, publish and do research. As a result, the 
public face of scientific, academic inquiry will come overwhelmingly to 
conform to the general viewpoint, and it will seem increasingly absurd 
to call this viewpoint into question. Once specialism is established insti-
tutionally, in short, no problem arises as to why this viewpoint should 
persist.
7. Specialism receives support from all those scientists and scholars 
keen to promote their own careers. An excellent way to ensure that one’s 
career flourishes is to found, develop and contribute to a new discipline, 
a new sub- discipline or speciality. This can be done by founding, with 
others, a new journal devoted to the new specialized field of study; it can 
be done by establishing research groups devoted to the new speciality, 
acquiring students who seek to gain PhDs in the discipline. With others, 
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experts in the new discipline, one can hope to win grants for research; 
one may even be able to create new departments or research institutions 
devoted to the discipline. For academic success, creating the impression 
of authentic scientific or scholarly activity may be more important than 
producing work that is of genuine intellectual value. In short, alongside 
authentic intellectual reasons for creating specialized fields of research, 
there are also merely personal, social or institutional reasons having to 
do with the desire, or the need, to make a success of one’s career. 
These, then, are some of the factors responsible for the failure to 
put universalism into practice – responsible for a pervasive corruption of 
intellectual standards.
9.7 Universalism, knowledge and wisdom
If universalism were to be put into practice we would expect intellectual 
inquiry as a whole to give priority to our most general and important 
problems  – specialized problems being chosen and tackled in order to 
help us solve the former.
The result to be expected from putting specialism into practice 
is, however, the exact opposite. Although specialized, technical prob-
lems may well be tackled with brilliance and great success, from the 
standpoint of what matters most in life the vast industry of special-
ized problem solving may well seem largely irrelevant. Most special-
ized problem solving will be unrelated to our fundamental problems. 
Specialized problems will not be understood or tackled as subordi-
nate problems to fundamental problems. Instead of illuminating our 
understanding of how fundamental problems may be solved, intellec-
tual inquiry will tend to do the exact opposite. We will tend to be over-
whelmed by a vast maze of specialized disciplines, jargon and results. 
It is not just intellectual inquiry as a whole that will suffer as a result. 
We will suffer.
Our capacity to think and act intelligently, in response to our basic 
problems, will be sabotaged. Experts will become, not our servants, but 
our masters.
Some years ago, in his Nobel Peace Prize lecture, Martin Luther 
King declared:
Modern man has brought this whole world to an awe- inspiring 
threshold of the future. He has reached new and astonishing peaks 
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of scientific success. He has produced machines that think and 
instruments that peer into the unfathomable ranges of interstellar 
space. He has built gigantic bridges to span the seas and gargan-
tuan buildings to kiss the skies. His airplanes and spaceships have 
dwarfed distance, placed time in chains, and carved highways 
through the stratosphere. This is a dazzling picture of modern 
man’s scientific and technological progress.
Yet, in spite of these spectacular strides in science and tech-
nology, and still unlimited ones to come, something basic is miss-
ing. There is a sort of poverty of the spirit which stands in glaring 
contrast to our scientific and technological abundance. The richer 
we have become materially, the poorer we become morally and 
spiritually. We have learned to fly the air like birds and swim the sea 
like fish, but we have not learned the simple art of living together as 
brothers. (In Haberman, 1972, pp. 333– 4)
The predominance of specialist intellectual inquiry plays its part, I sug-
gest, in the development of the “glaring contrast” to which Martin Luther 
King here refers: the achievement of specialist knowledge at the expense 
of the achievement of wisdom.
Consider the following analogy. Our problem, let us suppose, is to 
build a house. On the one hand, we may tackle this problem in a critical 
fundamentalist manner. We propose and criticize possible solutions to 
our basic problem  – thus developing an overall plan. In order to solve 
our basic problem, however, a host of specialized, technical, subordi-
nate problems need to be solved. Bricks need to be made; so, too, slates, 
doors, window frames, windows, beams, plaster, floorboards, and so on. 
Foundations need to be dug and cemented. All the various parts need to 
be assembled properly, in conformity with the plan, to build the house. 
Plumbers need to put in pipes, tanks, sinks, a bath; electricians need to 
wire the house; and so on. An intricate maze of highly specialized, techni-
cal problems need to be solved by an army of experts if the house is to be 
built. Equally, however, if the house is to be built, it is absolutely essential 
that the specialized problem solving be properly coordinated so that it 
all gives rise to a solution to the fundamental problem – to build a house. 
There needs to be a constant two- way flow of information between prob-
lem solving at the fundamental level, and at the specialized level. Failure 
to solve certain specialized problems may necessitate a revision of the 
basic plan.
This common- sense, critical fundamentalist approach is in com-
plete contrast to a specialist approach. According to specialism, building 
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a house only involves solving specialized, technical problems. The fun-
damental problem – what kind of house do we want? – is not a problem 
that the building trade can take seriously. (It is meaningless, subjec-
tive, incapable of being decisively solved, philosophical, evaluative or 
religious; in any case, not a matter for the trade to concern itself with 
professionally.) The building trade needs to concern itself with special-
ized, technical “puzzles” – manufacturing bricks, mortar, cement, slates, 
floorboards, windows, wiring, pipes, and so on. Progress in the building 
trade is to be judged in terms of how well these specialized puzzles are 
being solved.
The outcome of all this will of course be ever increasing piles of 
completely unusable bricks, slates, wire, pipes, etc. – and no house will 
be built at all. And if we complain, we will no doubt be met with indigna-
tion in that each specialist has indeed performed his task with skill and 
expertise.
The “house” that intellectual inquiry as a whole should help us 
build is, I suggest, a life of value – a rich and fulfilling life, a life in which 
we can share friendship, love, happiness, beauty, creative work, joy in 
being alive. Our “fundamental” problems are the problems we encounter 
in our lives in seeking to discover, experience, participate in and help cre-
ate that which is of value. The basic rationale for the whole of intellectual 
inquiry is to help us to articulate and solve these fundamental problems 
of living. All intellectual problems are subordinate to these fundamental 
personal and interpersonal problems of living. The problems of mathe-
matics, logic, philosophy, theoretical physics, cosmology, molecular biol-
ogy, neurology – all these need to be understood as sub- problems of our 
fundamental personal and interpersonal problems of living.
It is, of course, not the case that intellectual inquiry is pursued only 
for pragmatic reasons, as a means to the realization of non- intellectual, 
practical ends. Intellectual inquiry is also pursued for its own sake. 
Intellectual inquiry is, in other words, itself a part of life, enriching life 
directly when pursued for its own sake, like music or poetry. It is, for 
example, of the essence of life of value that we are perceptive and curi-
ous about our surroundings  – in touch with our environment. “Pure” 
research in physics, say, or cosmology, geology, history or anthropology, 
amounts simply to a cooperative following- up of such personal percep-
tiveness and curiosity. From the standpoint of pure intellectual inquiry, it 
is the curiosity, the imaginative explorations, the thoughts and feelings, 
the knowledge and understanding, the intellectual honesty and passion, 
the problem solving, of people in society as a part of life, that really mat-
ters. It is our shared exploration of our world, as an aspect of life of value, 
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that is important. It is the personal knowledge and understanding of our 
world that we have ourselves developed, integrated into our lives, that 
really matters. Pure intellectual inquiry is, in other words, at the most 
fundamental level, personal and interpersonal in character, a part of life. 
The impersonal or institutional aspects of pure intellectual inquiry exist 
simply as a means to an end: to aid personal and interpersonal curiosity, 
wonder, knowledge and understanding, as a vital aspect of our personal 
and social lives. Thus both “pure” and “pragmatic” intellectual inquiry 
seek to contribute to the richness, the value, of our shared lives here on 
earth. In both cases, what ultimately matters is the value of our personal 
and interpersonal lives.
The fundamental aim of intellectual inquiry, we may say, is to 
enhance our personal and interpersonal wisdom  – our capacity to dis-
cover and achieve what is of value in life both for ourselves and for 
others. All intellectual problems are problems subordinate to our basic 
life- problems of wisdom. Of the four fundamental problems formulated 
above, it is the third and fourth that are the most fundamental, the 
first and second being pursued as a part of our concern to discover and 
achieve what is of value in life.
If intellectual inquiry is to meet with success in helping us to dis-
cover and achieve what is of value in life, then it must of course be gen-
erally understood to have this basic purpose. Education must enable us 
to come to understand and use intellectual inquiry in this kind of way,49 
so that we discover fruitful interconnections between our personal prob-
lems and “impersonal”, “objective” intellectual problems, our own per-
sonal, childish wonderings about the nature of the universe, for example, 
illuminating and being illuminated by the “official” wonderings of Kepler, 
Newton, Faraday or Einstein, or our personal problems of adolescence 
illuminating and being illuminated by the philosophical, social problems 
of the open society discussed, for example, by Popper, Fromm, Mead and 
Singer. Intellectual inquiry must itself be organized in such a way as to 
be amenable to this kind of understanding and use. Above all, scientists 
and scholars must be fundamentally concerned to develop intellectual 
inquiry in such a way that it is designed to help us build our “houses” of 
wisdom with our lives. All this is essential if intellectual inquiry is to be 
developed as the tribal discussion of humanity, designed to help us create 
more valuable lives, a better human world.
When viewed from this perspective of the philosophy of wisdom,50 
what present- day scientific, academic inquiry produces is, in terms of our 
analogy, more like an unusable, chaotic heap of bricks, slates, window 
frames and pipes, than something out of which we can build a habitable 
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house. What confronts us is an immense pile of specialized jargon- ridden 
disciplines pursuing specialized intellectual problems dissociated from 
our problems of living, there being little indication as to how the non- 
specialist is to find his way through all this to discover and achieve what 
is of most value in life. Scientific, academic inquiry is not pursued, under-
stood, taught or organized in accordance with the overall assumption 
that what ultimately matters is personal and social wisdom.
In so far as a basic organizing assumption is built into present- day 
scientific, academic inquiry, it is that the aim of such inquiry is to improve 
objective, impersonal, institutional knowledge, not personal and social 
wisdom. Intellectual priority is not given to our problems of living, to the 
difficulties, frustrations and sufferings that we encounter in our lives in 
attempting to discover and achieve what is of value in life: on the con-
trary, intellectual priority is given to impersonal problems of knowledge 
encountered by the various academic disciplines in seeking to describe, 
predict and explain phenomena. Even the social sciences give intellectual 
priority to problems of knowledge as they arise within sociology, psy-
chology, and so on, rather than to the problems encountered by people in 
their lives. Intellectual progress is assessed, not in terms of the success we 
meet with in achieving what is of value in life, but rather in terms of the 
success achieved in acquiring academic knowledge. Intellectual progress 
is conceived as being decisively dissociated from human, social progress.
Impersonal, academic problems of knowledge may of course be 
tackled out of a concern to develop knowledge which can subsequently be 
used or applied to help solve human, social problems. The all- important 
point, however, is that these problems of knowledge are neither under-
stood nor tackled as intellectually subordinate to our more fundamental 
problems of living, but are, on the contrary, decisively dissociated from 
these. If science is to be of human value, it tends to be argued, it is essen-
tial that science acquires reliable, objective, impersonal factual knowl-
edge, this in turn requiring – so the argument goes – that the problems of 
knowledge be tackled in a way which is decisively dissociated from the 
problems of life.
From the standpoint of developing a kind of intellectual inquiry 
designed to help us achieve what is of value in life, however, all this is 
irrational in a quite elementary fashion, and for precisely the reasons 
emphasized throughout this essay. Granted that the fundamental task 
of intellectual inquiry is to help us solve those personal, social problems 
of living we encounter in seeking to achieve what is of value in life, ele-
mentary rules of rational problem solving require us to give intellectual 
priority to the task of articulating these personal, social problems of 
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living, and proposing and criticizing possible (and actual) solutions to 
them. Rationality also requires, of course, that we develop a multitude 
of subordinate, specialized problems – for example, technological prob-
lems, scientific problems, problems of knowledge and understanding. 
It is absolutely essential for rationality, however, that these specialized 
problems are understood as subordinate, the enterprise of tackling them 
being set within the framework of the more fundamental intellectual 
activity of proposing and criticizing possible solutions to our problems 
of living.
The philosophy of knowledge is, as I have said, at present almost 
universally taken for granted by the academic community, and is built 
into the whole institutional structure of the scientific, academic enter-
prise. As a result, the elementary irrationality of this philosophy has 
damaging repercussions for the whole of intellectual inquiry, and indeed 
for the whole modern world, all our lives here on earth. Both “applied” 
and “pure” intellectual inquiry, it should be noted, are damaged by the 
general acceptance of the philosophy of knowledge.51
On the one hand we may – with Bacon, Comte, Bernal and Ravetz, 
for  example  – be concerned primarily with the capacity of intellectual 
inquiry to help us solve our practical social problems. If so, then accord-
ing to the philosophy of wisdom, intellectual priority needs to be given to 
articulating these problems, and proposing and criticizing possible solu-
tions. Solutions to practical social problems are appropriate personal, 
social actions. Hence, according to the philosophy of wisdom, the fun-
damental intellectual task of intellectual inquiry is to develop imagina-
tively and assess critically possible and actual personal, social actions. 
The development of knowledge and technology needs to be rationally 
subordinated to the more fundamental intellectual activity of proposing 
and criticizing social actions.
The philosophy of knowledge, however, gives intellectual prior-
ity to the development of knowledge divorced from a concern with our 
social problems. New knowledge leads to the development of new tech-
nology which is then applied in ways which help, we may hope, to solve 
these problems. The crucial point, however, is that intellectual priority is 
given to the task of proposing and criticizing claims to knowledge – laws, 
theories, experimental results – instead of possible social actions.
Inevitably, as a direct result of giving intellectual priority to the 
development of knowledge rather than to proposing and criticizing pos-
sible solutions to social problems, intellectual inquiry must (1)  fail to 
help us solve all those major social problems which require new social 
actions, policies and institutions for their resolution rather than new 
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knowledge and technology; (2) fail to help us give priority to the devel-
opment of new knowledge and technology most needed for the resolu-
tion of urgent social problems; (3)  fail to help us use such knowledge 
and technology, where developed, to maximum advantage in a rational 
fashion to help solve social problems; (4) fail to help us anticipate and 
prevent new knowledge and technology being used in socially harmful 
ways; (5) fail to help us anticipate and refrain from engaging in intrinsi-
cally harmful scientific research; and (6) fail to concentrate intellectual 
attention on our most urgent social problems.52 These six kinds of failure 
are all immediate consequences of the fundamental failure to give intel-
lectual priority to rational human, social problem solving. As long as our 
thinking about the world and ourselves is dominated by the philosophy 
of knowledge, it is almost inevitable that the social ills of the modern 
world will arise, even if almost everyone acts with good will.
On the other hand we may  – with Kepler, Spinoza, Einstein and 
Popper, for  example  – be concerned primarily with the “intrinsic” or 
cultural value of intellectual inquiry, intellectual inquiry pursued for its 
own sake. If so, then we need to recognize – as emphasized by the phi-
losophy of wisdom  – that it is knowledge and understanding achieved 
by people that ultimately matters. “Pure” intellectual inquiry, conceived 
of in impersonal or institutional terms, is of value in so far as it helps 
us to achieve that which really has value – our personal knowledge and 
understanding of our world, our personal curiosity, perceptiveness, 
capacity to discover that which is of significance in our surroundings, 
and the extent to which all this enriches our life. The problems of “pure” 
intellectual inquiry are, in other words, at the most fundamental level, 
personal and interpersonal problems, problems that we encounter in 
seeking to enhance our personal knowledge and understanding of the 
world, our personal perception and appreciation of what is significant 
and of value in existence. As Einstein once remarked: “Knowledge exists 
in two forms – lifeless, stored in books, and alive in the consciousness of 
men. The second form of existence is after all the essential one; the first, 
indispensable as it may be, occupies only an inferior position” (Einstein, 
1973, p. 80). To this I would only add that from the standpoint of “pure” 
intellectual inquiry it is perhaps the activity, as a part of life, of imagi-
natively exploring the world, following up our passionate curiosity, the 
lively encountering of aspects of reality, that is essentially of value. And 
just as the professional, specialized, institutionalized activities associ-
ated with music are designed, ideally, to further our making and enjoying 
of music, so too the professional, specialized, institutionalized activities 
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associated with science are, ideally, designed to further our exploration 
and enjoyment of our world.
All this is in marked contrast with the views of those who, like 
Popper (1972) and Ziman (1968), emphasize the fundamental impor-
tance of “objective knowledge”, of “knowledge without a knowing sub-
ject”, of “public knowledge”, or of “institutional knowledge”, conceived 
as ends in themselves, rather than as means to the achievement of the 
end of life of value, via enhancement of personal awareness of the world. 
In insisting that “pure” science be dissociated from life, intellectual prog-
ress being understood in wholly objective, impersonal or institutional 
terms, the philosophy of knowledge misses out precisely that which mat-
ters most, our personal apprehension of the world. As a result of putting 
this philosophy of impersonal knowledge into practice, a disastrous split 
develops between the way we personally apprehend or conceive of the 
world, and the way “science” apprehends or conceives of the world. We 
fail to exploit science in order to enrich and extend our personal vision 
of things; and we fail to develop science in such a way that it is amenable 
to such exploitation. We fail to discover how to use scientific theories as 
spectacles through which we may, conjecturally, view the world. Instead 
of emphasizing the priority of the personal problems of understanding 
we need to solve in order to make such a use of scientific theories, the 
problems are dismissed as “subjective”, the development of impersonal 
knowledge embodied in scientific theories becoming an end in itself. As 
a result we become blind to – or ignore – the profound discrepancies that 
exist between the world as conceived by us in life, and the world as con-
ceived, impersonally, by science. A kind of advanced intellectual schizo-
phrenia in our thinking develops. Theoretical physics, for example, ceases 
to be, with Einstein, a personal “attempt conceptually to grasp reality as 
it is thought independently of its being observed” (Schilpp, 1969, p. 80), 
and becomes merely the impersonal, institutional, ritualistic prediction 
of phenomena, ‘the whole thing ... a wretched bungle’ which can ‘only 
claim the interest of shopkeepers and engineers’.(Einstein, in Przibram, 
1967, p. 39). Personal awareness of what is significant and of value in 
existence, intellectual passion, curiosity, wonder, all degenerate into 
nothing more than the possession of information and expert skills, the 
accumulation of dry knowledge of fact. As a result of dissociating “pure” 
intellectual inquiry from life, we lose sight of the value which intellectual 
inquiry has when pursued for its own sake.
Above all, and quite generally, as a result of engaging in, and think-
ing in terms of, intellectual inquiry as in the first instance the pursuit 
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of impersonal knowledge, we lose sight of those problems which, quite 
fundamentally, create the need for intellectual inquiry, and which intel-
lectual inquiry ought fundamentally to be helping us to solve. By giving 
priority to the pursuit of impersonal knowledge, we fail to emphasize the 
fundamental character of the personal and social problems of our plural-
istic world. Intellectual inquiry must then fail to enhance our common 
understanding of these problems and our common capacity to develop 
more adequate resolutions to them. Conceiving of things in terms of the 
pursuit of impersonal knowledge, we fail entirely to see the urgent need 
to develop intellectual inquiry as the critical fundamentalist tribal discus-
sion of humanity, as a vital part of all our lives, as a personal and social 
reality, as a part of the world, designed to help us create wiser ways of 
living, wiser institutions, a wiser world.
Whereas the philosophy of wisdom, in short, in subordinating intel-
lectual inquiry to the needs of life of value, does justice to both the prag-
matic and the cultural aspects of intellectual inquiry, in a unified way,53 
the philosophy of knowledge fails to do justice to both aspects.
Specialism is a relatively recent phenomenon, a general intellec-
tual malaise that has progressively overtaken scientific, academic inquiry 
during the last hundred years or so, and especially during the last fifty 
years. The natural philosophers of the seventeenth century, the philos-
ophes of the eighteenth century, and many scientists, philosophers and 
social thinkers of the nineteenth century had no difficulty in conceiving 
and pursuing intellectual inquiry in broadly critical fundamentalist terms 
(even if epistemological and methodological misconceptions prevented 
them from having a full understanding of the rationale for universalism 
indicated here).
I have argued in this last section that there is nevertheless an even 
deeper intellectual and humanitarian malaise inherent in scientific, aca-
demic inquiry, which cannot by any means be construed as a relatively 
recent phenomenon. On the contrary, it goes back to the origins of mod-
ern science some four hundred years ago and can even be traced back to 
the ancient Greeks of over two thousand years ago. It is built into the very 
foundations of the Western tradition. It can be put like this. Intellectual 
inquiry has been pursued in accordance, not with the philosophy of wis-
dom, but rather with the philosophy of knowledge. Instead of problems 
(3) and (4) of section 9.2 being taken as fundamental, problems (1) and 
(2) being tackled as an aspect of, and subordinate to, problems (3) and 
(4), on the contrary, scientific, academic inquiry has been devoted pri-
marily to solving problems (1)  and (2), solutions to aspects of these 
problems incidentally helping people in social life to develop improved 
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answers to problems (3) and (4) (or so it is hoped). Instead of problems 
(3) and (4) being held to constitute the central problems of intellectual 
inquiry, on the contrary, these problems have been ostracized from ratio-
nal inquiry, relegated to the domain of the personal and the political, 
solutions to them being determined by such “irrational” factors as subjec-
tive emotion and motivation, political power, market forces.
But if present- day scientific, academic inquiry really is damagingly 
irrational in the quite elementary and fundamental way indicated, how, 
it may be asked, is it possible? How can such a wholesale, fundamental 
irrationality have been tolerated for so long? It is not difficult to under-
stand why in the seventeenth century questions concerning the value 
of life should not have been open to rational discussion: the combined 
power of church and state made it impossible. (One only has to remem-
ber the difficulties encountered by Galileo, Descartes and others in seek-
ing to establish the principle that relatively neutral problems concerning 
the nature of the material universe should be open to non- authoritarian, 
rational discussion, to realize that any attempt to establish an analogous 
principle in connection with problems concerning the meaning and value 
of life was, at the time, out of the question.) The philosophes of the eigh-
teenth century sought to devote reason to the enhancement of human 
enlightenment, human progress; unfortunately, and understandably, 
being over- impressed by Bacon and Newton, they failed to emphasize, 
clearly and unambiguously, that intellectual priority needs to be given 
to wisdom rather than to knowledge. Romantic writers of the late eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries can be interpreted as emphasizing the 
priority of questions concerning life of value. Unfortunately, in doing so, 
they abandoned “reason” under the mistaken impression that reason is 
relevant only for the acquisition of impersonal knowledge of truth, and 
that it involves the repression of personal feelings, desires and imagina-
tion. The question we need to ask is this: Why were these past failures not 
put right in the twentieth century? Why have we still not put them right, 
in the twenty- first century? A major part of the answer is, I suggest, the 
increasing prevalence of specialism, which has cancelled the very possi-
bility of critical, influential discussion of fundamentals. Indeed, the exist-
ing fundamental disorganization of contemporary scientific, academic 
inquiry, with its elevation of knowledge above wisdom, is just what one 
would expect from putting specialism into practice – as the house analogy 
indicates. Indeed the pursuit of knowledge dissociated from the pursuit 
of wisdom is itself the outcome of a kind of specialism – the tackling of 
impersonal, objective or institutional problems of knowledge dissociated 
from those more fundamental personal and interpersonal problems that 
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face us in our search for what is, or can be, of value in existence. This ele-
mentary irrationality inherent in our official, public thinking about the 
world and ourselves is at the root of our present failure, as indicated by 
Higgins and others, to tackle our fundamental problems effectively and 
humanely. It is this that is responsible for the “glaring contrast” noticed 
by Martin Luther King.
It must be admitted that in recent years many more voices have 
been raised against rampant specialization. Interdisciplinary, cross- 
disciplinary, transdisciplinary, multidisciplinary and post- disciplinary 
are now buzzwords to an extent that was hardly the case a decade or 
so ago. These buzz terms now almost denote specialized fields of study 
in their own right. But this seems at most to involve encouraging inter-
disciplinary research, setting up interdisciplinary courses of various 
kinds, and perhaps creating interdisciplinary research groups, cen-
tres and journals. What it does not involve is transforming the overall 
structure and character of universities so that an arena is created for 
the sustained, informal, imaginative and critical discussion of funda-
mental problems – discussion that influences and is influenced by more 
specialized research. Nor does it involve the kind of radical transforma-
tion of the whole relationship between the university and society that is 
required by universalism.
Another indication of attempts to develop a more socially respon-
sive science is the emphasis that research funding bodies give to 
the importance of impact  – that is, social impact  – in deciding what 
research projects to support. But here again this development is lit-
tle more than a botched version of what is really needed. Demanding 
that research projects, in order to gain financial support, must have 
impact, may well lead to research being funded that has considerable 
social impact that is of little real value, or even impact that is harmful. 
On the other hand, research projects that have no immediate impact 
whatsoever, but nevertheless are of great potential intellectual value, 
or potential social value that may only come to fruition decades into 
the future, are likely to receive no funding at all. Impact may actually 
degrade the intellectual and social value of science. Holding impact to 
be important is no substitute for recognizing the inherently and pro-
foundly problematic character of the aims of science, imbued as they 
are with problematic assumptions concerning metaphysics, values 
and social use, there thus being the need to subject aims to sustained 
imaginative and critical exploration as an integral part of scientific 
inquiry itself. Research scientists and groups, funding bodies, govern-
ments and industry may make decisions as to which research projects 
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are, and are not, supported financially. Such decision- making needs 
to be bathed, however, in sustained imaginative and critical explora-
tion of problematic possibilities. This does not take place at present 
because the current orthodox conception of science does not permit it, 
or fails to insist that scientific rigour requires it to take place. What we 
need, in short, is the implementation of a new conception of science, 
a new conception of rational inquiry – universalism, or critical specio- 
fundamentalism. Impact is no substitute.
In some respects, things have got worse in the last few decades. 
There has been the growth of various anti- rationalist creeds within sec-
tions of academia: post- modernism, the “strong programme” within the 
sociology and history of science, social constructivist views about scien-
tific knowledge. This is in turn has led some scientists and philosophers of 
science to defend orthodox conceptions of science and reason. It all came 
to a head with the publication of Alan Sokal’s spoof article, “Transgressing 
the Boundaries” (reprinted in Sokal and Bricmont, 1998). The so- called 
“Science Wars” that resulted have amounted to little more than a distrac-
tion from what really does need to be debated:54 What kind of inquiry can 
best help us learn how to realize what is of value in life, for ourselves and 
others? What kind of inquiry can best help humanity learn how to create 
a better world – or at least learn how to avoid some of the worst possible 
future worlds?55
My own specialized field of research (in so far as I have one), namely 
philosophy of science, has suffered what I can only see as a degrading 
splintering into diverse specialized sub- disciplines. When I began my 
academic career, in the mid 1960s, the debate between Popper and Kuhn 
was all the rage. There was the idea that both history and  philosophy of 
science together have the profound task of understanding how scientific 
progress has come about – this astonishing record of progress in knowl-
edge and technology across generations and centuries that has trans-
formed the world. There was even the idea that much may be learnt from 
scientific progress about how progress may be achieved in other areas 
of human life, where it falters and where it is urgently needed – above 
all, social progress towards a better, wiser world. This optimistic and 
inspiring nascent research programme was then dealt a series of ham-
mer blows. First, adherents of the Edinburgh “strong programme”, and of 
social constructivism more generally, denied that there is any such thing 
as scientific progress – or at least abolished the idea from history of sci-
ence as illegitimate “Whiggishness”. Then philosophers of science fell to 
the lure of specialism. Philosophy of science, instead of becoming what 
was needed, the more general philosophy of inquiry, degenerated into 
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the philosophy of physics, biology, chemistry, neuroscience, computing, 
geology, microbiology, etc., etc. The fundamental problems of the disci-
pline disappeared from view, and an ever growing army of specialists fell 
upon an ever expanding domain of specialized puzzles.56
Academic philosophy, more generally, has perhaps improved 
somewhat in recent decades. The worst excesses of ordinary language 
 philosophy have died away, and many academic philosophers strive 
to engage with serious problems that arise in connection with serious 
issues: injustice, environmental degradation, war, science, politics, how 
to live. Old habits of thought nevertheless linger on. Open any issue of 
Mind (a leading journal of philosophy) and one can still find papers pub-
lished in the tradition of analytic philosophy. I cannot help but note that 
philosophers of science, and philosophers more generally, have by and 
large remained uninterested in my attempts to draw their attention to 
the argument that the aims and methods of academia are profoundly 
and damagingly irrational when judged from the standpoint of helping 
to promote human welfare.57
Another regrettable development is the loss of what one might call 
the idea of the liberal university. When I started out as a young academic, 
in the mid 1960s, the idea was still around that a university should con-
centrate on, first, hiring good people, and then, second, giving them the 
freedom to teach and do research as they themselves saw fit, the job of 
the administration being to provide support for these two essential uni-
versity activities. In the UK at least, research assessments, committee 
work, loss of tenure, short- term contracts, restricted funding and increas-
ing power of the administration seem together to have all but destroyed 
this idea of the liberal university.
On the other hand, there have been a number of recent develop-
ments (at the time of writing) in the UK – and no doubt elsewhere – 
which can perhaps be interpreted as constituting first steps towards 
putting universalism, or critical specio- fundamentalism, into aca-
demic practice. A number of new departments, institutes and centres 
have been created devoted to policy and peace studies. Growing con-
cern about environmental problems, especially those associated with 
climate change, have led to the founding of new institutions which 
seek to bring specialists together to engage in relevant interdisciplin-
ary research, and to communicate with government, the media and 
the public. Thus at the University of Cambridge there is the Cambridge 
Environmental Initiative (CEI), launched in December 2004, which 
brings together diverse specialized fields of research to work on envi-
ronmental problems, and holds seminars and public lectures to put 
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research scientists in touch with one another, and with the public. A sim-
ilar coordinating, interdisciplinary initiative exists at the University of 
Oxford. It is called the School of Geography and the Environment, and 
it was founded in 2005 (under another name). At University College 
London (UCL), my own university, there is a recent and very active ini-
tiative called the Grand Challenges programme, which seeks to bring 
together a wide range of specialists to work on seven broad themes all 
having to do with human wellbeing. A policy document produced in 
2011 is called “The Wisdom Agenda”.58 It seeks to “deliver a culture of 
wisdom” at UCL. There is also the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change 
Research, founded by twenty- eight scientists from ten different univer-
sities or institutions in 2000. It is based in six British universities, has 
links with six others, and is funded by three research councils, NERC, 
EPSRC and ESRC (environment, engineering, and social and economic 
research). In recent years many scientists have become concerned to 
involve the public in debate about questions of science policy.59 There 
is now an active movement which seeks to promote public engagement 
with science.60
In 2015, Nature produced a special issue devoted to interdis-
ciplinarity. One article argues that it is vital to “bridge the divide 
between the biophysical and the social sciences” in order to tackle 
global problems, but goes on to stress just how difficult this is to do 
(Brown, Deletic and Wong, 2015). The authors suggest five principles 
which help such interdisciplinary work succeed. Another contribution 
discusses the problems that confront efforts to set up interdisciplinary 
research (Rylance, 2015). Proponents of interdisciplinarity complain 
that funding, career prospects and status all favour disciplinary rather 
than interdisciplinary work. Much depends, however, on how close or 
distant from one another the component disciplines of interdisciplin-
ary work are – the more distant, the greater the obstacles to success. 
Especially difficult is the task of combining science and humanities. 
Another contribution attempts to assess the extent to which interdis-
ciplinarity is increasing. It turns out that there is, at least, an increase 
in papers that mention “interdisciplinary” in the title (Van Noorden, 
2015). Throughout this special issue of Nature, it is assumed that we 
need a kind of science  – a kind of academic inquiry  – well designed 
from the standpoint of helping us solve problems in the real world. 
It is argued that interdisciplinarity will suffice to provide what is 
required. But it will not. We need to instigate sustained imaginative 
and critical thinking about our fundamental problems  – intellectual 
and  humanitarian – at the heart of the academic enterprise, this to be 
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conducted in such a way that it interacts both with more specialized 
academic problem solving, and with thinking in the social world, guid-
ing personal, social, institutional, national and global life.
There are, in short, a few scattered signs that the revolution, from 
specialism to universalism, or from knowledge to wisdom, is already 
under way. It will need, however, much wider cooperative support – from 
scientists, scholars, students, research councils, university administra-
tors, vice chancellors, teachers, the media and the general public – if it is 
to become anything more than what it is at present, a few fragmentary, 
scattered changes intended to put right quite specific perceived defects 
in the status quo. What we need is a high- profile campaign, in the public 
eye, concerned to make out the case for a comprehensive revolution in 
our universities so they come to put universalism, or the philosophy of 
wisdom, into academic practice. If this revolution ever comes about it 
will be comparable in its long- term impact to that of the Renaissance, the 
scientific revolution or the Enlightenment. The outcome will be that we 
will at last have what we so urgently need, institutions of learning and 
research rationally organized and devoted to helping us realize what is 
of value in life – helping us make progress towards as good a world as 
possible.
291
  
10
Karl Popper and the  
Enlightenment Programme
10.1 Karl Popper’s most significant contribution
Karl Popper’s most significant contributions are contained in his first four 
books: The Logic of Scientific Discovery, The Open Society and Its Enemies, 
The Poverty of Historicism, and Conjectures and Refutations.
It is important to appreciate the existence of a central backbone 
of argument running through these four books. In The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery (1959), Popper argues (as we all know) that all scientific 
knowledge is irredeemably conjectural in character, it being impossi-
ble to verify theories empirically. Science makes progress by proposing 
bold conjectures in response to problems, which are then subjected to 
sustained attempted empirical refutation. This falsificationist conception 
of scientific method is then generalized to form Popper’s conception of 
(critical) rationality, a general methodology for solving problems or mak-
ing progress. As Popper puts it in The Logic of Scientific Discovery, “inter- 
subjective testing is merely a very important aspect of the more general 
idea of inter- subjective criticism, or in other words, of the idea of mutual 
rational control by critical discussion” (Popper, 1959, p. 44, n*1).1
In order to make sense of the idea of severe testing in science, we 
need to see the experimentalist as having at least the germ of an idea for 
a rival theory up his sleeve (otherwise testing might degenerate into per-
forming essentially the same experiment again and again). This means 
experiments are always crucial experiments, attempts at trying to decide 
between two competing theories. Theoretical pluralism is necessary for 
science to be genuinely empirical. And, more generally, in order to crit-
icize an idea, one needs to have a rival idea in mind. Rationality, as con-
strued by Popper, requires plurality of ideas, values, ways of life. Thus, 
for Popper, the rational society is the open society. Given pre- Popperian 
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conceptions of reason, with their emphasis on proof rather than criticism 
(and associated plurality of ideas), the idea that the rational society is the 
open society is almost a contradiction in terms. There is thus a very close 
link between The Logic of Scientific Discovery, on the one hand, and The 
Open Society and Its Enemies, The Poverty of Historicism, and Conjectures 
and Refutations on the other.
And the direction of argument does not go in just one direction, 
from The Logic of Scientific Discovery to The Open Society and Its Enemies: it 
goes in the other direction as well. For in The Open Society and Its 
Enemies Popper argues that rationality, and scientific rationality as well, 
need to be conceived of in social and institutional terms (1966a, vol. 2, 
pp. 217– 20) (and the argument is echoed in The Poverty of Historicism, 
in connection with a discussion about the conditions required for scien-
tific progress to be possible [1961, pp.  154– 7]). The Open Society and 
Its Enemies, The Poverty of Historicism, and Conjectures and Refutations 
illuminate and enrich the doctrines of The Logic of Scientific Discovery.
10.2 The Enlightenment Programme
Much of the importance of Popper’s first four books stems from the fact 
that they constitute a major contribution to what may be called “The 
Enlightenment Programme” – the basic idea of the eighteenth- century 
Enlightenment, especially the French Enlightenment, of learning from 
scientific progress how to achieve social progress towards an enlight-
ened world.2 Popper’s work does much to revitalize and improve on 
the version of the Enlightenment Programme that we have inherited 
from the eighteenth- century Enlightenment, from Voltaire, Diderot, 
Condorcet and the other philosophes.3 But, as we shall see – and this is 
the main point of this  chapter – Popper’s version of the Enlightenment 
Programme, despite its great virtues, is still defective, and needs further 
improvement.
But before I discuss Popper’s contribution, I want first to say a few 
words about how profoundly important the basic Enlightenment idea 
is of learning from scientific progress how to achieve social progress 
towards an enlightened world.
Science has made astonishing progress in improving knowledge. 
But social progress towards an enlightened world seems much more 
problematic. This discrepancy would be reason enough to take very seri-
ously indeed the Enlightenment idea of seeing whether we can learn 
from scientific progress how to achieve greater social progress towards 
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an enlightened world. But what makes this Enlightenment idea so much 
more important and urgent, for our times, is that all too often, and trag-
ically, modern science and technology have actually been implicated in 
some of our worst human disasters. Modern science and technology have 
undoubtedly done much to help relieve human suffering and enhance 
the quality of human life; but there is still our terrible record of unnec-
essary human suffering and death, our record of man- made disasters 
during the past hundred years or so: horrifyingly destructive wars; the 
terrifying threat posed by modern armaments, conventional, chemical, 
biological and nuclear; vast inequalities in wealth around the globe; 
explosive population growth; the destruction of natural habitats and 
the rapid extinction of species; pollution of earth, sea and air, the latter 
leading to the impending devastation of climate change. And a crucial 
point to note about these global problems is that they have been made 
possible, have even, in a perfectly legitimate sense, been caused,4 by the 
advent of modern science and technology. Without the amazing success 
of modern science and technology, they would not have happened. There 
is nothing surprising about this. New scientific knowledge and techno-
logical know- how enormously increase our power to act: in the absence 
of enlightenment, of wisdom, our new power to act will sometimes have 
good consequences, but will also, as often as not, have bad consequences, 
whether intended, as in war, or unintended, as in global warming. Before 
the advent of modern science, lack of wisdom, of enlightenment, did not 
matter too much; we lacked the power to do too much damage to our-
selves and the planet. But now that we do have modern science, and the 
unprecedented powers that it has given us, lack of enlightenment puts 
us into a position of unprecedented peril. It may even be that our very 
survival depends on humanity learning a bit more wisdom. Instead of 
blaming science for our troubles, as many do, we need, rather, to see 
whether we can learn from the astonishing and dangerous success of sci-
ence about how to acquire a bit more global wisdom.
The eighteenth- century philosophes interpreted the basic 
Enlightenment idea as requiring that the social sciences be developed 
alongside the natural sciences. Francis Bacon had already argued that, in 
order to better the lot of humanity, it is essential to improve our knowl-
edge of the natural world. The philosophes, understandably enough, came 
to the conclusion that, in order to make social progress it is, if anything, 
even more important to improve knowledge of the social world. So they 
set about creating and developing the social sciences:  economics, psy-
chology, history, anthropology, sociology, political science. This was con-
tinued throughout the nineteenth century by such men as Saint- Simon, 
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Comte, Mill and Marx until, by the mid- twentieth century, departments 
of these various social sciences, as conceived of by the eighteenth cen-
tury, had been created in universities all over the world.5 It is hardly too 
much to say that academic inquiry, as it exists today, is the outcome of 
developing and institutionalizing the scientific revolution of the seven-
teenth century, and the Enlightenment Programme of the eighteenth 
century.
The Enlightenment was of course opposed by the Romantic move-
ment. This put its faith in emotion, imagination, spontaneity, inspiration, 
art, genius, and opposed the Enlightenment faith in science and reason. 
This Romantic opposition to the Enlightenment, to science and reason, 
is still influential today in such fields as politics, education, anti- science 
movements, the arts. And it is still influential in some parts of academic 
inquiry, in such areas as philosophy, cultural studies, anthropology. 
Postmodernism comes out of the Romantic movement.6
But in objecting to the rationalism of the Enlightenment, 
Romanticism entirely missed the point. For the Traditional Enlighten-
ment, inherited from the eighteenth century, suffers, not from too 
much reason, but from not enough. It amounts to a characteristic kind 
of irrationality masquerading as rationality. In developing the basic 
Enlightenment idea intellectually, the philosophes botched the job; and 
unfortunately it is this botched, irrational version of the Enlightenment 
Programme that we now have built into the intellectual and institutional 
structure of the academic enterprise. Academic inquiry today, when 
judged from the standpoint of helping us create a better world, is dam-
agingly irrational in a wholesale, structural way.7
There are three steps that need to be got right to put the basic 
Enlightenment idea into practice correctly:
(i) The progress- achieving methods of science need to be correctly 
identified.
(ii) These methods need to be correctly generalized so that they 
become fruitfully applicable to any worthwhile, problematic 
human endeavour, whatever the aims may be, and not just appli-
cable to the endeavour of improving knowledge.
(iii) The correctly generalized progress- achieving methods then need 
to be exploited correctly in the great human endeavour of trying 
to make social progress towards an enlightened, civilized world.
Unfortunately, the philosophes of the Enlightenment got all three 
points disastrously wrong. They failed to capture correctly the 
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progress- achieving methods of natural science (in that they defended 
inductivist, or at least verificationist, conceptions of science); they failed 
to generalize these methods properly; and, most disastrously of all, they 
failed to apply them properly so that humanity might learn how to become 
more civilized or enlightened by rational means. Instead of applying the 
generalized progress- achieving methods of science to social life itself, so 
that social progress might be achieved, the philosophes sought to apply 
scientific method merely to social science. Reason (as construed by the phi-
losophes) got applied, not to the task of making social progress towards an 
enlightened world, but to the task of making intellectual progress towards 
greater knowledge about the social world. Social inquiry was developed, 
not as social methodology or social philosophy, but as social science.
That the philosophes made these blunders in the eighteenth cen-
tury is forgivable; what is unforgivable is that these blunders still remain 
unrecognized and uncorrected today, over two centuries later. Instead 
of correcting the blunders, we have allowed our institutions of learning 
to be shaped by them as they have developed throughout the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, so that now the blunders are an all- pervasive 
feature of academia, as we shall see in more detail in a moment.
10.3 Popper’s contribution to the  
Enlightenment Programme
As I  have already indicated, Popper made enormously important 
improvements to the Enlightenment Programme inherited from the eigh-
teenth century. Inductivism and verificationism become falsificationism. 
Traditional conceptions of reason, with all the emphasis on proof and 
justification, become critical rationalism. These improvements, at steps 
(i)  and (ii) of the Enlightenment Programme, become all- important 
when it comes to step (iii): the application of reason to social life, to pol-
itics, to problems of living, to political philosophy. As a result of bringing 
about a revolution in our conception of scientific method, and of ratio-
nality more generally, Popper in effect transforms the very idea of “the 
rational  society”, so that this ceases to be something that is morally and 
politically abhorrent, and becomes both highly desirable, and achiev-
able, instead.
Given traditional, pre- Popperian conceptions of science and rea-
son, which tend to see science as establishing secure knowledge of truth 
by means of evidence, and tend to see reason as establishing truth by 
means of deductive argument, the “rational society” can only be a society 
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determined, or at least severely constrained, by “the rules of reason”. 
Reason becomes a kind of tyrant. Individual liberty, diversity of views 
and ways of life, wayward imagination, disagreement and protest would 
all be suppressed by the iron rule of reason and logic. Granted such ver-
ificationist, authoritarian conceptions of reason,8 the “rational society” 
can only be regarded as a kind of nightmarish totalitarian state, the 
very opposite of democracy and liberalism.9 No wonder the Romantics 
protested.
But Popper’s revolutionary ideas about science and reason change 
all this dramatically. First, granted Popper’s falsificationist conception of 
scientific method, imagination plays a crucial role in science. Imagination 
is needed to dream up new wild speculations, subsequently to be sub-
mitted to ferocious attempts at empirical refutation. Second, plurality of 
conflicting theories is absolutely essential for scientific progress, not only 
to increase the store of theories to be submitted to attempted refutation, 
but in order to ensure that theories are severely tested in the first place. 
As I have already mentioned, in order to make sense of the idea of severe 
testing, we need to see the experimentalist as having at least the germ of 
an idea for a rival theory up his sleeve (otherwise testing might degen-
erate into performing essentially the same experiment again and again). 
This means experiments are always crucial experiments, attempts at try-
ing to decide between two competing theories. Theoretical pluralism is 
necessary for science to be genuinely empirical.10
Both these points carry over when Popper’s falsificationist con-
ception of scientific method is generalized to form critical rationalism. 
Reason, quite generally, is at a loss without imagination. Imagination 
is required to dream up possible solutions to problems, which can then 
be submitted to severe criticism. Again, plurality of views is an essential 
ingredient of Popper’s conception of reason. Criticism can only deliver a 
good idea as to how to solve a problem if there is a plurality of ideas to 
criticize in the first place. And merely in order to criticize an idea, one 
needs to have some kind of rival idea in mind, at least as a possibility.
Rationality, as construed by Popper, requires plurality of ideas, val-
ues, ways of life; the freedom to imagine, to criticize authority, dogma 
and received opinion. It demands sustained tolerance of diversity of 
views and ways of life, together with the existence of traditions of crit-
icism, so that good ideas may be selected from a pool of not- so- good 
ideas. Reason, as Popper emphasizes, needs to be seen in social, political 
and institutional terms (Popper, 1966a, ch. 24; 1961, section 32). Thus, 
granted Popper’s revolutionary conceptions of scientific method and rea-
son, the “rational society” is not some kind of totalitarian society, but just 
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the opposite, the “open society” – a society that tolerates doubt, diver-
sity of views and ways of life, and criticism, and sustains individual lib-
erty, reasonableness, humanity, justice and democracy. Reason, instead 
of being the enemy of freedom, individuality, imagination, democracy 
and justice, becomes the friend of these things, indeed essential for their 
preservation and development. As Popper puts it in a stray remark tossed 
out during the course of developing the argument: “We have to learn the 
lesson that intellectual honesty is fundamental for everything we cher-
ish” (Popper, 1966a, vol. 2, p. 59).
In The Open Society and Its Enemies, Popper depicts an epic struggle 
between those who have sought to help sustain and promote the open 
society (i.e. the rational society), and those who have opposed it. And 
he shows how even some of the greatest thinkers of the past have been 
beguiled by false ideas of science and reason into arguing for the closed 
society, above all, Plato and Marx.
In these ways, the path Popper pursues, from his conjectural, fal-
sificationist conception of science to its generalization to form critical 
rationalism, and its application to some of the most urgent and profound 
political and social problems of our times, represents an immensely 
valuable rediscovery and transformation of the eighteenth- century 
Enlightenment Programme. Popper’s contribution is important and pro-
found; but it is nevertheless defective. It needs further improvement. 
(Popper’s followers, in so far as they refuse to consider the need for fur-
ther improvement, do Popper a great disservice – and humanity, of course, 
an even greater disservice. At the heart of Popper’s thought there is the 
insight that scientific method, and reason, rightly understood, deliver, 
not certainty, but rather uncertain progress, improvement, development, 
growth.11 We betray Popper’s philosophy quite fundamentally if we do 
not take it as a set of proposals, suggestions and arguments urgently in 
need of further development.)
In what follows I indicate how Popper’s version of the Enlightenment 
Programme needs further improvement in two stages, which I shall dis-
cuss under the headings “The Improved Popperian Enlightenment” and 
“The New Enlightenment”.
10.4 The Improved Popperian Enlightenment
A basic inadequacy of Popper’s version of the Enlightenment Programme 
is that it depicts social inquiry, in highly traditional terms, to be social 
science, indeed pro- naturalist social science, with methods akin to those 
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of the natural sciences. Popper’s criticisms of some traditional views 
associated with social inquiry  – his criticisms of historicism, historicist 
social science and Utopian social engineering – are excellent and deci-
sive. But he does not carry through this criticism of traditional views far 
enough; he fails to correct the greatest blunder of the eighteenth- century 
Enlightenment, namely the mistake of applying reason to social science 
rather than to social life!
The basic Enlightenment idea, after all, is to learn from scientific 
progress how to make social progress towards an enlightened world. 
Putting this idea into practice involves getting appropriately generalized 
progress- achieving methods of science into social life itself! It involves get-
ting progress- achieving methods into our institutions and ways of life in 
addition to science, into government, industry, agriculture, commerce, 
international relations, the media, the arts, education. But in sharp 
contrast to all this, the Traditional Enlightenment has sought to apply 
generalized scientific method, not to social life, but merely to social sci-
ence! Instead of helping humanity learn how to become more civilized by 
rational means, the Traditional Enlightenment has sought merely to help 
social scientists improve knowledge of social phenomena (this knowl-
edge then being applied to help solve social problems). The outcome 
is that today academic inquiry devotes itself to acquiring knowledge of 
natural and social phenomena, but does not attempt to help humanity 
learn how to become more civilized. Instead of social inquiry having, as 
its basic task, to promote cooperatively rational tackling of problems of 
living in the social world, its primary task, rather, is to acquire knowledge 
of social phenomena. Instead of being social methodology or social phi-
losophy, social inquiry is pursued as social science.
This is the blunder that Popper simply reproduces, and fails to cor-
rect. Popper, one might almost say, argues for the open society, but fails 
to argue for open social inquiry, for a kind of open inquiry devoted to 
promoting the open society by rational means.
In order to correct this third, monumental and disastrous blunder, 
we need, as a first step, to bring about a revolution in the nature of aca-
demic inquiry, beginning with social inquiry and the humanities. Social 
inquiry needs to be, not social science, but rather social methodology or 
social philosophy, concerned to promote rational tackling of problems of 
living in the social world.12
Let us now see, in a little more detail, what would result 
from correcting this third, monumental blunder of the Traditional 
Enlightenment. What we need to do is to see what results from apply-
ing the progress- achieving rules of reason (arrived at by generalizing the 
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progress- achieving methods of science) to social life rather than to social 
science, to the task of making social progress towards a civilized world 
rather than to the task of making intellectual progress towards better 
knowledge of social phenomena.
In order to make clear what is at stake here, I need to appeal to the 
four rules of rational problem solving of the last chapter. I shall call these 
rules, which constitute an improved version of Popper’s critical rational-
ism, “problem- solving rationality”:
1. Articulate, and try to improve the articulation of, the problem to 
be solved.
2. Propose and critically assess possible solutions.
3. When necessary, break up the basic problem to be solved into a 
number of preliminary, simpler, analogous, subordinate or spe-
cialized problems (to be tackled in accordance with rules 1 and 
2), in an attempt to work gradually towards a solution to the basic 
problem to be solved.
4. Interconnect attempts to solve basic and specialized problems, so 
that basic problem solving may guide, and be guided by, special-
ized problem solving.13
Popper’s critical rationalism consists of rules 1 and 2; problem- solving 
rationality improves on this by adding on rules 3 and 4, which become 
relevant when we are confronted by some especially recalcitrant prob-
lem – such as the problem of understanding the nature of the universe, 
or the problem of creating a civilized world – which can only be solved 
gradually and progressively, bit by bit, and not all at once.14 Popper was 
too hostile to specialization to emphasize the need for rule 3; he did not 
appreciate that the evils of specialization can be counteracted by imple-
menting rule 4.
It might seem that in moving from scientific method to critical and 
problem- solving rationality we lose the idea of learning from experience; 
but this is not so. Problem- solving rationality, as enshrined in the above 
four rules, is a method of learning from experience. Experience is what 
we acquire through trying out various possible solutions to the problem 
we wish to solve, and discovering that these possibilities more or less fail. 
Consider, for example, a problem of action, a technological or political 
problem, perhaps: in criticizing a proposed solution we may well appeal 
to the (adverse) outcome of attempting to put the solution into practice; 
that is, we appeal to experience. Experience, in this broad sense, is what 
we acquire through trying to do things, trying to solve problems: it is a 
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generalization of the notion of experience as this arises in connection 
with science – observation and experimentation. Problem- solving ratio-
nality might also be called “problem- solving empiricism”; it is as much a 
generalization of scientific empiricism as it is of scientific rationality.
These four rules, though by no means sufficient for rationality,15 
are certainly necessary for it. No mode of inquiry can hope to be rational 
which systematically violates any of these rules. In a moment we shall see 
that academic inquiry as it exists in the main at present, devoted to the 
pursuit of knowledge, systematically violates three of these four elemen-
tary, almost banal, entirely uncontroversial, rules of reason.
Two preliminary points now need to be made.
First, in order to create a more civilized, enlightened world, the 
problems that we need to solve are, fundamentally, problems of living 
rather than problems of knowledge. It is what we do (or refrain from 
doing) that matters, and not just what we know. Even where new knowl-
edge or technology is needed, in connection with agriculture or medicine 
for example, it is always what this enables us to do that solves the prob-
lem of living.
Second, in order to make progress towards a sustainable, civilized 
world we need to learn how to resolve our conflicts in more cooperative 
ways than at present. A group acts cooperatively in so far as all mem-
bers of the group share responsibility for what is done, and for decid-
ing what is done, proposals for action, for resolution of problems and 
conflicts, being judged on their merits from the standpoint of the inter-
ests of the members of the group (or the group as a whole), there being 
no permanent leadership or delegation of power.16 Competition is not 
opposed to cooperation if it proceeds within a framework of cooperation, 
as it does ideally within science. There are of course degrees of coop-
erativeness, from its absence, all- out violence, at one extreme, through 
settling of conflicts by means of threat, agreed procedures such as voting, 
via bargaining, to all- out cooperativeness at the other extreme. If we are 
to develop a sustainable, civilized world we need to move progressively 
away from the violent end of this spectrum towards the cooperative end.
Granted, then, that the task of academic inquiry is to put the four 
rules of problem- solving rationality into practice in such a way as to help 
humanity learn how to make progress towards a civilized, enlightened 
world, the primary intellectual tasks must be:
1. To articulate, and try to improve the articulation of, those social 
problems of living we need to solve in order to make progress 
towards a better world.
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2. To propose and critically assess possible, and actual, increasingly 
cooperative social actions – these actions to be assessed for their 
capacity to resolve human problems and conflicts, thus enhancing 
the quality of human life.
These intellectually fundamental tasks are undertaken by social inquiry 
and the humanities, at the heart of the academic enterprise. Social 
inquiry also has the task of promoting increasingly cooperatively rational 
tackling of problems of living in the social world – in such contexts as pol-
itics, commerce, international affairs, industry, agriculture, the media, 
the law, education.
Academic inquiry also needs, of course, to implement the third rule 
of rational problem solving; that is, it needs:
3. To break up the basic problems of living into preliminary, simpler, 
analogous, subordinate, specialized problems of knowledge and 
technology, in an attempt to work gradually towards solutions to 
the basic problems of living.
But, in order to ensure that specialized and basic problem solving keep in 
contact with one another, the fourth rule of rational problem solving also 
needs to be implemented; that is, academic inquiry needs:
4. To interconnect attempts to solve basic and specialized problems, 
so that basic problem solving may guide, and be guided by, spe-
cialized problem solving.
In Figure 9.2 in Chapter 9 I have tried to depict the kind of inquiry that 
would emerge as a result of putting the above four rules of rational prob-
lem solving into academic practice, as just indicated. I will give some fur-
ther details below.
There are a number of points to note about this “rational problem 
solving” conception of academic inquiry. Social inquiry is not, primarily, 
social science; it has, rather, the intellectually basic task of engaging in, 
and promoting in the social world, increasingly cooperatively rational 
tackling of conflicts and problems of living.17 Social inquiry, so conceived, 
is actually intellectually more fundamental than natural science (which 
seeks to solve subordinate problems of knowledge and understanding). 
Academic inquiry, in seeking to promote cooperatively rational prob-
lem solving in the social world, must engage in a two- way exchange of 
ideas, arguments, experiences and information with the social world. 
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The thinking, the problem solving, that really matters, that is really fun-
damental, is the thinking that we engage in, individually, socially and 
institutionally, as we live; the whole of academic inquiry is, in a sense, a 
specialized part of this, created in accordance with rule 3, but also being 
required to implement rule 4 (so that social and academic problem solv-
ing may influence each other). Academic inquiry, on this model, is a kind 
of peoples’ civil service, doing openly for the public what actual civil ser-
vices are supposed to do, in secret, for governments. Academic inquiry 
needs just sufficient power to retain its independence, to resist pressures 
from government, industry, the media, religious authorities and public 
opinion, but no more. Academia proposes to, argues with, learns from, 
attempts to teach and criticizes all sectors of the social world, but does 
not instruct or dictate. It is an intellectual resource for the public, not an 
intellectual bully.
The basic intellectual aim of inquiry may be said to be, not knowl-
edge, but wisdom – wisdom being understood to be the desire, the active 
endeavour and the capacity to realize what is desirable and of value in 
life, for oneself and others.18 Wisdom includes knowledge, know- how 
and understanding, but goes beyond them in also including the desire 
and active striving for what is of value; the ability to experience value, 
actually and potentially, in the circumstances of life; the capacity to help 
realize what is of value for oneself and others; the capacity to help solve 
those problems of living that need to be solved if what is of value is to 
be realized; the capacity to use and develop knowledge, technology and 
understanding as needed for the realization of value. Wisdom, like knowl-
edge, can be conceived of not only in personal terms but also in institu-
tional or social terms. Thus, the basic aim of academic inquiry, according 
to the view being indicated here, is to help us develop wiser ways of liv-
ing; wiser institutions, customs and social relations; a wiser world.
So far academic inquiry has been characterized as having the task 
of helping humanity learn how to tackle its problems of living more 
rationally; nothing has been said about learning from experience. But, 
as I indicated above, the four rules of reason that we are considering are 
also rules for learning from experience; this has a vital role to play in the 
conception of inquiry we are considering. What we learn as a result of 
attempting to put into practice some proposed solution to a problem of 
living is of course all important for learning how to build a better world. 
A vital task for academic inquiry (especially for history) is to monitor the 
successes and failures of our past attempts at solving problems of living. 
As far as possible we should try to ensure that our failed social exper-
iments, our failed attempts at solving social problems, are performed 
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only in imagination, and not in practice in the real world, so that we only 
suffer the consequences of failure in imagination, and not in reality. But 
however vivid, far- seeing and accurate our imagination may be, failure in 
practice will always happen, and we should seek to learn all we can from 
it for future actions. To this extent, the conception of inquiry we are con-
sidering can be regarded as a kind of empiricism. In two crucial respects, 
however, it differs from what is usually meant by empiricism. First, what 
is learned is how to do things, how to realize what is of value, how to 
live, and not, primarily, what we learn in the context of science: knowl-
edge of fact. And second, as I have already remarked, “experience” means 
something like “what we acquire as a result of attempting to do things, 
attempting to realize what is of value”, and not, primarily, what it means 
in the context of science: observation and experiment. (This latter mean-
ing is a specialized version of the former meaning.)
It is important to appreciate that the conception of academic 
inquiry that we are considering is designed to help us to see, to know and 
to understand, for their own sake, just as much as it is designed to help 
us solve practical problems of living. It might seem that social inquiry, in 
articulating problems of living and proposing possible solutions, has only 
a severely practical purpose. But engaging in this intellectual activity of 
articulating personal and social problems of living is just what we need to 
do if we are to develop a good empathic or “personalistic” understanding 
of our fellow human beings (and of ourselves) – a kind of understand-
ing that can do justice to our humanity, to what is of value, potentially 
and actually, in our lives. In order to understand another person as a per-
son (as opposed to a biological or physical system) I need to be able, in 
imagination, to see, desire, fear, believe, experience and suffer what the 
other person sees, desires, etc. I need to be able, in imagination, to enter 
into the other person’s world; that is, I need to be able to understand his 
problems of living as he understands them, and I need also, perhaps, to 
understand a more objective version of these problems. In giving intellec-
tual priority to the tasks of articulating problems of living and exploring 
possible solutions, social inquiry thereby gives intellectual priority to the 
development of a kind of understanding that people can acquire of one 
another that is of great intrinsic value. In my view, indeed, personalistic 
understanding is essential to the development of our humanity, even to 
the development of consciousness. Our being able to understand each 
other in this way is also essential for cooperatively rational action.
And it is essential for science. It is only because scientists can enter 
imaginatively into each other’s problems and research projects that 
objective scientific knowledge can develop. At least two rather different 
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motives exist for trying to see the world as another sees it: one may seek 
to improve one’s knowledge of the other person; or one may seek to 
improve one’s knowledge of the world, it being possible that the other 
person has something to contribute to one’s own knowledge. Scientific 
knowledge arises as a result of the latter use of personalistic understand-
ing – scientific knowledge being, in part, the product of endless acts of 
personalistic understanding between scientists (with the personalistic 
element largely suppressed so that it becomes invisible). It is hardly too 
much to say that almost all that is of value in human life is based on per-
sonalistic understanding.19
The basic intellectual aim of the kind of inquiry we are consider-
ing is to devote reason to the discovery of what is of value in life. This 
immediately carries with it the consequence that the arts have a vital 
rational contribution to make to inquiry, as revelations of value, as imag-
inative explorations of possibilities, desirable or disastrous, or as vehicles 
for the criticism of fraudulent values through comedy, satire or tragedy. 
Literature and drama also have a rational role to play in enhancing our 
ability to understand others personalistically, as a result of identifying 
imaginatively with fictional characters – literature in this respect merging 
into biography, documentary and history. Literary criticism bridges the 
gap between literature and social inquiry, and is more concerned with 
the content of literature than the means by which it achieves its effects.
Another important consequence flows from the point that the basic 
aim of inquiry is to help us discover what is of value, namely that our 
feelings and desires have a vital rational role to play within the intel-
lectual domain of inquiry. If we are to discover for ourselves what is of 
value, then we must attend to our feelings and desires. But not every-
thing that feels good is good, and not everything that we desire is desir-
able. Rationality requires that feelings and desires take fact, knowledge 
and logic into account, just as it requires that priorities for scientific 
research take feelings and desires into account. In insisting on this kind 
of interplay between feelings and desires on the one hand, knowledge 
and understanding on the other, the conception of inquiry that we are 
considering resolves the conflict between rationalism and romanticism, 
and helps us to acquire what we need if we are to contribute to building 
civilization: mindful hearts and heartfelt minds.
This, then, in bare outline, is the kind of academic inquiry that 
would have emerged from the eighteenth- century Enlightenment if the 
third great blunder of the Enlightenment had not been made.
But the blunder was made. Instead of the progress- achieving meth-
ods of science (generalized to become problem- solving rationality) being 
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applied to social life, scientific method was applied to the task of devel-
oping social science alongside natural science. The outcome is what we 
have (by and large) today: a kind of inquiry that gives intellectual pri-
ority to the task of acquiring knowledge, this knowledge, once acquired, 
being subsequently and secondarily applied to help solve social prob-
lems. Rule 3 of problem- solving rationality is put into practice to splendid 
effect: the outcome is the maze of specialized disciplines of the formal, 
natural, social and technological sciences, and of scholarship, that go to 
make up much of academic inquiry today. But rules 1, 2 and 4 are vio-
lated. Academic inquiry today, restricted primarily to solving problems of 
knowledge, is so irrational, in a wholesale and structural way, that three 
of the four most elementary rules of reason conceivable are violated. 
Rule 1 is violated because academia can articulate problems of knowledge 
but cannot, at a fundamental level, articulate problems of living. Rule 2 
is violated because academia can propose and critically assess possible 
solutions to problems of knowledge – theories, observational and experi-
mental results, factual claims of all kinds – but cannot propose and criti-
cally assess possible solutions to problems of living – proposals for action, 
policies, political programmes, political philosophies, philosophies of 
life. All these latter do not state matters of fact; they embody proposals 
as to what we should do, how we should live, what we should seek to 
change and create; they incorporate such things as values, human hopes 
and fears, policies, strategies for living: they do not constitute potential 
contributions to knowledge, and are thus excluded from a kind of inquiry 
devoted to the pursuit of knowledge. Once rules 1 and 2 are violated, 
rule 4 is necessarily violated as well.
This wholesale, structural irrationality of academic inquiry as it 
mostly exists today is no mere formal matter. It has far- flung, long- term 
damaging consequences. It means that knowledge and technological 
know- how are pursued dissociated intellectually from a more fundamen-
tal concern to promote increasingly cooperatively rational tackling of 
conflicts and problems of living. As I have pointed out (in section 10.2), it 
is this that is at the root of most of our current global problems.
A kind of inquiry that pursues knowledge and technological know- 
how, and fails to give intellectual priority to the tasks of articulating our 
problems of living, and proposing and criticizing possible solutions (thus 
violating three of the four most elementary rules of reason conceivable), 
must inevitably tend to create the kind of global problems we face today, 
the outcome of possessing much recently acquired power to act, with-
out the power to act wisely. And the more successful such “knowledge- 
inquiry” is, so the greater the human suffering it is likely to lead to. 
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Reason is far too important “for everything we cherish” for it to be toler-
able that it should be systematically violated in this way.
Here, then, is a major failing of Popper’s version of the 
Enlightenment Programme. Instead of arguing for the need to reject 
knowledge- inquiry and replace it with the kind of academic inquiry 
indicated above, “wisdom- inquiry” as it may be called, Popper defends 
knowledge- inquiry, and even defends pro- naturalist social science.20
10.5 The New Enlightenment, step (i): 
from  falsificationism to aim- oriented empiricism
I come now to a rather more radical revision of Popper’s version of the 
Enlightenment Programme. This begins with a revision of step (i)  of 
the programme. Popper’s falsificationism is untenable, and needs to be 
replaced by a conception of scientific method that I  have called aim- 
oriented empiricism (AOE). The reason for this revision, already dis-
cussed in Chapters  2, 5 and 7, can be summarized as follows. Science 
only considers (and only accepts) theories that are sufficiently simple, 
unified or explanatory, and this means that the methods of science make 
a persistent metaphysical assumption about the universe, to the effect 
that it has a simple, unified, explanatory dynamic structure. That such a 
persistent metaphysical assumption is made by science, as a part of (con-
jectural) scientific knowledge, contradicts, and refutes, falsificationism. 
An improved conception of scientific method is required.
In The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), Popper claims that the 
more falsifiable a theory is, so the greater its degree of simplicity. (There 
is a second method for assessing degrees of simplicity, in terms of num-
ber of observation statements required to falsify the theories in question, 
but Popper stresses that if the two methods clash, it is the first that takes 
precedence.) It is easy to see that Popper’s proposal fails. Given a reason-
ably simple scientific theory, T, one can readily increase the falsifiability 
of T by adding on an independently testable hypotheses, h1, to form the 
new theory, T + h1. This new theory will be more falsifiable than T but, 
in general, will be drastically less simple. And one can make the situation 
even worse, by adding on as many independently testable hypotheses as 
one pleases, h2, h3 and so on, to form new theories T + h1 + h2 + h3 + …, 
as highly empirically falsifiable and as drastically lacking in simplicity as 
one pleases.21 Thus simplicity cannot be equated with falsifiability.
And there is a further, even more devastating point. Popper’s 
 methodological rules favour T + h1 + h2 + h3 over T, especially if h1, 
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h2 and h3 have been severely tested, and corroborated. But in scientific 
practice, T  + h1 + h2 + h3 would never even be considered, however 
highly corroborated it might be if considered, because of its extreme 
lack of simplicity or unity, its grossly ad hoc character. There is here 
a  fundamental flaw in the central doctrine of The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery.
Later, in Conjectures and Refutations (1963), Popper put forward a 
new methodological principle which, when added to those of the ear-
lier book, succeeds in excluding theories such as T + h1 + h2 + h3 from 
scientific consideration. This principle states that a new theory, in order 
to be acceptable, “should proceed from some simple, new, and powerful, 
unifying idea about some connection or relation (such as gravitational 
attraction) between hitherto unconnected things (such as planets and 
apples) or facts (such as inertial and gravitational mass) or new “the-
oretical entities” (such as field and particles)” (Popper, 1963, p.  241). 
T + h1 + h2 + h3 does not “proceed from some simple, new and powerful, 
unifying idea”, and is to be rejected on that account, even if more highly 
corroborated than T.
But the adoption of this “requirement of simplicity” (as Popper 
calls it) as a basic methodological principle of science, has the effect of 
permanently excluding from science all ad hoc theories (such as T + h1 
+ h2 + h3) that fail to satisfy the principle, however empirically suc-
cessful such theories might be if considered. This amounts to assum-
ing permanently that the universe is such that no ad hoc theory, that 
fails to satisfy Popper’s principle of simplicity, is true. It amounts to 
accepting, as a permanent item of scientific knowledge, the substan-
tial metaphysical thesis that the universe is non- ad hoc, in the sense 
that no theory that fails to satisfy Popper’s principle of simplicity is 
true. But this clashes with Popper’s criterion of demarcation: that no 
unfalsifiable, metaphysical thesis is to be accepted as a part of scientific 
knowledge.22
It is, in fact, important that Popper’s criterion of demarcation is 
rejected, and the metaphysical thesis of non- ad hocness is explicitly 
acknowledged to be a part of scientific knowledge. The thesis, in the 
form in which it is implicitly adopted at any given stage in the develop-
ment of science, may well be false. Scientific progress may require that 
it be modified. The thesis needs to be made explicit, in other words, for 
good Popperian reasons, namely, so that it can be critically assessed, and 
perhaps improved. As long as Popper’s demarcation criterion is upheld, 
the metaphysical thesis must remain implicit, and hence immune to 
criticism.23
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Popper’s falsificationism can be modified, however, so that substan-
tial metaphysical theses, implicit in methods that exclude ad hoc theo-
ries, are made explicit within science, and are acknowledged to be basic 
items of (conjectural) scientific knowledge, thus becoming open to crit-
ical scrutiny and revision. The outcome is a more rational, a more intel-
lectually rigorous kind of science, just because substantial, influential 
and problematic metaphysical theses, implicit in the methods of science, 
become explicitly criticizable and improvable.
The moment we acknowledged that there is a persistent metaphys-
ical thesis implicit in the methods of science, two new problems leap to 
our attention. What, precisely, does this metaphysical thesis assert? And 
on what grounds is it to be (conjecturally) accepted as a part of scientific 
knowledge? AOE is put forward as the solution to these two problems.
As far as the first of the above two problems is concerned, a wide 
range of metaphysical theses are available. At one extreme, we might 
adopt a metaphysical thesis that excludes only utterly silly theories; at 
the other extreme, we might adopt the thesis that the universe is physi-
cally comprehensible in the sense that it has a unified dynamic structure, 
some yet- to- be- discovered unified physical “theory of everything” being 
true – a thesis that I shall call “physicalism”. We might even adopt some 
specific version of physicalism, which asserts that the underlying physi-
cal unity is of a specific type: it is made up of a unified field perhaps, or 
a quantum field, or empty, curved, topologically complex space- time, or 
a quantum string field. Other things being equal, the more specific the 
thesis (and thus the more it excludes) so the more likely it is to be false, 
whereas the more unspecific it is so the more likely it is to be true.
As far as the second of the above two problems is concerned, there 
are three considerations that we can appeal to, wholly Popperian in spirit 
if not to the letter of Popperian doctrine:
(1) If some metaphysical thesis, M, is implicit in some scientific meth-
odological practice, then science is more rigorous if M is made 
explicit, since this facilitates criticism of it, the consideration of 
alternatives.
(2) A metaphysical thesis may be such that its truth is a necessary 
condition for it to be possible for us to acquire knowledge: if so, 
accepting the thesis explicitly can only help, and cannot under-
mine, the pursuit of knowledge of truth.
(3) Given two rival metaphysical theses, M1 and M2, it may be the 
case that M1 supports an empirical scientific research programme 
that has apparently met with far greater empirical success than 
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any rival empirical research programme based on M2: in this case 
we may favour M1 over M2, at least until M2, or some third thesis, 
M3, shows signs of supporting an even more empirically progres-
sive research programme.
Two difficulties arise, however, when one attempts to use (2) and (3) to 
select the best available metaphysical thesis from the infinitely many 
options available. As far as (2) is concerned, any thesis sufficiently sub-
stantial to exclude empirically successful crackpot theories from science 
is such that acquisition of knowledge might still be possible even if the 
thesis is false. On the other hand, any thesis such that its truth is neces-
sary for knowledge to be acquired is much too insubstantial to exclude 
crackpot theories. As far as (3)  is concerned, given any metaphysical 
thesis, M, that supports a non- crackpot empirically progressive scien-
tific research programme, we can mimic this with a crackpot M* that 
supports a crackpot empirically progressive research programme, with 
a series of crackpot theories, T1*, T2*, …, these theories becoming pro-
gressively more and more empirically successful, and closer and closer to 
exemplifying M*.
These two difficulties can be overcome, however, if physics is con-
strued as adopting a hierarchy of metaphysical conjectures concerning 
the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, these conjec-
tures becoming more and more insubstantial as one ascends the hier-
archy, more and more likely to be true (see Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2). 
At the top of the hierarchy, there is the conjecture that the universe is 
such that some (conjectural) knowledge of our local circumstances can 
be acquired, sufficient to make life possible. This, and the next conjec-
ture down are, I argue, to be accepted as permanent items of scientific 
knowledge, in accordance with (2), on the grounds, that is, that such 
acceptance can only help, and cannot hinder, the search for factual 
knowledge whatever the universe may be like. At level 4 the conjecture 
to be adopted is, I argue, physicalism. At level 5 there is the less precise 
conjecture that the universe is comprehensible in some way or other. At 
level 3 there is the best currently available more or less specific version of 
physicalism, which I call the current “metaphysical blueprint”. Examples 
from the history of physics include the following: the universe consists of 
(a) corpuscles, which interact by contact; (b) point atoms, which inter-
act by means of forces; (c) a unified classical field; (d) a unified quan-
tum field; (e) empty, curved, topologically complex space- time; and (f) 
a unified quantum string field. At level 2 are currently accepted funda-
mental physical theories, and at level 1 there are empirical data. Two 
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considerations govern acceptance of metaphysical conjectures from 
level 3 to level 6. Any such conjecture must, as far as possible, (A) exem-
plify, be a precise version of, and imply, the next conjecture up in the 
hierarchy, (B) be more empirically fruitful than any rival conjecture, 
in that it is a part of an empirical research programme that seems to be 
more empirically progressive than any rival research programme, in 
accordance with (3) above. Two considerations also govern acceptance 
of testable fundamental dynamical physical theories. Such a theory 
must be such that (i) it, together with all other accepted fundamental 
physical theories, exemplifies, or is a special case of, the best available 
metaphysical blueprint (at level 3) to a sufficiently good extent, and 
(ii) it is sufficiently successful empirically (where empirical success is to 
be understood, roughly, in a Popperian sense).
This hierarchical view of AOE overcomes the two difficulties, indi-
cated above, roughly as follows. Only the top two theses are accepted as 
a result of an appeal to (2); theses at levels 3 to 5 are accepted as a result 
of (a)  an appeal to (3), and (b)  compatibility with the top two theses 
at levels 7 and 6; this suffices to exclude aberrant rivals at levels 3 to 5 
(which might be construed to support aberrant, empirically progressive 
research programmes). For further details of how AOE overcomes the 
two difficulties indicated above, and for further details of the view itself, 
see previous chapters.24
A basic idea of AOE is to channel or direct criticism so that it is as 
fruitful as possible, from the standpoint of aiding progress in knowledge. 
The function of criticism within science is to promote scientific progress. 
When criticism demonstrably cannot help promote scientific progress, it 
becomes irrational (the idea behind (2) above). In an attempt to make 
criticism as fruitful as possible, we need to try to direct it at targets that 
are the most fruitful, the most productive, to criticize (from the stand-
point of the growth, the improvement of knowledge). This is the basic 
idea behind the hierarchy of AOE. Conjectures at all levels remain open 
to criticism. But, as we ascend the hierarchy, conjectures are less and 
less likely to be false; it is less and less likely that criticism, here, will 
help promote scientific knowledge.25 The best currently available level 
3 conjecture is almost bound to be false: the history of physics reveals, 
at this level, as I have indicated above, that a number of different con-
jectures have been adopted and rejected in turn. Here, criticism, the 
activity of developing alternatives (compatible with physicalism) is likely 
to be immensely fruitful for progress in theoretical physics. Indeed, in 
Chapter  3, and elsewhere,26 I  argue that this provides physics with a 
rational, though fallible and non- mechanical method for the discovery 
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of new fundamental physical theories, a method invented and exploited 
by Einstein in discovering special and general relativity, something 
which Popper has argued is not possible (see Popper, 1959, pp. 31– 2). 
Criticizing physicalism, at level 4, may also be fruitful for physics, but (the 
conjecture of AOE is that) this is not as likely to be as fruitful as criticism 
at level 3. (Elsewhere I have suggested alternatives to physicalism: see 
Maxwell, 2004, pp. 198– 205.) And, as we ascend the hierarchy (so AOE 
conjectures), criticism becomes progressively less and less likely to be 
fruitful. Against that, it must be admitted that the higher in the hierarchy 
we need to modify our ideas, so the more dramatic the intellectual revo-
lution that this would bring about. If physicalism is rejected altogether, 
and some quite different version of the level 5 conjecture of comprehen-
sibility is adopted instead, the whole character of natural science would 
change dramatically; physics, as we know it, might even cease to exist.
The biggest change, in moving from falsificationism to AOE, has 
to do with the role of metaphysics in science, and the scope of scientific 
knowledge. According to falsificationism, untestable metaphysical theses 
may influence scientific research in the context of discovery, and may even 
lead to metaphysical research programmes; they cannot, however, be a 
part of scientific knowledge itself. But according to AOE, the metaphysi-
cal theses at levels 3 to 7 are all a part of current (conjectural) scientific 
knowledge. In particular, physicalism is. According to AOE, it is a part of 
current (conjectural) scientific knowledge that the universe is physically 
comprehensible – certainly not the case granted falsificationism.
Another important change has to do with the relationship between 
science and the philosophy of science. Falsificationism places the study 
of scientific method, the philosophy of science, outside science itself, 
in accordance with Popper’s demarcation principle. AOE, by contrast, 
makes scientific method and the philosophy of science an integral part 
of science itself. The activity of tackling problems inherent in the aims of 
science, at a variety of levels, and of developing new possible aims and 
methods, new possible more specific or less specific philosophies of sci-
ence (views about what the aims and methods of science ought to be) is, 
according to AOE, a vital research activity of science itself. But this is also 
philosophy of science, being carried on within the framework of AOE.27
AOE differs in many other important ways from Popper’s falsifica-
tionism (see chapter 2 and Maxwell, 1998). Nevertheless the impulse, the 
intellectual aspirations and values, behind the hierarchical view of AOE 
are, as I have tried to indicate, thoroughly Popperian in character and 
spirit. The whole idea is to turn implicit assumptions into explicit conjec-
tures in such a way that criticism may be directed at what most needs to 
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be criticized from the standpoint of aiding progress in knowledge, so that 
conjectures may be developed and adopted that are the most fruitful in 
promoting scientific progress, at the same time no substantial conjecture, 
implicit or explicit, being held immune from critical scrutiny.28
10.6 The New Enlightenment, step (ii):  
from critical to aim- oriented rationalism
Falsificationism is defective because it fails to identify the problematic 
aim of science properly, and thus fails to specify the need for science to 
improve its aims and methods as it proceeds. Critical rationalism is defec-
tive in an analogous way. It does not make improving aims and methods, 
when aims are problematic, an essential aspect of rationality.
If, however, we take AOE as our starting point, and generalize that, 
the outcome is different. It is not just in science that aims are problem-
atic;29 this is the case in life too, either because different aims conflict, or 
because what we believe to be desirable and realizable lacks one or other 
of these features, or both. Above all, the aim of creating global civiliza-
tion is inherently and profoundly problematic. Furthermore, it is not just 
science that “represses” problematic aims (see Maxwell, 2002a); many 
other institutional and traditional endeavours repress problematic aims 
and acknowledge ostensibly unproblematic, token aims instead. Quite 
generally, then, and not just in science, whenever we pursue a problem-
atic aim we need first to acknowledge the aim; then we need to represent 
it as a hierarchy of aims, from the specific and problematic at the bottom 
of the hierarchy, to the general and unproblematic at the top. In this way 
we provide ourselves with a framework within which we may improve 
more or less specific and problematic aims and methods as we proceed, 
learning from success and failure in practice what it is that is both of most 
value and realizable. Such an “aim- oriented” conception of rationality is 
the proper generalization of the aim- oriented, progress- achieving meth-
ods of science.30
Any conception of rationality which systematically leads us astray 
must be defective. But any conception of rationality, such as Popper’s 
critical rationalism, which does not include explicit instructions for 
the improvement of aims, must systematically lead us astray. It will do 
so whenever we fail to choose that aim that is in our best interests or, 
more seriously, whenever we misrepresent our aim – as we are likely to 
do whenever aims are problematic. In these circumstances, the more 
“rationally” we pursue the aim we acknowledge, the worse off we will 
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be. Systematically, such conceptions of rationality, which do not include 
provisions for improving problematic aims, are a hinderance rather than 
a help; they are, in short, defective.31
AOE and its generalization, aim- oriented rationality (AOR), incor-
porate all the good points of Popper’s falsificationist conception of sci-
ence and its generalization, critical rationalism, indicated above, but also 
improve on Popper’s notions, in being designed to help science and other 
worthwhile endeavours progressively improve problematic aims and 
methods.
10.7 The New Enlightenment, step (iii):  
from  knowledge to wisdom
I come now to step (iii) of the New Enlightenment Programme. The task, 
here, is to help humanity gradually get more AOR into diverse aspects of 
social and institutional life – personal, political, economic, educational, 
international – so that humanity may gradually learn how to make prog-
ress towards an enlightened world. Social inquiry, in taking up this task, 
needs to be pursued as social methodology or social philosophy. What the 
philosophy of science is to science, as conceived by AOE, so sociology 
is to the social world: it has the task of helping diverse valuable human 
endeavours and institutions gradually improve aims and methods so that 
the world may make social progress towards global enlightenment. (The 
sociology of science, as a special case, is one and the same thing as the 
philosophy of science.) And a basic task of academic inquiry, more gen-
erally, becomes to help humanity solve its problems of living in increas-
ingly rational, cooperative, enlightened ways, thus helping humanity 
become more civilized. The basic aim of academic inquiry becomes, as 
I  have already said, to promote the growth of wisdom. Those parts of 
academic inquiry devoted to improving knowledge, understanding and 
technological know- how contribute to the growth of wisdom. The New 
Enlightenment Programme thus has dramatic and far- reaching implica-
tions for academic inquiry, for almost every branch and aspect of science 
and the humanities, for its overall character and structure, its overall 
aims and methods, and its relationship to the rest of the social world. 
I have spelled out in some detail what these implications are in a number 
of publications.32
As I have already remarked, the aim of achieving global civilization 
is inherently problematic.33 This means, according to AOR, that we need 
to represent the aim at a number of levels, from the specific and highly 
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problematic to the unspecific and unproblematic. Thus, at a fairly specific 
level, we might, for example, specify civilization to be a state of affairs in 
which there is an end to war, dictatorships, population growth, extreme 
inequalities of wealth, and the establishment of democratic, liberal world 
government and a sustainable world industry and agriculture. At a rather 
more general level, we might specify civilization to be a state of affairs in 
which everyone shares equally in enjoying, sustaining and creating what 
is of value in life in so far as this is possible. Figure 10.1 depicts a cartoon 
version of what is required, arrived at by generalizing and then reinter-
preting Figure 2.1 (see Chapter 2).
As a result of building into our institutions and social life such a 
hierarchical structure of aims and associated methods, we create a frame-
work within which it becomes possible for us progressively to improve 
our real- life aims and methods in increasingly cooperative ways as we 
Increasingly
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Figure 10.1 Aim- oriented rationality applied to the task of making 
 progress towards a civilized world (Source: author)
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live. Diverse philosophies of life – diverse religious, political, economic 
and moral views – may be cooperatively developed, assessed and tested 
against the experience of personal and social life. It becomes possible 
progressively to improve diverse philosophies of life (diverse views about 
what is of value in life and how it is to be realized), much as theories are 
progressively and cooperatively improved in science.
AOR is especially relevant when it comes to resolving conflicts 
cooperatively. If two groups have partly conflicting aims but wish to dis-
cover the best resolution of the conflict, AOR helps in requiring of those 
involved that they represent aims at a level of sufficient imprecision for 
agreement to be possible, thus creating an agreed framework within 
which disagreements may be explored and resolved. AOR cannot, of 
itself, combat non- cooperativeness, or induce a desire for cooperative-
ness; it can, however, facilitate the cooperative resolution of conflicts 
if the desire for this exists. In facilitating the cooperative resolution of 
conflicts in this way, AOR can, in the long term, encourage the desire for 
cooperation to grow (if only because it encourages belief in the possibil-
ity of cooperation).
10.8 Objections
I now consider, briefly, some objections that may be raised against my 
claim that the “New Enlightenment” improves on the Popperian version 
of the Enlightenment Programme.
It may be objected that the Traditional Enlightenment does not 
dominate current academic inquiry to the extent that I  have assumed. 
But grounds for holding that it does are given in chapter six of my From 
Knowledge to Wisdom. There I looked at the following: (1) books about 
the modern university; (2)  the philosophy and sociology of science; 
(3) statements of leading scientists; (4) physics abstracts; (5) chemistry, 
biology, geo and psychology abstracts; (6)  journal titles and contents; 
(7)  books on economics, sociology and psychology; (8)  philosophy. In 
1984, the year From Knowledge to Wisdom was published, there can be 
no doubt whatsoever that the Traditional Enlightenment (or “the phi-
losophy of knowledge”, as I called it in the book) dominated academic 
inquiry.
Have things changed since then? The revolution advocated by From 
Knowledge to Wisdom, and argued for here, has not occurred. There is 
still, amongst the vast majority of academics today, no awareness at all 
that a more intellectually rigorous and humanly valuable kind of inquiry 
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than that which we have at present, exists as an option. In particular, 
social inquiry continues to be taught and pursued as social science, and 
not as social methodology. Recently I undertook an examination, at ran-
dom, of thirty- four introductory books on sociology, published between 
1985 and 1997. Sociology, typically, is defined as “the scientific study of 
human society and social interactions” (Tischler, 1996, p. 4), as “the sys-
tematic, sceptical study of human society” (Macionis and Plummer, 1997, 
p. 4), or as having as its basic aim “to understand human societies and 
the forces that have made them what they are” (Lenski et al., 1995, p. 5). 
Some books take issue with the idea that sociology is the scientific study 
of society, or protest at the male- dominated nature of sociology (for 
example, Abott and Wallace, 1990, pp. 3 and 1). Nowhere did I find a 
hint of the idea that a primary task of sociology, or of social inquiry more 
generally, might be to help build into the fabric of social life progress- 
achieving methods, generalized from those of science, designed to help 
humanity resolve its conflicts and problems of living in more coopera-
tively rational ways than at present.
The tackling of problems of living rather than problems of knowl-
edge does of course go on within the academic enterprise as it is at 
present constituted, within such disciplines as economics, development 
studies, policy studies, peace studies, medicine, agriculture, engineer-
ing, and elsewhere. But this does not tell against the point that the pri-
mary task of academic inquiry at present is, first, to acquire knowledge 
and technological know- how, and then, second, to apply it to help solve 
problems of living. It does not, in other words, tell against the point that 
it is the Traditional Enlightenment that is the dominant influence on the 
nature, the aims and methods, the whole character and structure of aca-
demic inquiry.
It may be objected that it is all to the good that the academic enter-
prise today does give priority to the pursuit of knowledge over the task 
of promoting wisdom and civilization. Before problems of living can be 
tackled rationally, knowledge must first be acquired.34
I have six replies to this objection.
First, even if the objection were valid, it would still be vital for a 
kind of inquiry designed to help us build a better world to include ratio-
nal exploration of problems of living, and to ensure that this guides 
priorities of scientific research (and is guided by the results of such 
research).
Second, the validity of the objection becomes dubious when we 
take into account the considerable success people met with in solving 
problems of living in a state of extreme ignorance, before the advent of 
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science. We still today often arrive at solutions to problems of living in 
ignorance of relevant facts.
Third, the objection is not valid. In order to articulate problems 
of living and explore imaginatively and critically possible solutions (in 
accordance with Popper’s conception of rationality) we need to be able to 
act in the world, imagine possible actions and share our imaginings with 
others: in so far as some common sense knowledge is implicit in all this, 
such knowledge is required to tackle rationally and successfully problems 
of living. But this does not mean that we must give intellectual priority 
to acquiring new relevant knowledge before we can be in a position to 
tackle rationally our problems of living.
Fourth, simply in order to have some idea of what kind of knowl-
edge or know- how it is relevant for us to try to acquire, we must first have 
some provisional ideas as to what our problem of living is and what we 
might do to solve it. Articulating our problem of living and proposing and 
critically assessing possible solutions needs to be intellectually prior to 
acquiring relevant knowledge simply for this reason:  we cannot know 
what new knowledge it is relevant for us to acquire until we have at least 
a preliminary idea as to what our problem of living is, and what we pro-
pose to do about it. A slight change in the way we construe our problem 
may lead to a drastic change in the kind of knowledge it is relevant to 
acquire: changing the way we construe problems of health, for example, 
to include prevention of disease (and not just curing of disease), leads 
to a dramatic change in the kind of knowledge we need to acquire (the 
importance of exercise, diet, etc.). Including the importance of avoiding 
pollution in the problem of creating wealth by means of industrial devel-
opment leads to the need to develop entirely new kinds of knowledge.
Fifth, relevant knowledge is often hard to acquire; it would be a 
disaster if we suspended life until it had been acquired. Knowledge of 
how our brains work is presumably highly relevant to all that we do, 
but clearly, suspending rational tackling of problems of living until this 
relevant knowledge has been acquired would not be a sensible step to 
take. It would, in any case, make it impossible for us to acquire the rele-
vant knowledge (since this requires scientists to act in doing research). 
Scientific research is itself a kind of action carried on in a state of relative 
ignorance.
Sixth, the capacity to act, to live, more or less successfully in the 
world, is more fundamental than (propositional) knowledge. Put in 
Rylean terms, “knowing how” is more fundamental than “knowing 
that” (Ryle, 1949, ch. 2). All our knowledge is but a development of our 
capacity to act. Dissociated from life, from action, knowledge stored in 
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libraries is just paper and ink, devoid of meaning. In this sense, problems 
of living are more fundamental than problems of knowledge (which are 
but an aspect of problems of living); giving intellectual priority to prob-
lems of living quite properly reflects this point.35 The point made above 
in section 10.4 deserves to be re- emphasized: a kind of inquiry that gives 
priority to tackling problems of knowledge over problems of living vio-
lates the most elementary requirements of rationality conceivable. If the 
basic task is to help humanity create a better world, then the problems 
that need to be solved are, primarily, problems of living, problems of 
action, not problems of knowledge. This means that to comply, merely, 
with Popper’s conception of critical rationalism (or problem- solving 
rationality) discussed above, the basic intellectual tasks need to be (1) to 
articulate problems of living, and (2)  to propose and critically assess 
possible solutions, possible more or less cooperative human actions. 
(1) and (2) are excluded, or marginalized, by a kind of inquiry that gives 
priority to the task of solving problems of knowledge. The result will 
be a kind of inquiry that fails to create a reservoir of imaginative and 
critically examined ideas for the resolution of problems of living, and 
instead develops knowledge often unrelated to, or even harmful to, our 
most basic human needs.
It may be objected that in employing AOR in an attempt to help 
create a more civilized world, in the way indicated above, the New 
Enlightenment falls foul of Popper’s strictures against Utopian social 
engineering (Popper, 1966a, vol. 1, ch. 9; 1961, pp. 64– 92). I have three 
replies to this objection. First, to the extent that piecemeal social engi-
neering, of the kind advocated by Popper, is indeed the rational way to 
make progress towards a more civilized world, this will be advocated by 
the New Enlightenment. Second, when we take into account the unprec-
edented global nature of many of our most serious problems, indicated 
at the beginning of this chapter (the outcome of solving the problem of 
acquiring scientific knowledge but failing to solve the problem of becom-
ing wiser), we may well doubt that piecemeal social engineering is suffi-
cient. Third, Popper’s distinction between piecemeal and Utopian social 
engineering is altogether too crude: it overlooks entirely what has been 
advocated here, aim- oriented rationalistic social engineering, with its 
emphasis on developing increasingly cooperatively rational resolutions 
of human conflicts and problems in full recognition of the inherently 
problematic nature of the aim of achieving greater civilization.36
All those to any degree influenced by Romanticism and what Isaiah 
Berlin has called the counter- Enlightenment will object strongly to the 
idea that we should learn from scientific progress how to achieve social 
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progress towards civilization; they will object strongly to the idea of 
allowing conceptions of rationality, stemming from science, to dominate 
in this way, and will object even more strongly to the idea, inherent in the 
New Enlightenment, that we need to create a more aim- oriented ratio-
nalistic social world.
Directed at the Traditional Enlightenment, objections of this kind 
have some validity; but directed at the New Enlightenment, they have 
none. As I have emphasized elsewhere, AOR amounts to a synthesis of 
traditional rationalist and romantic ideals, and not to the triumph of the 
first over the second. In giving priority to the realization of what is of 
value in life, and in emphasizing that rationality demands that we seek to 
improve aims as we proceed, the New Enlightenment requires that ratio-
nality integrates traditional Rationalist and Romantic values and ideals 
of integrity. Imagination, emotion, desire, art, empathic understanding 
of people and culture, the imaginative exploration of aims and ideals, 
which tend to be repudiated as irrational by traditional Rationalism, but 
which are prized by Romanticism, are all essential ingredients of aim- 
oriented rationality. Far from crushing freedom, spontaneity, creativ-
ity and diversity, AOR is essential for the desirable flourishing of these 
things in life.37
Finally, it may be objected that science is too different from polit-
ical life for there to be anything worthwhile to be learnt from scientific 
success about how to achieve social progress towards civilization.38 
(a) In science there is a decisive procedure for eliminating ideas, namely 
empirical refutation: nothing comparable obtains, or can obtain, in the 
political domain. (b) In science, experiments or trials may be carried out 
relatively painlessly (except, perhaps, when new drugs are being given 
in live trials); in life, social experiments, in that they involve people, 
may cause much pain if they go wrong, and may be difficult to stop once 
started. (c) Scientific progress requires a number of highly intelligent and 
motivated people to pursue science on the behalf of the rest of us, funded 
by government and industry; social progress requires almost everyone 
to take part, including the stupid, the criminal, the mad or otherwise 
handicapped, the ill and the highly unmotivated; and in general there is 
no payment. (d) Scientists, at a certain level, have an agreed, common 
objective: to improve knowledge. In life, people often have quite differ-
ent or conflicting goals, and there is no general agreement as to what 
civilization ought to mean, or even whether it is desirable to pursue civ-
ilization in any sense. (e) Science is about fact, politics about value, the 
quality of life. This difference ensures that science has nothing to teach 
political action (for civilization). (f) Science is male- dominated, fiercely 
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competitive and at times terrifyingly impersonal (Harding, 1986); this 
means it is quite unfit to provide any kind of guide for life.
Here, briefly, are my replies. (a)  Some proposals for action can 
be shown to be unacceptable quite decisively as a result of experience 
acquired through attempting to put the proposal into action. Where this 
is not possible, it may still be possible to assess the merits of the proposal 
to some extent by means of experience. If assessing proposals for action 
by means of experience is much more indecisive than assessing scientific 
theories by means of experiment, then we need, all the more, to devote 
our care and attention to the former case. (b) Precisely because experi-
mentation in life is so much more difficult than in science, it is vital that 
in life we endeavour to learn as much as possible from (i) experiments 
that we perform in our imagination, and (ii) experiments that occur as 
a result of what actually happens. (c) Because humanity does not have 
the aptitude or desire for wisdom that scientists have for knowledge, it 
is unreasonable to suppose that progress towards global wisdom could 
be as explosively rapid as progress in science. Nevertheless progress in 
wisdom might go better than it does at present.
(d) Cooperative rationality is only feasible when there is the com-
mon desire of those involved to resolve conflicts in a cooperatively ratio-
nal way. (e) Aim- oriented rationality can help us improve our decisions 
about what is desirable or of value, even if it cannot reach decisions for 
us. (f)  In taking science as a guide for life, it is the progress- achieving 
methodology of science to which we need to attend. It is this that we need 
to generalize in such a way that it becomes fruitfully applicable, poten-
tially, to all that we do. That modern science is male- dominated, fiercely 
competitive, and at times terrifyingly impersonal should not deter us 
from seeing what can be learned from the progress- achieving methods of 
science – unless, perhaps, it should turn out that being male- dominated, 
fiercely competitive and impersonal is essential to scientific method and 
progress. (But this, I submit, is not the case.)
10.9 Implications for academic inquiry
Popper’s version of the Enlightenment Programme, as enshrined in his 
first four books, has major implications, still unacknowledged by many, 
for a wide range of human endeavours, such as politics, education, 
the arts, philosophy and the humanities. But when developed further, 
in ways indicated above, the Popperian Enlightenment has even more 
fruitful, dramatic widespread implications. It is hardly too much to say, 
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in my view, that the upshot of the argument is that we require a social 
and cultural revolution as substantial and dramatic, perhaps, as that of 
the Reformation, the Scientific Revolution, or the eighteenth- century 
Enlightenment itself. This revolution involves changing the Traditional 
Enlightenment and the Romantic opposition so that these become uni-
fied in the New Enlightenment; it involves appropriately modifying all 
those activities and institutions affected by the Traditional Enlightenment 
and the Romantic opposition so that they come to embody the New 
Enlightenment:  science, art, politics, education, medicine, philosophy, 
law, industry, agriculture, education.
In particular, it involves changing academic inquiry so that, instead 
of being shaped by the Traditional Enlightenment (modified somewhat 
by Popper) and the Romantic opposition, as at present, it comes to be 
shaped by the New Enlightenment. I  conclude this chapter with a list 
of twenty- three structural changes that need to be made to academic 
inquiry if it is to come to embody the New Enlightenment. The upshot 
would be universities rationally devoted to helping us realize what is of 
value in life, rationally devoted to helping us make progress towards as 
enlightened a world as possible.
how academic inquiry must change to put the 
New enlightenment into practice
1. There needs to be a change in the basic intellectual aim of inquiry, 
from the growth of knowledge to the growth of wisdom – wisdom 
being taken to be the capacity and active endeavour to realize 
what is of value in life, for oneself and others, and thus includ-
ing knowledge, understanding and technological know- how (but 
much else besides).
2. There needs to be a change in the nature of academic problems, 
so that problems of living are included, as well as problems of 
knowledge – the former being treated as intellectually more fun-
damental than the latter.
3. There needs to be a change in the nature of academic ideas, so 
that proposals for action are included as well as claims to knowl-
edge – the former, again, being treated as intellectually more fun-
damental than the latter.
4. There needs to be a change in what constitutes intellectual prog-
ress, so that progress- in- ideas- relevant- to- achieving- a- more- 
civilized- world is included as well as progress in knowledge, the 
former being indeed intellectually fundamental.
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5. There needs to be a change in the idea as to where inquiry, at its 
most fundamental, is located. It is not esoteric theoretical physics, 
but rather the thinking we engage in as we seek to achieve what 
is of value in life. Academic thought is a (vital) adjunct to what 
really matters, personal and social thought active in life.
6. There needs to be a dramatic change in the nature of social inquiry 
(reflecting points 1 to 5). Economics, politics, sociology, and so 
on, are not, fundamentally, sciences, and do not, fundamentally, 
have the task of improving knowledge about social phenomena. 
Instead, their task is threefold. First, it is to articulate problems 
of living, and propose and critically assess possible solutions, 
possible actions or policies, from the standpoint of their capacity, 
if implemented, to promote wiser ways of living. Second, it is to 
promote such cooperatively rational tackling of problems of living 
throughout the social world. And third, at a more basic and long- 
term level, it is to help build the hierarchical structure of aims and 
methods of aim- oriented rationality into personal, institutional 
and global life, thus creating frameworks within which progres-
sive improvement of personal and social life aims- and- methods 
becomes possible. These three tasks are undertaken in order to 
promote cooperative tackling of problems of living  – but also 
in order to enhance empathic or “personalistic” understanding 
between people as something of value in its own right. Acquiring 
knowledge of social phenomena is a vital but subordinate activity, 
engaged in to facilitate the above three fundamental pursuits.
7. Natural science needs to change, so that it includes at least 
three levels of discussion:  evidence, theory and research aims. 
Discussion of aims needs to bring together scientific, metaphysical 
and evaluative consideration in an attempt to discover the most 
desirable and realizable research aims. It needs to influence, and 
be influenced by, exploration of problems of living undertaken by 
social inquiry and the humanities, and the public.
8. There needs to be a dramatic change in the relationship between 
social inquiry and natural science, so that social inquiry becomes 
intellectually more fundamental from the standpoint of tackling 
problems of living, promoting wisdom. Social inquiry influences 
choice of research aims for the natural and technological sciences, 
and is, of course, in turn influenced by the results of such research. 
(Social inquiry also, of course, conducts empirical research, in 
order to improve our understanding of what our problems of liv-
ing are, and in order to assess policy ideas whenever possible.)
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9. The current emphasis on specialized research needs to change so 
that sustained discussion and tackling of broad, global problems 
that cut across academic specialities is included, both influencing 
and being influenced by, specialized research.
10. Academia needs to include sustained imaginative and critical 
exploration of possible futures, for each country, and for human-
ity as a whole, with policy and research implications being dis-
cussed as well.
11. The way in which academic inquiry as a whole is related to the 
rest of the human world needs to change dramatically. Instead of 
being intellectually dissociated from the rest of society, academic 
inquiry needs to be communicating with, learning from, teaching 
and arguing with the rest of society  – in such a way as to pro-
mote cooperative rationality and social wisdom. Academia needs 
to have just sufficient power to retain its independence from the 
pressures of government, industry, the military and public opin-
ion, but no more. Academia becomes a kind of civil service for the 
public, doing openly and independently what actual civil services 
are supposed to do in secret for governments.
12. There needs to be a change in the role that political and religious 
ideas, works of art, expressions of feelings, desires and values 
have within rational inquiry. Instead of being excluded, they 
need to be explicitly included and critically assessed, as possible 
indications and revelations of what is of value, and as unmask-
ing of fraudulent values in satire and parody – vital ingredients of 
wisdom.
13. There need to be changes in education so that, for example, 
seminars devoted to the cooperative, imaginative and critical 
discussion of problems of living are at the heart of all education 
from the age of five onwards. Politics, which cannot be taught by 
knowledge- inquiry, becomes central to wisdom- inquiry, political 
creeds and actions being subjected to imaginative and critical 
scrutiny.
14. There need to be changes in the aims, priorities and character of 
pure science and scholarship, so that it is the curiosity, the see-
ing and searching, the knowing and understanding of individual 
persons, that ultimately matters, the more impersonal, esoteric, 
purely intellectual aspects of science and scholarship being 
means to this end. Social inquiry needs to give intellectual prior-
ity to helping empathic understanding between people to flourish 
(as indicated in point 6 above).
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15. There need to be changes in the way mathematics is understood, 
pursued and taught. Mathematics is not a branch of knowledge of 
anything actual at all. Rather, it is concerned to explore problem-
atic possibilities, and to develop, systematize and unify problem- 
solving methods (Maxwell, 2010c).
16. Literature needs to be put close to the heart of rational inquiry, 
in that it explores imaginatively our most profound problems of 
living and aids personalistic understanding in life by enhancing 
our ability to enter imaginatively into the problems and lives of 
others.
17. Philosophy needs to change so that it ceases to be just another 
specialized discipline and becomes instead that aspect of inquiry 
as a whole that is concerned with our most general and funda-
mental problems – those problems that cut across all disciplinary 
boundaries. Philosophy needs to become again what it was for 
Socrates: the attempt to devote reason to the growth of wisdom 
in life.
18. Academic contributions need to be written in as simple, lucid, 
jargon- free a way as possible, so that academic work is as accessi-
ble as possible across specialities and to non- academics.
19. There needs to be a change in views about what constitute aca-
demic contributions, so that publications which promote (or have 
the potential to promote) public understanding as to what our 
problems of livings are and what we need to do about them are 
included, in addition to contributions addressed primarily to the 
academic community.
20. Every university needs to create a seminar or symposium devoted 
to the sustained discussion of fundamental problems that cut 
across all conventional academic boundaries, global problems of 
living being included as well as global problems of knowledge and 
understanding.
The above changes all come from my “from knowledge to wisdom” argu-
ment spelled out in detail elsewhere. The following three institutional 
innovations do not follow from that argument but, if implemented, 
would help wisdom- inquiry to flourish.39
21. Natural science needs to create committees, in the public eye, and 
manned by scientists and non- scientists alike, concerned to high-
light and discuss failures of the priorities of research to respond 
to the interests of those whose needs are the greatest – the poor 
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of the earth – as a result of the inevitable tendency of research 
priorities to reflect the interests of those who pay for science, and 
the interests of scientists themselves.
22. Every national university system needs to include a national 
shadow government, seeking to do, virtually, free of the con-
straints of power, what the actual national government ought to 
be doing. The hope would be that virtual and actual governments 
would learn from each other.
23. The world’s universities need to include a virtual world govern-
ment which seeks to do what an actual elected world government 
ought to do, if it existed. The virtual world government would 
also have the task of working out how an actual democratically 
elected world government might be created.
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Notes
Introduction
 1. Aim- oriented empiricism was first put forward in The Rationality of Scientific Discovery 
(Maxwell, 1974). Anyone interested in the way the view has evolved over the years should 
have a look at this two- part paper.
 2. In my In Praise of Natural Philosophy (2017b, ch. 7), I make the point that, once it is apparent 
that the intellectual aims of science are problematic, and hence need to be improved as science 
proceeds, it becomes obvious that the philosophy of science – the study of what the aims and 
methods of science ought to be – needs to be an integral, influential part of science itself, if 
science is to be rigorous. I there go on to generalize this to all worthwhile human endeavours 
with problematic aims: rationality requires that the philosophy of a life endeavour with a prob-
lematic aim must be an influential part of the life endeavour itself (politics, law, international 
relations, finance, education).
 3. For a discussion of these contradictory impulses to be found in Popper’s work, together with 
relevant references to Popper’s writings, see Maxwell (2016a).
 4. This may be no more than truth at the empirical level, at the level of empirical predictions.
Chapter 1
 1. Critical remarks about Wittgenstein are scattered throughout Popper’s works. For an extended 
criticism of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus see Popper (1966a, vol. 2, pp. 296– 9).
Chapter 2
 1. The version of AOE defended here is a simplification and improvement of the version 
expounded in Maxwell (1998), in turn an improvement of versions of the view expounded in 
Maxwell (1972a, 1974, 1979, 1984a, 1993a, 1997a). For summaries of Maxwell (1998), see 
Maxwell (1999a, 2000b, 2002a, 2002b). For more recent expositions, see Maxwell (2007, chs. 
5, 9, 14; 2011b; 2013), and especially Maxwell (2017a, 2017b).
 2. The standard model is the current quantum field theory of fundamental particles and the 
forces between them.
 3. See Popper (1959, 1963, 1983).
 4. See Lakatos (1970, 1978).
 5. For discussion of Popper, see Schilpp (1974); Levinson (1982); Hacohen (2000); Catton 
and Macdonald (2004); O’Hear (2004); Keuth (2005); Jarvie, Milford and Miller (2006); 
Gattei (2009); Rowbottom (2011); Shearmur and Stokes (2016). For discussion of Kuhn, 
see: Horwich (1993), Hoyningen- Huene (1993), Bird (2000), Nickles (2003), Gattei (2008), 
D’Agostino (2010), Wray (2011), Marcum (2015). For discussion of Lakatos, see:  Cohen, 
Feyerabend and Wartofsky (1976); Larvor (1998); Kadvany (2001); Kampis, Kvasz and 
Stöltzner (2002). For discussion that compares and contrasts the work of Popper, Kuhn and 
Lakatos, see Lakatos and Musgrave (1970), Stove (1982), Nola and Sankey (2000), Fuller 
(2003), Agassi (2014). See also Lakatos and Feyerabend (1999), and for a review that includes 
in a nutshell the main point of the present chapter, Maxwell (2000c).
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 6. I exempt my own work from consideration – work that so far has been almost entirely ignored 
by mainstream philosophy of science.
 7. I have in mind such publications as Holton (1973), Feyerabend (1978), Glymour (1980), 
Van Fraassen (1980), Laudan (1984), Watkins (1984), Hooker (1987), Hull (1988), Howson 
and Urbach (1993), Kitcher (1993), Musgrave (1993), Dupré (1995), McAllister (1996), 
Cartwright (1999), Lipton (2004) and, more recently, Achinstein (2010), Craver and Darden 
(2013), Dawid (2014), Sober (2015), Schrenk (2016), Scerri (2016).
 8. At the time of writing (2016), the metaphysics of science seems to have become a topic of 
growing interest:  see Rescher (2001); Lange (2009); Kincaid, Ladyman and Ross (2013); 
Morganti (2013); Mumford and Tugby (2013); Schrenk (2016). None of these works defends, 
or even expounds, a role for metaphysics in science of the kind required by aim- oriented empir-
icism. The closest I have come to discovering an exception to this is a book by Craig Dilworth 
(2007) entitled The Metaphysics of Science. Dilworth expounds only a very inadequate version 
of the view, and fails to provide the key argument for the view, as I have shown elsewhere 
(see Maxwell, 2009d). Dilworth seems to have derived the idea from my work: several times 
in his book he refers to Maxwell (1984a), where aim- oriented empiricism is expounded and 
argued for.
 9. For Popper’s replies to such criticisms, see Popper (1972, ch. 1; 1974, sections II and III; 1983, 
introduction and ch. 1.
 10. I stress this point because the one Popperian who has taken note of my criticisms of Popper, 
David Miller, has accused me, incorrectly, of defending “fallibilist justificationism” (see Miller, 
1994, p. 37). Miller repeats the criticism in his book Out of Error (2006, p. 94). For my refuta-
tion of the charge, see Maxwell (2006).
 11. Popper discusses such “silly” rival theories in volume 1 of Postscript (Popper, 1983, pp. 67– 71). 
He argues that they deserve to be rejected on the grounds that they create more problems 
than they solve, in particular problems of explanation. This is a relevant consideration 
granted dressed falsificationism, but not granted bare falsificationism. He also argues that it 
does not matter if such “silly” theories become potential rivals, since it can be left to scientists 
themselves to criticize them. But this ignores the fact that it is precisely Popper’s methodology 
which should be providing guidelines for such criticism. Far from condemning such a “silly” 
theory as worthy of rejection, bare falsificationism holds such a theory to be better than the 
accepted theory (if it has greater empirical content, is not falsified where the accepted theory 
appears to be, and some of the excess content of the “silly” theory is corroborated). Popper 
fails to appreciate that it is his methodology, not he himself, which needs to declare that silly 
theories are indeed “silly”. The fact that his methodology declares these silly theories to be 
highly acceptable is a devastating indictment of his methodology. To argue that these silly 
theories, refuting instances of his methodology, do not matter and can be discounted, is all too 
close to a scientist arguing that evidence, that refutes his theory, should be discounted, some-
thing which Popper resoundingly condemns. The falsificationist stricture that scientists should 
not discount falsifying instances, ought to apply to methodologists as well!
 12. In fact even the methodological rules of bare falsificationism are such that persistent applica-
tion of these rules commits one to making implicit metaphysical assumptions (which may be 
false). Bare falsificationism, as formulated by Popper, requires of an acceptable theory that it is 
strictly universal in that it makes no reference to any specific time, place or object. This makes 
it impossible for science to discover that the laws of nature just are different within specific 
space- time regions, or that there is a specific object with unique dynamical properties. There 
is no scope, within bare falsificationism, for the rejection of these metaphysical theses, even 
though circumstances could conceivably arise such that progress in knowledge would require 
this. (AOE, by contrast, allows for this remote possibility: that which is dogmatically upheld by 
bare falsificationism becomes criticizable granted AOE.) Popper recognizes that the method-
ological rule requiring any theory to be strictly universal does have a metaphysical counterpart 
(1959, sections 11 and 79), but fails to appreciate how damaging this is for falsificationism.
 13. It may be objected that persistent acceptance of unified theories in physics when endlessly 
many empirically more successful disunified rivals are available does not mean that physics 
makes a metaphysical assumption about the underlying unity of the universe. Unified theories 
are accepted over disunified rivals because they are better verified – or better corroborated, as 
Popper would say. But whether unified theories are more likely to be true – other things being 
(more or less) equal – depends on what kind of universe we are in. In a unified universe, uni-
fied theories will, no doubt, be more likely to be true, but in a disunified universe, the opposite 
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holds – and we have no valid reasons to hold that the former is more likely to be true than the 
latter. For a decisive refutation of this and other objections to AOE, and to the key argument for 
AOE, see Maxwell (2015a).
 14. To say that M1 “supports” an empirically successful research programme is to say that the pro-
gramme develops a succession of theories, each empirically more successful than its predeces-
sors, in a Popperian sense, and each being closer to exemplifying, to being a precise, testable 
instantiation of, M1 than its predecessors.
 15. Smart (1963) has used the term “physicalism” to stand for the view that the world is made 
up entirely of physical entities of the kind postulated by fundamental physical theories  – 
electrons, quarks and so on. As I am using the term, “physicalism” stands for the very much 
stronger doctrine that the universe is physically comprehensible, that it is such that some yet- 
to- be- discovered, unified “theory of everything” is true.
 16. For much more detailed arguments for accepting metaphysical theses at levels 7 to 3, see 
Maxwell (2017a, ch. 9).
 17. This talk of “justifying” may seem thoroughly un- Popperian in character, but it is not. What 
is at issue is not the justification of the truth, or probable truth, of some thesis, but only the 
justification of accepting the thesis (granted our aim is truth). Within Popper’s falsification-
ism, there is just such a “justification” for accepting highly falsifiable (and unfalsified) the-
ories:  such theories, being most vulnerable to falsification, facilitate the discovery of error, 
and thus give the most hope of progress (towards truth). Acceptance of such theories is jus-
tified (according to falsificationism) because it promotes error detection and progress. This 
Popperian justification justifies acceptance of that theory most likely to false! Nothing could 
demonstrate more starkly that justifying acceptance (in the interest of discovering truth) is not 
at all the same thing as justifying the truth of a theory or proposition.
 18. For further details of how AOE overcomes the two difficulties indicated earlier in this chapter, 
and for further details of the view itself, see Maxwell (1998, ch. 5; 2004a, chs. 1 and 2, and 
appendix; 2007, ch. 14; 2011b; 2013; 2017b; and especially 2017a).
 19. For a more detailed rebuttal of this objection, see Maxwell (2004a, pp. 207– 10; 2017a, ch. 9).
 20. See Maxwell (1998, pp. 78– 89, 159– 63, and especially 217– 23; 2017a, ch. 11; 2017b, ch. 5).
 21. Elsewhere I have suggested an alternative to physicalism (see Maxwell, 2004, pp. 198– 205; 
2017b, ch. 5, section 10).
 22. In holding that metaphysical theses and philosophies of science are an integral part of sci-
ence itself, AOE implies that Popper’s principle of demarcation (Popper, 1963, ch. 11)  is to 
be rejected. Popper’s demarcation proposal, apart from being untenable, is in any case too 
simplistic, in that it reduces to one a number of distinct demarcation issues. Popper rolls into 
one the distinct tasks of demarcating (a) good from bad science, (b) science from non- science, 
(c) science from pseudoscience, (d) rational from irrational inquiry, (e) knowledge from mere 
speculation, (f)  knowledge from dogma (or superstition, or prejudice, or popular belief), 
(g)  the empirical from the metaphysical, and (h)  factual truth from non- factual (analytic) 
truth. (a) to (d) involve demarcating between disciplines, whereas (e) to (h) involve demar-
cating between propositions.
 23. For a very much more detailed exposition of this solution to the problem of simplicity, together 
with an account of the way in which great unifying theories of physics illustrate the solution, 
see Maxwell (1998, chs. 3 and 4). See also Maxwell (2004a, pp. 160– 74; 2007, pp. 373– 86; 
2017a, ch. 5).
 24. For a more detailed discussion of the solution to the problem of verisimilitude, see Maxwell 
(2017a, ch. 8).
 25. It may be objected that if T is assumed to be the true unified theory of everything, no meaning 
can be given to the idea that theoretical physics is making progress, by means of a succession 
of false theories, to a more or less disunified theory of everything. But T does not need to be 
assumed to be unified; all that is required is that T is such that the notion of “partial derivation” 
from T makes sense. For further discussion of the inability of any standard empiricist view such 
as falsificationism to solve the problem of verisimilitude, and the ability of AOE to solve the 
problem, see Maxwell (1998, pp. 70– 2, 211– 17 and 226– 7).
 26. For further discussion of the method of discovery provided by AOE, see Maxwell (1974, part II; 
1993a, part III; 1998, pp. 159– 63 and 219– 23; 2017a, ch. 11; and especially 2017b, ch. 5).
 27. Thus one of the aims of geology is to improve knowledge about how and when specific rock 
strata have been formed – knowledge about the history of a particular object, the Earth. This 
is very different from the aims of theoretical physics, in seeking to discover the unified laws 
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that govern all phenomena. The aims of evolutionary biology, again, have a historical aspect to 
them, and are thus quite different from the aims of theoretical physics.
 28. Chemistry presupposes quantum theory. Thus an item (quantum theory) that is a component 
of level 2 as far as physics is concerned, is a high- level presupposition as far as chemistry is 
concerned, implicit in the basic aims of theoretical chemistry. In short, what is low down in the 
hierarchy for physics, is high up in the hierarchy for chemistry.
 29. For more on the implications of AOE for scientific method, see Maxwell (2004a, ch. 2; 2017a, 
chs. 10– 12).
 30. This theme is developed in my “Unification and Revolution:  A  Paradigm for Paradigms” 
(Maxwell, 2014a).
 31. See Maxwell (2014a) for further criticisms of Kuhn, especially in connection with “incom-
mensurability”, and for suggestions as to how Kuhn’s view can be modified to move it in the 
direction of AOE.
 32. The phrase “underlying dynamic unity in nature”, I  hope it is clear, is to be interpreted as 
appealing to the thesis that the universe is such that there is a yet- to- be- discovered, physical 
“theory of everything” that is both unified and true.
 33. See Lakatos (1970, 1978). For Feyerabend’s argument that severe testing requires the devel-
opment of rival theories, see Feyerabend (1965).
 34. Granted Lakatos’s overall view, the research programme of science cannot have a hard core, 
for then, in order to ensure Popperian severe testing, there would need to be a rival research 
programme with a rival hard core – and that would mean the original research programme 
was not the whole of science. Actually, Lakatos is not quite consistent here; after the sentence 
quoted in the text, Lakatos goes on: “Such methodological rules may be formulated, as Popper 
has pointed out, as metaphysical principles. For instance, the universal anti- conventionalist 
rule against exception- barring may be stated as the metaphysical principle:  ‘Nature does 
not allow exceptions’ ” (1970, p.  132). That this admission is damaging for Popper’s bare 
falsificationism was pointed out in note 12; it is equally damaging for Lakatos’s version of 
Popperianism.
 35. I say “not straightforwardly empirical” because both physicalism and the best available blue-
print are themselves accepted on the grounds that they support a more empirically progres-
sive research programme than any rival theses. Long- term empirical considerations influence 
choice of theses at levels 3 and 4, while at the same time these theses can lead to the rejection 
of potentially empirically successful theories that clash too severely with them (i.e. that are too 
severely ad hoc).
 36. The Popperian and Lakatosian demand that theories be strictly universal, places weak but 
rigid constraints on what theories are acceptable; the demand of AOE that theories accord, 
as far as possible, with physicalism and the best available blueprint, places strong, but flexible 
and revisable constraints on what theories are acceptable.
 37. For further details and discussion, see Maxwell (1998, pp. 172– 80).
 38. For an account of the discovery of parity non- conservation, and of the decisive character of the 
experiments refuting parity conservation, see Franklin (1990, pp. 6– 3 6 and 151– 2). See also 
Franklin (1986).
 39. In order to preserve parity in the teeth of the experimental results, one would have had to 
argue that one or other auxiliary theory – quantum theory, the theory of weak interactions, the 
theory of nuclear structure or the theoretical description of the experiment – simply did not 
apply to this specific experiment. But to do that would have amounted to turning one or other 
of these auxiliary theories into a highly ad hoc, disunified theory – and that would clash with 
AOE. The requirement of overall theoretical unity (plus the experimental result) demanded 
that parity be rejected.
Chapter 3
 1. See Maxwell (1972a) for my criticisms of Popper which led me to develop aim- oriented 
empiricism. See Maxwell (1979; 1993a, pp. 61– 79) for early attempts at employing aim- 
oriented empiricism to solve the problem of induction. This is a theme which will be taken 
up in  Chapter 7. Finally, see Maxwell (2012) for an account of how I came to develop aim- 
oriented empiricism as a result of pondering problems faced by Popper’s philosophy of 
science.
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 2. It may be asked how it is possible for Einstein to be the first to exploit aim- oriented empiricism 
explicitly in scientific practice if what I have argued in  Chapter 2 is correct, and aim- oriented 
empiricism is inherent in all of science. The answer is straightforward. Actual scientific prac-
tice is massively influenced by the long- standing conviction of the scientific community that 
science ought to proceed in accordance with standard empiricism. The result is that scien-
tific practice is a mixture of aim- oriented empiricism and standard empiricism. Aim- oriented 
empiricism is implemented in a surreptitious, hypocritical fashion, overlaid by the conviction 
that science ought to proceed in accordance with standard empiricism. As a result, physical-
ism and more specific metaphysical blueprints are not acknowledged within the intellectual 
domain of scientific knowledge, and this sabotages the possibility of putting the rational 
method of discovery of aim- oriented empiricism into sustained scientific practice. Explicit sci-
entific exploitation of aim- oriented empiricism is frustrated if not prohibited. (See Maxwell 
[1976b and 1984a] for further discussion of this point.) Einstein’s great lucidity about funda-
mental matters led him to put aim- oriented empiricism into scientific practice unconstrained 
by hypocritical allegiance to standard empiricism.
 3. Gerald Holton comes the closest to interpreting Einstein in the way that I do. One difference, 
of course, is that Holton espouses his “themata” conception of science and not aim- oriented 
empiricism (see Holton, 1973).
 4. See Maxwell (1979, pp. 647– 8; 1988, p. 42; 1998, pp. 80– 2; 2017b, ch. 5, sections 5 and 6).
 5. Einstein put it very clearly in a paper published in 1911. He states that as a result of assuming 
the equivalence of acceleration and gravitation for all phenomena “we obtain a principle that, 
if it really is correct, possesses great heuristic significance. For by means of theoretical con-
siderations of processes that take place relative to a uniformly accelerated reference system, 
we obtain conclusions about the course of processes in a homogeneous gravitational field” 
(quoted in Stachel, 2007, p. 85).
 6. For a more detailed discussion of the role played by the rotating disc in the genesis of general 
relativity, see Stachel (1980, 2007).
 7. Einstein had to labour long and hard to transform the initial insight of 1911 or 1912, that 
gravitation is due to the curvature of space- time, into the field equations of general relativity, 
first formulated in their final form in 1915. For a magnificent detailed account by a number of 
authors of Einstein’s creation of general relativity, see Renn (2007). See also Pitts (2016). For 
much earlier accounts, see Pais (1982, chs. 11 and 12) and Norton (1984). Authoritative and 
detailed as all these accounts are, none tells the story of Einstein’s discovery of general relativ-
ity as the implementation of aim- oriented empiricism, as I have tried to do, all too briefly, here.
 8. Good expositions of general relativity are to be found in Friedman (1983), Schutz (1988) and 
Misner et al. (1973). For a lively, non- technical account of the genesis of the theory and its 
subsequent applications to astrophysics and cosmology, with the emphasis on accounts of the 
physicists involved, see Ferreira (2014).
 9. The best “blueprint” for physics is the best available idea as to how the universe is physically 
comprehensible, a vital element of theoretical scientific knowledge according to aim- oriented 
empiricism (see  Chapters 2 and 5).
 10. Lucid summaries of these papers are to be found in Lanczos (1974). They are reproduced, 
translated into English, in Stachel (1998).
 11. He did this, too, in the introduction to his 1905 paper introducing the revolutionary idea of 
light quanta. He there makes clear that there is a fundamental clash between the idea of the 
particle, associated with theories of matter, and the field idea of Maxwell’s theory of electro-
dynamics (see Stachel, 1998, pp. 177– 8).
 12. Elsewhere, I have suggested that the way to implement this method of discovery is to take, 
as P1, the general idea of deterministic dynamic space- time geometry (from general relativ-
ity), and to take, as P2, the general idea of ontological probabilism (from quantum theory), 
the task then being to create unified probabilistic dynamic geometry, P3 (see Maxwell, 1985, 
pp. 40– 1).
 13. All Einstein’s great contributions to physics arose out of tackling aspects of the clash between 
Newton and Maxwell – between the classical theories of gravitation and electromagnetism. In 
seeking to unify general relativity and classical electrodynamics, Einstein was, in a sense, still 
tackling the problem of his youth, updated by the replacement of Newton’s theory of gravita-
tion with his own theory, general relativity.
 14. For an account of the great battle between Einstein and Bohr (and others) see Kumar (2008).
 15. Interpreting the ψ- function as describing quantum reality directly, measurement having no 
fundamental role in the theory, has the consequence that quantum superpositions never 
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disappear. Not only does Schrödinger’s cat persist as a superposition of being dead and 
alive, we persist as a superposition of observing the cat dead and alive when we open the 
box and look. These consequences might seem sufficient to rule out this interpretation of 
the theory. They did not prevent Hugh Everett from putting forward this interpretation 
of quantum theory long ago, in 1957. Recently, the Everett version of quantum theory 
has become almost fashionable: see Wallace (2012) for a recent exposition and defence. 
For critical assessments, see Bacciagaluppi and Ismae (2015) and Maxwell (2017b, ch. 5, 
section 6).
 16. See also Maxwell (1993c; 1994a; 1995; 1998, ch. 7; 2004b; 2011a). See also Chapter 8 of the 
present volume.
 17. The six fatal defects of OQT that I have indicated all stem from the failure of OQT to solve the 
fundamental quantum wave/ particle problem. We can draw an important conclusion from 
this point: no version of quantum theory (QT) is acceptable which fails to solve the wave/ 
particle problem. This constitutes a decisive objection to the currently fashionable Everett or 
“many- worlds” interpretation of QT: it provides no solution to the wave/ particle problem. It 
does not tell us what sort of physical entity in space and time the electron, photon or atom 
is. The probabilistic version of QT, to be outlined in  Chapter 8, here scores a striking victory 
over Everett QT. Probabilistic QT provides us with a very natural solution to the wave/ particle 
problem, as we shall see in  Chapter 8.
 18. “Perfection of means and confusion of goals seem – in my opinion – to characterize our age” 
Einstein (1973, p. 337). One can regard this state of affairs as the result of the failure of our 
age to develop and implement a kind of rational inquiry designed to help us improve our goals, 
informed by aim- oriented rationalism and the philosophy of wisdom, themselves the outcome 
of generalizing Einstein’s way of doing physics (see Maxwell, 1976b, 1984a, 2014b).
 19. Perhaps, more modestly, we should say that only the top two theses of aim- oriented empiri-
cism are synthetic a priori conjectures – theses we will never abandon because accepting them 
can only help, and cannot hinder, the search for knowledge whatever the universe may be like, 
and even though we have no grounds whatsoever to hold that they are true. (That these propo-
sitions are conjectures means that they are not synthetic a priori propositions in Kant’s sense.) 
It is just about conceivable that we might discover that the universe is not comprehensible, 
and still live; it is inconceivable that we will discover that it is not partially knowable, and not 
meta- knowable (see  Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2).
 20. Reasons for accepting partial knowability and meta- knowability will be spelled out in more 
detail in  Chapter 7. See also Maxwell (2017a, especially ch. 9; and 2017b, appendix 2).
 21. In my view, the most important implications of the new way of doing physics created by 
Einstein in developing special and general relativity lie in fields far beyond that of theoretical 
physics: see the Prologue and  Chapters 9 and 10 of the present volume, and Maxwell (1976a, 
1984a or 2007, 2004a, 2014b, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b). See also my articles summarizing 
aspects of the argument in various ways (Maxwell, 1977a, 1984b, 1986, 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 
1999b, 2000a, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2009a, 2012, 2013), where I attempt to spell out the 
implications of aim- oriented empiricism for science as a whole, for technological research, 
social inquiry, scholarship, education and global problems confronting humanity.
Chapter 4
 1. This argument was expounded in Chapter 2, section 2.3. It is taken up again in Chapter 5. For 
an earlier account, see Maxwell (1998, 47– 56).
 2. For more recent discussions of diverse aspects of the problem, see Weber and Lefevere (2014), 
Schurz (2014, 2015), Votsis (2015), Cohen (2015), Sterkenburg (2016), Niiniluoto (2016), 
and Dasgupta (2016).
 3. I exempt my own earlier work on the problem (Maxwell, 1998, chs. 3 and 4; 2004a, appendix, 
section 2; 2007, pp. 373– 86; 2011b; 2013; 2017a; 2017b).
 4. If the theory is formulated as a set of differential equations, then what is invariant through-
out the possible phenomena to which the theory applies is what is asserted by the physically 
interpreted set of differential equations. Laws specifying precisely how diverse physical states 
evolve in space and time may be quite diverse in character: what matters is that they are all 
solutions of the same set of differential equations.
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 5. Counting entities is rendered a little less ambiguous if a system of M particles is counted as (a 
somewhat peculiar) field. This means that M particles all of the same kind (i.e. with the same 
dynamic properties) are counted as one entity. In the text I continue to adopt the convention 
that M particles all the same dynamically represent one kind of entity, rather than one entity.
 6. For accounts of the locally gauge invariant structure of quantum field theories, see Aitchison 
and Hey (1982, part III), Moriyasu (1983), and Griffiths (1987, ch. 11). For introductory 
accounts of group theory as it arises in physics, see Isham (1989) or Jones (1990).
 7. For accounts of spontaneous symmetry breaking, see Moriyasu (1983), Mandl and Shaw 
(1984), and Griffiths (1987, ch. 11).
 8. This account of unity radically simplifies and improves on the account given in Maxwell (1998, 
chs. 3 and 4).
 9. I am grateful to Jos Uffink for drawing my attention to the two objections just discussed.
 10. For further discussion of simplicity, and how terminological simplicity can be related to unity, 
see Maxwell (1998, pp. 110– 3 and 157– 9).
 11. For a discussion of such “approximate derivations”, the conclusion being strictly incompatible 
with the premises, see Maxwell (1988, 211– 7).
 12. See also Chapters 5 and 7, and Maxwell (1998, 2004a, 2017a, 2017b).
Chapter 5
 1. The date of my first publication arguing for aim- oriented empiricism (see Maxwell, 1974).
 2. See especially Maxwell (1998); see also Maxwell (1976a, ch. 6; 1984a, chs. 5 and 9, or 2007, 
chs. 5, 9 and 14; 1993a; 1997a; 1999a; 2000b; 2001a, ch. 3 and appendix 3; 2002d; 2004a; 
2008; 2009d; 2010a, ch. 5; 2011b; 2012; 2013; 2014a; 2016a; 2017a; 2017b).
 3. Philosophers of science who have praised or criticized aim- oriented empiricism include 
Kneller (1978, pp.  80– 7, 90– 1), Harré (1986, pp.  26– 32), Midgley (1986), Chakravartty 
(1999), Chart (2000), Juhl (2000), Shanks (2000), Smart (2000), Weinert (2000), McHenry 
(2000, 2009a), Roush (2001), Muller (2004, 2008), Schiff (2005), Miller (2006, pp. 92– 4), 
MacIntyre (2009), Rogers (2009), Vicente (2010), Pandit (2010). For my replies to criticisms, 
see Maxwell (2001c, 2006, 2009b, 2010b).
 4. An earlier version of this chapter was delivered as a talk at a conference on “Induction, 
Confirmation and Science” at the London School of Economics on 10 March 2007. It was then 
perhaps rather more paradoxical to talk of “scientific metaphysics” than it is now, at the time of 
writing (2016). This is because, in recent years, as I mentioned in Chapter 2, note 8, something 
approaching a research industry in the philosophy of science has emerged devoted to the topic 
“the metaphysics of science” (see note 7 below and associated text). “Scientific metaphysics” 
has rather lost its paradoxical air.
 5. It is widely appreciated that some metaphysical theses have influenced science in the context 
of discovery, in influencing scientists to try to develop certain sorts of theories, and to ignore 
others (see, for example, Watkins, 1958; Popper, 1959, p. 278). What is being argued here 
is very different. I argue that there are metaphysical theses, neither falsifiable nor verifiable, 
which are an integral part of theoretical scientific knowledge, more firmly established, indeed, 
than such highly corroborated theories as quantum theory and general relativity. Science is 
more rigorous if this is acknowledged rather than denied. All this differs dramatically even 
from Popper’s later views concerning the important role that metaphysical research pro-
grammes play in science (see Popper, 1976a, sections 33 and 37; 1982b, sections 20– 8; 1983, 
section 23). Popper held on to his demarcation criterion to the end, and never wavered from 
holding metaphysical theses, however scientifically fruitful, to be “unscientific” (for discussion 
of this point, see Chapter 4 and Maxwell, 2012).
 6. For discussion of the claim that Kuhn and Lakatos defend versions of SE, see Chapter 2 and 
Maxwell (1998, p. 40).
 7. For recent contributions to the “metaphysics of science”, see note 8 of Chapter 2, and Maudlin 
(2007); Ladyman and Ross (2007); Chakravartty (2007); Lange (2009); Kuhlmann (2010); 
Ladyman (2012); Kincaid, Ladyman and Ross (2013); Morganti (2013); Mumford and Tugby 
(2013); Robus (2015); Brown (2016); Andersen and Arenhart (2016). Some of this work 
argues for conjectural essentialism, the anti- Humean view that theoretical physics should be 
interpreted as seeking to discover, not just physical laws, or regularities in phenomena, but 
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rather “necessitating properties” possessed by fundamental physical entities which determine, 
necessarily, that the entities in question evolve in accordance with specified laws. This is a view 
I argued for decades ago (see Maxwell, 1968).
 8. All the possible phenomena, predicted by any dynamical physical theory, T, may be repre-
sented by an imaginary “space”, S, each point in S corresponding to a particular phenomenon, 
a particular kind of physical system evolving in time in the way predicted by T.  In order to 
specify severely disunified rivals to T that fit all available evidence just as well as T does, all 
we need do is specify a region in S that consists of phenomena that have not been observed, 
and then replace the phenomena predicted by T with anything we care to think of. Given any 
T, there will always be infinitely many such disunified rivals to T.  This point is inherent in 
Nelson Goodman’s “new paradox of induction” (see Goodman, 1954), although the kind of 
empirically successful disunified rivals considered by Goodman in his discussion of “grue” and 
“bleen” are but one kind of a number of kinds of disunified theories, as we shall see in section 
5.3. There is a vast philosophical literature on the underdetermination of theory by evidence. 
For an excellent recent discussion, and reference to further literature, see Howson (2000, 
especially ch. 1, pp. 30– 4, 75– 7, and ch. 5). See also Lipton (2004).
 9. For a more detailed discussion of empirically successful ad hoc rivals to accepted theories, see 
Maxwell (1974; 1993a; 1998, pp. 51– 4).
 10. Vicente (2010) claims that this argument cannot establish that physics assumes the truth of 
some more or less unified physical theory, and the falsity of all seriously disunified rival the-
ories. It is, however, especially in the context of practical applications that physics requires 
predictions of accepted theories to be true, and clashing predictions of rival theories to be 
false. In contexts such as bridge- building, for example, we do indeed need to assume that rele-
vant accepted laws will yield true predictions, and better empirically established but disunified 
rivals, that predict the bridge will collapse, are false. (Human lives are at stake.) In making 
such an assumption, against the evidence, we implicitly assume the truth of a metaphysical 
thesis concerning the unity of phenomena. For a more detailed rebuttal of Vicente’s claim, see 
Maxwell (2010b, pp. 673– 4).
 11. It may be objected that the universe might have been genuinely disunified, so that physics 
could consist only of a great number of physical laws. In this case, it may be argued, physics 
could not be construed as making a metaphysical assumption about underlying unity. But even 
in this counterfactual situation, endlessly many very much more disunified but empirically 
more successful rival laws could easily be formulated: these would have to be rejected on non- 
empirical grounds, or physics would drown in an ocean of rival laws. The persistent rejection 
of such much more disunified but empirically more successful rivals would involve the meth-
ods of physics making an implicit metaphysical assumption, to the effect that nature is unified 
to some extent at least (all grossly disunified laws being false). It is necessary to make some 
such assumption, however disunified the totality of accepted laws may be – even if the assump-
tion made is rather weak in character, in that only gross disunity is denied.
 12. See Maxwell (1984a, p. 224; 1998, p. 21).
 13. See the previous chapter, section 4.1, note 3 and associated texts for various attempts to solve 
the problem, and criticisms of those attempts.
 14. The account of theoretical unity given here and in the last chapter simplifies the account given 
in Maxwell (1998, chs. 3 and 4), where unity is explicated as “exemplifying physicalism”, 
where physicalism is a metaphysical thesis asserting that the universe has some kind of unified 
dynamic structure. Explicating unity in that way invites the charge of circularity, a charge that 
is not actually valid (see Maxwell, 1998, pp. 118– 23 and 168– 72). The account given here 
forestalls this charge from the outset.
 15. This point is of fundamental importance for the problem of induction. Traditionally, the prob-
lem is interpreted as the problem of justifying exclusion of empirically successful theories that 
are ad hoc in sense (1): how can evidence from the past provide grounds for any belief about 
the future? This makes the problem seem highly “philosophical”, remote from any problem 
realistically encountered in scientific practice. But the moment it is appreciated that the prob-
lem of justifying exclusion of empirically successful theories that are ad hoc in sense (1) is just 
an extreme, special case of the more general problem of excluding empirically successful the-
ories that are ad hoc in senses (1) to (8), it becomes clear that this latter problem is a scientific 
problem, a problem of theoretical physics itself. For the implications of this crucial insight, and 
for a proposal as to how the problem of induction is to be solved that exploits this insight, see 
Maxwell (1998, especially chs. 4 and 5). See also Chapter 7 of the present work, and Maxwell 
(2004a, appendix, section 6; 2007, ch. 14, section 6; 2017b; 2017a, especially ch. 9).
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 16. It may seem that there is rather a jump here, from T referring to any fundamental dynamical 
physical theory in (1) to (8), to T referring to a “theory of everything”. However, the proper 
way to apply (1) to (8) is to the totality of fundamental physical theory (whether this consists 
of many or just one theory), and thus, in a sense, to candidate “theories of everything”. (If a 
range of phenomena has no theory, then empirical laws governing these phenomena must 
be treated as theories.) If we do not do this, disunity could always be evaded, as far as (4) to 
(7) are concerned at least, by chopping a theory disunified to degree N into N distinct unified 
theories. When it comes to non- empirical considerations governing choice of theory, what 
matters is the way individual theories fit into the totality of fundamental physical theory – the 
degree of unity of the whole of fundamental physical theory.
 17. Although, even in this case, one could imagine that there are different degrees of unification of 
space- time and matter.
 18. Is physicalism(n,N) to be interpreted so as to be compatible with stronger versions of physi-
calism, such as physicalism(n+1, N- 1) – assuming here that n < 8 and N > 1? If we want the 
different versions of physicalism to constitute metaphysical theses that are, as far as possible, 
mutually exclusive, then we should interpret physicalism(n,N) to be incompatible with stron-
ger, more unified versions of physicalism. But if we want physicalism to play the role in physics 
of excluding more or less disunified theories, then it will be convenient to interpret physical-
ism(n,N) to be compatible with stronger, more unified versions of the doctrine. In this second 
case, physicalism(n,N) has the role of excluding theories more disunified than (n,N), but not 
theories more unified than this. In what follows, physicalism is to be interpreted in this latter 
way, as we will be considering the role physicalism has in excluding disunified theories from 
physics.
 19. This explication of the “unity” and “explanatory power” of theories improves on proposals 
put forward by Friedman (1974), Kitcher (1981), Watkins (1984) and others referred to 
in section 5.1 and note 3 of the previous chapter. For a critical assessment of these and 
other proposals, see Salmon (1989) and Maxwell (1998, pp. 61– 8). Maxwell (1998) also 
contains a detailed account of my positive theory of explanatory power (see especially chs. 
3 and 4).
 20. For further discussion, see Maxwell (1998, pp. 80– 9, 131– 40, 257– 65, and additional works 
referred to therein).
 21. Note 5 above indicates how my view differs from Popper’s “metaphysical research 
programmes”.
 22. See Chapter 8 for further discussion of these issues.
 23. Lagrangianism is discussed in Maxwell (1998, pp. 88– 9).
 24. See Maxwell (2004a, pp. 198– 205) for a suggestion along these lines.
 25. In practice, physical theory is persistently used to correct clashing experimental results, in that 
theory is used to reveal that experimental equipment is not working properly.
 26. What does “increase the conflict” mean here? It means that the kind or degree of unity of the 
totality of fundamental physical theory gets worse with respect to the currently accepted meta-
physical thesis at level 3. (This thesis asserts that there is a certain kind of unity in nature. The 
more the totality of physical theory departs from this kind of unity, the greater the “conflict” 
with the thesis at level 3.)
 27. See Maxwell (1974, especially part II) and, more recently, Maxwell (1998, pp.  17– 9). 
Others, too, have argued that the methods of science improve with improving knowledge, 
but have done so only within the framework of standard empiricism (see, for example, 
Boyd, 1980).
 28. No attempt is being made in this chapter, I hope it is clear, to solve the problem of induction. 
I merely seek to rebut the objection that the problem cannot conceivably be solved, granted 
AOE. In Chapter 7, I will, however, argue that AOE solves the problem of induction – as I have 
argued elsewhere (see Maxwell, 1998, ch. 5; 2004a, appendix, section 6; 2007, ch. 14, 
pp. 400– 30; 2017b; and 2017a, especially ch. 9).
 29. I here echo the two reasons for accepting meta- knowability given in Chapter 2.
 30. I assume that this is being read before 2050!
 31. Consider a universe such that progress in theoretical physics requires infinitely many theoret-
ical revolutions, each revolution leading to the degree of unity of the totality of physical the-
ory going up by one. In such a universe, meta- knowability is true, since it possesses a general 
feature which, once discovered, would aid progress in physics; nevertheless, it is also the case 
that physicalism(N = ∞) is true. Physicalism holds, meta- knowability holds, but the universe 
is infinitely disunified, infinitely incomprehensible.
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Chapter 6
 1. See also Maxwell (1972a; 1974; 1984a, or 2007, especially ch. 14; 1993a; 2001a, ch. 3 and 
appendix 3; 2004a; and especially 1998; 2017a; and 2017b. For summaries, see Maxwell 
1999a; 2000b; 2009d; 2010a, ch. 5; 2011b; 2013; 2014a; 2015a; 2016a).
 2. See Chapter 3. See also Maxwell (1998, pp. 219– 23; 2017a, ch. 11; 2017b, ch. 5).
 3. Elsewhere I have defended an objectivist, realist account of value (see Maxwell, 1984a, ch. 10; 
1999b; and 2001a, ch. 2). This does not, however, affect the present argument.
 4. Bassi et al. (2013) discuss a number of fundamentally probabilistic versions of quantum the-
ory, and how they can be tested experimentally; Gao (2017) expounds a probabilistic ver-
sion of quantum theory. Both works provide many references to earlier papers and books in 
the field.
 5. There is, it is true, the additional requirement of simplicity. This, however, presupposes unity, 
and is not as methodologically significant as unity.
 6. McAllister might, of course, reject SE and defend MAI in such a way that MAI acknowledges 
that science makes a substantial, permanent metaphysical assumption about the nature of the 
universe – namely that the universe is such that no ad hoc theory is true. But at once two major 
problems arise: What precisely is this assumption in view of the fact that there is no sharp 
distinction between the ad hoc and the non- ad hoc? What is the justification for making this 
assumption? In order to answer these questions satisfactorily, it is necessary to adopt AOE, 
which involves abandoning those parts of MAI which clash with AOE.
Chapter 7
 1. See Chapter 1 of the present work for a discussion of Popper’s attempt at solving the problem 
of induction. The problem was also discussed in Chapter 5. David Hume formulated and dis-
cussed the problem in Hume (1959, vol. 1, part III). For somewhat more recent discussions 
of the problem, and surveys of somewhat more recent literature on the subject, see Kyburg 
(1970), Swain (1970), Watkins (1984), Howson (2000) and Vickers (2016).
 2. These include problems of unification and verisimilitude, the problem of rational scientific 
discovery, the problem of saying what it is that science has discovered about the ultimate 
nature of reality, problems concerning rationality and the nature of social inquiry, and, most 
important of all, the discovery that academic inquiry as it exists at present is profoundly 
defective when viewed from the standpoint of its capacity to help us learn how to become 
more civilized, there being an urgent need to bring about a revolution in the overall aims and 
methods of inquiry if we are to have what we so urgently need, a kind of inquiry rationally 
devoted to helping us acquire wisdom (see, for example, Maxwell, 1976a; 1980; 1984a or 
2007; 1984b; 1985b; 1987; 1991; 1992a; 1994b; 1997b; 1998, ch. 3, 4 and 6; 2000a; 2000b; 
2002b; 2003a; 2003b; 2003c; 2004a; 2008; 2010a; 2011b; 2012; 2013; 2014a; 2016a; 
2016b; 2017a; 2017b).
 3. Work of mine related to my proposed solution to the problem of induction has received some 
critical attention:  see, for example, Kneller (1978, pp.  80– 91), Longuet- Higgins (1984), 
Collingridge (1985), Easlea (1986), Midgley (1986), Smart (2000), Roush (2001), Hodgson 
(2002), Muller (2004), Iredale (2005), McHenry (2009b), Vicente (2010), Müürsepp 
(2014).
 4. I sketched how to solve the circularity problem in Chapter 5, section 5.9. An earlier defence 
against the charge of circularity was brief and unsatisfactory (see Maxwell, 1998, pp. 166– 8).
 5. See Maxwell (2017a, especially ch. 9). See also Maxwell (2017b). For earlier attempts at solv-
ing, or contributing to the solution to, the problem of induction, see Maxwell (1968; 1972a; 
1974; 1977a; 1979; 1984a, or 2007, especially ch. 14; 1993a; 1997a; 1998; 1999a; 2000b; 
2001a, ch. 3 and appendix 3; 2002b; 2002e, 2004a; 2009d; 2010a, ch. 5; 2011b; 2013; 
2015a; 2016a).
 6. One of the great mistakes made by endlessly many attempts at solving the problem of induc-
tion is to assume unthinkingly that science is wholly in order just as it is, the task being to find 
some way of justifying existing valid methods of science. What the long- standing insolubility 
of the problem of induction is trying to tell us, in my view, is that the orthodox conception of 
science, taken for granted by scientists and non- scientists alike, is untenable, and needs to 
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be changed. Before the problem of induction can be solved, we need to change the currently 
accepted conception of science; indeed, we need to change, not just our conception of sci-
ence, but science itself. Properly conceived, the problem of induction involves formulating a 
new conception of the aims and methods of science, more rigorous than current conceptions, 
which is such that the problem of induction no longer arises. The task is not to justify the status 
quo, but to change the status quo so that the problem of justification no longer arises. Popper’s 
failed attempt at solving the problem stands head and shoulders above the rest just because it 
fits this prescription: it consists of a new view about the aims and methods of science, a new 
philosophy of science, namely falsificationism.
 7. Aim- oriented empiricism was first expounded in Maxwell (1974). It was spelled out in greater 
detail in Maxwell (1984, 1998).
 8. For the AOE account of what theoretical unification means, see Chapter 4.
 9. In what follows “accept T” implies, not just “accept T as a working hypothesis for further 
research”, but also “accept T for the purposes of technological and other practical applications, 
including contexts where human life may depend on the predictions of T being true”.
 10. All the possible phenomena, predicted by any dynamical physical theory, T, may be repre-
sented by an imaginary “space”, S, each point in S corresponding to a particular phenomenon, 
a particular kind of physical system evolving in time in the way predicted by T.  In order to 
specify severely disunified rivals to T that fit all available evidence just as well as T does, all we 
need do is specify a region in S that consists of phenomena that have not been observed, and 
then replace the phenomenon predicted by T with anything we care to think of. Given any T, 
there will always be infinitely many such disunified rivals to T.
 11. For a more detailed discussion of empirically successful ad hoc rivals to accepted theories, see 
Maxwell (1974; 1993a; 1998, pp. 51– 4; 2017a, ch. 4).
 12. The two prescriptions for formulating empirically more successful rivals to accepted unifying 
theories, indicated in this and the previous paragraph, can of course be combined to create 
further more empirically successful disunified rival theories.
 13. This needs to be amended in two ways. In the first place any number of approximate disunified 
theories would be implied by the true, unified “theory of everything” (supposing there is such 
a thing). If, for example, we take Newtonian theory as standing in for the true, unified theory 
of everything, then we can derive from this theory a combination of appropriately approxi-
mate versions of Kepler’s laws of planetary motion and Galileo’s laws of terrestrial motion, 
which, put together, constitute a disunified theory, true if Newtonian theory is true. “Science 
assumes that the universe is such that no disunified theory is true”, must be amended to read, 
“Science assumes that the universe is such that no precise disunified theory is true”. But even 
this amendment is not sufficient. Newtonian theory implies different, precise laws of plane-
tary motion for the different planets in their orbits round the sun. Gather these precise laws 
together, and one has a precise but thoroughly disunified theory of planetary motion. These 
laws are, however, specific to precise specifications of initial conditions: initial relative posi-
tions and velocities, and masses. These laws cease to be true (granted that Newtonian theory is 
true), if the initial conditions are changed even slightly (in a way which does not obtain during 
the orbit of the planet in question). In other words, these laws cease to be consequences of 
Newtonian theory the moment they are interpreted to apply to a range of values of initial con-
ditions (of the indicated kind), however minute this range of values might be. We must amend 
the statement in the text to read: “Science assumes that the universe is such that no precise 
disunified theory is true, where the components of the disunified theory are interpreted to 
apply to a range of values of initial conditions (of the appropriate kind), however minute that 
range might be.” What does “of the appropriate kind” mean here? It means this. Variables 
that characterize initial conditions are “of the appropriate kind”, if the component laws of the 
disunified theory apply only to different values of these variables. These variables are such, in 
other words, that in order to move from conditions for which one component law of the dis-
unified theory applies, to conditions for which another component law applies, it is the value 
of these variables that we need to change. The range of values must not correspond to different 
states of the physical system that evolve from just one precise initial state of the system.
 14. For a much more detailed exposition of this refutation of standard empiricism, see Maxwell 
(1998, ch. 2). See also Maxwell (2017a, ch. 4).
 15. For discussion of the claim that Kuhn and Lakatos defend versions of SE, see Maxwell (1998, 
p. 40). Bayesianism might seem to reject SE, in acknowledging both prior and posteriori prob-
abilities. But Bayesianism tries to conform to the spirit of SE as much as possible, by regarding 
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prior probabilities as personal, subjective and non- rational, their role in theory choice being 
reduced as rapidly as possible by empirical testing (see Maxwell, 1998, p. 44).
 16. See, for example, Maudlin (2007); Ladyman and Ross (2007); Chakravartty (2007); Lange 
(2009); Kuhlmann (2010); Achinstein (2010); Ladyman (2012); Kincaid, Ladyman and Ross 
(2013); Morganti (2013); Mumford and Tugby (2013); Dawid (2014); Robus (2015); Brown 
(2016); Andersen and Arenhart (2016); Scerri (2016); Schrenk (2016).
 17. What does it mean to say that U2 is an “improvement” over U1, U2 being “closer” to the true 
characterization of the unity of nature, T (supposing there is such a thing) than U1 is? This 
problem can be solved by exploiting the solution to the problem of verisimilitude, which I have 
spelled out in some detail elsewhere (see Maxwell, 2007, pp. 393– 400; 2017a, ch. 8). The 
problem of verisimilitude is this: What does it mean to say that physics makes progress towards 
the truth, if it advances from one false theory to another? What does it mean, in other words, 
to say that fundamental physical theory T2 is closer to the truth than T1, if both T2 and T1 are 
false? Let T, as before, represent the truth – the true “theory of everything”. Then we can say 
that T2 is closer to the truth than T1 if T approximately implies T2, and T2 approximately implies 
T1, but T1 does not approximately imply T2. The key notion of “approximately implies” can be 
illustrated by means of the way Newtonian theory approximately implies Kepler’s law that 
planets move in ellipses. There are three steps. First, Newtonian theory is restricted to systems 
consisting of rather few bodies that move within a finite spatial region. Second, the masses of 
all the bodies but one tend to zero which, in the limit, leads to the bodies of zero mass tracing 
out ellipses round the remaining massive body. Third, the resulting laws are reinterpreted to 
apply to systems of bodies such that one body (the sun) is very much more massive than all the 
others (the planets), these others nevertheless having masses greater than zero. (It is this third 
step that introduces error.) More generally, T2 approximately implies T1 if a theory simulating 
the empirical predictions of T1 can be extracted from T2 by means of a finite number of steps 
of the kind just illustrated: T2 is restricted in scope; non- zero physical variables tend to zero; 
laws applicable to precise values of variables are reinterpreted to apply to a range of values of 
physical variables. (For more details, see the works to which I have just referred.) We can now 
exploit this solution to the problem of verisimilitude to explicate what it means to say that the 
metaphysical thesis of unity, U2, is closer to T than U1. 
  Let T2 and T1 be theories that accord with, or exemplify, U2 and U1 respectively. U2 can be said 
to be closer to T than U1 if T2 is closer to the truth, T, than T1 is, and there are no theories, T2* 
and T1*, exemplifying U2 and U1 respectively such that T1* is closer to the truth than T2*.
 18. For example, Gordon Fleming (personal communication).
 19. How can level 3 assumptions, or assumptions higher up in the hierarchy, both influence, and be 
influenced by, level 2 theories? What makes this possible is the feature of the hierarchy about 
to be indicated in the text, namely that, as one goes up the hierarchy, assumptions are more 
and more firmly upheld. Level 2 theories that accord with the best available level 3 assumption 
tend to be favoured over rivals that do not so accord. Nevertheless, a level 2 theory that clashes 
with the current level 3 assumption, but (a) accords with the level 4 assumption, and (b) is 
more empirically successful than theories that are in accord with the best level 3 assumption, 
will be accepted, and will lead to the rejection, or modification, of the level 3 assumption with 
which it clashes. Consider, however, a theory that clashes, not just with level 3, but with level 
4 as well, even though it is compatible with level 5, in such a way that no version of the idea 
that the universe is physically comprehensible, at level 4, can be rendered compatible with 
the theory. Such a theory would have to meet with far greater, sustained empirical success 
before it led to the overthrow of the current level 4 assumption. It would have to lead to empir-
ical research programmes across a broad front of natural science even more successful than 
current science, based on the current level 4 assumption, before it would become acceptable. 
And this would be the case even more, given a theory that clashes with the current level 5 
assumption. In short, an assumption at a given level may, for much of the time, determine 
choices lower down in the hierarchy; but every now and again, it may itself be revised, because 
the revised version accords better with the assumption above or is more empirically fruitful, or, 
more likely, both of these simultaneously.
 20. Corresponding to each cosmological thesis, at level 3 to 7, there is a more or less problem-
atic aim for theoretical physics: to specify that cosmological thesis as a true, precise, testable, 
experimentally confirmed “theory of everything”. The aim corresponding to level 7 is rela-
tively unproblematic:  circumstances will never arise such that it would serve the interests 
of acquiring knowledge to revise this aim. As one descends the hierarchy of cosmological 
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assumptions, the corresponding aims become increasingly problematic, increasingly likely 
to be unrealizable, just because the corresponding assumption becomes increasingly likely to 
be false. Whereas upper- level aims and methods will not need revision, lower- level aims and 
methods, especially those corresponding to level 3, will need to be revised as science advances. 
Thus lower- level aims and methods evolve within the fixed framework of upper- level aims and 
methods.
 21. Some features of AOE may seem reminiscent of Laudan’s “normative naturalism” (see Laudan, 
1984, 1987). There are, however, marked differences: “normative naturalism” is not commit-
ted to physicalism, and does not postulate the hierarchy of aims and methods of AOE, which 
makes the rational assessment of low- level aims and methods possible. I  might add that 
Laudan’s “normative naturalism” is derived from AOE, which was first expounded in a col-
loquium I gave at the University of Pittsburgh in 1972, chaired by Laudan, the text of which 
became my paper “The Rationality of Scientific Discovery” (Maxwell, 1974). Rescher has 
defended the view that science makes metaphysical presuppositions (see Rescher, 1973, 1977, 
1987); his views also differ substantially from AOE. For an excellent survey of methodologi-
cal views, including those of Laudan and Rescher (but excluding AOE) see Nola and Sankey 
(2000).
 22. At this point I confess that in The Comprehensibility of the Universe (Maxwell, 1998, pp. 192– 3) 
I give a third argument for accepting meta- knowability which does, perhaps, contain a whiff 
of circularity, in that it appeals to the apparent success of science. This suffices, I now think, to 
make this argument circular.
 23. What justifies the claim that physicalism has been more fruitful for theoretical physics than 
any rival idea? This is justified by the point made in section 7.2. All new, revolutionary, fun-
damental physical theories have been accepted because they (a) have brought greater unity 
to physics, and (b) have been more empirically successful, than any rivals – (a) being just as 
important as (b). In other words, the persisting non- empirical requirement for acceptance of 
revolutionary theory has been enhanced exemplification of physicalism (as far as theoreti-
cal physics as a whole is concerned). What irony that scientific revolutions – just that which 
convinced Kuhn (1970a) that there are ruptures in science with nothing theoretical surviving 
each rupture – actually demonstrate just the opposite: the persistent and increasingly success-
ful search for unity, the assumption of underlying unity being repeatedly reinforced by each 
successive revolution. It may be asked: But how can revolutionary theories reinforce physi-
calism when the totality of physical theory has always, up till now, clashed with physicalism? 
The answer: If physicalism is true, then all physical theories that only unify a restricted range 
of phenomena, must be false. Granted the truth of physicalism, and granted that theoretical 
physics advances by putting forward theories of limited but ever increasing empirical scope, 
then it follows that physics will advance from one false theory to another, all theories being 
false until a unified theory of everything is achieved (which just might be true). The successful 
pursuit of physicalism requires progressive increase in both empirical scope and unity of the 
totality of fundamental physical theory. It is just this which the history of physics, from Galileo 
to today, exemplifies – thus demonstrating the unique fruitfulness of physicalism.
 24. For further details of the argument for AOE, see Maxwell (1998; 2001a, ch. 3 and app.  3; 
2002d; 2003d; 2007, ch. 14; and especially 2017a and 2017b).
 25. Laudan (1977, 1984), inspired by Maxwell (1974, and earlier personal communication), does 
argue for changing methods of science within an SE view. But because of the anti- realist and 
SE character of his view, its lack of the hierarchical “meta- methodological” character of AOE, 
Laudan cannot do justice to the idea that new aims- and- methods need to be appraised so that 
those selected improve on earlier aims- and- methods, there being positive feedback between 
improving knowledge and improving knowledge- about- how- to- improve- knowledge  – a key 
feature of the rationality of science, according to AOE, and one which helps account for the 
explosive growth of modern science.
 26. See note 2 for references to recent attempts to solve the problem within the framework of SE.
 27. Galileo’s laws of terrestrial motion and Kepler’s laws of planetary motion are contradicted by 
Newtonian theory, in turn contradicted by special and general relativity. The whole of classi-
cal physics is contradicted by quantum theory, in turn contradicted by quantum field theory. 
Science advances from one false theory to another. Viewed from an SE perspective, this seems 
discouraging and is often called “the pessimistic induction”. Viewed from an AOE perspective, 
as I have already mentioned, this mode of advance is wholly encouraging, since it is required 
by AOE. Granted physicalism, the only way a dynamical theory can be precisely true of any 
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restricted range of phenomena is to be true of all phenomena. All physical theories must be 
false until we obtain a theory of everything!
 28. See especially Maxwell (2017b); see also Maxwell (2017a).
Chapter 8
 1. Good introductory accounts of OQT, increasingly technical, are Squires (1986), Gillespie 
(1973), and Feynman et al. (1965). See also Maxwell (1998, appendix).
 2. The argument that the failure of OQT to solve the wave/ particle problem leads remorse-
lessly to multiple, severe defects in the theory was developed by me in a series of papers (see 
Maxwell, 1972b, 1973b, 1976b, 1982, 1988, 1993c, 1994a, 1995). Some of the points were 
developed independently by John Bell (1987). Bell tended to restrict himself, however, to the 
point that, if quantum theory is about measurement, it is inherently imprecise. I discuss Bell’s 
contribution in Maxwell (1992c).
 3. Rival interpretations of quantum theory include Bohm’s interpretation, according to which 
quantum systems are both particles and waves; Everett’s many- worlds interpretation; deco-
herence; and consistent histories. None of these, in my view, provides us with a satisfactory 
version of quantum theory. For critical surveys and further literature, see Squires (1986), 
Rae (2002, ch. 13)  and Bacciagaluppi (2003). For a fairly recent exposition and defence 
of Everett’s interpretation, see Wallace (2012). For a review, see Bacciagaluppi and Ismae 
(2015).
 4. Popper has suggested that probabilism is the key to understanding wave/ particle duality, and 
has put forward a propensity interpretation of quantum theory (see Popper, 1957b, 1967, 
1982b). His interpretation of quantum theory is, however, unsatisfactory and quite different 
from the one I advocate here. For my criticisms of Popper, see Maxwell (1976b, pp. 285– 6; 
1985, pp. 41– 2).
 5. Elsewhere (Maxwell, 1976b, pp. 283– 6; 1988, pp. 44– 8) I have indicated how the notion of 
probabilistic physical property, or propensity, that is being presupposed here, amounts to a 
probabilistic generalization of the notion of deterministic, necessitating property explicated in 
Maxwell (1968; see also Maxwell, 1998, pp. 141– 55). I might add, no doubt controversially, 
that in my view, my 1968 paper gives the definitive account of how dispositional, necessitating 
properties in physics should be conceived. This viewpoint, in particular, makes no appeal to 
Kripke’s (1981) fallacious considerations concerning identity and necessity; for a refutation of 
Kripke, see Maxwell (2001a, appendix 2). Much subsequent work on dispositional properties 
in science is vitiated by a failure to take my earlier work into account, and a reliance instead on 
Kripke.
 6. For a survey of more recent proposals, and attempts to test them experimentally, see Bassi 
et al. (2013); see also Gao (2017). These authors, including Ghirardi et al. and Penrose, do 
not stress, however, as I do in this chapter, that probabilism provides a very natural solution, 
potentially, to the key quantum wave/ particle problem.
 7. See Maxwell (1972b; 1973a; 1973b; 1976b; 1982; 1988; 1993c; 1994a; 1995; 1998, ch. 7; 
2004b; 2011a).
 8. See also Maxwell (1974; 1984, ch. 9, or 2007, chs. 9 and 14; 1998; 2004b; 2017a; 2017b).
Chapter 9
 1. As the argument of this chapter develops, it will emerge that the position I  wish to defend 
ought really to be called specio- universalism, rather than just universalism. It is, in a sense, an 
admixture of specialism and universalism. Or rather, it ought really to be called critical specio- 
universalism, but that is too much of a mouthful to repeat throughout the chapter. I should add 
that, having selected “universalism” to stand for the view I wish to defend, I was somewhat dis-
mayed to find that the Oxford Concise Dictionary defines “universalism” as the Christian view 
that everyone will be saved. This has the merit of being more humane than those views which 
consign many to eternal damnation. Nevertheless, in what follows, please ignore this Christian 
interpretation of the term. “Universalism”, here, means what I say it means.
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 2. These fundamental problems may of course be formulated a little differently from this without 
affecting the overall argument. I shall argue, in fact, that these problems need to be under-
stood, at the most fundamental level, as personal and interpersonal, or social, problems which 
we encounter in our lives. The exact form in which problem (3), for example, arises for any 
individual will depend upon the circumstances in which the individual finds himself. “How can 
I get enough to eat?”, “How can I find worthwhile, productive work to engage in?”, “How can I 
give and receive love?”, “How can my life be of value if l am to grow old and die?”, “How can I 
escape being killed?”, “What am I to do with my life?”, “How can I develop my present pursuits 
so that I achieve more successfully that which is of real value?” – these can all be regarded as 
possible variants of problem (3).
 3. “… the one method of all rational discussion … is that of stating one’s problem clearly and of 
examining its various proposed solutions critically” (Popper, 1959, p. 16).
 4. We may regard a problem as having the form of an aim we seek to realize and some provisional 
idea for a route to the realization of our aim, which fails, however, to enable us to achieve 
the aim. As a result of representing problems in this fashion, we may well adopt the idea that 
rationality involves quite essentially seeking to improve our aims and methods as we act by 
imaginatively developing and critically scrutinizing possible and actual aims and methods. For 
an exposition of this somewhat more sophisticated “aim- oriented” conception of rationality – 
and its implications for intellectual inquiry – see Chapters 4, 5, 7 and 8, and Maxwell (1976a, 
esp. ch. 9; 1984a, chs. 3 and 4).
 5. See Maxwell (2010a, ch. 2; 2014c, ch. 2; 2017b, ch. 3).
 6. Rules (a)  and (b)  specify universalism, pure and simple. It is the addition of rules (c)  and 
(d)  that transforms universalism into what may be called specio- universalism (see note 1). 
Specialism results when rule (c) alone is implemented, rules (a), (b) and (d) being ignored, at 
least as far as fundamental problems are concerned.
 7. See Maxwell (2017b, especially ch. 3)  for an account of the history of modern philosophy 
along these lines.
 8. I return below to this issue of the failure of philosophy to keep universalism alive.
 9. I am grateful to L. Briskman for provoking me into discussing this objection explicitly.
 10. Problem P1 is more fundamental than P2 if (a) the solution to P1 solves P2, but not vice versa; 
and (b) the solution to P1 is unified or coherent in some significant, substantial sense of these 
terms, and not just a jumble of disconnected items. An example of a unified or coherent 
solution is a unified physical theory that solves a range of problems in physics (see Maxwell, 
2014b, pp. 14– 5). For what it means to say that a physical theory is unified, see Chapter 4, and 
also Maxwell (1998, chs. 3 and 4; 2017a, ch. 5).
 11. I even put this forward as a psycho- neurological hypothesis:  our wonderful unconscious 
problem- solving capacity, which we exhibit so effortlessly in life whenever we perceive, 
understand, speak and act, is due to the fact that a fundamentalist hierarchical structure is 
programmed, as it were, into the neurological structure of our brains. This has evolved as a 
result of natural selection (problem- solving ability  – and above all the ability to solve rele-
vant problems, procured by the fundamentalist hierarchical structure – having great survival 
value). Unfortunately, at present, nothing like so intelligent a structure is built into scientific, 
academic inquiry – or into much conscious thought – in that here, lamentably, specialism pre-
vails. In particular, we have failed to build the hierarchical structure of universalism into our 
civilization. Not surprisingly, this civilization, or world order, at present exhibits a terrifying 
failure to recognize and resolve its fundamental problems  – problems most relevant to the 
achievement of what is of most value- even to the extent that its very survival is now in doubt.
 12. Some modern writers have done full justice to the great potential value of living and working in 
a small community or “tribe”: see, for example, Turnbull (1976), Schumacher (1973), and “A 
Blueprint for Survival” (The Ecologist, 1972). Popper’s failure to recognize this potential must 
be due partly to his being unacquainted with the anthropological evidence. He asserts that “the 
main element” of the tribal “magical attitude towards social custom” is “the lack of distinction 
between the customary or conventional regularities of social life and the regularities found 
in ‘nature’ ”, this often being associated with “the belief that both are enforced by a supernat-
ural will”. Social customs are rigidly maintained, there being a superstitious fear of change, 
magical “taboos rigidly regulating [and dominating] all aspects of life”. Significantly, Popper 
adds that “comparatively infrequent changes have the character of religious conversions or 
convulsions, or of the introduction of new magical taboos” (Popper, 1966a, vol. I, p. 172). It 
is striking that Turnbull finds all these Popperian characteristics of tribal life dominating the 
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life of agricultural Bantu tribes in Central Africa. Turnbull describes just such a rigid, taboo- 
ridden, superstitious, compulsive, fearful, ritualistic way of life. Turnbull’s really remarkable 
discovery, however, is that all this is entirely absent in the Pygmy hunting and gathering tribal 
way of life. The Pygmies’ lives are imbued with a quite extraordinary spontaneity, grace and 
trust, there being a complete absence of superstition, compulsive ritual or fearful observance 
of taboo. Turnbull argues, in my view entirely convincingly, that it is the development of agri-
culture which is responsible for this dramatic difference in the whole way of life. Hunting and 
gathering tribes can afford to live spontaneously, from day to day, trusting in the forest to 
provide food for tomorrow. Agricultural tribes, on the contrary, live in a state of constant battle 
with the environment and must perform persistent, long- term agricultural work before food 
and reward are eventually forthcoming. (M. Harris, in his Cannibals and Kings, comes to the 
conclusion, from a consideration of archaeological evidence, that early hunting and gathering 
tribes “enjoyed relatively high standards of comfort and security” [Harris, 1978, p. 17], having 
more leisure than later agricultural tribes.) Thus, it is not closeness to Nature, but the exact 
opposite, departure from day- to- day dependency on Nature, the development of agricultural 
technology, which creates rigidity, taboo and ritual. In any case, the Pygmies decisively refute 
Popper’s contention that tribal life is invariably rigid, ritualistic and irrational. In many ways, 
in fact, our modern “open” societies in the industrially advanced West are closer, at the insti-
tutional level, to the Bantu reliance on rigidly maintained ritual and taboo, than to the Pygmy 
reliance on spontaneous instinct and skill. And – of particular relevance to the theme of this 
chapter – this is perhaps especially true of modern specialized scientific, academic research. 
Rigidly maintained taboo and ritual, broken only by “comparatively infrequent changes” hav-
ing “the character of religious conversions or convulsions” – this corresponds almost exactly to 
specialist scientific research as described and documented by Kuhn (1970a). Even the vocabu-
lary is the same. Kuhn describes scientific revolutions as infrequent episodes of crisis, inducing 
intense anxiety while they last, the process of acquiring the new paradigm constituting a kind 
of irrational religious conversion.
  At present one perhaps needs the serene self- assurance and lucidity of an Einstein (acquired 
as a result of sustained, instinctive fundamentalist thought) to recapture the spontaneity and 
trust of the Pygmy way of life in the modern scientific world. It is clear that in Einstein’s case 
scientific curiosity arose spontaneously from the heart in response to a feeling of “raptur-
ous amazement at the harmony of natural law”. (In a letter to Gertrud Warschauer in 1952, 
Einstein wrote:  “You have given me great joy with the little book about Faraday. This man 
loved mysterious Nature as a lover loves his distant beloved. In his day there did not yet exist 
the dull specialization that stares with self- conceit through hornrimmed glasses and destroys 
poetry” [In Dukas and Hoffmann, 1979, p. 42]). And Einstein found no difficulty in conceiving 
himself as a part of Nature. When asked to respond to the question “If, on your death bed, 
you looked back on your life, by what facts would you determine whether it was a success or 
failure?”, Einstein replied: “Neither on my death bed nor before will I ask myself such a ques-
tion. Nature is not an engineer or contractor, and I myself am a part of Nature” (In Dukas and 
Hoffmann, 1979, p. 92).
 13. The destructive impact of industrially more advanced ways of life on primitive or so- called 
primitive ways of life has been, and is at present, all too often, blatant and brutal. But it can 
also be subtle and unintended. For a perceptive account of this in connection with the impor-
tation of Western economic ideas and practices, see Schumacher (1973).
 14. Einstein was always aware of the instinctively fundamentalist character of childish thinking – 
as well as of the childish origins of mature fundamentalist thought – associated, for him, essen-
tially with curiosity provoked by a sense of wonder, together with scepticism concerning the 
received dogmas of the adult world. In explanation of his own fundamentalist thinking con-
cerning the structure of the physical universe, he once remarked that ordinarily only children 
take such problems seriously. He, however – a late developer – continued to pursue such ele-
mentary questions; and, as an adult, naturally, was better equipped to come up with improved 
answers. On another occasion he remarked: “There exists a passion for comprehension, just 
as there exists a passion for music. That passion is rather common in children, but gets lost in 
most people later on. Without this passion, there would be neither mathematics nor natural 
science” (Einstein, 1973, p. 342). And in connection with his own education, in a well- known 
passage, he remarks: 
In this field … [of physics] I  soon learned to scent out that which was able to lead to 
fundamentals and to turn aside from everything else, from the multitude of things which 
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clutter up the mind and divert it from the essential. The hitch in this was, of course, the 
fact that one had to cram all this stuff into one’s mind for the examinations, whether one 
liked it or not. This coercion had such a deterring effect [upon me] that, after I had passed 
the final examination, I found the consideration of any scientific problems distasteful to 
me for an entire year. In justice I must add, moreover, that in Switzerland we had to suffer 
far less under such coercion, which smothers every truly scientific impulse, than is the 
case in many another locality. There were altogether only two examinations; aside from 
these, one could just about do as one pleased. This was especially the case if one had a 
friend, as did I, who attended the lectures regularly and who worked over their content 
conscientiously. This gave one freedom in the choice of pursuits until a few months before 
the examination, a freedom which I enjoyed to a great extent having gladly taken into the 
bargain the bad conscience connected with it as by far the lesser evil. It is, in fact, nothing 
short of a miracle that the modern methods of instruction have not yet entirely strangled 
the holy curiosity of inquiry; for this delicate little plant, aside from stimulation, stands 
mainly in need of freedom; without this it goes to wrack and ruin without fail. It is a very 
grave mistake to think that the enjoyment of seeing and searching can be promoted by 
means of coercion and a sense of duty. (Einstein, “Autobiographical Notes”, in Schilpp, 
1969, p. 17).
 15. See Maxwell (2014c, ch. 1) for a suggestion as to how critical fundamentalist education might 
be conducted for five- to ninety- five– year- olds.
 16. Kuhn, for example, argues that the instigation of the specialized, autonomous puzzle solving 
of the specialist is essential for scientific progress (see Kuhn, 1970a, pp. 21, 24, 37, and 64– 5).
 17. As we shall see below, there is a further vital point of difference. Universalism asserts that 
inquiry can only be really intellectually rigorous if it is recognized that inquiry (thought, prob-
lem solving), at the most fundamental level, goes on in life as an integral part of our personal 
and social lives, actively helping us to discover and achieve what is of most value in life, poten-
tially and actually, as we live.
 18. A further clarification, to be elaborated below. Universalism conceives of intellectual prog-
ress, fundamentally, in personal and social terms, in terms of progress in our achievement of 
what is of value in life, in terms of the progress in our personal and social thinking actively 
associated with and guiding our endeavours to achieve what is of value, on a personal and 
worldwide basis.
 19. A remark about the first and last of these “fundamentalists”. Einstein once said: “I want to know 
how God created this world. I’m not interested in this- or- that phenomenon, the spectrum of 
this- or- that element. I want to know His thoughts, the rest are details” (see Salaman, 1979, 
p. 22). In The Seventh Enemy: The Human Factor in the Global Crisis, R. Higgins (1978) outlines 
with devastating clarity and force six basic threats to the future of civilization – six fundamen-
tal worldwide problems which we must somehow resolve on a worldwide basis if mankind 
is to survive. His “seventh enemy” is our human incapacity to acknowledge and respond to 
these fundamental problems, on both individual and social, political or institutional, levels. 
Thus, on a worldwide basis, life on earth is at present almost lunatically irrational in the most 
elementary fashion (since it fails to put into practice the two most elementary rules of rational 
problem solving).
 20. It must be emphasized that this modern meaning of the phrase, introduced by Price, is a typical 
specialist perversion of the original fundamentalist meaning intended, for example, by Robert 
Boyle in the seventeenth century when he writes: 
The “Invisible College” consists of persons that endeavour to put narrow- mindedness 
out of countenance by the practice of so extensive a charity that it reaches unto every 
thing called man, and nothing less than an universal good- will can content it. And indeed 
they are so apprehensive of the want of good employment that they take the whole 
body of mankind for their care. But … there is not enough of them. (Quoted in Werskey, 
1978, p. 13)
 21. It is noteworthy, for example, that Higgins (1978) is obliged to break all conventional academic 
boundaries in order to articulate our basic global problems. It is also noteworthy that these 
problems discussed by Higgins and others do not receive sustained, influential discussion as an 
integral part of the orthodox scientific, academic enterprise. In recent years this may, however, 
have changed a bit; the growing menace of climate change has led some experts to speak out 
about the problem in non- specialist terms. There is, in recent times, more discussion of global 
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problems in universities – as I shall indicate below. Some determined academics do manage to 
struggle against the stifling constraints of specialism.
 22. I refer here, of course, to the dominant schools of philosophy in Britain and the USA since 
the war, ordinary- language philosophy, conceptual analysis, logical empiricism and descrip-
tive metaphysics, as practised by, for example, Gilbert Ryle, J. L. Austin, A. J. Ayer, Elizabeth 
Anscombe, Geoffrey Warnock, R.  M. Hare, Anthony Kenny, P.  F. Strawson, Rudolf Carnap, 
Carl Hempel, W.V.O. Quine, Donald Davidson, and many others. Somewhat more recently 
there have been indications of some improvement in this tradition. J.J.C. Smart (1963), Mary 
Midgley (1979), Thomas Nagel (1986), Daniel Dennett (1993) and David Chalmers (1996) 
have all produced work that can be regarded as making valuable contributions to the fun-
damental problem “How do we fit into the world and how have we come to be?” In contrast 
to this tradition, there is so- called Continental philosophy:  idealism, phenomenology, exis-
tentialism, Marxism, the Frankfurt School, structuralism, post- structuralism, postmodernism, 
and the work of G.W.F. Hegel, Arthur Schopenhauer, Søren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean- Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau- Ponty, Michel 
Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and many others. Some of this work can be held to put problems 
of living at the heart of thought, but as a body of work it is deeply flawed by anti- scientific and 
anti- rationalist attitudes, an allegiance to idealism, and a readiness to aspire to profundity by 
means of bombastic obscurity. These prevalent flaws disqualify this body of work from consti-
tuting serious discussion of fundamental problems within the context of universalism. See, 
however, Bakewell (2016) for a delightful account of the lives and work of the existentialists. 
Karl Popper, as I have already indicated, has been highly critical of both philosophical tradi-
tions. He has argued that real philosophical problems have their roots outside philosophy, in 
science, politics, art, social life, and in his work he tackles fundamental problems with exem-
plary clarity and intellectual integrity (especially in Popper, 1959, 1961, 1963 and 1966a). 
Popper has also vehemently criticized specialization in such remarks as, “Specialization may 
be a great temptation for the scientist. For the philosopher it is the mortal sin” (Popper, 1963, 
p. 136); and “If the many, the specialists, gain the day, it will be the end of science as we know 
it – of great science. It will be a spiritual catastrophe comparable in its consequences to nuclear 
armament” (Popper, 1994, p. 72). So vehement was Popper’s condemnation of specialization 
that he failed to see its value, indeed its necessity – and failed to see how the damaging irra-
tionality of specialism can be overcome by implementing rule (d) of the four rules of rational 
problem solving I formulated in section 9.2. For a more detailed criticism of academic philoso-
phy, on the grounds that it fails to keep alive rational tackling of fundamental problems – and 
fails to solve two key philosophical problems as a result – see Maxwell (2017b, chs. 3 and 4).
 23. Something like this account is presupposed, or propounded, by G. Ryle (1967), Ayer (1969, 
ch. 1, pp. 1– 18) and Whiteley (1955, pp. 5– 6).
 24. An amusing indication of this is the way in which philosophers tend to acknowledge, apolo-
getically or critically, that philosophy still concerns itself with the problems discussed by, for 
example, Plato, whereas other disciplines successfully solve initial problems and move on to 
new problems, thus making progress. The failure of philosophy to progress in this way is only 
problematic if philosophy is conceived in specialist terms. From the standpoint of the funda-
mentalist or Enlightenment conception of philosophy, it is of course precisely the basic task 
of philosophy to keep alive, throughout the whole of intellectual inquiry, and throughout our 
culture and social life, a sustained concern with our four fundamental problems.
 25. Since the first version of this chapter was published, in 1980, some academics have become 
concerned that members of the public should contribute to discussion concerning science pol-
icy options. Thus, in the UK, the Royal Society produced a report on the future of nanotech-
nology, the result of a collaboration of scientists and non- scientists. The Economic and Social 
Research Council has funded a research programme, Science in Society, which has explored 
issues having to do with public engagement with science. There is a rather general recognition 
that communication between science and the public should go in both directions. It is not 
good enough for scientists merely to inform the public about science. These developments do 
not, however, amount to academia as a whole engaging with the social world in a two- way 
discussion about how our problems of living are to be tackled in increasingly cooperatively 
rational ways.
 26. It is this feature of universalism which led me to suggest the view should really be called 
“specio- universalism” (see note 1).
 27. Failure to put universalism into practice has, as a consequence, that sustained discussion of 
our fundamental global problems does not take place in a way that can influence the priorities 
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of scientific research. As a result, research devoted to such matters as halting global warming, 
or alleviating global poverty, and the diseases of the global poor, is neglected, in favour of 
research funded by, and devoted to the interests of, the military, government, industry and 
commerce.
 28. For a more detailed and sophisticated advocacy of this critical fundamentalist conception of 
science, see Chapters 2 and 5, and Maxwell (1974; 1976a; 1977a; 1979; 1984a; 1998; 2004a; 
and 2007, especially ch. 14). For a critical assessment, see Kneller (1978, pp.  36– 8, 80– 7, 
90– 9); Muller (2008) and my reply (Maxwell, 2009b); McHenry (2009a); and Vicente (2010), 
Pandit (2010) and my reply (Maxwell, 2010b). For more recent expositions see Maxwell 
(2013, 2017a, 2017b).
 29. Contrast Russell’s uncritical or inflexible “postulational” approach with the critical, flexible 
postulationism of aim- oriented empiricism, which stresses that science, in order to be ratio-
nal, must continuously articulate, develop and criticize metaphysical blueprints for science 
as an integral part of scientific inquiry, and in the light of ostensible scientific progress, thus 
enabling us to improve our aims and methods as our scientific knowledge and understanding 
of the world improves.
 30. See also Popper (1983, section 23; 1982b, sections 20– 8).
 31. See note 28.
 32. This important point can be established quite simply as follows. Science is centrally concerned 
to solve the problem “What kind of world is this?” If science is to tackle this problem ratio-
nally, priority needs to be given to proposing and critically assessing possible solutions – thus 
developing a tradition of rational cosmology like that represented, for example, by Popper 
in his “Back to the Presocratics” (1963, ch. 5). This leads, however, to the development of a 
number of rival imprecise possible solutions – rival cosmologies – with no indication as to how 
we are to make these vague ideas precise and choose between them. In order to proceed, we 
need to put into practice the third and fourth rules of rational problem solving: each vague 
solution needs to generate preliminary, subordinate, specialized problem solving. If one such 
approach begins to achieve apparent spectacular specialized success, then this entitles us to 
take this general approach especially seriously. Thus the spectacular specialized successes of 
Kepler and Galileo entitle us to take especially seriously their common vague cosmological 
presupposition: “the book of Nature is written in the language of [simple] mathematics.” If 
science is to proceed rationally, however, it is essential that there continues to be an interplay 
between our best ideas as to how the overall problem is to be solved, and our best solutions to 
subordinate problems. In particular, our assessment of possible solutions to subordinate prob-
lems – testable scientific laws and theories – must not be dissociated from our assessment of 
untestable, metaphysical ideas as to how the overall problem is to be solved. Popper, however, 
violates this elementary, general requirement for rationality, in insisting that assessment of sci-
entific laws and theories is dissociated from assessment of metaphysical ideas. Furthermore, it 
is precisely this irrational insistence which creates, for Popper, the insoluble problem of induc-
tion. The impossibility of assessing scientific laws and theories solely with respect to empirical 
success is a special case of the general irrationality of attempting to assess possible solutions to 
subordinate problems independently of vague ideas about how to solve the overall problem. 
The problem of induction, in short, is a product of specialism, the insolubility of the problem, 
as traditionally conceived, an indication of the irrationality of specialism as far as science is 
concerned.
 33. Ironically enough, Popper does come close to acknowledging the Russellian point that the 
methods of science make implicit metaphysical presuppositions about the nature of the world 
(see Popper, 1959. pp. 252– 4), despite explicit disavowals elsewhere (see Popper, 1963, p. 54). 
He fails, however, to emphasize that critical rationalism requires that we explicitly articulate 
these metaphysical presuppositions, so that they may be criticized, and thus, we may hope, 
improved, as an integral part of science, so that the methods of science may be improved with 
our improving knowledge. Just this way of doing science was instigated by Einstein in devel-
oping the special and general theories of relativity, as we saw in Chapter 3. The invariance and 
symmetry principles of modern physics – which can be interpreted as either methodological 
or metaphysical principles – are a development of Einstein’s profound innovation. However, 
modern physics, and modern science quite generally, fail to put into practice, explicitly and 
fully, Einstein’s way of doing science, in that they fail to articulate and criticize actual and 
possible aims and methods – or philosophies of science – as an integral part of science itself. 
The institutional reorganization that this requires – namely philosophy of science pursued as 
an integral part of science itself – has not been carried out. This is of course in part due to the 
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fact that the scientific community accepts Popper’s falsificationist demarcation criterion for 
dividing off science from non- science. Views about what ought to be the aims and methods of 
science – philosophies of science – not being themselves testable theories in any straightfor-
ward sense, have no place in science itself according to traditional, and Popperian, empiricism. 
Thus scientific integrity at present demands that discussion of aims and methods be excluded 
from science, instead of demanding that this discussion constitutes an integral part of science 
(as required by aim- oriented empiricism or universalism). At present, by and large, science 
departments and departments of history and philosophy of science do not speak to each other 
(although in recent years a bit of dialogue has been instigated). To this extent Popper, rather 
than Einstein, is institutionalized. This institutionalization of Popperian methodology pre-
vents us from developing a genuinely rational, fundamentalist science.
 34. For Einstein’s advocacy of universalism see, for example, Einstein (1973, part v). See also 
Chapter 3 of the present book.
 35. See note 16.
 36. It should be noted that the basic objection to Kuhn’s prescription for science applies with almost 
equal force to Lakatos’s prescription as outlined in his (1970). Lakatos’s problem is to recon-
cile the dogmatism of Kuhn’s normal science, on the one hand, with the anti- dogmatic, criti-
cal falsificationism of Popper, on the other hand, taking into account especially Feyerabend’s 
important point that in order to test a given theory severely, we need to possess, and even 
develop, alternative theories (see Feyerabend, 1965). Lakatos’s solution is to prescribe for 
science simultaneous competing fragments of Kuhnian normal science – competing research 
programmes – thus doing justice simultaneously to Kuhnian dogmatism and Feyerabendian 
pluralism. Lakatos makes it abundantly clear, however, that ultimately only relative empiri-
cal success ought to decide the fate of research programmes within science. There is thus no 
essential role, within Lakatos’s conception of science, for sustained critical development of our 
best metaphysical answer to the problem “What kind of world is this?”, so that the hard cores 
of research programmes could be assessed in part in terms of this answer. Lakatos advocates a 
kind of competitive specialism. In terms of our obstacle- course analogy, Lakatos sees science 
as a number of competing individuals, with different routes in mind, stumbling blindly from 
A to B.
 37. For a powerful criticism of the idea that the social sciences should be value- neutral, see 
Easlea (1973, pp. 167– 78). Essentially the same point is made by Schumacher (1973), when 
he argues that economic thinking must reflect or presuppose some philosophy of life, some 
view as to what is of value in life. For the point that explicit articulation and criticism of value 
assumptions implicit in the aims of research is actually essential for the whole of science if it is 
to be objective and rational, see Maxwell (1976a, chs, 5 and 7; 1977b; 1984a or 2007; 2004a; 
2014b; 2016b). Values are even implicit, it should be noted, in the aims of a science as appar-
ently remote from ordinary life as pure theoretical physics. The question “What kind of world 
is this?”, may be interpreted in such a fashion that merely developing theories, like quantum 
theory, which predict more and more phenomena more and more accurately constitutes sat-
isfactory progress towards answering the question. Einstein asked for much more from theo-
retical physics: he sought to capture, in a “wildly speculative way” the “thoughts of God”. He 
did not know that the universe has a coherent, unified structure; rather, the mere possibility 
of discovering such a structure seemed to him to be of such supreme value that to abandon the 
search for it seemed to be a profound betrayal of the noblest aspirations of theoretical physics. 
Thus Einstein’s judgement that quantum theory is unsatisfactory, in that it abandons micro- 
realism, was in part based on a value judgement. (For an endorsement of Einstein’s judgement 
on this point see Maxwell, 1976b; 1982; 1988; 1994a; 1998, ch. 7; see also Chapter 8 of the 
present book.)
 38. A number of writers – for example, Koyré (1973), Burtt (1932) and Buchdahl (1969) – have 
advocated a view which might be called “metaphysical presuppositionism”, according to 
which the natural sciences do make substantial metaphysical presuppositions about the world. 
These writers fail, however, to emphasize the crucial point that scientific rationality demands 
sustained, explicit, critical development of such metaphysical presuppositions as an integral 
pan of science itself – the essential tenet of universalism, and aim- oriented empiricism.
 39. See Mannheim (1952); Merton (1970); Mathias (1972); Teich and Young (1973); Hagstrom 
(1965); Bloor (1976); Mulkay (1979); Barnes, Bloor and Henry (1996).
 40. On the one hand there are those who pursue sociology of science and “externalist” history 
of science merely in order to add to specialist knowledge within sociology and history. These 
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writers tend to decry the significance of epistemology and the study of scientific method. 
(A notable example of this is to be found in Bloor, 1976.) From the standpoint of the fun-
damentalist viewpoint defended in section 9.7, this approach entirely misses the point. 
For, according to the view advocated below, the basic task of the social sciences is to help 
us develop more rational institutions and ways of life, a more rational world. A central task 
of the social sciences, in other words, is to propose and critically assess possible institu-
tional and social changes designed to help people all the better to discover and achieve what 
is of value in life – that is, to help people solve rationally the problems of living which they 
encounter in seeking to achieve that which is of value in life. The social sciences, on this 
view, ought thus fundamentally to be institutional or social epistemology or methodology. 
What is being attempted in this chapter in connection with one institution – the scientific, 
academic enterprise – should be attempted quite generally in connection with institutions 
associated with politics, the law, the media, commerce, industry and international relations. 
Far from the sociology of science taking over from the philosophy of science, on the contrary, 
sociology – and the social sciences quite generally – need to become the philosophy and meth-
odology of institutional, social pursuits and enterprises. Granted that our concern is to develop 
better solutions to problems (3) and (4), a central task of the social sciences and humanities 
ought to be to help us develop fundamentalist, or aim- oriented rationalistic, institutions quite 
generally – including aim- oriented rationalistic academic institutions (see Maxwell, 1976a, 
chs. 8 and 9; 1984a or 2007, chs. 5– 8; 2004a, chs. 3 and 4; 2014b).
  On the other hand, however, there are those Marxist- inclined writers who wish to commit 
science to socialist or Marxist objectives and who seek to “radicalize” science (see, for example, 
Easlea, 1973; Rose and Rose, 1976). These writers see social and cultural reality in terms of 
competing class interests: the dominant class ensuring that even culture and science serve its 
own class interests, this situation being maintained, in part, by means of the institutionalized 
lie that science is an objective, value- neutral search for truth, serving no special class interests. 
There is clearly some truth in this allegation. The moment we view scientific and technological 
research on a worldwide basis, it becomes clear that very little such research is devoted to 
serving the interests of the millions upon millions of desperately poor people in the developing 
world. In so far as such research does serve social interests, it is the interests of those who live 
in industrially advanced, relatively wealthy countries which are served  – even to the point 
of increasing the misery of the underprivileged, as in the case, perhaps, of the tin miners of 
Bolivia. The fundamental defect of this Marxist conception of intellectual inquiry, however, 
is that it commits intellectual inquiry to socialist or Marxist social theory and objectives, and 
thus prevents intellectual inquiry from itself scrutinizing these social, political and evaluative 
presuppositions, even to the point of improving on them.
  We might view the matter as follows. (1)  Standard empiricists, like Hempel and Popper, 
reject the existence of permanent metaphysical presuppositions inherent in science. (Even 
Kuhn and Lakatos only allow for temporary metaphysical presuppositions to be assessed ulti-
mately in terms of the empirical success of the specialist research they support; thus Kuhn and 
Lakatos ultimately also advocate standard empiricism.) This is dishonest, as the insolubility of 
the problem of induction indicates. (2) Metaphysical presuppositionists, like Russell, Koyré, 
Burtt and Buchdahl, do acknowledge the existence of long- term, comprehensive metaphysical 
presuppositions implicit in science. This is more honest. These writers fail, however, to empha-
size the crucial importance of articulating and critically developing such presuppositions as an 
integral part of science. In addition, these writers fail to acknowledge the existence of value- 
presuppositions implicit in science. This is dishonest. (3) Easlea, Schumacher and others do 
acknowledge the existence of such value- presuppositions implicit in science. This is more 
honest still. These writers fail, however, to emphasize the crucial importance of articulating 
and critically developing such presuppositions as an integral part of intellectual inquiry – thus 
failing to advocate a rational, critical fundamentalist version of the philosophy of wisdom. In 
addition, merely to acknowledge that value- presuppositions are implicit in intellectual inquiry 
is to fail to acknowledge that intellectual inquiry is itself a part of personal, social life, a kind 
of personal, social action, pursued in order to realize personal, social goals. This is dishonest. 
(4) Radical Marxists go further, in that they do conceive of, and pursue, intellectual inquiry 
as an aspect of personal, social action, designed to help achieve personal, social objectives. 
According to these writers, in capitalist societies intellectual inquiry is devoted primarily to 
helping to attain the objectives of capitalism: in their intellectual work these writers seek to act 
in such a way as to help overthrow capitalism, thus creating a socialist society and a socialist 
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intellectual inquiry devoted to helping to realize socialist goals. In so far as these writers see 
and pursue intellectual inquiry as an aspect of life, social reality, social action, their vision 
and practice is even more honest still. These writers fail, however, to acknowledge the cru-
cial importance of articulating and critically developing basic socialist presuppositions and 
objectives. They fail to confront obvious major problems inherent in the idea of a socialist soci-
ety – such as the problem of centralized, bureaucratic power. This is dangerously dishonest. 
In particular, as a result of this failing, these writers fail to emphasize the fundamental impor-
tance of seeking to develop ways of life, institutions, societies, which progressively develop 
the aims and methods of personal, institutional and social life – thus enhancing our capacity 
to achieve that which is of value in life. These writers presuppose answers to problems (3) and 
(4), instead of seeking to develop a fundamentalist, rational society which enables us to dis-
cover improved answers to these problems, as we live.
  In short, despite their diversity, the four positions just outlined have one crucial failing 
in common: they all fail to emphasize that rational action involves quite essentially seeking 
to improve our aims and methods as we act – the key tenet of aim- oriented rationality (see 
Maxwell, 1976a, 1984a or 2007, 2004a, 2014b).
 41. For a fascinating account of such a hunting and gathering tribal life, see Turnbull (1976).
 42. Higgins writes (1978, pp. 21– 45) especially clearly and convincingly on this point, in part from 
personal experience.
 43. A humane, cooperative, mutually understanding, pluralistic society presupposes and is, in 
a sense, presupposed by, universalism. If two people, two societies or two cultures, giving 
different answers to our four fundamental problems, are to act humanely and cooperatively 
together, there must be mutual understanding; this requires that each is able to imagine, at 
least as a possibility, that the other’s answers are correct (or at least an improvement, in certain 
respects, over his own). This in turn requires that each recognizes the genuineness of the four 
fundamental problems. If each is to learn from the other, then each must acknowledge the 
genuineness of the four fundamental problems. On the other hand, to recognize that these 
problems are genuine is to imagine at least the possibility of answers different from one’s own 
being given – which is to imagine a pluralistic society, at least as a possibility.
  Only universalism can do justice to the Socratic and Kantian idea that Reason forms a basis 
for the unity of mankind.
 44. “Reason, like language, can be said to be a product of social life” (Popper, 1966a, vol. 2, 
p.  225). See also the discussion of the claim that science is necessarily social in character, 
“Robinson Crusoe science”, however successful, being necessarily only “revealed science” in 
that it must lack objectivity, pluralistic criticism (ibid., pp.  216– 20). Unfortunately, Popper 
in his later work fails lamentably to develop these anticipations of the point stressed in this 
chapter (see, for example, note 40), that reason, epistemology, thought, intellectual inquiry, 
all need to be conceived of, and developed, as personal and social in character, in the world, a 
part of life.
  If we adopt the view advocated in section 9.7 that the aim of intellectual inquiry is to help 
us achieve wisdom, life of value, then the fundamental aim of intellectual inquiry becomes a 
personal, social aim, and the problems of intellectual inquiry become, fundamentally, personal, 
social problems of living. Our central task, in pursuing intellectual inquiry, becomes to help 
develop more rational, wiser ways of living, institutions, social orders. The split between per-
sonal, social aims and intellectual aims – the split between personal, social action and thought 
– disappears. Popper, however, holds that the basic aim of intellectual inquiry is to develop 
impersonal, objective knowledge. This leads him to develop his “world 3” theory of the intellec-
tual domain. As a result, and quite disastrously, the fundamental personal and social problems 
of intellectual inquiry – problems we encounter in helping to develop life of value, a wiser world 
– are transformed into the pseudo metaphysical- neurological problems of how “world 3” can 
interact with the mind and the brain (see Popper, 1972; Popper and Eccles, 1977).
  Universalism, in sharp disagreement with Popper, recognizes just one world. Within uni-
versalism, Popper’s conceptually incoherent psycho- neurological thesis that world 3 interacts 
with world 1 via world 2, can be replaced by the kind of conceptually coherent psycho- neu-
rological postulate indicated in note 11, or by a version of this postulate which asserts that 
aim- oriented rationalism is programmed into the neurological structure of our brains – or at 
least needs to be so “programmed” if we are to be able to achieve what is of value in life. (For 
an exposition of aim- oriented rationalism, see the Prologue and Chapter 10. See also Maxwell, 
1976a; 1984a or 2007; 2000a; 2001a, ch. 9; 2004a, chs. 3 and 4; 2010a, chs. 6 and 9; 2014b; 
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2016b; 2017a, ch. 14; 2017b, ch. 8.) There is only one world; it is in this world that universal-
ism and aim- oriented rationalism need to flourish. In order to help achieve this, it is essential 
that we see critical fundamentalist intellectual standards, aim- oriented rationality, as some-
thing embedded, actually and potentially, in this world. It is essentially this insight that we 
need to see implicit in much of Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies (1966a) in order 
to appreciate the real value of that work, and in order to make sense of Popper’s wonderful 
suggestion that we should see intellectual evolution as a development of biological evolution. 
In the circumstances it is somewhat tragic that Popper should have gone on, with the devel-
opment of his three- world view, to reject explicitly the insight that reason needs to be seen as 
materially and socially embodied in this one world.
 45. According to Popper, we must learn to live with the intense emotional strain of civilization, 
as the price that must be paid for reason, for the open society, for civilization. Any attempt 
to introduce social and cultural changes which alleviate this strain must be fiercely resisted, 
as such changes must inevitably lead to totalitarianism. However, as indicated in section 9.2, 
this is because Popper fails to conceive of the possibility of universalism, and is led as a result 
to defend a seriously irrational and undesirable conception of rational inquiry and civiliza-
tion. See Maxwell (1984a, pp. 189– 99, or 2007, pp. 213– 22) for a related criticism of Popper’s 
social and political rationalist philosophy.
  For purposes of clarification, I should indicate four further main differences between the 
viewpoint being advocated in this chapter, and views advocated or presupposed in Popper’s 
writings. The chief difference, unquestionably, is simply this. I advocate that the basic aim of 
rational inquiry is to enhance wisdom. Here I part company not only with Popper, but with 
the whole Western tradition, in that this tradition gives to rational inquiry the basic aim of 
enhancing knowledge (human welfare, enlightenment and progress being only secondary and 
uncertain by- products of the basic and prior achievement of knowledge). As a result of giving 
priority to wisdom – to our living, actual capacity to discover and achieve what is of value in 
life – I am led to locate rational inquiry, at the most fundamental level, within and amidst our 
lives, personal and interpersonal or social. This leads me to stress the fundamental impor-
tance of aim- oriented rationalism designed to help us improve our aims, and thus our lives, 
as we live (aim- oriented empiricism being simply a special case of aim- oriented rationalism, 
applicable to science). This is in marked contrast to Popper’s conception of reason, which he 
has called critical rationalism (falsificationism being simply, for Popper, a special case of crit-
ical rationalism, applicable to science). Since for me rational inquiry has, as its basic task, to 
help us achieve what is of value in life, I hold that all intellectual values need ultimately to be 
founded in human value – especially in the supreme value of each individual person, and the 
good things that can go on between people once this is recognized – rigorous, objective inquiry 
being, as though by definition, a universal tool perfectly designed to help us all maximally 
to achieve, or grow, life of value. I thus disagree absolutely with Popper’s thesis – in effect a 
standard component of the philosophy of knowledge – that purely scientific values should be 
distinguished as sharply as possible from human or extra- scientific values. (This is Popper’s 
sixteenth thesis in his “Reason or Revolution” [1976b, pp. 96– 8].) The purpose of the pres-
ent essay is to argue that the rationality, the intellectual rigour, the objectivity, of inquiry is 
essentially bound up with the capacity of inquiry to help us resolve those problems of living 
we need to resolve in order to achieve what is of value in life. That which is of value in life is 
primary: intellectual value is a reflection of – or is subservient to – primary value in life. Ideas – 
including the idea of this chapter – are spectacles intended to help us to see clearly what is 
of value in existence, actually and potentially; they are forks and spades designed to help us 
to cultivate what is of value in our lives, in reality. Like spectacles, ideas are to be assessed 
in terms of whether they serve to clarify or blur our vision; like forks and spades, ideas are 
to be assessed in terms of their use, their success in practice. The idea that intellectual value 
is dissociated from value in life, in the world, quite fundamentally misconceives the proper 
value and use of ideas: pushed to the extreme, this becomes Plato’s doctrine of the forms. 
(The Popperian, Western doctrine of the autonomy of intellectual value devolves, in fact, from 
Plato’s doctrine.) The idea that intellectual value needs to be conceived of as dissociated from 
value in the world – and not as integral to and contributing to value in the world – receives 
support no doubt from the desire of many intellectuals to find in intellectual work some kind 
of escape from the world, a quiet and transparent refuge. Given Popper’s defence of the ortho-
dox doctrine concerning the autonomy of purely scientific or intellectual value, it is not at all 
surprising that he should call Hume’s thesis that “Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave 
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of the passions” a “horrifying doctrine” (Popper, 1977, p. 132). An upholder of aim- oriented 
rationalism and the philosophy of wisdom would wish to make only minor adjustments to 
Hume’s thesis. Either reason should be held to be the slave of that most profound passion of 
ours of all to participate in life of value; or reason ought perhaps to be called the “good servant” 
or “enlightened tutor” of the passions – reason itself the outcome of our cooperative, balanc-
ing, or resolving, of our passion for a whole, authentic life of value. As a result of conceiving of 
inquiry and reason as being an essential, active component of human life, more or less realized 
in practice in our personal and social actions, I am led to avoid the conceptual incoherence of 
Popper’s three- world view, as indicated in notes 11 and 44, and in this note above. In general, 
the viewpoint that I wish to advocate is much closer to Einstein’s than to Popper’s, taking into 
account especially the emphasis that Einstein came to place in his later life on the fundamental 
importance of developing a living ethical culture, and a kind of education designed to help us 
acquire and participate in such a culture: 
It is not enough to teach a man a speciality. Through it he may become a kind of useful 
machine but not a harmoniously developed personality. It is essential that the student 
acquire an understanding of and a lively feeling for values. He must acquire a vivid sense 
of the beautiful and of the morally good. Otherwise he – with his specialized knowledge – 
more closely resembles a well- trained dog than a harmoniously developed person. He 
must learn to understand the motives of human beings, their illusions, and their suffer-
ings in order to acquire a proper relationship to individual fellow- men and to the commu-
nity. (Einstein, “Education for Independent Thought”, in Einstein, 1973, p. 66)
 46. See Isaac Bashevis Singer (1975a, 1975b, 1975c, 1977a, 1977b, 1977c).
 47. It is doubtless commitment to this kind of oracular conception of reason which leads both 
Kuhn and Feyerabend, in their rather different ways, to characterize science as irrational. The 
same mistake is implicit in almost all forms of relativism.
 48. In this chapter I am of course arguing that even though the goal is difficult to attain, nevertheless 
it is a matter of supreme importance that we seek to build universalism, rather than specialism, 
into the institutional structure of the scientific, academic enterprise, and education. Indeed what 
I am proposing goes much further than this. We need to build universalism, and aim- oriented 
rationalism, into our whole way of life, into society as a whole, into the human world. The basic 
aim of intellectual inquiry ought to be to devote reason to the enhancement of wisdom. This 
programme can scarcely begin to be put into practice, however, as long as specialism rather than 
universalism is built into the institutional structure of the scientific, academic enterprise.
 49. See Gray (1972) for the suggestion that the aim of education should be the achievement of 
wisdom in life. Gray fails to point out, however, that intellectual inquiry is at present pro-
foundly irrational and defective when judged from the standpoint of having as its basic aim to 
help us achieve wisdom.
 50. For a detailed exposition and critical assessment of the two contrasting philosophies of inquiry 
of the philosophy of knowledge and the philosophy of wisdom, see Maxwell (1984a or 2007). 
I have subsequently come to call these two contrasting philosophies of scientific and academic 
inquiry “knowledge- inquiry” and “wisdom- inquiry”. In Maxwell (1984a or 2007) I expound in 
detail the two views, and argue that knowledge- inquiry prevails in academia, despite its dam-
aging irrationality, and despite the clearly articulated, more rigorous and humanly valuable 
alternative of wisdom- inquiry. This situation has not changed much since 1984, or 2007. Both 
knowledge- inquiry and wisdom- inquiry can be taken to hold that the basic aim of inquiry is to 
help promote human welfare by means of research and education. Knowledge- inquiry holds 
that this is to be done by, in the first instance, the acquisition of knowledge. First, knowledge 
is to be acquired; once acquired, it can be applied to help solve social problems. The pursuit 
of knowledge must be decisively shielded from potentially corrupting influences of the social 
world, otherwise authentic, objective factual knowledge will degenerate into mere propa-
ganda and dogma, and will cease to be of human value. Wisdom- inquiry holds that the four 
elementary rules of rational problem solving of section 9.2 need to be put into practice. Priority 
needs to be given to the tasks of (a) articulating, and improving the articulation of, problems of 
living, and (b) proposing and critically assessing possible solutions, possible actions, policies, 
political programmes, ways of living, philosophies of life. Problems of knowledge are subor-
dinate to problems of living. Wisdom- inquiry puts specio- universalism into practice, whereas 
knowledge- inquiry is a version of specialism (in that it dissociates problems of knowledge from 
more fundamental problems of living).
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 51. For a much more detailed depiction of the damaging irrationality of the philosophy of knowl-
edge – or knowledge- inquiry as I have come to call it – see Maxwell (1984a, or 2007, chs. 2 
and 3).
 52. Only if intellectual priority is given to the task of proposing and criticizing possible and actual 
personal, social actions, policies, aims and methods, institutional enterprises, ideologies  – 
problems of knowledge and technology being tackled as subordinate to our fundamental 
personal, social problems of living – can intellectual inquiry overcome these defects. For an 
elaboration of this point, see Maxwell (1984a or 2007; 2004a; 2014b; 2016b).
 53. For a development of this point see my What’s Wrong With Science? (Maxwell, 1976a), the 
subtitle of which reads, “Towards a People’s Rational Science of Delight and Compassion”. See 
too Maxwell (1984a or 2007).
 54. Provocations of or contributions to the “science wars” include Barnes (1974); Barnes, Bloor 
and Henry (1996); Bloor (1976); Brown (2001); Feyerabend (1978 and 1987); Gross and 
Levitt (1994); Gross, Levitt and Lewis (1996); Harding (1986); Koertge (1998); Latour 
(1987); Pickering (1984); Segerstrale (2000); Shapin (1994); Sokal (2008); Sokal and 
Bricmont (1998).
 55. It is highly significant that “philosophy of science” exists as a discipline, but “philosophy of 
inquiry” does not. What kind of inquiry can best help us create a good world? – to quote the 
title of one of my papers (Maxwell, 1992a) – is a question of fundamental significance for the 
future of humanity that is ignored by philosophers, and ignored by academics more generally. 
Only bureaucrats, business corporations and politicians think about the overall aims of aca-
demic inquiry; we should not be surprised that the level of this thought and decision- making 
does not amount to much when judged from the standpoint of its intellectual and humanitar-
ian value – its value for the long- term interests of humanity.
 56. For more on this theme, see Maxwell (2015b). For Popper’s views on specialization, see 
Maxwell (2016a).
 57. See Maxwell (1976a, 1984a, 1998, 2004a, 2010a, 2014b, 2014c, 2016b). See, too, the flood 
of my articles on this issue, available online at http:// discovery.ucl.ac.uk/ view/ people/ 
ANMAX22.date.html and https:// philpapers.org/ profile/ 17092
 58. See www.ucl.ac.uk/ research/ wisdom- agenda
 59. For further details, see Maxwell (2014b, ch. 4).
 60. See note 25.
Chapter 10
 1. See also Popper (1963, pp. 193– 200; 1972, pp. 119 and 243; 1976a, pp. 115– 6).
 2. This seems to me to be a reasonable brief characterization of the basic idea of the French 
Enlightenment. It seems to me to be implicit in much that the philosophes did and said. 
I have not, however, found any philosophe explicitly asserting this to be the basic idea of the 
Enlightenment. And it was, I admit, only after I had developed my own version of the basic 
Enlightenment idea, partly as a result of learning from and criticizing Popper, that I came to 
the conclusion – in hunting for predecessors – that the basic idea could be traced back to the 
Enlightenment.
 3. Three magnificent works on the Enlightenment are Peter Gay, The Enlightenment:  An 
Interpretation (1973); Jonathan Israel, Democratic Enlightenment (2011); and P. N. Furbank, 
Diderot: A Critical Biography (1993).
 4. It may be objected that it is not science that is the cause of our global problems but rather the 
things that we do, made possible by science and technology. This is obviously correct. But 
it is also correct to say that scientific and technological progress is the cause. The meaning 
of “cause” is ambiguous. By “the cause” of event E we may mean something like “the most 
obvious observable events preceding E that figure in the common- sense explanation for the 
occurrence of E”. In this sense, human actions (made possible by science) are the cause of such 
things as people being killed in war or destruction of tropical rainforests. On the other hand, 
by the “cause” of E we may mean “that prior change in the environment of E which led to the 
occurrence of E, and without which E would not have occurred”. If we put the twentieth cen-
tury into the context of human history, then it is entirely correct to say that, in this sense, scien-
tific and technological progress is the cause of distinctively twentieth- century disasters: what 
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has changed, what is new, is scientific knowledge, not human nature. Yet again, from the 
standpoint of theoretical physics, “the cause” of E might be interpreted to mean something like 
“the physical state of affairs prior to E, throughout a sufficiently large spatial region surround-
ing the place where E occurs”. In this third sense, the sun continuing to shine is as much a part 
of the cause of war and pollution as human action or human science and technology.
 5. See Hayek (1979) and Fargaus (1993, introduction).
 6. For accounts of Romantic opposition to the Enlightenment, see Berlin (1980, 1999)  and 
Gascardi (1999).
 7. Elsewhere I have argued for this thesis in much greater detail (see Maxwell, 1984a, or 2007; 
see also Maxwell, 2004a, 2014b, 2016b).
 8. Significant, in this connection, is Popper’s detection of an authoritarian streak in even appar-
ently anti- authoritarian traditional conceptions of empiricism and reason upheld by, for exam-
ple, Bacon and Descartes: see Popper (1963, introduction).
 9. For a novelist’s fantasy of such a “rational” society, see Zamyatin (1972).
 10. This point is especially emphasized and further developed by Feyerabend (1965). Popper, too, 
emphasizes that, in order to make sense of the idea of severe testing, we need to appeal to 
crucial experiments (see, for example, Popper, 1963, p. 112).
 11. See, for example, Popper (1959, preface to the English edition; 1963, chs. 8 and 10).
 12. Elsewhere I  have spelled out in more detail than I  am able to do here why this revolution 
is needed, and what it would amount to:  see Maxwell (1984a or 2007). See also Maxwell 
(1976a, ch. 3; 1991; 1992a; 1997b; 2000a; 2001, ch. 9; 2004a; 2014b; 2016b).
 13. For a somewhat more detailed discussion of rational problem solving see Maxwell (1984a, 
pp. 67– 75, or 2007, pp. 80– 8).
 14. Can problem- solving rationality be regarded as a generalization of Popper’s falsificationist 
conception of scientific method? In Popper (1959, pp.  276– 8) there is a discussion of the 
“ ‘inductive’ direction” of the growth of science: science proceeds by putting forward laws and 
theories of ever greater empirical content. This could be regarded as a case of putting rule 
3 into practice: science proceeds by, initially, tackling highly specialized, restricted problems 
and moves towards tackling problems that are increasingly general and fundamental in char-
acter. But rule 2 cannot be put into practice in science, in the context of “justification”, since 
this would involve considering metaphysical theses as a part of scientific knowledge (as Popper 
himself in effect notes), which goes against Popper’s demarcation criterion. This point comes 
up again in section 10.5.
 15. These rules are not sufficient for rationality, in part because of a lack of specific detail about 
how to improve aims and methods when aims are problematic, and in part because the list of 
rules is by no means complete (see Maxwell, 1984a, pp. 69– 75, or 2007, pp. 82– 8). A very 
important additional rule is: 5.  In seeking to solve a problem, P*, search for an analogous, 
already solved problem, P; if such a problem is found, modify the solution, S, appropriately, 
taking the similarities and differences between P and P* into account, so that S becomes S*, 
and consider this as a candidate solution to P*.
 16. As I am using the term, a conflict is only resolved “cooperatively” if it is resolved “justly”.
 17. Social inquiry needs, of course, to tackle problems of knowledge of the social world subordi-
nate to the tackling of social problems of living, in accordance with rule 3.
 18. “Realize” is intentionally ambiguous in that it here means both “to apprehend” and “to make 
real” – both aspects of inquiry being included, inquiry pursued for its own sake, and for the 
sake of other, practical ends.
 19. For a more detailed discussion of the nature, significance and intellectually fundamental char-
acter of “personalistic” understanding, and its role in “wisdom- inquiry”, see Maxwell (1984a, 
pp. 172– 89 and 264– 75, or 2007, pp. 196– - 213 and 285– 96; 2001a, chs. 5– 7).
 20. Popper holds that the methods of the natural and social sciences “are fundamentally the 
same … The methods always consist in offering deductive causal explanations, and testing 
them (by way of predictions)” (Popper, 1961, p. 131). Popper does not seem to have appreci-
ated that this is starkly at odds with his passionate advocacy of the open society, the society of 
diversity, tolerance, reason, democracy and the rule of law. Even if we restrict social inquiry to 
the pursuit of knowledge and understanding of social phenomena, still there are a number of 
reasons for holding that social inquiry must differ fundamentally from natural science. First, 
in pursuing social inquiry we study ourselves; this is not the case when we pursue natural sci-
ence. Results of social inquiry may well directly influence what is studied, namely ourselves; 
this does not happen as far as natural science is concerned (in that our scientific theories do 
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not directly influence nature). Again, causal explanations of natural phenomena enable us 
to manipulate nature so that it comes to serve our ends; analogous knowledge of social phe-
nomena would provide the means to manipulate people. Some manipulation may be neces-
sary, even desirable, in certain contexts, but this should not be the primary way we interact 
with one another. Yet again, and reinforcing this point, the kind of knowledge and under-
standing we should seek to acquire of people differs profoundly from that acquired by natural 
science:  within social inquiry, primacy should be given to what I  have called “personalistic 
understanding” (and others have called empathic understanding or “theory of mind”):  see 
note 19 and associated texts. Our capacity to acquire personalistic understanding of each 
other is absolutely essential for our humanity, for cooperative action, for friendship, and love; 
the open society is inconceivable without it. And yet nothing like personalistic understand-
ing of nature arises within natural science – apart from that element of it that is relevant for 
the understanding of sentient animals. There are no legal or moral constraints on “torturing 
nature to reveal her secrets” in experiments (as seventeenth- century natural philosophers put 
it); there are such constraints when it comes to the human world. Finally, we may well hold, 
with Popper, that the social sciences and the humanities, even when restricted to improving 
knowledge and understanding of the social world, should nevertheless be pursued in such a 
way as to aid the promotion of the open society, for example, in seeking to acquire knowledge 
of human suffering, or in seeking to assess the success and failure of policies and political pro-
grammes. But the moment social science is given this role of acquiring knowledge relevant to 
the promotion of the open society, it becomes distinct from natural science. Nature has nothing 
comparable to our struggle to make progress towards a more open or enlightened world, and 
that suffices to distinguish natural and social science. For all these reasons, social inquiry, even 
when restricted to the pursuit of knowledge, must differ radically from natural science. In this 
section (section 10.4), I have taken this argument much further. The primary task of social 
inquiry and the humanities, I have argued, is to help promote the open society – or, as I have 
put it, the cooperatively rational society. Social inquiry and the humanities should indeed seek 
to improve our knowledge and understanding of aspects of the social world; but their primary 
task is to promote cooperatively rational tackling of problems of living. Social inquiry is pri-
marily social methodology or social philosophy, and only secondarily devoted to the pursuit of 
knowledge.
 21. Given any accepted scientific theory, whether Newtonian theory, general relativity, quantum 
theory or the standard model, endlessly many rival theories can be concocted in each case 
that are even more falsifiable, better corroborated but, if anything, even more seriously ad hoc 
(i.e. lacking in simplicity) than the accepted theory, in the following way. Taking Newtonian 
theory (NT) as an example of an accepted theory, here are two examples of grossly ad hoc rival 
theories. NT*: “Everything occurs as NT asserts, until the first second of the year 2100, when 
an inverse cube law of gravitation will abruptly hold.” NT**: “Everything occurs as NT asserts, 
except for systems consisting of gold spheres, each having a mass of 1,000 tons, interacting 
with each other gravitationally in outer space, in a vacuum, within a spherical region of 10 
miles: for these systems, Newton’s law of gravitation is repulsive, not attractive.” It is easy to 
see that there are infinitely many such rivals to NT, all just as empirically successful (at the 
moment) as NT. The predictions of NT may be represented as points in a multidimensional 
space, each point corresponding to some specific kind of system (there being infinitely many 
points). NT has only been corroborated for a minute region of this space. In order to concoct 
a (grossly ad hoc) rival to NT, just as well corroborated as NT, all we need do is identify some 
region in this space that includes no prediction of NT that has been verified, and then modify 
the laws of NT arbitrarily, for just that identified region. Rival theories, of the above type, can 
easily be concocted that satisfy falsificationist requirements for being more acceptable than 
NT. NT, like most accepted physical theories, yields predictions that clash with observation 
or experiment, and thus are ostensibly falsified. We can always concoct new theories, in the 
way just indicated, doctored to yield the “correct” predictions. We can add on independently 
testable auxiliary postulates, thus ensuring that the new theory has greater empirical content 
than the old one. And no doubt this excess content will be corroborated. For further examples 
and discussion, see previous chapters, and Maxwell (1998, pp. 47– 54; 2017a, ch. 5).
 22. But does implementing Popper’s methodological “principle of simplicity” really commit sci-
ence to the metaphysical thesis that the universe is simple? Suppose, instead of adopting 
Popper’s principle, science adopted the principle “In order to be acceptable, a new physical 
theory must postulate that the universe is made up of atoms”. This methodological principle is 
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upheld in such a way that even though theories are available which postulate fields rather than 
atoms, and which are much more empirically successful than any atomic theory, nevertheless 
these rival field theories are all excluded from science. Would it not be clear that science, in 
adopting and implementing the methodological principle of atomicity in this way, is making 
the assumption that the universe is made up of atoms, whether this is acknowledged or not? 
How can this be denied? Just the same holds if science adopts and implements Popper’s meth-
odological principle of simplicity.
 23. Followers of Popper have proved strangely impervious to recognition of this crucial Popperian 
criticism of Popper. No hint of it is to be found, for example, in Miller (2006), or Musgrave 
(2004). Even sympathetic critics of Popper, such as Rowbottom (2011), are oblivious to this 
crucial point. (Darrell Rowbottom denies it explicitly [personal communication].)
 24. See also Maxwell (2004a, chs. 1 and 2; 2007, ch. 14; 2013; 2017a, chs. 6–9).
 25. It is not enough just to be critical: we need to be critically critical. Criticism needs to be directed 
at those points in a possible solution to a problem where it is most likely to be fruitful.
 26. See Maxwell (1998, pp. 78– 89, 159– 63, 217–23; and especially 2017b, ch. 5).
 27. In holding that metaphysical theses and philosophies of science are an integral part of sci-
ence itself, AOE implies that Popper’s principle of demarcation (Popper, 1963, ch. 11)  is to 
be rejected. Popper’s demarcation proposal, apart from being untenable, is in any case too 
simplistic, in that it reduces to one a number of distinct demarcation issues. Popper rolls into 
one the distinct tasks of demarcating (a) good from bad science, (b) science from non- science, 
(c) science from pseudoscience, (d) rational from irrational inquiry, (e) knowledge from mere 
speculation, (f)  knowledge from dogma (or superstition, or prejudice, or popular belief), 
(g)  the empirical from the metaphysical, and (h)  factual truth from non- factual (analytic) 
truth. (a) to (d) involve demarcating between disciplines, whereas (e) to (h) involve demar-
cating between propositions.
 28. And as a bonus (a consequence of its intellectual rigour) AOE turns out to be both necessary 
and sufficient to solve the problem of induction, and other major associated problems of sci-
entific progress, such as the problem of verisimilitude, and the problem of what it means to 
say of a scientific theory that it is explanatory – as we have seen in previous chapters. See also 
Maxwell (1998; 2004a; 2007, ch. 14; 2013; 2017a; 2017b). AOE has emerged from criticism 
of falsificationism over many years (beginning with Maxwell, 1972a and 1974).
 29. Figure 2.1 represents science as making a hierarchy of problematic metaphysical assumptions. 
We may equally, however, interpret AOE as attributing to science a hierarchy of problematic 
aims. At each level in the diagram, the aim is to transform the metaphysical thesis at that level 
into a precise, testable physical “theory of everything”.
 30. See Maxwell (1976a; 1984a, or 2007, ch. 5; 2001a, ch. 9; 2014b; 2016b).
 31. Science specifically, and academic inquiry more generally, misrepresent basic aims in just this 
way (see Maxwell, 1984a; 2002a; 2004a).
 32. See Chapter 2 and Maxwell (1976a, 1977a, 1984b, 1987, 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1997b, 1998, 
2000a, 2000b, 2001a, 2001b, 2002a, 2002b, and especially 1984a or 2007). See also Maxwell 
(2014b, 2016b).
 33. Fundamentally, this is due to the profound difficulty of discovering what is achievable (by 
increasingly civilized means), and of value. People hold conflicting views about what is achiev-
able and of value, all too often in a highly dogmatic way, ignoring the profoundly problematic 
character of the whole idea of civilization. Many well- known views that have been proposed 
as to what constitutes Utopia, an ideally civilized society, have been unrealizable, horrifi-
cally undesirable, or both, attempts to realize such ideals, when taken up in practice, lead-
ing to various kinds of hell on earth (as in Hitler’s Germany, Stalin’s Russia or Mao’s China). 
Furthermore, it is not just that people have conflicting interests, values and ideals; even our 
very best ideas as to what constitutes civilization embody (and need to embody) conflicting 
ideals. Thus freedom and equality, even though interrelated, may nevertheless clash. It would 
be an odd notion of individual freedom which held that freedom was for some, and not for oth-
ers; and yet if equality is pursued too single- mindedly this will undermine individual freedom, 
and will even undermine equality, in that a privileged class will be required to enforce equality 
on the rest, as in the Soviet Union. A basic aim of legislation for civilization, we may well hold, 
ought to be to increase freedom by restricting it:  this brings out the inherently problematic 
character of the aim of achieving civilization. One thinker who has stressed the inherently 
contradictory character of the idea of civilization is Isaiah Berlin (see, for example, Berlin, 
1980, pp. 74– 9). Berlin thought the problem could not be solved, but this was because he was 
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ignorant of aim- oriented rationality. In depicting ideals of civilization at a hierarchy of levels, 
aim- oriented rationality provides the means for progressively improving resolutions to inher-
ently conflicting ideals, such as freedom and equality.
 34. This is the objection that most academics will wish to raise against the conception of inquiry 
implied by the “Improved Popperian Enlightenment” and the “New Enlightenment”. It will be 
made by all those who hold that academic inquiry quite properly seeks to make a contribution 
to human welfare by, first, acquiring knowledge and then, secondarily, applying it to help solve 
human problems.
 35. For a development of this point, see Maxwell (1984, pp. 174– 81). In some respects it accords 
with Popper’s views on the biological and evolutionary origins of human thought (see, for 
example, Popper, 1972, ch. 7).
 36. For further discussion see Maxwell (1984a, pp. 189– 98).
 37. See Maxwell (1984a, pp. 63– 4, 85– 91 and 117– 8), for further discussion of this issue. See also 
Maxwell (1976a, especially chs. 1 and 8– 10).
 38. This objection has been made by N. Rescher (personal communication) and Durant (1997).
 39. This is a modified version of the list to be found in Maxwell (2004a, pp. 119– 21).
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Here is an idea that just might save the world. It is  
that science, properly understood, provides us with the 
methodological key to the salvation of humanity. 
 A version of this idea can be found in the works of Karl 
Popper. Famously, Popper argued that science cannot 
verify theories but can only refute them, and this is how 
science makes progress. Scientists are forced to think up 
something better, and it is this, according to Popper, that 
drives science forward.
But Nicholas Maxwell finds a flaw in this line of 
argument. Physicists only ever accept theories that are 
unified – theories that depict the same laws applying 
to the range of phenomena to which the theory applies 
– even though many other empirically more successful 
disunified theories are always available. This means 
that science makes a problematic assumption about the 
universe, namely that all disunified theories are false. 
Without some such presupposition as this, the whole 
empirical method of science breaks down.
By proposing a new conception of scientific 
methodology, which can be applied to all worthwhile 
human endeavours with problematic aims, Maxwell 
argues for a revolution in academic inquiry to help 
humanity make progress towards a better, more civilized 
and enlightened world. 
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